Jason Brownlee has made another fine contribution to the literature on Middle East politics, in this case to the emerging corpus of works examining U.S. foreign policy and its impact on developing polities by scholars such as Steven Levitsky. Brownlee takes the reader on an informative chronological ride, starting with the checkered and ultimately ruptured relationship between Egypt and the United States during the era of Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir's presidency and wending his way through the more tightly cooperative ties that marked that relationship under presidents al-Sadat and Mubarak. Steadily increasing the depth, breadth, and richness of his analysis as he moves along this historical path, and astutely including references to pressures applied by congressional actors, he concludes with an examination of the U.S. government's efforts to safeguard its strategic arrangements with Egypt in the period following the “revolution” that began on 25 January 2011.
In Brownlee's words, “this book seeks to explain why Egyptians who joined the Day of Rage in winter 2011 managed a political triumph that had eluded them in the Autumn of Fury of 1981” (p. 3); that is, the work investigates how Egyptians succeeded in terminating Mubarak's regime, after having failed to destroy the state al-Sadat built three decades earlier. Alluding primarily to Theda Skocpol (States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979]), Brownlee notes that: “Scholars have identified two major political components to the durability of authoritarianism: domestic coercion and international support” (p. 3). For Brownlee,
Arguably the best guide to Egypt's dynamic and evolving present is a clear understanding of U.S. support, internal repression, and domestic opposition in Egypt's recent past . . . Rather than fostering democracy in an incremental fashion, U.S. and Egyptian officials have promoted an autocratic security state that supports a U.S.-led regional order built around Israeli security and the projection of U.S. influence over the Persian Gulf. By contrast, public opinion in Egypt favors a regional security order less dominated by the United States and Israel, and a government that respects political competition and civil liberties. (p. 3)
This premise—and it is largely a solid one—establishes the pattern for the rest of Brownlee's analysis. From the moment President al-Sadat secured the strong bond with the United States that he so coveted, all eight U.S. presidents up to the present have placed a premium on building and maintaining a collaborative Egyptian security apparatus, no matter how deleterious, in the final analysis, the implications for Egyptians’ human rights. They have done so in the name of securing regional stability, as defined by U.S. interests, and protecting the sole regional actor with whom, since 1967, the United States has had a truly “special relationship”: Israel.
In Brownlee's narrative, the 1967 war represents the point of rupture in the roller coaster ride of U.S.–Egyptian relations during the al-Nasir era. The U.S. government's initially strong approval of al-Nasir's 1952 coup against King Farouk was followed by the souring of relations that led to Egypt's 1956 war with Israel, and then to the restoration of more cordial ties and aid proffered by President Kennedy. But actions undertaken by the Kennedy administration against leftist-oriented, “third world” populist leaders fostered concerns in Cairo that al-Nasir might be similarly targeted by Washington policymakers, and after President Johnson took command and saw al-Nasir engage in his 1964 “socialist deepening,” the roller coaster plunged downhill. Thus, to quibble with Brownlee's timing, at least two years before the cataclysmic 1967 war, the U.S. government was already trying to sabotage al-Nasir's Arab socialist experiment through the cancellation of U.S. assistance.
Al-Sadat's decision to move Egypt from the Eastern to the Western bloc constituted a huge shift on the international political scene. Al-Sadat's secret overtures to U.S. officials in 1971 were spurned by American decisionmakers, including Henry Kissinger. Had they reacted otherwise, an entire war—the October 1973 war—might have been averted. But the war, combined with the Arab oil embargo, won their attention, and from that point forward the United States became fully engaged in building and maintaining a powerful Egyptian security apparatus under both al-Sadat and Mubarak. U.S. strategic security planners have subsequently believed that they have benefited enormously from this relationship, as Brownlee repeatedly and correctly points out, whether during the remainder of the bipolar era, or in the post–9/11 period, with its emphasis on combating non-state-based terrorists. Egyptian officials have earned many accolades from their American counterparts for Egypt's granting of safe U.S. passage through the Suez Canal; providing the United States with access to Egyptian air bases; cooperating fully in the 1991 Gulf War against Saddam Husayn's Iraq; standing alongside the United States against common regional opponents such as Libya and the Sudan; assisting and sharing intelligence with the United States in the post–9/11 “war on terror” (including establishing Egypt as a veritable hub for the interrogation of “renditioned” terrorist suspects); and helping in constraining Hamas.
My biggest concern with this richly researched and carefully constructed book relates to Brownlee's embrace of Skocpol's “domestic coercion/international support” dyad, and his proposition that “[a]rguably the best guide to Egypt's dynamic and evolving present is a clear understanding of U.S. support, internal repression, and domestic opposition in Egypt's recent past” (p. 3). While the U.S. role has been of great importance, it should not be overvalued. Greater attention could be paid to the “domestic opposition” component in Brownlee's formulation, including the deep and debilitating divisions within Egypt's political culture, and between opposition actors—especially various Islamist and secularist interests. These may provide an equally (if not a more) compelling key to deciphering change (or stagnation) in the Egyptian polity. Why did the 25 January “revolution” succeed whereas the 1981 Autumn of Fury failed? Because in 2011, over the course of eighteen days, almost everybody—old and young, men and women, Muslims and Christians, many rich and multitudes of middle class and poor, Islamists and secularists—set aside their narrower identities and objectives, flooding the streets by the millions across the country to drive Mubarak from power. The inability to sustain this unity has subsequently left Egypt in political limbo.
Brownlee's book flows beautifully and avoids jargon. It is also well edited; I spotted only three spelling glitches. It includes one standard map of the region and is otherwise free of charts or illustrations. Endnotes are organized in a clear and effective manner, both by chapter and under helpful headers referring to their page location. Many notes include enlightening commentaries. The book also contains a “Sources” section that divides the materials into “Government Archives,” “Interviews by the Author,” “Other Interviews,” and “Published Sources.” Brownlee's twenty-eight personal interviews involve an array of highly placed, well-informed American and Egyptian political actors and cognoscenti. The “Published Sources” reflect a comprehensive review of the relevant literature. The book also includes a robust index.
This book is recommended for intermediate and advanced undergraduate students, as well as scholars and general readers seeking insight into the travails of countries still struggling to establish stable and legitimate political orders.
