In recent years it has become popular to denounce the Supreme Court as an activist institution, grasping at powers beyond its constitutional authority and increasingly undermining its own moral authority in American life. Scholars and commentators across the academic and ideological spectrum voice this criticism.
Of course, such critiques presuppose that we have a positive theory of the judiciary's proper role in the theory of American constitutionalism. The distinguished constitutional scholar Louis Fisher addresses this question in On the Supreme Court: Without Illusion and Idolatry. The book is part of a series which offers “short reflections by major scholars in key subfields within political science.” It targets the general reader and the student. And in keeping with the series theme, Fisher avoids writing a dry and detached treatise on the development of the Supreme Court. To the contrary, the book is written in a very spirited tone, containing a clear thesis amounting to the following: as long as the Supreme Court knows its place—as “not the sole or even the dominant agency in resolving constitutional questions” (33)—it will continue to be a respected and respectable institution. The Court loses credibility because it produces bad results when it fails to understand its proper role.
Most of the book consists of brief discussions of what Fisher believes to be the poorest Supreme Court decisions in its history. Dozens of cases, from the obvious (Dred Scott, Buck v. Bell, Ex Parte Quirin) to the surprising (McCullough v. Maryland) make the list. The underlying theme in most of these cases is that the Court stepped outside of its proper role to decide questions that were not properly assigned to it. Fisher's purpose is partially remedial: “Perhaps by acknowledging the Court's capacity to make errors in the past, justices might make fewer in the future. Even if that objective is not attained, it is important for scholars, the media, and the public to keep in mind the times the Court fell short in protecting the law, the Constitution, and individual rights. With less adulation and fawning from the outside, justices might be more circumspect and decide cases better grounded in law and institutional judgment” (69–70).
The analysis of poor Supreme Court decisions is preceded by two chapters, one of which discusses the foundations of judicial review, and the other of which explains the manner in which the Court hears and decides cases.
The first chapter, on the legitimacy of judicial review, is the most substantive and interesting. Fisher begins by noting that there is no express authority for the Supreme Court to exercise the power of judicial review: “nothing in Article III appears to directly empower the Supreme Court to exercise judicial review” (12). Furthermore, at the Constitutional Convention itself there was ambiguity regarding whether the Supreme Court would have this power under the proposed plan. Thus, he concludes, it cannot be said that the framers of the Constitution intended to make the Supreme Court the chief arbiter of the Constitution's meaning.
The chapter also provides some helpful historical context to the famous Marbury v. Madison decision, which Fisher says is poorly understood by most students today. Well before 1803, judges had developed arguments in favor of a limited power of judicial review. In some cases, particularly in upholding a tax on carriages, justices such as Chase indicated that the power of judicial review did exist, even if the Court did not exercise it in that particular case. Also during the 1790s, members of Congress openly argued that judicial review “existed and was legitimate” under the Constitution (15). Fisher's account of the historical record here is helpful to place Marbury in its proper context.
The Marbury decision itself receives quite a rebuke from Fisher: “Elements of Marshall's decision merit reverence, but which ones? That the Court is superior to the two elected branches? No” (19). Much of Marshall's opinion was dicta, issued well after the decision to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds had been reached. “Perhaps 90 percent of this decision is political, not legal. . . . Marshall's decision is largely political in its impulse and content,” he asserts (20). And even “Marshall regretted the way Marbury was being interpreted by lawyers” in later years (21).
Fisher spends several pages deconstructing perhaps the most famous sentence from the Marbury decision: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” If, Fisher argues, this simply means that “Courts decide the law,” it is obviously correct. But the sentence says nothing about judicial supremacy, and should not be interpreted to imply judicial supremacy, for in certain respects Congress decides the law, and the president decides the law (22–23).
And furthermore, immediately following, in Stuart v. Laird, the Court deferred to traditional practice and Congress's decision to eliminate sixteen circuit court judges by repealing the act that created them. And “the manner in which the Court decided Stuart—deferring to congressional judgment—would be repeated many times” subsequently (28). Seeing Marbury in this context, Fisher argues, demonstrates the ambiguous nature of judicial review at the time of the Founding. “The unsettled nature of judicial review . . . adds some constraint to judicial activism,” he suggests (6). The Court, and Marshall himself, acted more responsibly in later cases involving expansions of the commerce power. “On each occasion,” Fisher notes, “Marshall was there to bestow a judicial blessing and lend legitimacy to statutory policy,” not to second-guess such policies (30).
Thus, the central message of On the Supreme Court: Without Illusion and Idolatry aims to debunk the idea of judicial supremacy: that the Court is, and should be, the exclusive interpreter of law and the Constitution. “If we count the times that Congress has been ‘wrong’ about the Constitution and compare those lapses with the occasions when the Court has erred,” Fisher concludes, “the results make a compelling case for legislative confidence and judicial modesty” (223).
This is the central thesis, which is complemented by a secondary argument: that “nonjudicial forces compete with, and prevail over, the Court” (xii). For instance, with regard to Stuart v. Laird, Fisher notes that the Court deferred to Congress's judgment to eliminate circuit court judgeships. “Who fixed the construction? Congress. Whose constitutional interpretation prevailed? Congress's. The final voice on this constitutional issue,” as in so many others, Fisher notes, “went to the elected branches” (27). Thus, in short, “the framers never intended to vest in the Court final and exclusive authority over the meaning of the Constitution. The Court has never exercised such unchecked power” (32–33). Reading such passages must afford quite a shock to the typical law student!
Fisher certainly offers a salutary reminder that the meaning of the Constitution cannot be determined exclusively by the Supreme Court. Undergraduates studying constitutional law, and law students being educated in the case method, certainly need to be reminded that their subject necessarily encompasses more than Supreme Court opinions. The book therefore offers an important correction to a leading deficiency in our educational approach to constitutional law, and should be commended for doing so.
Yet one may wonder whether the argument goes too far in the opposite direction, or more precisely, whether in merely emphasizing the limits of judicial review Fisher fails to offer a positive theory that justifies judicial review in some cases and not in others. By emphasizing the dominance of the legislative and executive branches in resolving political and legal issues, he seems to have no recourse when a court fails to intervene, to the detriment of sound policy and civil liberty. This deficiency is most apparent in the discussion of Korematsu, which along with Lochner v. New York is mentioned (citing a Harvard Law Review study) as the two great Supreme Court mistakes of the twentieth century. Fisher argues that Justice Black's opinion for the majority in Korematsu “acquiesced to military experts” (111). This laid the precedent for later (post–9/11) questions where “the courts could have insisted on an independent role to check constitutional violations, but once again they deferred to executive claims” (116). In short, Fisher seems to object when the Court meddles too much in business that does not belong to it, yet he also objects when the Court is insufficiently meddlesome when the legislative or executive branch requires correction. Certainly a principle could be offered to reconcile the paradox, but Fisher does not offer one.
Fisher's discussion of the other major judicial failure of the twentieth century, Lochner, also provokes questions. After consistently maintaining the judiciary's inability to impose its will vis-à-vis the other branches of the government, Fisher denounces the Lochner decision as one which “converted the general right to make a contract into a laissez-faire doctrine” (87). For “about four decades,” he maintains, “the Court tried to impose a liberty-of-contract theory.” Thankfully, “subsequent decisions made it clear that policies concerning economic and social philosophy would be shared with the elected branches, not decided exclusively by the courts” (89).
This is a plausible reading of Lochner-era jurisprudence running up to the New Deal, but scholars have increasingly questioned both elements of it: that laissez-faire really animated the Lochner majority, and that the Lochner era witnessed a dominant Supreme Court which consistently imposed its will against the elected branches by overturning legislation. Furthermore, and more relevant to Fisher's thesis, the description of the Court as the dominant power during this period seems to overlook much of the historical record, which indicates that the elected branches did decide most questions of economic and social philosophy, rather than the Supreme Court. The record suggests that Lochner was more of an outlier than a symbol of the courts' desire to usurp legislative power generally.
Perhaps a book designed for brevity and readability, and intended to be consumed by general readers and students, should not be excessively criticized for these ambiguities. Fisher has offered a helpful general overview of an important subject, one which corrects many deficiencies in the way constitutional law is normally taught. The book's limitations only underscore the importance of the need for a positive theory of judicial review that will help scholars distinguish legitimate from illegitimate practices of judicial review.
