As all students of contemporary European politics know, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 specified a series of criteria that member states of the European Union had to fulfill in order to join the single currency that would be launched in 1998–99. Most importantly, public debt had to be less than 60% of the GDP and government deficits were not to exceed 3% of GDP. When decisions on initial membership of the Eurozone were taken in 1998, the debt criterion was relaxed, but the deficit criterion was strictly enforced, and as result, Greek membership was postponed for several years. The Stability and Growth Pact adopted by the European Council in 1997, in turn, introduced a procedure whereby the European Commission would monitor the fiscal policies of Eurozone members and would be required to propose sanctions against states with persistent government deficits in excess of 3% of GDP. During 2002–4, the European Commission found Portugal, France, and Germany in violation of the Stability and Growth Pact, but the Council of Ministers declined to impose sanctions on any of these countries.
Thus summarized, the story of fiscal policy coordination under the auspices of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is well known and pretty straightforward. James Savage's recent book brings out another side to this story, which is less well known and in many ways more intriguing. In order for the EMU project to be successful, the European Union had to devise a common framework for calculating government debt and deficits and to implement a “compliance information system” that all member states would consider impartial and therefore politically legitimate. As I learned from Savage's book, calculating public debt in terms of national accounts is not particularly controversial, but the size of the current government deficit very much depends on which organizations are considered to be part of “general government” (local and regional as well as central government) and whether transactions between such organizations and other sectors of the economy are considered to be financial or nonfinancial transactions.
How did the EU succeed in mobilizing member-state consensus around such matters? Much of Savage's account focuses on Eurostat, a fairly obscure body of the European Commission that came to assume the role of lead agency in budgetary surveillance following ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The author describes how the director of Eurostat, Yves Franchet, managed to expand the agency's remit against the wishes of the powerful Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). Apart from Franchet's entrepreneurial leadership and political connections, Savage attributes the ascendancy of Eurostat as lead agency to the fact that it had more expertise in matters pertaining to national accounting and was considered by member states to be a less political entity than DG ECFIN. He also describes Eurostat's long-standing and extensive ties with national statistical institutions and argues that the “epistemic community” of the European statistical profession played an important role in legitimating the process of budgetary surveillance. Not fully articulated by Savage, the implications of this account would seem to be that the launching of the single currency might have been less smooth—more fraught with conflict between member states—had the bureaucratic politics of budgetary surveillance played out differently.
In separate chapters, the author proceeds to discuss the key rulings that Eurostat made regarding the national accounts of specific member states in the lead-up to the decision on EMU membership, as well as subsequent rulings pertaining to enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact. The most important of these rulings concerned the privatization of state enterprises, but Eurostat has also ruled on the sale of gold by central banks, the sale of mobile phone licenses, debt held by German hospitals, and Italy's one-off “eurotax” of 1997. In the matter of privatization, Eurostat ruled consistently that the sale of government assets is a financial transaction that does not reduce the deficit directly, since one asset (say, shares in a corporation) is simply swapped for another (cash). Only to the extent that the proceeds from such a sale are used to pay down public debt, thereby reducing interest payments, does it affect the government deficit.
According to Savage (p. 105), Eurostat rulings “produced marginal, though sometimes decisive changes in budgetary outcomes from what the member states intended.” More generally, he argues against those who claim that the surveillance process essentially allowed member states to undertake whatever actions they deemed necessary to meet the Maastricht criteria. In his words (p. 106), “the Maastricht Treaty, in fact, imposed a regulatory structure and regulatory reform on member states' fiscal policies by way of the surveillance procedure, and reshaped rights by declaring ESA [European System of Accounts] to be the measure of government fiscal behavior with the Commission serving as ESA's interpreter.” Relatedly, he sides with Eurostat's defenders on whether or not the agency rigged the surveillance process to ensure that certain member states would qualify for EMU membership, arguing that the surveillance process was sufficiently transparent that overtly biased rulings simply were not possible.
Savage's calculations (pp. 139–40) indicate that Eurostat rulings had the effect of bringing the budget deficits of France, Italy, and Spain below the critical 3% cutoff in 1997. Overall, Eurostat rulings reduced the size of the deficit in eight countries, while increasing the size of the deficit in five countries. On average, the countries that benefited from Eurostat rulings in 1997 achieved a deficit reduction of .35% of GDP, and the countries that were adversely affected by these rulings saw their budget deficits increase by .08% of GDP. These figures suggest some systemic bias in favor of across-the-board deficit reduction, which Savage seems to miss because he (like most everyone else) is preoccupied with the question of whether France or some other powerful country received special treatment. Along with the absence of overt favoritism, this bias might help explain the broad-based support for the surveillance procedure.
Savage's careful account of the politics of budgetary surveillance is a must-read for anyone who wants to gain a deeper understanding of how the EU works and the impact of EMU on budgetary practices in the member states. He frames his analysis in terms of principal-agent theory, but the empirical analysis does not seem to depend directly on this framing, nor does the empirical analysis yield new theoretical insights. As far as principal-agent theory is concerned, the take-away message of Making the EMU seems to be that “there are key decision points where the Commission enjoys autonomy that resembles trustee-like independence, but the overall process is one that combines moments of trusteeship and a principal-agent relationship” (p. 192).
