4.1 Epistemic virtue: an overview

While there are many personal qualities that help us reason well, such as faculties, natural temperaments, and so on – qualities that are often interrelated with virtues – here I will focus exclusively on virtues, as they are understood in the eudaimonist virtue tradition. In this tradition, a virtue is a set of strongly entrenched and systematically interrelated dispositions to act (and to act in a certain manner, for certain reasons), reason, feel, value, choose, perceive, respond (behaviorally, attitudinally, emotionally), and so on. When someone is honest, for example, she has a firm and settled disposition to think, act, reason, feel, etc. in ways that are characteristic of honest people; moreover, these dispositions ‘hang together’, mutually supporting one another. Call these sets of strongly entrenched and systematically interrelated dispositions ‘character traits’. Epistemic virtue is a system of such traits – a system of systems of dispositions.

What makes an individual trait an epistemic virtue is that it is part of overall epistemic virtue, and overall epistemic virtue is a matter of being, characterologically, excellently oriented vis-à-vis a variety of epistemic factors. (I prefer “factors” to “goods” to leave open the possibility that some of the factors that may be relevant to excellence, such as deontological constraints, aren't goods per se.) William Alston identifies a number of such “epistemic desiderata”.Footnote ³ The epistemically virtuous person will be concerned that her beliefs are accurate – that she is in “cognitive contact with reality” (Zagzebski Reference Zagzebski1996) – especially about matters that are in some way significant or important, either intrinsically, or because of their personal relevance to her. Of her overall system of beliefs, she is concerned that it is not only accurate, but comprehensive, again, especially on matters of importance. She will be concerned that she has grounds for her beliefs, and, moreover, that her beliefs are based on those grounds. She will consider it even better if she has a kind of cognitive access to the grounds of those beliefs, and knows that the grounds of those beliefs are accurate, the inference sound, and so on.Footnote ⁴ These are just a few examples of the considerations to which the epistemically virtuous person will be sensitive.

Given that there is a plurality of considerations to which the epistemically virtuous person will be sensitive, how does she weigh all of these various considerations? I propose that the standard for balancing these various considerations is set by the idea of a valuable noetic structure. By ‘noetic structure’ I mean the vast and complex structure of epistemic goods – beliefs, understandings, acquaintances, etc. – that is instantiated by beings like ourselves, and cultivated in the course of a life. Whether or not it is appropriate for someone to be concerned about some particular epistemic consideration in a specific instance depends ultimately on how her concern contributes, or fails to contribute, to a valuable noetic structure.Footnote ⁵

As there is a variety of considerations to which the epistemically virtuous person will be sensitive, so is there a variety of kinds of virtuous response to the various bearers of epistemic value. Christine Swanton points out that an ethical virtue may involve not only promoting value, but also respecting, appreciating, or honoring value (Swanton Reference Swanton1995). Likewise, I propose, for epistemic virtue. For example, the epistemically virtuous person will have a kind of respect for the truth, and for truth-seekers, that is incompatible with knowingly believing or spreading falsehoods, even if doing so would result in a greater number of true beliefs.

Furthermore, I submit, the epistemically virtuous person will have a concern for others’ noetic structures, not only her own. The epistemically virtuous person sees a certain kind of noetic structure as valuable, whether in herself or in another (although naturally there will be an asymmetry between the way she cultivates her own noetic structure and the way she contributes to others’ cultivation of their noetic structures).Footnote ⁶

4.2 “Excellence”

I have said that epistemic virtue is a matter of being “excellently” oriented vis-à-vis a variety of epistemic factors. It is worth pausing to note that by “excellence” I don't mean excellence from some purely epistemic point of view, but excellence as a person more generally. I depend on the idea that there is such a thing as being a good person, and propose that goodness qua person admits of not only a moral dimension, but an epistemic dimension.Footnote ⁷ So when I say that the epistemically virtuous person is excellently oriented vis-à-vis a variety of epistemic factors, I don't mean merely that she is excellent by the standards of a certain narrow point of view, as one might be excellent from a sartorial point of view, or from a fiscal point of view. I mean that she is sensitive to epistemic considerations in a way that is excellent as a person.

I will also understand a trait as an excellence only if it is compatible with what we have reason to do, all things considered: an excellence is compatible with practical reason in the sense that if a trait is an excellence, it is not irrational to cultivate it and not irrational to not regret having it.Footnote ⁸

Having this understanding of excellence in mind ensures that the account of epistemic virtue we are developing will articulate an ideal that is of direct practical significance. When epistemic virtue is understood as a dimension of personal excellence (and achieving personal excellence is understood as part of a way of life that is reasonably chosen), an account of epistemic virtue is able to provide part of an answer to the question ‘how should I live?’. As such, it is an account that is of direct relevance to each of us.

By contrast, an account of epistemic virtue that understands “excellence” as excellence from some purely epistemic point of view will be of limited practical interest. Just as excellence from a sartorial point of view may in principle come apart from excellence as a person (if being fashionable demanded some practice that disrespected oneself or others, for example – foot-binding, perhaps, or carrying small children as accessories), so can excellence from a purely epistemic point of view in principle come apart from excellence as a person. Consider the prize-winning journalist who exposes the truth, in part, by making false promises to sources that they will be kept confidential; the committed scientist who steals others’ work, correctly judging that she is brilliant enough to make greater advances with it than they will; the monstrous researcher who is able to make prodigious advances in medicine by performing horrendous experiments on unwilling human subjects. Each of these is plausibly an example of a person who is excellent when judged from a purely epistemic point of view, but fails to be excellent as a person. Such examples demonstrate the limited practical import of an account of excellence from a purely epistemic point of view. At the end of our investigation, we would have an account of what it would be to be excellent from some narrow, artificially delineated point of view, but no reason to think that the ideal we've taken such care to articulate is one toward which we should aspire. By contrast, an account that understands epistemic virtue as the epistemic dimension of personal excellence (where excellence is not irrational to cultivate, and not irrational to not regret achieving) has a built-in sensitivity to what we have most reason to do, and thus has the potential to be part of an ideal that will be directly relevant to us as we consider who we want to be, and how we want to live. To the extent that the latter is important to us, we would do well to understand epistemic virtue as the dimension of personal excellence that is both characterological and concerns epistemic goods (or other epistemic factors).

4.3 Dimensions of epistemic virtue

Having understood epistemic excellence as characterological excellence vis-à-vis a variety of epistemic factors, it is a further question which qualities, more specifically, satisfy this description. I propose that epistemic virtue is characterized by qualities such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, conscientiousness, intellectual honesty, intellectual charity, intellectual generosity, intellectual courage, intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, curiosity, perseverance, care, rigor, and wonder. It is common to individuate these qualities, giving each its own independent treatment.Footnote ⁹ This can be a useful strategy, but it is important to remember that what makes the epistemic virtues epistemic virtues (on my account, among others) is that they are aspects or dimensions of epistemic virtue overall. We should not assume that the various dimensions of epistemic virtue will be able to be neatly parsed into distinct traits; there may, for example, be no sharp division between intellectual honesty and conscientiousness, conscientiousness and rigor, and so on. Nor would it be surprising, given our understanding of epistemic virtue as part of personal excellence, if the epistemic virtues cannot be sharply distinguished from other dimensions of personal excellence, such as the ethical virtues. Virtues that directly concern epistemic goods, such as open-mindedness, often have moral dimensions, while other epistemic virtues, such as intellectual courage, seem best understood as epistemic dimensions of more familiar moral virtues.Footnote ¹⁰ We should not be surprised if epistemic virtue is realized not by a neat collection of distinct, structurally identical traits, but by a messy conglomeration of dispositions that interconnect and overlap, both with each other, and with other virtues. In any case, in a brief sketch such as this one, the aim will be to give an accurate broad-strokes overview of the various dimensions of epistemic virtue, not to explain how the individual epistemic virtues are distinguished from one another.

One dimension of epistemic virtue concerns a person's interest in epistemic goods, finding expression in traits like curiosity, open-mindedness, and (to adapt an idea of Hursthouse's) what we might call wonder: being properly appreciative of the world and all the interesting things there are to learn. The epistemically virtuous person is receptive to new and surprising ideas and ways of thinking about things; she finds them cool and interesting, instead of exhausting and annoying to have to think about. Not all the time, of course; it's too much to ask that someone be receptive to new ideas as she is trying to drift off to sleep, for example, or when she's parallel parking. But what characterizes the person who is appropriately curious, open-minded, and so on is that she is receptive to new ideas on the occasions when it's appropriate and warranted – when she's rested, and has time, and when the new thoughts or ideas merit interest. What in particular a person finds interesting will vary according to her interests, talents, and the direction her life has taken. Epistemically virtuous cooks, for example, will be curious about why a recipe didn't turn out as expected, will be interested in finding creative solutions to culinary problems, will find themselves motivated to solve the puzzle of how to organize their prep so that everything is ready at the right time. Epistemically virtuous parents will be curious about what it's like to be their child, about what's happening at the child's stage of development and how best to foster his/her development.Footnote ¹¹ The epistemically virtuous person will be open not only to discovering true propositions, but to novel ways of thinking. An adult who takes up improvisational theater or creative writing and finds herself increasingly able to make cognitive leaps and engage in intellectual play isn't engaging in a directed inquiry aimed at learning propositional truths, yet she is displaying epistemic virtue by being open in a way that enhances the dynamicity of her noetic structure.

The epistemically virtuous person is conscientious when it comes to gathering evidence, making judgments, and so on. She is fair-minded, evaluating ideas without prejudice, on the basis of their merits. She shows an appropriate degree of intellectual autonomy (for example, by not allowing others to be overly influential in setting her epistemic agenda); at the same time, she is aware of, and properly attentive to, her own intellectual strengths and weaknesses, and defers to others when appropriate.Footnote ¹² She is charitable, putting in the effort required to do justice to ideas. She shows perseverance in continuing with important inquiries even after the task loses its initial appeal.

All of these dimensions of epistemic virtue are dispositions to relate properly not only to epistemic goods, but to epistemic agents. Open-mindedness is not only a matter of being open to ideas, but, when those ideas are espoused by a person, taking that person and her ideas seriously. Being properly curious will, at times, involve being genuinely curious about people's thoughts or ideas. Being intellectually charitable involves giving ideas, and the epistemic agents who espouse them, the benefit of the doubt – not only for the sake of getting to the truth oneself, but from a direct concern for, or respect for, others, in their capacity as epistemic agents.Footnote ¹³ We might distinguish what is normally called intellectual charity from intellectual generosity: supporting others in their development of their own epistemic virtue and the cultivation of their noetic structure. Honesty in intellectual contexts involves a concern to be accurate and faithful – or even transparent, when appropriate – concerning the sharing of information that is important for shared epistemic ventures and the excellent development of a person's noetic structure.

All these dimensions of epistemic virtue are interrelated with a respect for epistemic agents as such: respect for people (including ourselves) in their capacity as reasoners, inquirers, problem solvers; as the kinds of creatures who make creative leaps, develop theories and ideas; as people with their own points of view, epistemic endeavors, and cultivated noetic structures. We should acknowledge, for example, that other epistemic agents have their own subjects that interest them as areas of inquiry, and not expect them to be as interested in our pet projects as we are. We should understand that, for the most part, we cannot expect others to draw conclusions simply on the basis of our say-so; we must allow them to draw conclusions of their own through the exercise of their own capacities.

This is a broad-strokes overview of the kind of epistemic virtue I will have in mind in the remainder, in which I explore the relationship between epistemic virtue and well-being.

5.1 The idea of a constitutive overlap

Having established a clear sense of epistemic virtue, we are in a position to return to the relationship between epistemic virtue and well-being. Do we realize epistemic virtue at the cost of our own well-being?

The reader might worry that given the way I am understanding epistemic virtue, I am guaranteeing that epistemic virtue's contribution to well-being is a positive one. For if I build reasonableness into epistemic virtue, in the way described in Section 4.2, it may seem that I am guaranteeing the truth of the claim that epistemic virtue contributes positively to well-being. But that would only be true if it were only reasonable for a person to do something if doing it contributed to her personal well-being. But surely it can sometimes be reasonable to do things that do not contribute to one's personal well-being, or even things that detract from it, to some degree. For example, it can be reasonable to make personal sacrifices for the sake of one's children, or for the sake of some worthy cause. It is, then, an open question whether epistemic virtue, as I am understanding it, contributes to the possessor's well-being, or, as the examples from the beginning of the paper suggest, detracts from it.

There are a number of ways in which epistemic virtue might contribute to well-being. Its contribution may be instrumental. If, for example, well-being is a matter of feeling satisfied with one's life, and being epistemically virtuous tends, on balance, to make one feel satisfied with one's life, then epistemic virtue would tend to contribute instrumentally to well-being. Alternatively, epistemic virtue may be a constitutive contributor to well-being, either directly, or via some good that in turn is constitutive of well-being. Just as eudaimonist virtue ethicists propose that the exercise of the moral virtues is not merely instrumental to, but constitutive of, well-being, so may it be that the exercise of epistemic virtue is constitutive of well-being: that to live well, in part, just is to exercise epistemic virtue. Or, if there are certain goods that are themselves constitutive of well-being – for example, friendship, achievement, autonomy, or self-respect – epistemic virtue may constitutively contribute to well-being by constitutively contributing to one or more of these goods.Footnote ¹⁴

In this paper I will explore the possibility that epistemic virtue constitutively contributes to one or more of the goods that is widely thought to be at least instrumental to, or perhaps even constitutive of, well-being. Among the goods that have been proposed as constitutive contributors to well-being are knowledge, achievement, friendship, health, pleasure, happiness, aesthetic experience, respect, virtue, autonomy, rational activity, and creative activity.Footnote ¹⁵ Even those who deny that goods like these are constitutive contributors to well-being (because, for example, they hold a hedonistic or desire-satisfaction account of well-being) often acknowledge such goods as being of special importance (e.g. as especially common and fecund sources of pleasure or desire satisfaction). Call these ‘basic goods’. I believe there is an important kind of overlap – a “constitutive overlap” – between epistemic virtue and a number of basic goods.

The kind of overlap I have in mind may be drawn out through discussion of a particular example of just one basic good. Consider aesthetic experience.Footnote ¹⁶ Like all the items on the list, it is a general type of good, realized in token instances – for example, in viewing Pablo Picasso's Guernica, or reading George Eliot's Silas Marner. Rather than being a passive experience that just ‘washes over one’, aesthetic experience consists in a certain kind of active engagement. It consists in charitably interpreting the work; transcending one's familiar or default cognitive standpoint to open-mindedly engage with it (Baehr Reference Baehr2011: 103); honestly assessing it; confronting the darker parts of human nature; not being overly influenced by others’ opinions about the piece. What one is doing, in part, in the active experience that is aesthetic experience, is exercising epistemic virtue – for example, intellectual charity, open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, intellectual courage, and intellectual autonomy. Notice that the exercise of epistemic virtue is not merely instrumental to realizing some distinct thing, aesthetic experience; rather, the expression of virtue is, at the same time, a token realization of the good of aesthetic experience.

This example illustrates the important and philosophically interesting connection – a more-than-merely-instrumental connection – between epistemic virtue and certain basic goods: token instances of such goods are realized, in part, by expressions of epistemic virtue. As I shall say, there is a constitutive overlap between expressions of epistemic virtue and token realizations of such goods.

What I mean by “constitutive overlap” may be brought out by a more material example. Imagine a soccer league has three teams, A, B, and C, as well as an all-star team made up of the best players from these teams. This year five of the players from Team A – Players 1–5 – made the all-star team, and thus are a part of both teams. Players 1–5 partly constitute Team A, and they also partly constitute the all-star team. There is, in this respect, constitutive overlap between Team A and the all-star team. As another example, consider two outfits a person has created, both of which include the same belt as part of the outfit. Each outfit is partly constituted by the belt. In this respect, there is constitutive overlap between the two outfits.

Analogously, there is a constitutive overlap between epistemic virtue and the good of aesthetic experience: just as there are particular players who are both members of Team A and members of Team B, there are particular events that are both expressions of epistemic virtue and token realizations of aesthetic experience. When a person engages with Guernica or Silas Marner, for example, her particular expressions of epistemic virtue are, at the same time, token realizations of aesthetic experience.

This is the kind of constitutive overlap I shall have in mind in what follows.

5.2 Friendship

As an extended example of how epistemic virtue can constitutively overlap with a basic good, I will give the case of friendship.Footnote ¹⁷ There are many kinds of relationships we casually call friendships, but I will focus on a certain kind of deep, rich relationship that it is plausible to think is an important part of what makes our lives valuable. For an initial characterization of the kind of relationship I have in mind, I will draw on Bennett Helm's (Reference Helm and Zalta2013) overview in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which gives a concise summary of many of the features that philosophers have proposed are characteristic of friendship.

As an initial characterization, we may say that friendship is:

So understood, friendships can include not only friendships in the ordinary sense of the word, but romantic relationships, and also certain other intimate relationships, such as certain working relationships – for example, a relationship of longtime collaborators on a creative or research project. Friendships are characterized, in large part, by deep-seated dispositions of the friends. Friends care about each other for their own sakes. They are disposed to consider one another's feelings: to take joy in their successes, share in their disappointments, and so on. Friends are disposed to act on their friends’ behalves – to promote their welfare, to support them in their pursuit of their aims, and so on, not for any ulterior motive, but just for the friend's own sake. Friends love each other for who they are, esteem each other for their merits (Stroud Reference Stroud2006). A friend is committed to reminding her friend “of what's really valuable in life and to foster within her a commitment to these values so as to prevent her from going astray” (Whiting Reference Whiting1991; Helm Reference Helm and Zalta2013). Friends trust one another in a way that makes true intimacy possible, sharing thoughts or experiences they would not share with other more casual acquaintances. Friends take each other seriously, in such a way that their values, interests, reasons, and so on provide one another with pro tanto reasons to value and think similarly. Moreover, the relationship is dynamic – friends mutually influence each other's sense of value in a way that supports intimacy (Friedman Reference Friedman1989; Helm Reference Helm and Zalta2013). Friends have a sense of solidarity, premised on the sharing of values and a sense of what is important. They feel empathy towards one another, even to the point of sharing in one another's pride and shame (Taylor Reference Taylor1985; Sherman Reference Sherman1987; Helm Reference Helm and Zalta2013). Finally, and perhaps most simply, friends spend time together, not only in the sense that they are in one another's presence, but in the sense that they partake in shared activities in an engaged way.Footnote ¹⁸

Hereafter, this is what I shall mean by “friendship”.

5.3 Epistemic virtue and friendship

With this brief sketch of friendship, and our broad-strokes overview of epistemic virtue, we are in a position to consider the case that there is a constitutive overlap between epistemic virtue and the good of friendship.

To begin, consider the kind of situations that friends encounter that call for expressions of friendship. We are called on to be good friends, for example, when a friend has an argument with her spouse, or trouble at work, and needs to talk through it; when a friend has an important life decision to make and needs an outside perspective; or when talking about art, or politics, or sports, or whatever topic this particular set of friends enjoy discussing together. In any deep, rich friendship of the kind I am talking about here, some such situations arise: any friend, in the course of the friendship, finds herself both in the position of needing someone to talk through these issues, and in the position of being a friend to someone who needs someone to talk through these issues with.

In such situations, being a good friend calls for epistemic virtue. To see how, consider a specific case. Imagine long-time friends Nick and Nora. Nick has been having conflicts with a co-worker over the last several months, which have escalated to the point of making him miserable. As Nick sees it, the co-worker has been making negative comments about him to his bosses and other colleagues, making snide remarks directly to Nick, and generally being subtly hostile to Nick. For example, when they pass in the hall, the co-worker always walks right in the middle of the hall, so Nick has to stand aside to let him pass. Nick and Nora are meeting for dinner, and Nick is so upset about the situation with his co-worker that they wind up discussing it for quite a while. What is it to be a good friend in this situation?

Let's imagine that Nick doesn't just want to vent one-sidedly to Nora; he is distressed and really wants to know what is going on with this co-worker. Why is the co-worker acting this way? Is there anything Nick is doing to elicit this kind of reaction? Is there any plausible alternative interpretation of the events that would explain this? What kinds of things can Nick try in the future to make their relations better, or at least keep them from getting any worse?

If Nick sincerely seeks help from Nora, he is already exhibiting the part of epistemic virtue called intellectual humility: he is seeking help from other sources to help him get at the truth; he is acknowledging that he has intellectual limitations (for example, that he's too close to the issue and that this might be blinding him to certain features); he is aware that there are important things he doesn't know; he is open to considering alternative ideas about what's going on; and so on. Should Nora give a plausible alternative interpretation of events, Nick can show openmindedness by listening to it and considering it, trying to understand it, and if appropriate, reducing his confidence in his own interpretation of events. For example, imagine that Nora gently suggests that Nick is a bit dense about emotional matters: that although Nick hasn't picked up any signs that he hurt his co-worker's feelings on some past occasions, Nora thinks that she thinks that, from the details of the story he's shared, Nick is warranted in believing that his co-worker's feelings were hurt. Someone more arrogant than Nick might dismiss this conclusion out of hand (since after all, it was he who was actually there, not Nora) but imagine that, prompted by Nora, Nick comes to recognize a weakness in this area, and, recognizing this, and Nora's relative strength in this area, defers to her judgment.

We can also imagine how a lack of epistemic virtue can prevent Nick and Nora from realizing the good of friendship. Consider Nick first. Imagine that Nick becomes defensive when Nora suggests some features of the situation that she thinks he did not pick up on. Imagine that, in response to her suggestion, he focuses less on whether she is right and more on the point that he is not blameworthy for missing the signs that his co-worker is holding a grudge. Imagine that he is so enamored of his high scores on online IQ tests that he does not take Nora's suggestions very seriously. Or imagine that although he entered into the conversation sincerely, his desire to be well-regarded by Nora, and to maintain his own positive self-image, ultimately leads him to massage the facts so that his co-worker's behavior seems more and more opaque, such that Nora can no longer really give help Nick figure out what is going on, but can only agree that his co-worker is crazy. Next, consider Nora. Imagine that she is prone to confidently assert interpretations of events that are ultimately baseless. Imagine that she is overly conscious of her own intellectual strengths and Nick's intellectual weaknesses, which leads her to be arrogant about her own conclusions about the events Nick describes. Imagine that she is dominating, attempting to impose her perception of events on Nick, and not resting until she has persuaded him to see things her way.

This extended example shows how in being a good friend one expresses epistemic virtue. In considering the details of a particular situation we can see how being a good friend, in the way demanded by the situation, calls for the expression of epistemic virtue. But the example is not idiosyncratic; it is representative of a wide range of situations friends encounter, in which friendship calls for an expression of epistemic virtue. In myriad situations, friendship calls for showing a genuine curiosity about the things that matter to one's friend. Helping a friend work through a difficult event in her life requires open-mindedness and intellectual flexibility, taking up alternative points of view, and evaluating the various views being espoused with charity, and without bias. Taking the time to help the friend come to an understanding of something – whether a problem with a co-worker, a difficulty with her child, or anything else in her life she is struggling with – takes intellectual generosity. Friendships include an element of challenge: challenge to a friend's dogmatism, unfounded assumptions, and so on. A true friend is one who is willing and able to press her friend to reconsider when she forms ill-founded beliefs on matters of importance, even when it will be uncomfortable, and who, in turn, is willing to entertain challenges to her own beliefs. Indeed, there are some matters on which it seems that it is only friends who are in a position to engage in this kind of mutual challenge. Although friendship is a relationship of mutual influence, friends do not attempt to dominate each other or insist that the other adopts her own world view; rather, each party has a respect for the other as an autonomous epistemic agent and truth-seeker who deserves the opportunity to form her own beliefs and, ultimately, make up her own mind. It is only when each can trust the other to respect them as autonomous epistemic agents that they will be able to ‘try on’ different perspectives and world views, to experiment with ideas, and brainstorm, in a safe, supportive environment. Each friend must have a genuine concern for the other's intellectual well-being, the intellectual courage to challenge the other even when it is uncomfortable (and to confront challenges to one's own treasured beliefs that one might prefer to ignore), and the intellectual humility to recognize when a friend is an authority or has a valuable perspective that one ought to listen to.

In a wide range of situations friends encounter, expressions of epistemic virtue are, at the same time, expressions of friendship. There are, then, numerous occasions on which the expression of epistemic virtue is, at the same time, a realization of the good of friendship. In this way, there is constitutive overlap between epistemic virtue and friendship.

We may be able to say something stronger as well: that unless both parties are epistemically virtuous, at least to some threshold degree, it will be impossible for them to be friends at all (in the sense of friendship sketched above). For the kinds of situations I have identified as ones in which epistemic virtue is called for are the very situations that two people must go through, together, if they are to develop and maintain the intimacy characteristic of friendship. Unless two people have some such opportunities for exchange, it is hard to see how they could actually be friends, in this sense. If so, then it is not only that there is a constitutive overlap between epistemic virtue and friendship, but that epistemic virtue is necessary for realizing friendship.Footnote ¹⁹

5.4 Epistemic virtue and friendship: a challenge

Recently Sarah Stroud (Reference Stroud2006) has argued that a certain kind of epistemically inappropriate partiality is required by, and is in fact a constitutive feature of, friendship (Stroud Reference Stroud2006: 505). According to Stroud, the good friend's beliefs and belief-forming practices “shift in her friends’ favor when her friends’ actions and character are at issue”, in a number of ways, simply because the person in question is her friend (Stroud Reference Stroud2006: 512, 513). For example, the good friend spends more energy finding reason not to believe negative things about her friend than she would about a stranger; she is inclined to seek out positive interpretations of her friend's behavior, and to give potentially exculpatory evidence more weight; if forced to accept something negative about her friend, she will be more likely to consider it trivial or unimportant; and ultimately, she will have beliefs about her friend that are systematically “slanted” in favor of the friend (Stroud Reference Stroud2006: 505–10). Stroud supports her claim that partiality of this sort is required by friendship by noting that “friendship is in some important sense based on your friend's character and esteem for his merits,” and so “it makes sense that we need, as it were, to maintain a favorable opinion of our friend's character” (Stroud Reference Stroud2006: 511). Simon Keller (Reference Keller2004), in defending a similar claim, appeals to the value of knowing that someone is “on your side”: “it is encouraging, motivating, and reassuring to have friends who are inclined to believe that things for you are improving, that your business venture will work out, that you will surely get published eventually, that you look good in your new outfit, and so on, even as you realize that their beliefs are less than fully reliable” (Keller Reference Keller2004: 338, 340).Footnote ²⁰

Although neither Stroud nor Keller discusses epistemic virtue, as I understand it, the implications of their arguments for my proposal may easily be drawn out. Epistemic virtue, according to the account I have given here, is incompatible with the kind of partiality Stroud describes – call it ‘Stroudian’ partiality.Footnote ²¹ The arguments that Stroudian partiality is required by, and is in fact a constitutive feature of, friendship, give us reason to doubt that epistemic virtue is necessary for realizing friendship.

Jason Kawall (Reference Kawall2013) offers a number of reasons to be unpersuaded by Stroud's and Keller's arguments. Granting that “friendship is in some important sense based on your friend's character and esteem for his merits” (Stroud Reference Stroud2006: 511) does not imply that friendship requires Stroudian partiality. Rather, it seems that what we want from our friends is not merely approval that is insensitive to our actual merits, but for our friends to esteem us for who we really are. To the extent that the beliefs that play a role in sustaining and deepening a friendship are unjustified, “we should worry that the friendship is flawed, based on illusion and unjustified belief, and not a love of the friend herself, with her actual character and qualities” (Kawall Reference Kawall2013: 361). Granting that it is important that one's friends are ‘on one's side’ does not imply that friendship requires Stroudian partiality, for there are far more meaningful and important ways for friends to be on each other's sides, namely, by accepting each other, flaws and all,Footnote ²² by encouraging each other to improve, and by forgiving each other their shortcomings. “But all of these important aspects of friendship only come into play as we recognize our friend's shortcomings, and they ours” (Kawall Reference Kawall2013: 356). As such they would be undermined by Stroudian partiality.

Moreover, Stroudian partiality seems undermining of friendship in further ways. For one thing, it can be self-defeating: if my friend learns that my assessments are inaccurate, then she will be unlikely to take my claims seriously (Kawall Reference Kawall2013: 359). And if I systematically put a positive spin on my friend's failures and shortcomings, I undermine my ability to recognize when my friend has a problem and needs my support (Kawall Reference Kawall2013: 357).

This is not to deny that there will be a kind of partiality involved in friendship – just not a kind of partiality that is incompatible with epistemic virtue, as I understand it. In the context of friendship, it is appropriate – both appropriate vis-à-vis friendship, and epistemically appropriate – for Nora to take time to help Nick brainstorm alternative interpretations of events, help him identify possible biases, etc. By contrast, it would not be a failing – an epistemic failing, or any other kind of failing – if she were to fail to take the same trouble with a stranger who confronts her on the street. As Kawall writes: “Our behavior can be epistemically responsible, even if it differs from that which we would engage in with respect to strangers – just as the cautious behavior of a person with severe allergies may differ from that of other agents, or her own behavior in other situations. There is no need to posit a fundamental clash between the norms of friendship and epistemic norms” (Kawall Reference Kawall2013: 369). There may indeed be a kind of partiality shown friends, in epistemic contexts. But it is a kind of partiality that is perfectly compatible with epistemic virtue.