Introduction
Traditional Christianity holds that Jesus Christ's life, death, and resurrection – Christ's work, for short – helps to bring about our salvation. A theory of atonement is a theory about how Christ's work does this. One elegant and influential theory of atonement is Richard Swinburne's reparation theory. Although I am sympathetic to this theory, the purpose of this article is to direct attention to a serious problem for it that has not been appreciated by Swinburne's critics. First, I articulate and defend a condition of adequacy on theories of atonement that is very plausible upon reflection, but that has been overlooked in the literature. Then, I argue that reparation theory fails to satisfy this condition of adequacy. I conclude with some remarks about the broader significance of my arguments.
The Acceptable Ignorance Condition
By the salvific benefit of Christ's work, I mean the main benefit conferred on us by Christ's work that contributes to our being reconciled with God.Footnote 1 I submit that we have strong reason to believe that nobody is greatly hindered from acquiring the salvific benefit of Christ's work by being ignorant about how the atonement works. Because this is so, any account of the atonement that implies otherwise is false. In other words:
Acceptable Ignorance Condition (AIC): A theory of atonement is true only if it does not imply that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
By a distinctive claim of a theory of atonement, I mean a claim that is part of that theory, and that proponents of alternative theories of atonement are not likely to accept. For example, a distinctive claim of penal substitution theory is that God punished Christ on the cross. My argument for AIC is as follows:
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(1) If failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work, then God has clearly revealed to Christians which theory of atonement is correct.
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(2) God has not clearly revealed this to Christians.
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(3) So, it's not true that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
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(4) So, a theory of atonement is true only if it does not imply that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
The inferences from (1) and (2) to (3), and from (3) to (4), are clearly unproblematic. So, I only need to defend (1) and (2) to vindicate AIC.
Premise (1) is extremely plausible in light of two of God's attributes: His rationality and His love. It would be irrational for God to choose to undergo the tremendous sacrifice of His son's life on the cross in order to provide us with a certain salvific benefit, but then refrain from clearly revealing crucial truths that must be believed in order for us to be at all likely to receive these benefits. This would be analogous to graciously buying a house for a homeless person, but then purposefully refraining from telling her where her new house is located. Since God is not irrational, we have excellent reason to believe that He would clearly reveal the correct theory of atonement, were it true that failure to believe parts of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very hard to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
Further, God loves us, so He strongly desires to be reconciled with us. It follows that God strongly desires that we receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work. God can therefore be expected to provide us with all of the information the possession of which is crucial to receiving these benefits. So, if it is impossible or very difficult to acquire the salvific benefits of Christ's work when one does not believe a key truth about how the atonement works, then God would have clearly told Christians the correct theory. In other words, premise (1) is true.
There are two reasons to accept premise (2). First, there is a lot of disagreement – currently and historically – between Christians about which theory of atonement is correct. The extent of this disagreement is not what we would expect on the supposition that God has clearly revealed to Christians which theory is true, so we have good reason to believe that He has not done so. Second, it is reasonable to think that if God has clearly revealed the correct theory of atonement to Christians, then He has done so through either the Bible or the teachings of the major church councils that are accepted by the majority of Christians. But none of the major church councils insists on any particular theory of atonement. As Swinburne notes, ‘Christian theology has no formal definition of what was effected on the Cross with the stamp of orthodoxy upon it possessed by the Chalcedonian definition of the Incarnation’ (Swinburne (Reference Swinburne1989), 150). Similarly, Scripture does not clearly settle the matter. It contains a wide array of terms and images that are intended to convey ideas about Christ's salvific work, and it is not obvious which of the theories of atonement on offer does best at accommodating the biblical data.Footnote 2 Since neither the Bible nor the church councils clearly convey which theory of atonement is true, we have good reason to believe that God has chosen not to reveal clearly the truth of this matter to Christians.
I have not offered definitive proof of AIC, of course. In particular, premise (1) of the above argument for AIC is less than wholly certain because of the difficulties in understanding God's motivations. But I do take myself to have offered a strong presumptive case in favour of AIC that makes its acceptance reasonable in the absence of compelling counter–argument. I will therefore assume AIC in what follows.
Against Swinburne's reparation theory
Central to Swinburne's reparation theory are the ideas of guilt and its removal. Guilt is thought by Swinburne to be a kind of uncleanness, or ‘stains on a soul requiring expunging’ (ibid., 75). One acquires guilt when one wrongs someone, and this guilt creates a rift between the wrongdoer and her victim. The process of expunging one's guilt is the process of atonement, and it has four components: repentance, apology, reparation, and penance.Footnote 3 In repenting, the wrongdoer acknowledges to herself that she has wronged her victim, and she resolves to refrain from committing similar wrong acts in the future. Apology consists of expressing to her victim the attitudes she expresses to herself privately in repentance. In offering repentance and apology, the wrongdoer disowns her past wrong act privately and publically, distancing herself from it.
In cases of minor wrongs, repentance and apology suffice to make it appropriate for the wrongdoer's victim to offer forgiveness; and if he does, atonement is completed and the wrongdoer's guilt is removed. But in cases of serious wrongdoing, reparation and penance may be insisted on by the victim. In offering reparation, the wrongdoer compensates her victim for the harm imposed on the latter. For example, if I wrong you by breaking your best vase, then reparation may consist of buying you a new vase of comparable price. Penance involves giving the victim ‘something beyond mere compensation’ (ibid., 84). For example, in addition to simply replacing your vase, I could give you penance by also giving you flowers or offering to mow your lawn. Giving the victim a costly gift in the form of penance is a performative act whereby the wrongdoer further disowns her wrong act in ‘a way which mere words do not do’ (ibid.). When a wrongdoer has apologized, repented, and offered reparation and penance, her guilt is removed, assuming that her victim offers forgiveness in response.
According to Swinburne's reparation theory of atonement, the salvific benefit of Christ's work is the removal of the guilt that we possess as a result of sinning against God. Although we are able to apologize and repent on our own, it is extremely difficult for us to offer God a sufficiently costly reparation and penance on our own. Thus, we need help in making atonement to God. This is where Christ's work comes into play. Christ gave his life to us, so that we can ‘offer it to God as the life we ought to have led’ as our reparation and penance (ibid., 154). Swinburne imagines a person pleading the sacrifice of Christ in prayer:
Our life is a failure . . . We have made a mess of the life which you gave us, we have made no reparation of our own for our sins, nor have we helped others to make atonement for their sins. But we have been given a perfect life, not owed to you, O God. We offer you this life instead of the life we should have led, and instead of the lives which others (in whose sins we are involved) should have led. Take its perfection instead of our imperfection. We are serious enough about our sins to repent and apologize and to offer you back an offering of this value as our reparation and penance. (ibid., 154–155)
When we have apologized, repented, and offered up Christ's life as our reparation and penance, it becomes appropriate for God to forgive us, which He does. Guilt is removed, and we are reconciled with God – that is, we are saved. Let the reparation theory be this entire picture of atonement, according to which all of the following are true: Christ has literally given us his life; we can give Christ's life to God as proper reparation and penance; when we give Christ's life to God as our reparation and penance, God forgives us and our guilt is expunged; and the salvific benefit of Christ's work is that it makes possible this process of atonement.
I have omitted many details of Swinburne's rich account, but we have enough of it on the table to see that it is vulnerable to the following objection.
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(1) AIC: A theory of atonement is true only if it does not imply that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
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(2) Reparation theory implies that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
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(3) So, reparation theory is false.
Premise (1) has been defended already. Premise (2) is true if (A) is true:
(A) Reparation theory implies that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of reparation theory makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
To see that (A) implies (2), assume for the moment that (A) is true. It is then true that reparation theory implies both (i) that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of reparation theory makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work, and (since each theory of atonement trivially implies about itself that it is the correct theory of atonement) (ii) that reparation theory is the correct theory of atonement. And if (i) and (ii) are true, then failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work. So, (2) is true: reparation theory implies that failure to believe one of the distinctive claims of the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work. Again, this is all assuming that (A) is true. So, it follows that if (A) is true, then (2) is true. To establish (2), then, I will argue for (A).
To see why we should accept (A), notice that in order for someone successfully to give Christ's life to God as reparation and penance for her sins, she must believe the following claim: (I) That she is in possession of Christ's life such that she can give it to another. This is because it is a general truth that one can give a thing X to someone only if one believes that one possesses X. If I have no idea that I have a cup of flour, for example, it is impossible for me to offer it to you. Now, (I) is a distinctive claim of reparation theory: proponents of alternative theories of atonement are unlikely to accept it, or even to consider whether it is true until reading Swinburne's work. Some folks even explicitly reject (I).Footnote 4 So, if a person P believes (I), then she believes a distinctive claim of reparation theory. Since P gives Christ's life to God as reparation and penance only if she believes (I), and since P believes (I) only if she believes a distinctive claim of reparation theory (namely, (I) itself), it follows that P gives Christ's life to God as reparation and penance only if she believes a distinctive claim of reparation theory. Recall that it is part of reparation theory that the expunging of P's guilt by way of giving Christ's life as reparation and penance is the salvific benefit of Christ's work. So, reparation theory implies that P's believing this distinctive claim of reparation theory is necessary in order for her to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work. In other words, reparation theory implies that P's lack of belief in a distinctive claim of reparation theory makes it impossible for her to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work. And what goes for P goes for all of us. So (A) – and consequently, (2) – is true.
Consider a second line of reasoning in support of (A). It is extremely unlikely that a person will offer Christ's life to God as her reparation and penance unless she believes the following claims: (II) That humans are estranged from God until we offer Him a very costly gift as reparation and penance, (III) That Christ's life is an appropriate reparation and penance for our sins, and (IV) That God will accept Christ's life as a fitting reparation and penance. Perhaps it is logically possible to succeed in offering Christ's life to God as one's reparation and penance without believing (II)–(IV). But it is at least very difficult to succeed in doing this without belief in these claims, for a person who fails to believe these claims would have no idea that there is any reason to offer Christ's life to God as her reparation and penance. And (II)–(IV) are clearly distinctive claims of reparation theory: those who endorse other theories of atonement will tend to fail to believe them, and some even explicitly reject them.Footnote 5 So, it is very difficult to succeed in giving Christ's life to God as one's reparation and penance without believing some distinctive claims of reparation theory. And again, according to reparation theory, the salvific benefit of Christ's work just is a benefit that one receives by offering Christ's life to God as reparation and penance. So, reparation theory implies that it is very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work without believing some distinctive claims of reparation theory. That is, (A) – and thus, (2) – is true.
In Responsibility and Atonement, Swinburne makes some remarks about how typical Christians come to offer Christ's life as their reparation and penance, and it may be thought that these remarks provide a rebuttal to my argument for premise (2). He suggests that we may receive the ‘benefit of forgiveness’ from Christ's sacrifice if we ‘associate ourselves with it’ (ibid., 153). And a major way that one ‘associates’ herself with Christ's sacrifice is by participating in the sacraments. Swinburne explains:
The Christian Church provides a formal ceremony of association in the pledges made by the candidate for admission in its initiation ceremony of baptism and before participation in the Eucharist . . . In the Eucharist, St Paul wrote to the Corinthians, ‘we proclaim the Lord's death until he come’; and, of course, our participation in that involves receiving Christ's ‘body and blood’, which, whatever else it means, means at least the benefits of his laid-down life. We plead the sacrifice of Christ in joining and rejoining ourselves to the new humanity, the new and voluntary association of those who accept Christ's offering on their behalf, the Church. In so doing we repent and apologize and offer that sacrifice as our reparation and atonement. (ibid., 161)
As I understand it, Swinburne thinks that when a person actively participates in baptism and the Eucharist, she thereby associates herself with Christ's sacrifice, and this is sufficient for her to offer Christ's life as her reparation and penance. If this sufficiency claim is correct, then my argument for premise (2) fails. Even if a Christian outright rejects reparation theory, she may easily participate in the sacraments. So, if participating in the sacraments is sufficient for one to offer Christ's life as one's reparation and penance, then I have failed to establish premise (2), and my objection to reparation theory fails.
In reply, we should reject the claim that active participation in the sacraments is sufficient for one to have offered Christ's life to God as one's reparation and penance. As I have said, it is surely a necessary condition on giving somebody something that one believes that one possesses that thing. So, it is a necessary condition on giving Christ's life to God that one believes that one possesses Christ's life. Since participation in the sacraments does not guarantee that one believes that one possesses Christ's life, such participation is not sufficient to give Christ's life to God. I conclude that premise (2) is true: reparation theory has the problematic implication that lack of belief in the correct theory of atonement makes it impossible or very difficult to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
Conclusion
My goal has been to direct attention to an overlooked way in which an account of the atonement might fail, and to argue that one of the most sophisticated theories on offer – Swinburne's reparation theory – does fail in this way. But this discussion has broader implications. For it is an important question that is worthy of further investigation whether there are other theories of atonement in the literature that conflict with AIC.
At least some of the major theories seem to avoid the problem. For example, Christ could easily have defeated Satan and his cohort in a cosmic battle even if we are completely unaware that this is what Christ primarily accomplished on the cross. Consequently, some Christus Victor theories do not have the problematic implication that correct belief about how the atonement works is crucial to receiving the salvific benefit of Christ's work. This is a theoretical virtue of such theories that has not been appreciated.
Penal substitution theory also has this virtue. Even someone who is totally convinced that penal substitution theory is mistaken can be such that Christ is punished in her place. So, this theory does not imply that belief in the correct theory of atonement is crucial to receiving the salvific benefits of Christ's work.
The same can be said about moral exemplar theory, according to which Christ's life and death reconciles us to God primarily by inspiring us to repent and to perform acts of love. Even if a person fails to believe that the salvific benefit of Christ's work is constituted by this inspiration to love and repentance, thereby rejecting the distinctive claim of moral exemplar theory, she can still be so inspired. So, this theory of atonement is not threatened by AIC.
Things are more complicated for Anselmian versions of satisfaction theory.Footnote 6 On views of this sort, all rational creatures owe God perfect obedience. We have failed to give this to God, and this means that we are in debt to Him. Because of the enormity of the debt, and because we owe God everything as it is, we cannot repay the debt by ourselves. This puts us at odds with God. But fortunately, Christ leads a supererogatory life, and this makes it so that God owes Christ a reward. The reward that Christ claims is the forgiveness of our debt, and this results in our being reconciled with God.
There is a natural way of developing this type of satisfaction theory that results in its conflicting with AIC. This becomes clear when we inquire into the details of the nature of Christ's reward: exactly which people are such that Christ's reward is constituted by the cancellation of their debt? A natural answer is this: those people who plead Christ's life and death, requesting that they be recipients of the reward that was due to Christ. This specification of Christ's reward will be especially attractive to those who, like Swinburne, are inclined to believe that we must be actively involved in the process of the removal of our sins, and that ‘the sinner has to use Christ's death to get forgiveness’ (ibid., 153, my emphasis). If Christ's reward consists of the cancellation of the debt of those who explicitly ask to be included in that reward, then this ensures that one must make active use of Christ's death in order to receive God's forgiveness.
This version of the Anselmian view is falsified by AIC. It is a distinctive claim of this theory that we are estranged from God because we are debtors of a certain sort. One who fails to believe this distinctive claim is unlikely to plead Christ's work for the sake of the cancellation of the debt, and thus is unlikely to receive that which is, according to this theory, the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
But while this natural development of the Anselmian view conflicts with AIC, other developments of it do not. A version on which Christ's reward consists of the cancellation of the debt of everyone who loves and has faith in Christ seems to avoid the problem. On this version of the view, a person could be included in Christ's reward even if she is ignorant about how the atonement works, so long as she has the requisite love and faith in Christ. Importantly, the arguments that I have developed in this article provide guidance on how most plausibly to develop the details of an Anselmian satisfaction theory.
So, some of the major theories of atonement have the resources to escape the basic problem that I have developed. In closing, I suggest that this problem may well seriously threaten Mark Murphy's recent vicarious punishment theory.Footnote 7 According to this ingenious theory, the main barrier between us and God is that we deserve to be very severely punished for our sins. Until God punishes us, thereby requiting our ill-desert, we cannot be reconciled with God. Christ facilitates our salvation by providing the means by which we may receive the deserved punishment for our sins. Specifically, the Christian's punishment is constituted by the imposition of the following hard treatment on her: her Lord is ingloriously killed on the cross. Because a person's good is partly constituted by the good of her Lord, this is the very severe punishment that suffices to requite our ill-desert, enabling perfect union with God. On this theory, the salvific benefit of Christ's work is this union.
It is prima facie plausible that vicarious punishment theory has the problematic implication that failure to believe some of its distinctive claims makes it impossible to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work. On the plausible assumption that there is always something morally problematic about punishing a person without their knowing that and how they are being punished, God would be doing something morally problematic if He were to punish a Christian by killing her Lord when she fails to believe that God punishes her in this way. And on the further plausible assumption that God cannot do that which is morally problematic, it would follow that God cannot punish a Christian by killing her Lord when she does not believe that she is being punished in this way. And obviously, the belief that God punishes us by subjecting our Lord to an inglorious death on the cross is a distinctive claim of vicarious punishment theory. So, this theory may imply that failure to believe one of its distinctive claims makes it impossible to receive the salvific benefit of Christ's work.
Murphy might have responses. My point is only that it is currently an open question whether vicarious punishment theory has the problematic implications that I have been discussing. Whether it does is an issue that should be further investigated. Similarly, all current and future theories of atonement should be assessed partly on the basis of whether they cohere well with our ignorance about the mechanics of Christ's atonement, which for most of us remain quite mysterious.Footnote 8
