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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2004
Timothy Minchin continues his solid work on labor in the post–World War II South with Forging a Common Bond. Minchin blends labor history with environmental history to produce a narrative of the infamous BASF lockout of union workers at its Geismar, Louisiana, facility in the 1980s. Based on union records, press accounts, and oral histories with participants on both sides of the lockout, Minchin's latest work tells an important story of an unlikely alliance between unionized industrial workers and environmentalists.
Buoyed by the Reagan revolution and the conservative political tide in Washington, Minchin argues, German chemical giant BASF sought concessions on wages and seniority from its workers at Geismar in 1984. Union leaders, convinced that the company's true intent was to destroy the union, balked at the changes. Workers seemed particularly committed to resisting alterations to “non-economic” benefits such as seniority. When the existing contract expired in June 1984 without an agreement, workers refused to strike, preferring to remain on the job as negotiations continued. BASF locked out its 370 workers on 15 June. Company officials justified the lockout by arguing that they feared sabotage if disenchanted union members were allowed into the plant without a contract. The BASF dispute lasted more than five years before a settlement was finally reached. In the process, the Geismar local of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union (OCAW) forged alliances with environmental groups such as Greenpeace and the Sierra Club to prosecute its struggle against the German chemical giant.
OCAW developed an effective corporate campaign against BASF. Like other union officials in the 1970s and 1980s, OCAW leaders believed that strikes “were becoming increasingly ineffective” and “looked for other ways to exert pressure against companies that vehemently opposed organized labor” (pp. 58–59). Corporate campaigns encouraged consumer boycotts and used the media to spread negative publicity about the target firm. The campaign against textile giant J. P. Stevens was perhaps the most famous example of this new union strategy. The textile workers' victory at Stevens in 1980 inspired other corporate campaigns, though few duplicated the success of the Stevens campaign.
OCAW's corporate campaign developed new themes, such as environmental danger, that had traditionally been ignored by organized industrial workers. Before the lockout, BASF workers in Geismar viewed the environmental movement “with suspicion, or even hostility,” exemplified by the comment of one worker: environmentalists “were a bunch of loonies that … were after my job” (p. 17). Although Minchin notes that the hostility of labor toward environmentalists has been exaggerated, the attitudes of BASF workers were far from warm and welcoming toward the environmental movement. BASF workers exhibited little environmental awareness or concern until after the lockout began. The union made no mention of safety or environmental concerns at the outset. Indeed, many workers spoke of the “trade-off” they had made in going to work for BASF—a slightly shorter lifespan in exchange for (comparatively) decent wages and benefits. Eventually, however, OCAW leaders decided to use the environmental issue against BASF.
A disastrous leak from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in December 1984, killed and injured thousands. The event did not go unnoticed by OCAW leaders involved in coordinating the union's campaign. The Bhopal disaster, combined with a similar (though far less deadly) leak at a chemical plant in West Virginia in August 1985, helped push OCAW leaders toward a greater emphasis on environmental safety. BASF continued to operate the plant using salaried personnel and temporary workers. The union charged that this compromised safety. Eventually, the union used the Bhopal accident in its signature publicity effort. At the beginning of the lockout, OCAW had placed a large billboard along Interstate 10 in Baton Rouge that read “Stop Foreign Oppression of Louisiana Workers.” After deciding on the environmental angle, the union changed the billboard to read “Bhopal on the Bayou? Stop BASF Before They Stop You.” The billboard incensed company officials but proved an effective public relations tool for the union.
Minchin's book illustrates the difficulties in uniting workers across national boundaries, even when the laborers in each nation are organized. BASF's unionized German workers, for example, had difficulty relating to their American counterparts. U.S. unions were more confrontational than those in Germany. In addition, early in the campaign, the American union used some questionable tactics that alienated German workers, such as leaflets that referred to BASF's participation (through the old I. G. Farben cartel) in the Holocaust. German workers also were uncomfortable with the American union's use of the environmental issue. OCAW leaders, for their part, believed that German workers were too willing to accept BASF's safety assurances at face value. In the end, OCAW received more support from German branches of Greenpeace than from its international union brothers.
Eventually, the connections with environmental groups in Louisiana and pro-environment politicians such as Buddy Roemer put enough pressure on BASF to encourage the company to settle. OCAW successfully linked its cause with environmental responsibility and concern for the broader community in Louisiana. The company and the union finally reached an agreement in December 1989 and most locked-out workers returned to their jobs with promised wage increases and seniority guarantees.
The union's environmental awareness did not fade with victory, Minchin argues, and workers insist that there will be “no more trade-offs” between safety and material well-being (p. 155). Forging a Common Bond is an effective and detailed account of a local struggle with broader implications.