Romsics is a prolific Hungarian historian who was asked to write an explanatory text to Imre Prohászka's photographs taken during 1988–1991. The Hungarian-language account of the period, with the photographs, was published in 2003 under the title Volt egyszer egy rendszerváltás (Once Upon a Time There Was a Regime Change, Budapest, 2003). The English version is basically an unrevised translation of the Hungarian edition, with the addition of eleven important, well-selected documents instead of the photographs. Romsics presents a comprehensive account of Hungary's history between the collapse of Communism and the reemergence of a Hungarian parliamentary republic.

The title of the book is a bit misleading as the period covered in detail is 1988–1990. The history of the years between 1991 and 2001 (actually 2006) is summarized in an eight-page epilogue, which forms part five of the book. The rest of the book is divided into four parts. Part one, a brief and balanced account of the external and internal factors playing a role in the transformation, going back to the 1960s, includes a concise review of the changing American foreign policy toward Central Europe, the factors leading to the economic crisis in Hungary, and the rebirth of the opposition movement and the role of Gorbachev. The remaining three parts are divided and subtitled according to the years covered, 1988, 1989, and 1990.

In 1988, the conflicts that began years earlier between the aging and ailing János Kádár and the prime minister, Károly Grósz, ended with Grósz's victory as he was not only supported by the younger Hungarian technocrats, but also by the Soviet political leadership. In this politically more open atmosphere, opposition groups began to form. One of the first was the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), which began organizing “dialogues” between the public and members of the democratic opposition offering solutions to the Hungarian economic and political problems. Various other opposition groups formed associations, proto-parties, and political parties during the year. Throughout the year, as a show of strength, demonstrations were organized by various organizations. The largest two were the 27 June demonstration against the Ceausescu regime's treatment of the Hungarian minority and the planned destruction of Transylvanian Hungarian villages, which brought 150,000 demonstrators to the streets, and the 12 September demonstration against the Bős-Nagymaros/ Gabčíkovo hydroelectric power plant, with about 40,000 participants. The success of these two demonstrations made it clear to the ruling party that the opposition groups had active popular support and could mobilize large numbers. As the economy deteriorated, the reform Communists of the MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) increasingly gained the upper hand in the party.

The events of 1989 were bracketed by two events outside Hungary: Gorbachev's announcement in December 1988 of the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, which signaled a change in the role of the Warsaw Pact; and the December 1989 agreement between Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush on arms reduction and noninterference in Eastern Europe by the Soviets. These two occurrences validated the political events in Hungary. Within Hungary, 1989 began with the state party reevaluating the role of 1956 in Hungarian history and the acceptance of the introduction of a multiparty system. Following the example of the Polish Roundtable talks, the MSZMP opened talks with individual oppositional parties and associations in March 1989, with the stated goal of “achieving a peaceful change in the regime.” However, the economic transformations, called “spontaneous privatization” by the Hungarians, were criticized by all the political parties, as the process was not really privatization because the majority holder in the subsidiaries was the state, and minority owners were often other state-owned enterprises and banks. In many cases, as a result of ill-defined ownership rights and ineffective corporate governance, top managers co-opted ownership rights. With the simultaneous collapse of Comecon markets, the Hungarian economic situation worsened while inflation increased.

The following year, 1990, started with protests by taxi drivers, the homeless, miners, and transportation workers against planned price hikes and the preparations for the first of two elections. There were over sixty officially registered parties, and forty participated in the electoral campaigns. The elections' winners were the national/Christian parties. In July, the loopholes allowing for spontaneous privatization were closed, and the privatization process was made more transparent, yet the economic conditions worsened. Production and employment fell and inflation rose. The economic crisis that began in 1988 continued for another ten years. The radical changes in Hungary were mirrored in other Central European countries. Almost simultaneously with the cessation of the Warsaw Pact, Comecon expired and Hungarian foreign policy shifted focus. Hungary was accepted as a member of the Council of Europe and became part of the Alps-Adriatic Working Community and the Visegrád triangle. In spite of these foreign relations successes, the government was unsuccessful in resolving the issues of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries.

The book is a factual account of the political, social, and economic events of three crucial years, 1988 to 1990. It describes how the seemingly strong and relatively popular one-party state with an increasingly inefficient planned economy transformed itself into a multiparty democracy. It is a well-researched account of the regime change in Hungary and is a valuable addition to the library of social scientists interested in the background of the events and players in Hungary and Central Europe. Matthew Caples' translation is excellent.