Ann Ward's Herodotus and the Philosophy of Empire stands out as perhaps the most ambitious of recent works on Herodotus. Inspired by Leo Strauss's account of Thucydides' contribution to political philosophy, Ward argues that a careful reading of the Histories reveals that Herodotus “has a political philosophy of better and worse regimes based on an understanding of uni-versal principles of human nature” (13). She opposes Aristotle's view of Herodotus, attempting to show that Herodotus is both a poetic and philosophic historian who sees in Athens a regime pointing both to the best way of life and the excesses possible when that regime loses sight of its end. Ward's claim is extraordinary not only for what she tells us about Herodotus but, if correct, for the insight into the nature of political philosophy she provides.

Ward argues that the philosophic dimension of the Histories is apparent both in the form and substance of the text. The philosophic character of Herodotus's text is evident in his manner of writing as the reader is compelled to uncover and interpret “the universal truths embedded in the particulars that Herodotus records” (19). Like Socratic dialectic, Herodotus's account of the various cultures and regimes compels us to consider conflicting and contrary beliefs in order to point us to a consideration of the highest things. In Ward's reading, Herodotus's presentation of the diversity of cultures unfolds in a way such that each regime represents one aspect, or particular manifestation of the whole, so that taken together they point to universal truths of the human condition. Ward's book is arranged so that the story of each regime is shown to be connected to the larger narrative of the Histories.

Ward first applies her reading of Herodotus in her analysis in chapter 2 of his narrative of Egypt and Scythia. Egypt, the “pious” regime, is paired with Scythia, the “poetic” regime. Ward culls from Herodotus's rich accounts of Egypt in book 2 and Scythia in book 4 of the Histories, arguing that the stories of these regimes provide two opposing and parallel perspectives that issue in two ways of life. It is impossible to detail the richness and subtlety of Ward's weaving of Herodotus's stories into a coherent and, in many respects, convincing whole. We can only review the main points of her argument concerning these regimes in order to appreciate the strengths and limitations of her account. Her detailed account of Herodotus's narrative aims at demonstrating that he views the Egyptian regime as valuing rest and the past, and that the Egyptian approach to piety leads to a valuing of the body over the soul. The Egyptian emphasis on the body, on that which is visible and external, conceals the internal and invisible and is accompanied by, Ward argues, the Egyptian praise of lying. The consequence of the Egyptian perspective where lying rather than truth-telling is praised is that justice and wisdom are undermined. Scythians, as opposed to the Egyptians, value motion and war, and their nomadic lifestyle and contempt for the body stand as a metaphor for abstract individualism and a materialist perspective ending in a complete loss of individuality. The Scythian regime is poetic because they confuse “the images of natural things with natural things themselves.” Ward's recounting of Herodotus's narrative of Egypt and Scythia certainly brings to the fore central themes of each regime. While one might question her interpretation of this or that story, her reading is guided by an understanding of what she takes to be Herodotus's larger purpose. Thus, her reading of Egyptian rest and Scythian motion is meant to set the stage for her analysis of Greek and Persian regimes where the principles of rest and motion are combined in unique ways. Readers will decide for themselves whether the particular incidents she recounts fit or are forced into her interpretive scheme. Does Herodotus actually make as much of Egyptian lying as Ward claims? The more general question one may well ask is why Herodotus does not explicitly draw the parallels she uncovers in the text and instead buries, so to speak, the regime parallels in the larger narrative of the text. Why is his account of Egypt and Scythia interrupted by stories of Persian empire? Ward's answer would appear to be that Herodotus intentionally writes this way to draw the reader into the text in order to discover the universal principles that emerge from a comparison of these regimes. While this interpretive method provides a fascinating reading of Herodotus, her attempt to discover a universal teaching seems to force a reading of the text that leads one to wonder if the various cultures Herodotus considers are aimed at something other than political philosophy.

In chapter 3 Ward further develops the argument in her account of “Persia and Regimes in Theory.” Herodotus's Persians, says Ward, are both rationalists and imperialists as they combine the two principles ruling nature, rest and motion. Ward argues that a careful reading of Herodotus's account of the Persians shows they are rationalists since their contempt of particularity and particular cultures is accompanied by an embrace of universal principles aiming at rest. The Persian worship of nature—sun, moon, stars, fire, and water—rather than mythic gods manifests the Persian aim at universality. The Persian attempt to universalize everything is also manifest in the embrace of truth-telling where the abstraction from particular bodies issues in an attempt to “universalize” the soul and share it with others (66). The political analogue of Persian rationalism is the attempt to establish a universal empire, especially under the Persian king Xerxes. Thus Persian politics, unlike Persian religion, requires constant motion or imperialism. Herodotus's criticism of Persian universalism and love of abstract ideas explains the presence, Ward believes, of the famous Persian debate over regime forms. Ward observes that Herodotus's account appears after he has described the turmoil undermining Persian customs and political life in order to serve as a warning against theoretical regimes not grounded in actual historical regimes. Provocatively, Ward goes further, arguing that Persian universalism or the “perfection of Persian customs leads to madness” (82) in the case of Cambyses, and lying in the case of Darius. Again Ward's interpretation of Herodotus's account of Persian culture and politics is insightful and thought provoking. Yet again one gets the sense that Ward is forcing Herodotus's account into her own scheme. Is Cambyses' insanity the perfection of Persian culture, or are his lies and madness those of a crazed tyrant who rejects the limits imposed by the culture? While there may be nothing in Persian culture contrary to the establishment of monarchy, does Persian culture necessarily eventuate in the madness of a Cambyses, or the unbridled imperialism of a Xerxes? While it is true that Herodotus remarks on the truth-telling ways of the Persians, it is not at all clear that the Persians who lie have lost sight of the distinction between truth-telling and lying. Everyone recognizes that Cambyses is mad just as Darius knows when he is lying and for what purpose. Perhaps the logic of the Persian regime is more varied than and not as universalizing as Ward suggests. Persia is as capable of producing a father-like ruler such as Cyrus as it is his mad son Cambyses. Thus the reader may well ask if Herodotus' account of Persian monarchy is more an inquiry into the possibilities and limits of tyranny than it is aimed at laying bare the logic of Persian rationalism and imperialism, ultimately directing us to a universal teaching about political regimes.

Ward's account of that universal teaching comes to light more fully in chapter 4 in her account of Athens, the regime, she argues, that “stands at the peak of the political possibilities that he explores” (107). Ward roots Athenian greatness in the nature of its democratic regime, a regime in which the Athenians recognize that their foundation and success are due not to the gods, but to themselves. Since the Athenians understand their own role in the making of their regime, they are not encumbered by customs that prevent them from seeing other cultures as different from themselves though, at the same time, as human. The Athenians, like the Persians, are thus able to see beyond the limits of their own city and universalize. Unlike the Persians, though, the Athenians are not necessarily imperialistic. The Athenians, she writes, “have external motion but internal rest.” The Athenians internalize their regime in such a manner that they integrate the whole of human nature, both body and soul, making possible “a life according to the highest human potential” (108) during which they, like Herodotus, are capable of accessing universal truth. This makes the Athenian regime representative of the highest political science. Ward's claim that Athens aims at the highest human potential is nuanced enough for her to insist that the Athenian potential for universality is not a condition obtainable in all times. The democratic individualism of Athens “becomes consistent with universalism in speech or thought” especially when conquering other cities (126). Thus the potential for imperialism in Athens is always a lurking threat for Herodotus as he recognizes that the Athenian ability to grasp the universal may be imposed on the political world.

Ward acknowledges others who recognize that Herodotus regarded the democratic nature of the Athenian regime as responsible for the victory of the Greeks over Persia, and that Athens is, so to speak, his best regime. What is unique about her contribution is the claim that Herodotus's text, taken as a whole, amounts to a political philosophy providing a solution to the problem of empire. Herodotus teaches the Athenians and other democratic regimes that they may satisfy their universal longings intellectually while avoiding the dangers that led to the defeat of the Persians. Herodotus offers a “humane alternative” to empire that is both universal and superior to the empire sought by Xerxes. In seeking to moderate the desire for empire in politics, Herodotus allows for “the possibility of the discovery of nature and self-knowledge on the intellectual level” (170). Herodotus thus overcomes the tragic view of life and establishes a political philosophy demonstrating that future politics can be steered “by a thoughtful inquiry into the whole.”

In Ward's epilogue, she argues for the continuing relevance of Herodotus's political philosophy, applying her thesis to American foreign and defense policy in the post–September 11th era. Here she provides an interesting critique of the various approaches impacting the Bush doctrine as well as some leading opponents of America's post–September 11th policies. In sum, Ward takes all sides to task for focusing too narrowly on what it would take to preserve America's material or bodily interests. Ward argues that Herodotus well understood the necessity of a regime's projecting its own interests to protect the life of its citizens. But Herodotus also offered an alternative view recognizing that while the diversity of cultures means we may not share a common political life, there is the possibility of sharing a common intellectual life. American foreign and defense policy could be moderated by following Herodotus's recognition that “the deepest motivation of empire is the desire to know the soul itself and to preserve the soul in some form beyond bodily death” (190). Herodotus's warning to America is, then, to moderate its tendency to universal empire by recognizing the diversity of cultures while transforming the urge to empire to a transcendent goal. For Ward the only way to achieve this goal is to understand the world in order to transcend it; that is, to choose philosophy over politics.

The strength of Ward's book may be found in the many insights the author provides into Herodotus's text. The novel interpretations to be found in every chapter make the book a pleasure to read. However, the most promising claim of Ward's book is also the most problematic. To argue that Herodotus's understanding of the relationship between particular cultures and the universal makes Herodotus a political philosopher requires a much deeper analysis of the origins of political philosophy than Ward attempts. At the same time that Leo Strauss recognized that Thucydides discovered the universal in the singulars of his war, he also understood that “he does not rise to the heights of classical political philosophy” (The City and Man, 239). It is not clear that Herodotus's understanding of the universal that emerges from his consideration of particular regimes points to an idea that questions the truth of all conventions. Perhaps Aristotle rejected Herodotus as a political philosopher because he supposed that Herodotus could never imagine that the idea of a properly ordered regime could guide speech about good and bad and just and unjust things. Although it has become increasingly popular to discover the political philosophy of many ancient thinkers such as Heraclitus or Herodotus, we should not be so quick to dismiss Cicero's claim that Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens and introduce it into the cities and homes.