Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamic solidarity present challenges to political scientists and historians of the modern Middle East because of their transnational and seemingly timeless appeal. Sonoko Sunayama successfully tackles these topics in her work on the changing relationship between Syria and Saudi Arabia from 1978 through the 1990s.
Sunayama argues that concerns about identity (and its manipulation through various ideologies) facilitate alliance building between Syria and Saudi Arabia. She does not disregard other explanations for alliances, such as balance of power or economic considerations (both aid and trade), or the importance of social networks. She argues, however, that they do not fully explain good Syrian–Saudi relations during periods when the two states' policy goals differed significantly, for instance, between 1978 and 1990. During this period, Sunayama argues that relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia were friendly and cooperative on the surface but stormy and hotly negotiated in private.
Shared, transnational Arab nationalist and Islamic identities made it possible for each state to use ideology to alter the regional standing and policy cost of the other. Syrian–Saudi cooperation was possible during this period because they did not (and do not) compete with each other on an ideological basis: Syria models itself as a secular bastion of Arab nationalism and Saudi Arabia prides itself on being the guardian of Islam and its holy places. They continued to cooperate, even when their interests diverged significantly, because shared identities meant that each was able to influence the other's policies: Syria needed Saudi financial support and Islamic legitimacy and Saudi Arabia needed to be seen as supportive of (or at least not against) Arabism and the stand against Israel. She does not argue that Syria or Saudi Arabia made relations with the other a main foreign-policy goal but that each needed the other to accomplish many individual initiatives, especially in periods when their interests diverged.
She organizes background information and case studies in a periodic, historical approach, which she chose instead of a thematic approach because of the interconnected nature of events across the region. The book addresses five periods: initial bilateral relations after Syrian independence in 1946 to 1978; the beginning of a divergence of interests from 1978 to 1980; affairs from 1980 to 1982, while the countries led competing blocs and Saudi Arabia was dominant; relations from 1982 to 1984, when Syria's regional influence increased; and a period of both significant difference and cooperation from 1984 to 1990, roughly coinciding with the Iran–Iraq War.
Sunayama weaves her reoccurring theme of ideology into her initial background chapter. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Middle Eastern states used ideology—Arab nationalism, Islamism, or both—to increase their regional standing and to gain the legitimacy that many initially lacked. In 1958, Egypt temporarily won the “struggle for Syria” at the expense of both Saudi Arabia and the Hashimites in Iraq and Jordan, although Saudi Arabia and Jordan helped Syria dissolve its union with Egypt in 1961. Tension between Syria and Saudi Arabia increased significantly in the decade thereafter, when the region divided sharply between the “progressive” Arab nationalists (Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) and the “reactionary” monarchies (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies). The death of Nasser in 1970, in the wake of the 1967 defeat, marked the reemergence of collaboration between states, a corresponding warming of Syrian–Saudi relations, an increase in Saudi regional prestige, and the reemergence of the often recurring alliance among Damascus, Riyadh, and Cairo. Ideology was still important to the general Arab population, so it remained an important tool in regional politics, especially as regional solidarity began to sour in the run-up to Egypt's peace accord with Israel.
The main part of the argument begins after the Camp David accords, when there was much uncertainty in Middle Eastern countries—especially Syria and Saudi Arabia—about how to proceed on a variety of issues: the Camp David Accords and resulting estrangement of Egypt, the Iranian Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and superpower machinations, and the escalating war in Lebanon. Syria and Saudi Arabia disagreed over how to approach all of these issues, and in the absence of strong regional leadership from Egypt after 1978, each led opposing blocs of states. Although Syria was initially allied with Baghdad in opposition to Saudi Arabia's pro-Egypt position, this alliance faded and Saudi Arabia increased its ties with Iraq. Syria's subsequent alliance with the new Islamic regime in Iran not only maintained Syria's regional importance, but also, Sunayama argues, gave it additional Islamic credibility at a time when it was waging an all-out battle against the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite significant policy divergences, Syrian–Saudi relations remained warm—at least on the surface—as internal weaknesses and inherent complementarities led them to work together instead of against each other. Syria needed Saudi aid money and, although this money did not buy Saudi Arabia significant influence in Syrian affairs, it did insure it against charges of abandoning Arabism or being a puppet of the United States.
Between 1980 and 1982, Saudi Arabia began to gain the upper hand. Hafiz al-Asad and King Fahd both benefited from maintaining pleasant relations with each other (once again due to association with the other's respective Islamic or Arab nationalist legitimacy), even though each country supported the other's domestic opposition. Syria's willingness to cooperate with Saudi initiatives varied significantly. By 1982, Syria's military defeat in Lebanon and increasing regional isolation (especially after the 1980 Amman summit) significantly weakened its position and enabled Saudi Arabia to obtain crucial Syrian support at the Fez II peace summit.
Sunayama points out that Saudi dominance did not last long after the summit. The Syrians received an influx of Soviet military aid, and (among other things) the Saudis were not able to end the Iran–Iraq War or get Fez II summit statements integrated into the Reagan plan. Syria was then again able to disrupt Saudi policy efforts—most crucially its attempts to further Arab unity (which Sunayama ascribes to its need for Arab nationalist credentials). Once again, Saudi aid money was not able to influence Syria's policy but instead merely kept Syria from attacking Saudi Arabia using the rhetoric of Arabism. Sunayama argues that, between 1982 and 1984, the key players influencing Saudi–Syrian relations were the United States and the Soviet Union; she downplays the role of personal connections between leaders (especially Prince ʿAbdullah and Rifʾat al-Asad, Hafiz's brother).
In the final period given detailed consideration, 1984 to 1990, Sunayama argues that both countries initially reverted to familiar roles: Saudi Arabia strove to further Arab unity, which gave Syria the power to upset Saudi plans. Starting in 1984, Saudi (and Arab) focus shifted from troubles in Lebanon and Israel–Palestine to the Iran–Iraq War. Syria was no longer able to play up its role on the front line of these Mediterranean conflicts, although it successfully positioned itself as intermediary between the Arab Gulf and Iran during the tanker war. Once again, Syria and Saudi Arabia needed each other because of their differences.
Syria's influence over Saudi policy waned again near the end of the Iran–Iraq War (1985 onward) due to the increasing regional role of Egypt, the weakening of Syria's credibility as a mediator with Iran, Syria's implied involvement in continuing violence in Lebanon, and Soviet decisions to pull back from its alliance with Syria. At the 1987 Amman summit, Saudi Arabia showed its determination to settle certain issues—chiefly the Iran–Iraq War—regardless of Syrian discomfort; it also refused to continue its aid commitment to Syria under the Baghdad summit. However, Sunayama argues that Syria was still important to Saudi decisions, as shown by a return to the Lebanese and Palestinian issues after the end of the war. After 1988, Syria slowly recovered its regional influence, in part by playing off Saudi bids for Arab unity, and smoothed over relations with Jordan, Egypt, and the United States.
By the end of the 1980s, three of the four main factors that radically separated Syrian and Saudi policy goals had disappeared or been settled. Lebanon was still a source of division, but Syrian pressure led to Saudi acceptance of Syria's presence and the inclusion of many of its goals in the 1989 Taʿif accords. The book briefly treats the post-1990 period but argues that explaining Syrian–Saudi cooperation in this period is easier because the major sources of disagreement that dominated 1978–90 were no longer present.
This book is clearly written and organized, making it pleasant to read. It appears to be the first book devoted entirely to a discussion of Syrian–Saudi relations. Sunayama argues that the topic is important even though it has been overlooked, especially as Saudi Arabia's support was (and is) crucial for Syria's stance toward Israel, and Syria curtailed several Saudi efforts toward peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Her book successfully presents Syrian–Saudi relations as an interesting lens through which to view regional events in the post-Nasser era, an era in which Syria and Saudi Arabia were able to increase their roles as regional leaders.
Its principal drawback is one that the author acknowledges and can unfortunately do very little about: a lack of accessible official Syrian or Saudi Arabian government documents on the period in question. This shortage guided the author's choice of topic. She constructed this account primarily by comparing local, regional, and international media coverage of the events in question and by heavily supplementing this understanding with secondary-source citations. Although the author occasionally refers to anonymous oral testimony, the lack of accessible government documents or official memoirs makes it impossible to compare explicitly what was said in public with what was discussed in private. When such materials become available, it will be possible to add more depth and behind-the-scenes detail to the relationships described in this book.
A quick flip through the book might give one the (false) impression that parts of the book are overly reliant on secondary sources or English-language analytical bulletins (MECS, MEI, MEED, etc.). However, the endnotes in the back of the book add a good deal of important information to the in-text citations. The bibliography as well as the extensive periodical citations in later sections demonstrates that the author consulted a wide variety of titles from the Arabic press. Sunayama does not overstate her argument by presenting sensitivity to Arab nationalist and Islamic identities as the sole determinant of relations. Instead she presents a nuanced, detailed narrative that tracks the relationship between the two states and highlights instances where she sees ideological concerns playing a crucial role.
