To the UN’s then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, it was “possibly the most significant legal instrument of this [twentieth] century,”Footnote 1 while The New Yorker’s William Wertenbaker called it “the most complex and most inclusive redrafting of worldwide regulations ever undertaken.”Footnote 2 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982 at the end of a decade of debates during the third Law of the Sea Conference, attracts superlatives. International lawyers of specialist and generalist persuasion consider it a key text of the discipline; successive generations have, in Surabhi Ranganathan’s phrase, sought, from different methodological angles, to “put the Ocean on the map.”Footnote 3 But UNCLOS is not just a text for international lawyers. Journalists—among them Wertenbaker and Clyde SangerFootnote 4—followed the Law of the Sea Conference’s every twist and turn and produced “riveting account[s].”Footnote 5 Economists and social scientists have, since the 1970s, studied the delegates’ negotiation strategies to distill Lessons in the Art and Science of Reaching Agreement.Footnote 6 And many of the central negotiators have published personal recollections and eyewitness accounts.Footnote 7 In the history of twentieth century international governance, the making of the law of the sea occupies a prominent place.
With A “Constitution for the Oceans,” Kirsten Sellars joins the debate, taking readers on The Long Hard Road to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Her focus is not on the “fine-spun … law” set out in UNCLOS, but on the “trade-offs and concessions” that shaped the half-century of international lawmaking up until 1982, which Sellars reconstructs “based primarily on documents from government archives” (pp. xii, vii, xiii). Her aim in this reconstruction, readers learn early on, is to illustrate “the behind-the-scenes and often undisclosed contribution of diplomats, ministers and government legal advisers to the formation of the law” (p. xiii). Sellars seeks to “make visible,” as far as possible, the “invisible” process of crafting the contemporary law of the sea (id.). This is, in other words, a work of diplomatic-legal history that aims to enhance our understanding of how the agreement on the contemporary legal order of the oceans was reached in decades of protracted negotiations.
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Sellars’s account is organized chronologically and can be broadly divided into two halves. Chapters 1–4 set out the pre-history to UNCLOS, up until the late 1960s. Unlike other writers, Sellars does not treat this pre-history as a mere prologue to UNCLOS. She goes to some lengths to recount the codification projects of 1930, 1958, and 1960, with briefer sections on the Corfu Channel and Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries cases. Her overarching narrative is that of “the end of the old order”—an old order in which a powerful Great Britain could rely on customary rules to limit coastal state interference with shipping on the mare liberum and thus ensure British mastery of the seas. In the early twentieth century marked by “British decline,” Sellars argues, the old custom came under pressure, as many states asserted “wider territorial seas and jurisdiction over adjacent security zones, customs zones, and fishing and conservation areas,” thus limiting the high seas freedoms that had so benefited Britain and other major maritime powers such as the United States (pp. vii, 8, 25).
To stem the regulatory tide, the major maritime powers sought to enshrine wide-ranging navigational freedoms in treaty frameworks that were essentially meant to consolidate the prior customary status quo. Things did not work out as planned, though. In The Hague, at the League of Nations Codification Conference of 1930, Great Britain miscalculated, refusing to accept relatively minor concessions—namely, the acceptance of a modest contiguous zone—that might have secured agreement on a narrow three-mile territorial sea and left traditional navigational freedoms largely intact: “a capital mistake,” noted the Foreign Office twenty years later (p. 26). By then the prize for securing navigational freedoms had risen markedly. After 1945, coastal states did not merely assert broader territorial seas and contiguous zones but, led by the United States, advanced claims to their continental shelf. Rendered in 1951, the ICJ’s Fisheries judgment recognized the possibility of straight baselines: a recognition used (some would say, abused) by coastal states to calculate their respective maritime zones favorably.Footnote 8 At the 1958 Geneva Conference, “new ideas and new actors” entered the fray (p. 66). The contiguous zone and continental shelf were “treatified” in the respective Geneva Conventions, reflecting increased coastal state influence.Footnote 9 Western powers, including Great Britain, now focused on limiting the territorial seas to six miles, perhaps with an optional fisheries zone added. But they did not speak with one voice, and met with significant opposition from Latin American, communist, and newly independent states. Dominated by the changing geopolitics of the post-World War II order—in which (unlike in 1930), “North, South, East and West” had to be accommodated—both the 1958 Geneva Conference and its 1960 coda “failed to settle the most important issue—the breadth of the territorial sea”: six miles were unacceptable to coastal states, who pushed for a wider zone, but so proved a long line of other proposals (pp. 66, 106). The old maritime order was dying—but would the new be born? At the end of the pre-history, Sellars leaves readers in suspense: “States of the south” in particular had challenged “traditional conceptions of [the] law of the sea” and “put the [old] powers on notice”—“but it remained to be seen whether, by attempting to recalibrate the Law of the Sea, they could realise their aspirations” (pp. 135–36).
Sellars’s offers her response in chapters 5–9, the second half of the book. It is in the nature of a “not quite.” The “new order in the oceans” agreed at the end of nine years of debates during the third Law of the Sea Conference (1973–1982) satisfied some of the aspirations of the new powers. And yet, to Sellars, the “biggest winners” were Western maritime nations and the Soviet Union: they “secured recognition of their navigational rights” to a large degree, more than was to be expected after 1960; and some of them (Sellars lists “Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United States and the USSR”) “acquire[d] some of the most extensive exclusive economic zones (and continental margins) in the world” (pp. 325–27).
Chapters 5–9 retrace the steps toward the “new order.” Attempts to “internationalis[e] the seabed,” culminating in the 1970 General Assembly Declaration, marked the opening gambit (p. 137, ch. 5).Footnote 10 But Sellars’s focus is on the new order’s recalibration of navigational rights during the third Law of the Sea Conference. Chapters 6–8 offer a detailed analysis of the Conference’s debates on three core issues that were addressed in recalibrated regimes: (1) the consolidation of navigational rights in straits, set out in Part III UNCLOS (ch. 6); (2) the new rules on archipelagic waters and passage through them, devised in Part IV UNCLOS (ch. 7); and (3) the complex balancing of far-reaching coastal state jurisdiction against robust navigational rights reflected in UNCLOS Parts II, V, and VI (ch. 8). The focus on these three issues allows Sellars to present to readers an accessible account that highlights central fault lines of the complex and lengthy negotiations.
Great powers and their delegates remain at the heart of this account, and their positions shape Sellars’s assessment. Western maritime nations led by the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR appear as unlikely allies during the Conference. Notwithstanding geopolitical tensions, especially during the first half of the negotiations they formed a “united front” in defense of navigational rights against far-reaching assertions of jurisdiction by coastal and archipelagic states (p. 324). Sellars underlines that, while in other United Nations debates of the time the Group of 77 (G77) set the agenda, in negotiations of the future UNCLOS, the “united front” of maritime powers managed to push through agreement on a number of their core priorities: “[I]ronically, … when the G77 appeared to be at its most forceful [in other debates] …, the [maritime] powers secured … [a] twelve-mile territorial sea limit in 1975, transit passage through straits in 1976, and both high seas navigational rights in the exclusive economic zone and the right of archipelagic sea lane passage in 1977”—gains that were not reversed during the Conference’s later stages when great power unity “faded away” (pp. 292, 325).
How did the united front of a minority of nations succeed? In Sellars’s reading, power politics were aided by conference procedures. The move from majority voting (which had shaped the earlier codification attempts of 1958/1960) to the consensus principle favored influential minorities who could not be outvoted (pp. 189–90, 292). Moreover, the breadth and heterogeneity of the agenda limited the influence of the G77, which struggled to mobilize majorities: many of its members demanded expanded coastal state rights, while influential island states like Indonesia and the Philippines were keen to secure acceptance of the concept of archipelagic states, and land-locked states pushed for access to the sea. On core issues, the new geopolitical majority of the 1970s, which dominated lawmaking efforts in other fora, appeared to be “a divided group” (p. 243). But above all, Sellars notes, the great powers during the 1970s were prepared to accept demands of coastal states that they had refused during earlier codification attempts, notably for an extended territorial sea and a new, large zone of functional jurisdiction, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was, in Sellars’s analysis, the central element of the package deal at the heart of UNCLOS, which survived the protracted controversies over seabed mining and technology transfer toward “the bitter end” of the Conference (p. 293).
Sellars returns to these controversies in Chapter 9 of her book, but presents them as a secondary issue (and in less detail than the debates about archipelagoes and straits): “[D]espite professing great interest in this new frontier [seabed minng], … most countries were far more preoccupied with access to oil and gas—tapped from dry land or from the continental shelf—than with access to deep seabed minerals” (p. 325). And so, while the end was “bitter” for many, and would be further soured by the late U.S. withdrawal from the Conference, agreement on a “new order in the oceans” was reached: It had taken four international conferences and fifty-two years to reach agreement on all the cardinal points of the law of the sea. Now, it seemed, the task was finally finished” (pp. 322, 326).
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Kirsten Sellars’s analysis of the half-century of international efforts to “finish the task” is well-written and engaging. Contrary to what the book’s title might suggest, this is not a hagiographic celebration of constitution-making by a handful of founding fathers and mothers, but a narration focused on the often “tortuous” struggle to formalize a global regime of navigational freedoms—protracted, but so consequential as an exercise in standard-setting that, by the end of the third Law of the Sea Conference, the major maritime power of the late twentieth century, the United States, could walk away from the treaty project, not having to join, but “calculating that [it] could rely on custom” as a newly consolidated basis of the maritime freedoms it had successfully sought to enshrine in UNCLOS (pp. vii, 324). But Sellars offers more than an engaging take on a prominent topic. She has delivered on her professed aim, to “make … visible” relevant parts of the law of the sea and show how these have been molded in decades of international debates (p. xiii). Her close analysis of internal government documents shines a spotlight on strategic choices, diplomatic blunders, and clever negotiation tactics; and key players gain contours.
Some of this is eye-opening. Sellars’s account of the pre-history to UNCLOS in the first half of her book is particularly valuable. Her description of the 1930 conference reads like a report from a bygone era, when a handful of nations could make “the law”—and might have done so had British diplomats not overplayed their hand. The chapters on the 1958 and 1960 conferences demonstrate that, at the height of the Cold War, Western allies (Canada, Great Britain, the United States, etc.) would at times “f[a]ll out among themselves,” to the point where Canadian delegates addressed their British counterparts with “the frostiness usually reserved for the Soviets”: an early example of “rifts behind the façade of NATO unity,” though perhaps rather a fissure compared to today’s fractures among members of the alliance (pp. 77, 135). By recounting these fallouts in detail, Sellars presents a rich history of early codification attempts that many other contemporary works centered on UNCLOS relegate to the footnotes, but that are crucial to our understanding of the evolution of twentieth century law of the sea.
While the first half of the book unearths largely forgotten details, the second half, covering the Law of the Sea Conference of 1973–1982, retells a story that has often been told. So much has been said before, and by so many, that Sellars’s account of the road toward UNCLOS can rarely break entirely new ground. Much of the contemporary law was, in Sellars’s terms, already rather “visible” (cf. p. xiii). Sellars’s take is nonetheless important and instructive, for she highlights particular aspects of the making of UNCLOS, and leaves others aside. Three of her choices are particularly relevant and set her account apart.
The first is Sellars’s decision to approach the UNCLOS negotiations from the perspective of the major maritime powers. This perspective allows her to highlight how closely Western maritime powers and the Soviet Union collaborated to ensure that the new order of the ocean would guarantee their main aim, i.e., access to the oceans. The basic point is not entirely new, of course. Much of the existing scholarship emphasizes that, while negotiated against the backdrop of the cold war, the third law of the sea conference was not dominated by superpower rivalry. Sellars confirms this reading, but she does a lot to deepen and nuance it. Throughout the second half of her book, she traces the diplomatic back and forth between Washington, London, and Moscow. Her analysis of the early, pre-conference discussions of 1968, in which the Soviet Union and United States essentially settled on a joint approach to the territorial sea (limited to twelve miles) and a new regime for passage through straits, is instructive (pp. 165–67). Equally illuminating (and highly readable) is Sellars’s account of how the great powers collaborated to preclude coastal states from claiming jurisdiction over archipelagoes of islands: the Americans insisted in numerous debates that such claims could only be made by independent island states without a continental base, while the Soviets “delivered the coup de grace” by proposing to change the title of the relevant section (now Part VII) to “‘archipelagic states’ so that it would be inapplicable to continental States” that also comprise groups of islands (p. 237). In these and other sections, the “united front” of major maritime powers becomes tangible (p. 324).
Sellars’s account is noteworthy also for her overall assessment of the Conference’s winners and losers. By presenting the major maritime powers as the main beneficiaries of the new legal order, Sellars challenges prominent readings of the Law of the Sea Conference, e.g., those that present UNCLOS as a “notable diplomatic triumph” of the G77,Footnote 11 or that emphasize the major gains of coastal and archipelagic island states.Footnote 12 This challenge is important because it nuances the standard dichotomy between major maritime powers on the one hand (keen on defending the freedoms of the high seas) and coastal/archipelagic states on the other (keen on extending their spheres of maritime jurisdiction). Sellars is right to note that some of the major maritime powers—notably France, the United States, the UK, and Russia—would benefit enormously from the new regime: entitled to claim vast EEZs, they were silent beneficiaries of the move toward extended maritime jurisdiction that others had pushed for. But did the major maritime powers really manage to safeguard their high seas freedoms against interference? Sellars is adamant that they did. The “recalibrated” new legal order of UNCLOS “gave the [maritime] powers almost everything they had sought in straits,” made the archipelagic waters penetrable and protected “high seas rights” in the EEZ (p. 135, 207, 270). This claim is persuasive, and Sellars makes it persuasively by analyzing the early sessions of the law of the sea conference, in which the Western maritime powers and the Soviet Union “work[ed] in tandem to suppress unwelcome initiatives from the … G77” (p. xi). But it is a narrow claim focused on freedom of navigation, which leaves aside other aspects of the balancing between “high seas freedoms” and coastal and archipelagic state jurisdiction, and which marks a progressive narrowing of Sellars’s inquiry. At the beginning of her study, Sellars had approached the tension between the two in much broader terms: as noted above, in her perspective, Great Britain and other maritime powers set out on “the long hard road” toward a new maritime order to shore up high seas freedoms against coastal states asserting “wider territorial seas and jurisdiction over adjacent security zones, customs zones, and fishing and conservation areas” (p. vii). At the end of that long hard journey from The Hague (1930) via Geneva (1958/1960) to UNCLOS at Montego Bay (1982), Great Britain and the new maritime super powers succeeding it may have preserved their “naval mobility” to a large extent (p. xi). However, the old order centered on comprehensive high seas freedoms had been dramatically recalibrated. In Sellars’s terms, coastal states can now claim much “wider territorial seas”; their right to police “adjacent security zones, customs zones” is recognized; and modest claims to manage “fishing and conservation areas” have been upgraded to become sovereign rights in the EEZ, archipelagic waters and on the continental shelf (cf. p. vii). This does not invalidate Sellars’s view that the major maritime powers were UNCLOS’ “biggest winners” (p. 327). But it suggests that this view reflects a narrowing of her analytic gaze.
Implicit in this is Sellars’s third and most important choice. In recounting the drafting of UNCLOS from the perspective of navigational freedoms, she not only singles out one particular “high seas right.” She also leaves aside significant other elements of the UNCLOS deal. Dispute settlement under Part XV, that favorite topic of international lawyers, is briefly summed up in the afterword, as is the creative adjustment of the seabed regime in the Part XI Implementation Agreement (pp. 325–26). Maritime boundary delimitation—which, as drafters knew, would become a central issue once UNCLOS had recognized coastal state rights to extended maritime zones without offering a meaningful formula to deal with overlapping claims—barely features. Linkages between the UNCLOS framework and regional and special treaty regimes, one of the elements of viewing UNCLOS as a constitution,Footnote 13 are not addressed. The innovative regime of marine environmental law under Part XII is absent, and so are the Continental Shelf Commission and the complex governance structure created by UNCLOS. Quite a lot, one might say, has gone overboard. Sellars’s work is more focused and more readable for that. But its explanatory power is affected. In essence, Sellars presents the law of the sea as a body of rules balancing “navigational manoeuvrability” against coastal (and later, archipelagic) state jurisdiction. This angle fits the debates of the early twentieth century well and shaped the “old order” of the sea—and it allows Sellars to analyze how these debates evolved as states proceeded on “the long hard road towards the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” But at the end of the road, only part of the “Constitution for the Oceans” has come into view.
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Forty-three years after its conclusion, UNCLOS continues to fascinate observers. It is one of the most momentous treaty projects of the twentieth century and completed a shift from an old maritime regime shaped by nineteenth century maritime powers to a new legal order of the oceans. Kirsten Sellars charts the decades-long struggle over that new order with evident skill and competence, in a rich and engaging analysis that in its best passages comes close to the “riveting accounts” produced by Wertenbaker and Sanger.Footnote 14 Her book is not a comprehensive study of UNCLOS. But anyone wanting to understand how the contemporary regime of navigational freedoms emerged will read it with enormous benefit.
