David Levy's Eros and Socratic Political Philosophy is the kind of bold book that one is inclined to admire. Levy attempts to show that Socrates's criticisms of eros in the Republic, Phaedrus, and Symposium are more serious than has generally been accepted, even suggesting that the life of philosophy is essentially unerotic. More precisely, Levy contends not that philosophy is unerotic but posterotic, and the philosopher a former lover. Eros is therefore only a qualified good: it is useful to self-knowledge—to “the clear-sighted acknowledgment of our deepest longing,” religious hopes that mislead us because they are impossible to satisfy (149). In the end, though, philosophy is the cessation of all these hopes and beliefs that give rise to and nourish erotic longings. His thesis can therefore help us to understand why Plato's Socrates both praises and blames eros, as well as the connection of this aspect of the human soul to our views about the highest things. Levy divides his book into three chapters, beginning with various criticisms of eros in the Republic, then Socrates's speeches in blame and praise of the lover in the Phaedrus, and concluding with Socrates's Symposium speech.
Levy argues that the dissolution of the private family, the establishment of sexual equality, the prohibitions on mourning, and the critique of the tyrannical soul in the Republic, are all intended to destroy erotic attachments, which are the greatest obstacle to philosophic rule. Self-sufficiency (hence the prohibition of mourning) and unity (hence the destruction of familial attachments) entail the acceptance of a rationalized theology that accords with philosophy. It is a theology in which gods are simple, produce no evil, and are unconcerned with benefiting any humans, “except, perhaps, the wise” (41–42). Both attachment to one's family and mourning induce “idle” desires that lead us to believe in divine assistance for their fulfillment.
How then do we understand Socrates's apparent praise of erotic philosophy in the Phaedrus and Symposium, both of which make eros its principal theme more than does the Republic? In the Phaedrus, Socrates recants his criticism of love by praising eros as the highest kind of madness. Levy argues, however, that Socrates's praise rests on an unpersuasive argument that the soul is immortal, and his recantation therefore cannot be genuine. According to Levy, it nevertheless serves a rhetorical purpose with his interlocutor Phaedrus, for it criticizes the vulgar unerotic moderation to which he is inclined, as opposed to philosophic moderation. That vulgar moderation, Levy argues, rests on a cowardly fear and unwillingness to experience our deepest erotic longings, whereas the philosophic life requires us to confront those longings and to understand that they cannot be satisfied.
Levy confirms and deepens this reading by his analysis of Socrates's Symposium speech, in which Socrates recounts what the prophetess Diotima taught him about love. In the first place, Levy argues that Socrates's speech implicitly denies the possibility of a providential god: inasmuch as love is desire or lack and the god is perfect, he has no care for human beings. But only divine assistance can satisfy our longing for immortality, the good, and happiness. In the second place, Levy emphasizes that the lover, as he ascends Diotima's ladder of love to the beautiful itself, drops his love for a particular human being. The beautiful itself is nevertheless another theology, one that by denying caring gods, depreciates human life and thereby leads us to “anthropomorphize the highest being” (149). In Levy's analysis, paradoxically, Socrates's speech about eros culminates in its dissolution.
Levy's provocative thesis raises a host of questions. Levy imputes to Socrates a complex rhetoric on eros, a philosophic education that attempts to benefit his friends by leading them through erotic experience and finally to the dissolution of eros and the best life this makes possible. But what precisely in this account can explain such a noble effort from a philosopher who has achieved a posterotic, philosophic moderation? What precisely accounts for the attachment to a friend at all for an individual whose eros is suppressed only by being made aware of the paltriness of human being by beholding the beautiful itself? Moreover, could a philosophic education “benefit” another if it requires making him aware that death is the end, a harsh fact of the human condition that makes his life seem all the more unbearable the better his life is? If philosophy consists in such moderation, the happiness of the philosopher is rather obscure and mysterious, as Levy seems to acknowledge (149). It is noteworthy that Levy does not discuss the concluding line of Diotima's speech: at the end of the ladder of love, the one who beholds the beautiful is able to engender true virtue, “and once he has given birth to and cherished true virtue, it lies within him to become dear to god and, if it is possible for any human being, to become immortal as well” (Symposium 212a1–10). Diotima thus ends with an appeal to a provident god, the desire for immortality, and the generation of virtue, which posterotic moderation in Levy's view is supposed to have left behind.
In his conclusion, Levy acknowledges that “Socrates seems to have assumed that the gods must be intelligible on the basis of human reason alone. But it seems implausible that he could have been confident in that assumption” (154). Levy thus indicates that he is aware of the problems with his thesis, that his presentation of “Socrates’ view of Eros” imputes an assumption to Socrates that he could not possibly have accepted. More important, Levy's observation sheds new light on the problem of eros. It is not only a humble admission of the incompleteness of Eros and Socratic Political Philosophy, but it cleverly suggests that the development of the argument of the book has been an erotic enterprise all along. It depended on putting aside and forgetting the question of the very possibility that Socrates could have believed human reason sufficient to comprehend the gods. For this reason, the depth of Levy's book lies less in its express thesis than in the subtlety of its underlying intention. Levy may in fact show that eros not only supports religious belief, but is manifest also in an equally powerful longing for a world perfectly intelligible to human reason (that a provident god not answerable to human reason would problematize)—a longing that lies at the heart of human thought, but one that is perhaps as illusory as the religious hopes of the lover. In the end, Levy leaves open whether Socrates's way of life consists in this posterotic moderation, and thus what Socratic political philosophy is remains an abiding question for any serious human being.
