UK-Argentine relations

UK-Argentine relations are in a parlous state. At the epicentre of this lie the highly disputed Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). Notwithstanding thirty years of post-war British/Falkland Island settlement, investment and development (not least the construction of Mount Pleasant Airbase, a potentially dual-use facility), successive Argentine governments have shown no loss of interest in pursuing the ‘recovery’ of the islands for the Argentine Republic. The 1994 Argentine constitution commits administrations to such a task, and the improvement in UK-Argentine relations in the late 1990s proved to be short-lived (Dodds and Manovil Reference Dodds and Manovil2001; Dodds Reference Dodds2007). The UK and Argentina did cooperate on some issues (under the terms of the 14 July 1999 Joint Statement; Government of the United Kingdom and Government of the Argentine Republic 1999), such as fisheries management, visits of next of kin of Argentine military personnel buried on the islands, the removal of the British military from South Georgia, and air access (and the UK withdrew its objection to Argentina hosting the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat in 2001), but the knotty issue of sovereignty never diminished in salience. Arguably, the growth of the Falkland Islands economy (based on fishing licensing and tourism revenue in the main and now, even more controversially, oil/gas exploration, which might generate new revenue streams) highlighted a fundamental dilemma facing all Argentine governments. If Argentina helped to establish and maintain collaborative mechanisms for South Atlantic issues such as fisheries management, then it was arguably further cementing the prosperity of the 3000-strong Falkland Islands community. What possible incentive was there, as a consequence, for the British government, let alone the Falklands community, to ever contemplate (let alone agree to any implementation strategy for) a change in sovereignty arrangements?

Resource development remains deeply controversial. Since the mid 1980s, the Falkland Islands Government's (FIG) fisheries licensing regime has provided the lion's share of the community's GDP (circa 60%, around £15 million, in the 2009/2010 financial year (Falkland Islands 2012)). The income generated from licensing varies from year to year and depends on the state of fish (in particular, squid) stocks. In terms of oil and gas exploration, wells were drilled in February 2010 (16 wells) and there was a new round of exploratory activity in 2012 in the South Falklands Basin. There are a number of companies operating in the area, both north and south of the islands, including Rockhopper Exploration, Borders and Southern Petroleum, Falklands Oil and Gas, Desire Petroleum and Argos Resources. While the actual results remain tentative, the spectre of the Falklands becoming a major oil and gas production zone is highly sensitive to Argentina because of fears that this would simply embolden further the Falklands community in their desire to self-determine a future never involving their nearest continental neighbour.

Since 1982, every British government (Conservative, Labour and now a coalition) has committed itself to respecting the rights of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination. Prime Minister David Cameron, in January 2012, even told his parliamentary colleagues that Argentina was behaving in a colonial-like manner by persistently and aggressively demanding negotiations over sovereignty. With the run-up to the 30th anniversary of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, both governments have been involved in a ‘war of words’ aided and abetted by national media organisations. There have been some ‘deeds’ as well. In the case of Argentina, President Cristina Kirchner (the self-styled Presidenta Malvinera) remains personally committed to the issue, and in a manner reminiscent of her late husband and former Argentine president, Nestor. Since her re-election in October 2011, she has devised a three-pronged strategy of co-option, disruption and promotion, while at the same time it is worth recognising that Argentina's military forces have not been modernised since the early 1980s (Jones Reference Jones2011), so this strategy should not be seen as likely to lead to any kind of military invasion/confrontation (for a longer review, see Dodds Reference Dodds2012).

In terms of co-option, the Falklands situation has been raised continuously in every possible regional and international forum, including the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Summit of the Americas and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. No opportunity is missed to seek resolutions demanding that the UK negotiate with Argentina over the future sovereignty of the Falklands. For the UK, the attitude of the United States and powerful regional neighbours, such as Brazil, is always noted carefully. The aim is clearly to embarrass and pressurise the UK government to negotiate. With regard to disruption, the aim here is to interfere with the Falklands economy and potentially deter investment, especially in the highly emotive (and ‘emotive’ in the sense that if it proves ‘lucrative’ then Argentina fears that there will be even less hope of any change to the sovereignty equation) area of oil and gas development. In March 2012, Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman wrote to the London Stock Exchange warning about the ‘illegal activities’ of five companies operating in the disputed South Atlantic waters around the Falklands. He stipulated that these companies should face punitive action against any assets held in Argentina if the current government succeeded in a prosecution case. Finally, promotion involves the manner in which public personalities, including Hollywood actors such as Sean Penn, are swiftly deployed to voice their support for Argentina's claim to the Falklands. Paradoxically, the dispatch of Prince William (the grandson of Queen Elizabeth II) as a helicopter search and rescue pilot to the Falklands in March 2012 (and explained at the time as a ‘routine deployment’ by the Ministry of Defence) was seen as deeply provocative in Argentina, and designed in part to raise the profile of the Falklands both within Britain and in the wider world. Prince William's deployment stands as a good example of how relations between the two countries have plummeted, and more broadly, reminds us that the Queen has never visited Argentina and is not likely to do so. In 1968, a proposed visit to Argentina was cancelled and she travelled to Brazil and Chile instead.

What has been underestimated by journalists and political commentators is that the Falklands dispute also has ramifications for other areas of South Atlantic/Antarctic diplomatic business. This dispute features as a regular item in the annual diplomatic meetings of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and thus contradicts earlier optimistic claims that Anglo-Argentine antagonism never ‘reached’ the meetings of the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties (ATCPs) (Beck Reference Beck1986). This was never entirely true and the difficulties in agreeing to the establishment of an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, for instance, were largely around Anglo-Argentine issues since the Falklands War, with the UK, in particular, objecting to the proposal to locate it in Argentina (Vigni Reference Vigni, Triggs and Riddell2007: 20). After consensus was finally reached in 2001 that it would indeed be located in Buenos Aires, tensions eased somewhat, although the UK delegation was in the vanguard of the very close scrutiny of the Secretariat's operation at each Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting (ATCM). The Secretariat commenced operations in September 2004.

Elsewhere, new life was seemingly given to UK-Argentine antipathies through the initiation by the UK of fisheries certification in the South Atlantic, around South Georgia (and a 2012 submission relating to the Falklands). There are currently 177 Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)-certified fisheries worldwide, including three Argentine fisheries (anchovy, hoki and Patagonian scallop) and a further Argentine fishery currently in assessment (southern red king crab) (MSC 2012a). Whilst the UK origins of the MSC may not be an entirely happy contingency for Argentina, plainly, submission of its own fisheries for certification precludes its repudiation of the scheme in general. The substantive problem for Argentina has been the MSC certification of two UK fisheries around South Georgia, for Patagonian toothfish (2004, renewed in 2009) and icefish (2010). In 2002, Argentina protested strongly at the annual Antarctic marine living resources meeting about what it termed the ‘unilateral action’ of the UK in seeking such certification (CCAMLR (Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources) Commission 2002: paras 14.9–14.11). Perhaps Argentina read more into the commitment to ‘coordinated programmes’ in relation to fishing in Section III of the UK/Argentine Joint Statement (Government of the UK and Government of the Argentine Republic 1999) than the UK. Since the CCAMLR regulates marine harvesting south of the polar front, its area of application includes areas within and north of the Antarctic Treaty Area. Argentina, in this regulatory arena, has been able to contest UK sovereignty in relation to northerly territories, without needing to say anything explicitly about disputed areas within the Antarctic Treaty Area per se, which are anyway subject to the more general constraints under Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.

Aside from rejecting the certification action, from 2002 Argentina insisted that the report of the commission include text in which ‘The Government of Argentina reaffirms that the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands are an integral part of its national territory and that these islands and surrounding waters are the subject of a sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom’ (CCAMLR Commission 2002: para. 14.9). Whilst the triggering concern has changed over time – for example, in 2011 the focus was on ‘incorrect references existing in CCAMLR documents related to the territorial status of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands’ (CCAMLR Commission 2011: para. 18.1) – the Argentine sovereignty position is now annually reaffirmed. In turn, since 2002 the UK has reiterated that ‘it has no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas’ (CCAMLR Commission 2002: para. 14.9). This statement is now followed by an Argentine statement rejecting the UK statement and reiterating its legal position (CCAMLR Commission 2002: para. 14.11). This diplomatic/legal interchange now follows a pattern widely replicated in other international arenas including the United Nations. The UK decision to seek certification of a fishery in the contested waters off South Georgia was always likely to provoke Argentina regardless of the publicly articulated resource management/stewardship rationale. The August 2012 announcement that the Falkland Island toothfish fishery is under MSC assessment (MSC 2012b) may stimulate further exchanges.

A similar pattern of statements is found in the final reports of the ATCM since 2004 (Government of South Africa 2004: paras 236–238). In recent years Argentina has used the trigger of concerns about incorrect references ‘made in documents, cartography and publications available and presentations’ made at ATCMs (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty 2012: paras 316–320) to lead into its statements on its unalienable sovereignty. The UK responds as in the CCAMLR case noted above. All of this adds grist to the mill in terms of expressions and practices of sovereignty vigilance, and offers further evidence for continued caution in accepting claims that the ATS and associated legal instruments do not face challenges in managing sovereignty, territory and resource-related issues (see Hemmings Reference Hemmings, Hemmings, Rothwell and Scott2012a: 79–81). They do, and will continue to do so.

Mapping the ‘Argentine territory’

Antarctic territorial claims have been given a new profile in recent years as a consequence of coastal states’ (sensu UN Law of the Sea Convention) assertion of their rights in relation to the extended continental shelf. For the seven Antarctic claimant states, this has (in their estimation at least) required them to reserve coastal state rights in relation to their claimed Antarctic territories, without doing violence to their obligations under Article IV of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, whereby positions on territorial sovereignty are ‘frozen’, or overly irritating fellow consultative parties who do not recognise the territorial claims upon which the supposed coastal state rights rest. The manner in which claimant states have approached this has been summarised by Hemmings and Stephens (Reference Hemmings and Stephens2010: 314–316).

The position is plainly particularly complex in the Antarctic Peninsula, where Argentina, Chile and the UK claim essentially the same area, since here it was not just a matter of a claimant asserting rights which others did not recognise, but also a matter of mutually exclusive claims vis-à-vis other claimants (for a historical review, see Dodds Reference Dodds2002). Chile reserved its position without actually submitting data to the CLCS by submitting only ‘Preliminary Information’, and the UK merely reserved a right to make a submission of data at a later date. Argentina, by contrast, opted in 2009 to make what is termed a ‘full submission’, providing data for the extended continental shelf across all of the disputed territories in the Antarctic Peninsula, Scotia Arc islands and Malvinas/Falklands. It did so without apparent reservations and without explicitly identifying that the areas concerned were under dispute, as it is required to do under the rules of procedure of the CLCS. The commission will not ordinarily consider data for such areas, and as a non-legal technical advisory body (though see Kunoy Reference Kunoy2012) it will not enter into debates about the legal standing of areas.

The Argentine ‘full submission’ led to notes in 2009 from not only the UK in relation to all the disputed areas, but also the United States, the Russian Federation, India, The Netherlands and Japan asking the CLCS not to consider data for the shelf within the Antarctic Treaty Area (CLCS 2012). In August 2012, Argentina made a technical presentation to CLCS on the outer limits of the Argentine continental shelf, including the disputed territories of the Falklands/Malvinas, South Georgia, South Sandwich and Argentine Antarctic Territory (Government of Argentina 2012a). Coincident with its August 2012 presentation to the CLCS, Argentina also sent a note to the Secretary General (Government of Argentina 2012b), with the declaratory purpose of responding to a UK note of 6 August 2009. A response that only occurs three years after the event, and is on entirely familiar sovereignty positions, rather than mustering arguments based upon some more recent events, is surely indicative of deliberative strategy designed to publicise and promote sovereignty/resource interests in the Antarctic and South Atlantic region.

The rationale for the Argentine submission and subsequent follow-up with the CLCS regarding the disputed South Atlantic and Antarctic territories should be seen for what it is: further evidence of Argentina's determination to raise the domestic and international profile of these areas of ‘Argentine territory’. As the political scientist Carlos Escude has noted, on many occasions, the mapping and presenting of ‘Argentine territory’ has been a crucial element in a public culture that is eager to remind its citizens of Argentina's territorial extent (see for example, Escude Reference Escude1992). As Alec Murphy notes more generally, ‘territory retains its allure . . . [and we need, as academics, to recognise] the extraordinary power of the state in the production of the types of knowledge that legitimate and substantiate particular territorial arrangements’ (Murphy Reference Murphy2012: 2 and 6). The Argentine state and, in particular, the Institute of Military Geography and the Argentine Antarctic Institute remain preeminent in the generation and reproduction of maps, charts and statistics that contribute to the dominant state-territorial imaginary of a country that enjoys an extensive South Atlantic and Antarctic territorial portfolio.

This issue, it is worth clarifying, is not unique to Argentina. All the claimant states, including the UK, are behaving on the basis that they are coastal states in the Antarctic context. As noted earlier, another claimant state, Australia, is arguably in the vanguard of this desire to identify outer continental shelves in and around the polar continent (Dodds and Hemmings Reference Dodds and Hemmings2009). In conjunction with controversies over marine protected areas (MPAs) and fisheries management (see, for example, The New Zealand Herald (Auckland), 2 November 2012 and Hemmings Reference Hemmings2012b), what we are likely to witness is ever greater evidence of claimant/coastal states, non-claimants and semi-claimants jockeying for position or advantage against diverse other interests within the ATS. Without short-term prospects of positions on territorial claims being resolved the ATS may face increasing difficulties going beyond a de minimis, and often cosmetic, procedural ‘management’ of emerging issues.

The UK and overseas territories

In June 2012, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) released a White Paper on the British Overseas Territories with the subtitle of Security, success and sustainability (FCO 2012). This followed a request in June 2010 from the foreign secretary that relevant officials review UK policies pertaining to the overseas territories. Between June 2010 and August 2012, the FCO held consultations with political leaders of the British Overseas Territories, and the matter was considered by the National Security Council and, later, Parliament in September 2011. The White Paper was intended to update and supplant an earlier 1999 White Paper released under the Labour government, which spoke of a ‘partnership for progress and prosperity’. In his foreword, Prime Minister David Cameron noted that, ‘This White Paper sets out our commitment to work with the Territories to address the challenges we face together. This is a commitment across the UK government . . . . 2012 is the Centenary of Scott's heroic journey to the South Pole. It is the 30^th anniversary of the Falklands conflict when so many gave their lives to protect the islanders’ right to chose their own future’ (FCO 2012: 5).

The prime minister's assemblage of Scott and the Falkland Islands in the same proverbial breath is deeply intriguing. Leaving aside how particular anniversaries (such as 25th, 30th, 50th, 75th and 100th) are favoured by media and political commentators alike, we might ponder what is at stake here when such a connection is made. Scott's Terra Nova expedition to reach the South Pole left from New Zealand rather than the Falkland Islands. By contrast, the BAS conducts the vast majority of its scientific work in the British Antarctic Territory (BAT) and South Georgia and has a forward operating base in Stanley. Perhaps what the prime minister was attempting to string together was a rather vaguer notion of longer-term commitment to the South Atlantic and Antarctic region through the idea of sacrifice – the sense in which Scott and his party and then, later, in a more violent manner, over 250 British personnel perished in and around the Falkland Islands in 1982.

The foreign secretary, William Hague, in his own foreword commented that the UK should be aware of the ‘vast and pristine environments’ of the territories and the need to be seen as ‘stewards of these assets for future generations’. Between the prime minister's and the foreign secretary's forewords, the rationale for and logic of the White Paper are established. The UK's commitment to the fourteen overseas territories is premised on the need to protect their security, to act as environmental stewards and to recognise that the sovereignty of the territories will be strongly shaped by the wishes of the inhabitants. In the ‘Executive Summary’, this three-pronged commitment is reiterated again with reference to words such as ‘choice’, ‘external threats’, ‘rich environmental heritage’ and ‘challenges’. What is also striking is the emphasis placed on ‘our shared history’, and the value of the British Overseas Territories in terms of their connections to broader global concerns. So, for example, the BAT is not only significant in its own terms (size and historical association with the UK) but also ‘highly prized as a global laboratory’ (FCO 2012: 12). Thus, the UK is being positioned (in a highly opportune manner, critics would contend) as a national and global guardian of this particular part of the polar continent and maritime areas.

The timing of this White Paper on the overseas territories is noteworthy in the context of the BAT. While the Falklands dispute has grabbed the headlines, especially in a 30th anniversary year (2012), it is also worth remembering that a UK universities and science minister, David Willetts, visited the Falklands and the Antarctic Peninsula in February 2012. He spent time at the BAS office in Stanley and then travelled to Rothera Research Station where he learnt more about the work undertaken by BAS scientists. The ministerial visit to the Antarctic Peninsula was surely opportune in promoting the BAS's scientific and strategic role in the region (but see below with reference to the BAS/NERC/NOC merger affair).

What can be taken from all of these developments thus far, however, is that Britain's South Atlantic and Antarctic overseas territories are proving to be bothersome in terms of their diplomatic-political-scientific management. Hydrocarbon exploration off the Falklands (regardless of the scale, Argentina regards continuing oil exploration as deeply provocative), fisheries certification off the waters off South Georgia and uncertainty regarding the future of the BAS, including its funding and senior management, all contribute to a sense that the UK government will have to devote greater resources to managing this highly contested portfolio of territories. Depending on the funding settlement for the BAS, in the post-2015 era, this might entail some fundamental re-examination of where British Antarctic science is undertaken in the Antarctic Peninsula region. Uncomfortable as it may be, counter-claimants such as Argentina and Chile have lower operating and logistical costs and Argentina has a president who is determined to pursue her agenda of pressuring the UK on all the disputed South Atlantic and Antarctic territories.

To merge or not to merge? The British Antarctic Survey and The National Oceanography Centre

In June 2012, the NERC announced that it was contemplating the merger of the BAS and the NOC. In September, a document was released setting out the case for a proposed merger and invoking a number of factors including research synergies, logistical rationalisation and cost-cutting (NERC 2012). As a House of Commons Science and Technology Report later concluded, the consultation document did not establish whether the proposed merger was either ‘appropriate or desirable’ or whether alternatives existed (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012: 8). There was no business case offered apart from the suggestion that a more nuanced evaluation would be offered to the NERC in December 2012. It was also not clear from the consultation document whether the merger would actually achieve the stated goals. While the consultation document purported to invite interested stakeholders to submit their views, a number of staff attached to the BAS feared a fait accompli. Strikingly, the director, the deputy director and the head of corporate services of the BAS resigned.

Within days of the consultation document being released, it became clear that this proposed merger was deeply contested. For critics of the merger, including a number of parliamentarians in both the Houses of Commons and Lords, it was judged unnecessary and insufficiently attentive to both the ‘brand power’ of the BAS and the contested geopolitics of the Antarctic. The BAS operates in the most contested part of the Antarctic and the BAT remains counter-claimed by both Argentina and Chile. Notwithstanding Article IV of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, critics were not persuaded that NERC senior management had been sufficiently attentive to this geopolitical/scientific dimension. For another group of critics, including former BAS scientists and environmental groups, the proposed merger of the BAS and the NOC was seen as retrogressive and alarming in the sense that the profile of polar science in both the Antarctic and Arctic was likely to be diminished. At the same time it was noted that the NERC was also mentioning a possible role for the BAS as a knowledge-producing agent for those wishing to work in ‘frontier environments’, leading to speculation that the BAS's scientific outputs might be directed towards those intent on resource exploitation in the Arctic region in particular.

In October the NERC announced that the decision over the proposed merger would be brought forward to October in light of public and parliamentary opposition. A ‘Save BAS’ petition, organised by the veteran environmental campaigner Tony Juniper, was another indication of this disquiet. It attracted thousands of signatures and generated much online activity (including tweeting) as well. As the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee's report made clear, the membership thought that this proposed merger deserved further parliamentary scrutiny (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012: 11). The science minister (David Willetts) and chair of the NERC (Edmund Wallis), the interim director of the BAS and director of the NOC (Ed Hill) and the chief executive of the NERC (Duncan Wingham) were invited to give evidence to the committee. The minister's evidence was striking for a number of reasons – first, he spoke about the importance of the BAS and explicitly recognised that the BAS had a ‘strategic presence’ in the Antarctic and South Atlantic. Indeed, in the report it is noted that ‘During oral evidence, the Science Minister and NERC Chair conceded that there are lessons to be learned from how the geopolitical aspect of this matter has been handled during the consultation’ (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012: 12). Second, the minister acknowledged that funding for polar logistics (including ship-related costs) should be considered to be a distinct budget line for future NERC financial planning.

The senior management team responsible for the proposed merger was questioned by committee members and a figure of around £500,000 per year was eventually offered as a possible benefit following merger. Noticeably, the committee appeared sceptical of the manner in which the merger process had been organised. In their published report, the committee declared that ‘the consultation has been confused and lacks transparency’ and that senior management ‘did not take seriously the loss of several senior staff at the British Antarctic Survey’. More generally, the conclusion of the report reiterates ‘geopolitical considerations’ and, although it does not cite the contested nature of the BAT explicitly, it seems clear that the committee was mindful of this prevailing context (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012: 13).

The following day, 1 November, the NERC announced that the proposed merger had been abandoned. A ministerial statement issued by David Willetts had the following to note:

Rarely has there been a more explicit statement that the BAS is a vital element in the protection and promotion of UK interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic region. While the BAS enjoys a flat-line cash settlement until 2015, it is unclear whether the BAS ‘will remain [a] NERC centre’ in the longer term. There may be some pressure to extract the BAS from the NERC and recognise that its dual mission (science and geopolitics) means that it might be better managed by an organisation other than a research council.

There is a danger, however, that this shambolic-looking process has seen the UK squander a key card in relation to its position and influence in the Antarctic Peninsula. The strength of its scientific activity there, alongside the international standing of the BAS, has given the UK a powerful instrument of power within the ATS. Whilst the UK's (and others’) claims to territory, and the countervailing positions of semi-claimants and non-claimants, are an undeniable fact of life within Antarctic geopolitics generally and the ATS specifically, territorial positions have not been an acceptable overt basis for power-projection. The instrument for that, at least at the scientific-technocratic level at which much ATS management occurs, has been the power of the BAS itself. Indeed, so strong an instrument has the BAS been that it was possible to see the UK's less assertive public position on Antarctic sovereignty (the Falklands is another matter) compared with that of some other claimants (not just Argentina, but also Australia) as a reflection of this (Hemmings Reference Hemmings, Hemmings, Rothwell and Scott2012a: 90). That has all changed. The defence of an autonomous BAS has seen public declarations that part of its imperative justification is its delivery of benefits in relation to the UK's territorial claim (‘strategic presence’, BBC News 2012). It remains to be seen whether its scientific capacity has been damaged, but its soft power (Nye Reference Nye2004) has certainly been compromised, even tainted. Taking the long view, therefore, will mean coming to terms with this uncomfortable revelation.