In the wake of World War I, the Arab lands were detached from the Ottoman Empire and distributed, like spoils, among the victors. Fierce resistance to this European colonization forced a process of decolonization starting as early as the 1920s. As a result, the area was converted into many countries, which form the bulk of today's Middle East. One of such new additions to the world map was Iraq, which the Ottomans ruled as three separate provinces, each of which was called a vilāyat: Musol, Baghdad, and Basra. Hence, many scholars of the region have come to the conclusion that Iraq is an “artificial state” with no natural bond to keep it united.
The Future of Iraq is one of the recent works that advances this argument. The book calls for a three-way partition of the country if peace and prosperity are to prevail because Iraq is “a state which should not have been formed in the first place … [and] there simply is no other way to ensure [its] territorial integrity” other than partition or rule by violence and dictatorship (p. 182). Among the many flaws of this argument, two are very glaring. First, there are no clear points of territorial partitioning. There are more than a million Kurds in the Arab territories, hundreds of thousands of Shiעa in Sunni cities, and comparable numbers of Sunnis living among the Shiעa. The second flaw stems from the assumption that violence is the only way to keep Iraq together. It remains to be seen that the untried option of political, cultural, and social justice cannot deliver better results.
Nonetheless, the book provides a first-rate concise history of Iraq since British involvement. Often historical events are connected through brilliant analyses, demonstrating the authors' deep knowledge and solid understanding of the complexities of these events. It is also important to note that the book was written in 2003—with an epilogue completed just before June 2004 and an afterward in 2005. The authors insisted on their predictions despite recent events, which point at a direction different from those that the book's argument tends to lead the reader. Being extremely partisan for their original argument, the authors brushed off any adverse evidence that might undermine their theory of the inevitability of a “managed partition.”
The authors divide The Future of Iraq into three parts. The first part surveys Iraq's history from 1920 to the present, divided by regime types. The Hashemite monarchy, along with its British patrons, is discussed in the first chapter, which concludes correctly that this era set the stage for the injurious political process of the next eight decades because of the appointing of Sunnis as Iraq's overlords, despite their being a numerical minority. Maintaining this status could not be achieved by any means other than the worst forms of coercion. The monarchy was toppled by a military coup and a republic was declared in Iraq in 1958, setting the stage for ten years of disarray and instability. Although acknowledging the difference between the rule of Brigadier Qassim (1958–63) and the regime of the Arif brothers (1963–68), the authors fail to highlight the natural link of the Arif era with the following regime, thereby missing an opportunity to better analyze the events of the 1970s to the present. The 1963 coup, after all, was planned and carried out primarily by the Baעth Party and its nationalist allies.
Baעth rule is discussed in two chapters divided at the point of the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988. Choosing “The Destruction of Iraq” as a title for the chapter concerning the events of post-1988 strikes the informed reader as an arbitrary judgment by the authors, as if eight years of World War I type conflict that crippled Iraq both financially and socially was not bad enough to signal the beginning of Iraq's destruction. Nonetheless, these two chapters do provide a fair analysis of the Baעth regime and its catastrophic policies, leading up to the U.S. invasion of 2003.
The second part consists of three chapters dedicated to the Shiעa, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. Each chapter presents many details on the movements within each group and the sociopolitical dynamics that govern relations between the group and the rest of Iraq's population—and, of course, with the political regimes. Highlighted in all of these chapters are the events and indicators that these groups are not meant to coexist in one state because they are incapable of forming a national identity bridging their ethnic and sectarian differences, hence leading to the main argument the authors wish to advance: namely, partition is the only viable solution for the Iraq question.
The final part is based on Fukuyama's model for a successful democracy. According to this model, there are four levels of democratic consolidation, starting with the “normative commitment to the idea of democracy” among the people, then establishment of institutions, followed by the existence of a vibrant civil society, and finally the embeddedness of democracy in the political culture (pp. 190–91). Applying this model to Iraq, the authors conclude that it is unlikely that this process can fully materialize; therefore, the authors advocate a “managed partition of Iraq” as the least-bad option.
