Peter Sarris' book (based upon his doctoral dissertation) is addressed to an audience: one, very familiar with Byzantine Imperial history; two, with a knowledge of ancient Greek (circa 500 CE); and three, with solid grounding in the political and social institutions of the Byzantine Roman Empire from the third through the sixth centuries CE. The author contends that the political, social, and economic history of the Byzantine Empire can be discovered and comprehended through the lens of papyri texts and documents that have been unearthed in Egypt.

Massive amounts of papyri have been preserved in what were essentially trash dumps. The dry Egyptian climate and the lack of development over a millennium assured the survival of the Oxyrhynchus papyri that constitute the bulk of Sarris' source materials. Oxyrhynchus and its surrounding area were relatively prosperous and populated up to the sixth century; subsequently it became more of an economic backwater. Economic decline allowed the dumps (and the papyri) to remain undisturbed until well into the modern era. In Byzantine Egypt papyrus was expensive; this led to its recycling. Consequently a papyrus fragment may contain a letter, school boy's exercises, and estate accounts. This increases the difficulty of transcribing and interpreting papyri.

The thesis that the Byzantine Empire can be understood through Egyptian papyri requires two additional assumptions: first, the Oxyrhynchus papyri are representative of Egypt under the rule of Byzantium Rome; and second, because the main part of the papyri come from the accounts and documents of the Apion family, that the Apion family estates were representative of the great estates of the Empire. Consequently the hypothesis that Imperial fortunes can be understood through the papyri requires either faith or additional evidence. The first two chapters (there are eleven plus an introduction and conclusion) are devoted to making the case that Egypt, Oxyrhynchus, and the Apion estates were representative and important components of the entire Empire.

Scholars expert in the history of early Egypt may debate how representative Egypt, Oxyrhynchus, and the Apion estates were but Sarris's depiction of the institutional arrangements surrounding the Apion estates does not dispel the lack of knowledge on this subject. Only late in the book (p. 194) does Sarris mention that these estates were inalienable; this resolves a question that arises in the early chapters dealing with estate management. There is neither an adequate explanation of the institutional arrangements that governed the Apion estates, nor is there an explanation of how consequential decisions were made. In contrast to the black box of decision making within the Apion family, the author explains in some detail the nuances of Imperial government and interactions of the Emperor, Senate, and aristocracy. A chart (p. 79) outlining the hierarchy of the Apion household as a supreme decision maker (“Landowner”), but all the textual evidence suggests that there was no single individual in charge of the estate as in contemporary estate ownership or management. Whatever it may be cannot be ascertained here.

Chapters 3 through 6 explain some of the details of estate management. There were labor contracts and money was typically used rather than payments in kind. But there were significant differences so that labor was not free to contract with anyone, nor were payments in kind completely absent. Obviously this is confusing; part of this confusion is that in the early to mid-sixth century both feudal and market institutions were in existence, sometimes in conflict, sometimes symbiotically.

Chapters 7 through 10 are devoted to the great estates: within and beyond Egypt their historiography, interactions with Imperial authorities, and the rise of the great estate. In these chapters the great estates are depicted as evolving (although I am not sure whether Sarris would be in complete agreement with this interpretation) into feudal entities. During and after the sixth century the central government's authority weakened and the Empire was fragmenting. Sarris does not explain why the Empire fragmented; he mentions the Plague of Justinian (starting 542 CE) in Chapter 11, as well as inflation, debasement, and evaluation. Along with others, I would suggest that the Plague of Justinian was instrumental in the decline in the fortunes of the Empire because it reduced the resources available to the Imperial government. The decline in the Empire's population and its population relative to its less urbanized rivals is sufficient to explain the Empire's shrinking resource base and its failures in warfare. Sarris does not make much of this, indeed while the author is learned in many subjects and languages, economics and demography are not among them.

Sarris's Egypt was populous and prosperous, constituting approximately one-fourth of the Empire; Oxyrhynchus and the Apion estates were similarly privileged. His depictions are highly nuanced; there were both contractual and servile laborers, payments were sometimes in money, sometimes in kind, and the common folk were at times exploited, other times exploiting. This approach may be appropriate, but it is not enlightening. Also the significance of some of the evidence eludes Sarris. He writes (p. 32) that agricultural laborers were compensated when their land was converted from vineyards to meadows; there is no date associated with the event; Sarris appears to not recognize its significance. Vineyards were long-lived plants, producing more value per acre than meadows; why were they converted? Vineyards were also much more labor-intensive, so the Plague could be an answer if both prices for wine declined and labor expenses rose post—Plague, alternatively the climate may have changed; regardless, illustrating the economic void herein, the author only comments on the compensation paid to the laborers.

The contributions to economic history are in the documentation of a more monetized economy rather than the economy depicted by Moses Finley (The Ancient Economy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). That being said, Sarris's reporting on inflation, devaluation, revaluation, and comparative advantage are, at best, inadequate. I am ambivalent about this book because my interests are primarily in economic history. The author's major contribution to economic history is that he has publicized an unexploited trove of documents from late antiquity that probably dwarfs those of the Cairo Geniza that Avner Greif (Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) used to illuminate medieval trade, society, and economics. The papyri that are Sarris's sources may reveal much of what is unknown. So while this is not an economic history, it is a map of where treasures may lie, for this he is commended.