The author declares that “the primary objective of this book is to introduce, in the form of a survey of the economic literature, a straightforward account of modern growth theory and capital theory from the 1930s to the present, along with a critical examination of each” (p. 5). The book thus sets out on a large-scale assessment of the field. To a large degree it is successful, especially when dealing with developments in modeling, but there are some important omissions and weaknesses. As a survey of the development of models of economic growth, it is a very useful text.
Chapter 1 looks at the classical economists, particularly Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. Chapter 2 examines the “neo-Keynesian” theory of growth inspired by Roy Harrod and Evsey Domar. Chapter 3 outlines the theory of distribution and growth developed by Nicholas Kaldor and Luigi Pasinetti. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the neoclassical theory of growth developed by Robert Solow and several others. Chapter 6 looks at the Cambridge capital controversies, between Joan Robinson and others in the United Kingdom on the one side, and Paul Samuelson and others in the United States on the other side. Chapter 7 looks at theories of economic growth and development. Finally, chapters 8, 9, and 10 contain a detailed examination of endogenous growth theory, bringing us up to the cutting-edge mainstream growth theory of today.
The book's emphasis is very much on mathematical models. For those looking at the development of models of growth and capital since the 1930s, this is a very useful volume, executed with great care and attention to detail. But for those looking further, it may be a disappointment.
While the book is driven by the technical details of the modeling, relatively little attention is given to the empirical shortcomings of even the most sophisticated growth models. The failures of standard growth models to give accurate predictions of growth have dogged all theory in this genre. In repeated cases, large residuals typically remain unexplained. Indeed, this shortcoming has been a major stimulus since the 1970s of approaches that attempt to take institutional factors into account in explaining growth, as in the earlier work of Douglass North and Mancur Olson and more recently with Daron Acemoglu and his colleagues. Work in that genre has brought institutions into the explanation, but despite its prominence, we learn little of this work in the book.
Even more fundamentally, when almost all attention is focused on the formal models, the gaze is diverted from the meaning of key variables used in the modeling, including the meaning of capital itself. There is no mention of the fact that Adam Smith changed the meaning of capital to a physical input, from its standard and still-enduring business meaning of a monetary outlay. There is no acknowledgment that leading economists such as Joseph Schumpeter regretted this change.
While the book does look at the Cambridge capital controversies, it misses out on other important disputes concerning the nature of capital and the underpinnings of growth. For example, the contribution of the Austrian school gets scant attention; in particular, the important debate between Friedrich Hayek and Frank Knight in the 1930s on the nature of capital is not discussed. Bold and controversial attempts to extend the notion of capital to human capital and social capital are given inadequate consideration.
Perhaps the author would respond that the book is about “mainstream” economists. Yet he discusses a number of economists, from Karl Marx to John Robinson, who were not mainstream. The book is not about mainstream economists alone. Perhaps a better title for the book would have been The Development of Models of Economic Growth and Capital. This would be more accurate in reflecting the central role that models play in the book.
These underlying conceptual omissions are not minor. An economic model that attempts to capture reality has limits to its improvement that are set by the underlying concepts and variables. The history of economic thought shows that capital is a problematic and controversial concept, and its role in economic growth is no less difficult to capture and demonstrate empirically.
As an illustration of the importance of these underlying issues, it should be noted that in his Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), Thomas Piketty reverted back to the pre-Smith definition of capital in terms of money and collateralizable assets. For him, humans and other noncollateralizable resources are not capital. With this important move, Piketty was able to show that the concentrated distribution of collateralizable property was a major generator of further inequality within the capitalist system.
I have been a student of capital theory and growth theory for half a century. I cannot conceal my concern about the limited empirical and practical successes in this field, while acknowledging the many important developments in economic modeling. The book under review shows us a lot about the models, but it does not share my underlying concern. My intuition is that capital theory and growth theory need to be reconstructed in a very different manner, and the book under review does little to address the radical changes that would be required.
Some important and fundamental suggestions were made in Maurice FitzGerald Scott's neglected volume entitled A New View of Economic Growth (1989). Scott questioned the standard definition of investment in terms of tangible assets and argued that investment should include research and development, the creation of new production-related institutional structures, and the formation of new management teams. He argued that economic growth is predominantly a cognitive, learning process in which the scope for learning is progressively extended by gross investment. If this “new view” were to be modeled mathematically, it would require a different kind of mathematics—one that could handle information, knowledge, and hugely varied resources and outputs. I have tried to build on these and other insights in my own recent work. But I agree, such a reconstruction would no longer be mainstream.
