When China's leaders whom I have met appear in print, their words, having been drafted or pasteurized by committee, generally sound formulaic, appear to be in code, and often give little insight into the actual world they confront. This book is different. The Vice Premier Li Lanqing I found in 1993 to be insightful, to the point, and educational in explaining the PRC's actual problems, comes through clearly, honestly and often humorously in Breaking Through. Reading this volume I could not help but think that China would be so much more effectively represented if it encouraged its many talented citizens and former leaders to speak the truth, in their own voice, and make a genuine effort to reach out to the world.
Breaking Through refers to 1978–84 when Deng Xiaoping was firmly in the saddle of power (Li dates Deng's resumption of power to 17 July 1977 [p. 397]) and launched China on the “reform and opening policy.” This volume is a technocrat's account of the nuts and bolts of how a general inclination to learn from the outside world, build a more market-driven economy, and summon up the intellectual and business talents of China's people was translated into reality through the implementation of a series of specific policies. The policy streams that are elaborated upon in well-written detail are: creating special economic zones; importing advanced equipment and technology; establishing joint and other ventures with foreigners; accepting development assistance and multilateral organization loans; overhauling the foreign trade system; and cultivating talent through international educational exchange. For those of us who have written on bureaucratic politics, the tiao-kuai system, and the role of interagency co-ordination through leading small groups, not to mention how domestic politics shapes foreign policy, we can only wish that we had possessed Li Lanqing's multitude of examples decades ago.
One example gives a flavour of both the writing and the protracted bureaucratic guerrilla war that Li and his like-minded reform-oriented technocratic leaders faced. In the early 1980s Li was involved heavily in reform of the foreign trade system that consisted of about a dozen centrally run foreign trade corporations, built on monopolies, overvalued currency, centralized decision making, “eating from the big, common pot,” and massive subsidies. Li recounts one meeting in which he had to referee a bureaucratic cat fight between three different foreign trade corporations, each claiming the exclusive right to trade in designed textiles (“drawnwork”): “The man from Chinatex claimed that drawnwork was a textile product and the man from CNACIEC contended that it was a handicraft. The leader of China Tuhsu argued that ramie was a native product, and went so far as to declare that anything that flew in the sky, grew on the ground or was raised by man was either native produce or an animal product, and was therefore well within his company's business domain. He fell just short of saying that all commodities on earth should be left to their management… When I announced the verdict, I knew it was only a temporary ‘armistice agreement’, rather than a thorough settlement of the issue” (p. 371).
Beyond gaining sympathy for high-level officials in their life of constant interagency co-ordination and conflict reduction, in this volume one gains appreciation for the role of leadership and how many strategic decisions Deng Xiaoping made, even before the policies announced at the landmark Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee that opened on 18 December 1979 – three days after the announcement of US–China normalization. By the time of the Third Plenum's opening, Deng already had decided to send massive numbers of students abroad, set up special economic zones, and import as much foreign technology as possible. Showing how overloaded with decisions the top of the Chinese hierarchy is, however, Deng not only had to personally deal with grand strategic issues, he also had to make decisions that should have been made many levels below his. For example, many readers of this review will have stayed at the Jianguo Hotel while in Beijing. It turns out that neighbours behind the construction site in the very early 1980s objected to its planned height and consequent obstruction of sunlight – they initially were able to stymie construction. Deng Xiaoping finally had to intervene, saying, “No trouble-making is allowed even for good reason, let alone for no reason!” “Only then,” Li tells us, “did the project proceed smoothly” (p. 283).
While Li gives enormous credit to Deng's strategic vision, he also acknowledges those of vision around him, including: Li Xiannian, Gu Mu, Chen Yun, Wang Daohan, Jiang Zemin, Wan Li, Xiang Nan, Fang Yi, Chen Muhua, among many others. At the same time that he credits China's leadership, Li Lanqing also acknowledges that there was a conjunction between Deng's vision and the emergence of a relatively hospitable international economic and strategic environment. Firms like GM were looking for new partners to diversify away from mature markets in the West; the dragon economies around China required outlets for their exports and capital, needed to lower labour costs, and could serve as intermediaries; Western Europe was in a growth lull and needed new markets; and the United States was ready to help, not least for strategic reasons having to do with the Soviet Union. In short, China's reform reflected domestic leadership and external opportunity.
For an American reading this book, there are three lessons for our own practice that I carried away: first, leaders and vision count; second, public and private sector leaders need to constantly scan the horizon for better practices – self satisfaction is a great danger; and finally, governments must devote great attention to both popular education and training and, importantly, training of government personnel on an ongoing basis.
Concisely, this is the best available account of China's move toward the world in the late-1970s and early 1980s by a Chinese leader who was central to the process, variously as auto plant director, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and Vice-Premier and Politburo Standing Committee member, among other important posts. This volume is likely to remain the most thorough inside explanation of this watershed period for a long time.
