The value of this book, by the doyen of the UK's health policy journalists, is that it shines a full-beam torch into the government's skeleton cupboard of policy faux pas before there has been time to bury the recent health policy disaster under spadefuls of retrospective spin. One of Timmins’ key observations is that policy should resemble a well-aimed rifle shot rather than a carpet bombing. Well, this book – produced far quicker than self-styled ‘academic’ treatises and losing little in the process – aims a rifle shot at Coalition health policymaking, which hits the target, while the government is still dusting itself down from the bloody passage of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Without using academic terms, Timmins illustrates how the policymaking, which led to the 2012 Act, came straight from the ‘garbage can’ (Cohen et al., Reference Cohen, March and Olsen1972; Paton, Reference Paton2006) – whence policy is non-rational even when it is not irrational – and therefore contains little order and more than a little ordure.
That said, another of the book's virtues is that Timmins eschews cynicism. Yes, he depicts the chaos and short-termism in the process of evolution from Conservative health policy documents of the mid-2000s through the Coalition agreement, the White Paper (Department of Health, 2010), the Health and Social Care Bill (Mark 1) and on via the infamous ‘pause’ in consideration of this first version of the Bill in 2011 to the final incoherent Act. However, he also depicts the vision of Andrew Lansley, the Act's tortured guardian. This is the Conservative Health Secretary who claimed that, after his reform of the National Health Service (NHS), it will ‘never again’ need fundamental reform. As well as being arrogant, this sounds more than a little crazed. Therefore, for Timmins to hold out the possibility, that maybe – just maybe – Lansley will be treated by posterity as a hero rather than a villain in the zig-zagging story of ‘public sector reform’, shows that the author has achieved a well-nigh-impossible combination – an account of politics at its worst and yet sympathy for the main political protagonist.
This commentator nevertheless sees that any such sympathy is of the sort felt for the Shakespearean tragic hero – brought down by flaws on his own side rather than by chance or malice. For those who find this analogy fanciful, I refer you to Timmins’ subtitle – A Moderne Drama in Five Incompleted Acts. And by ‘his own side’, we should mean both the policy flaws within Lansley's vision and also the pantomime-horse nature of both the Coalition agreement in 2010 and the NHS Future Forum's conduct of the ‘pause’ in 2011 (of which, more below).
Lansley's ideas for the NHS were there for all to see from 2005, according to Timmins’ careful account of his speeches and policy documents from the period (six and a half years before the general election of 2010, which brought the Coalition to power) when Lansley was Shadow Health Secretary. So how do we explain the view that his White Paper of July 2010 was a bombshell? The implicit answer, in my view, would be that commentators and NHS people generally assumed that Conservative leader (and Prime Minister after May 2010) Cameron's soothing words on the NHS (no top-down reorganisation) as part of his campaign to detoxify the ‘nastiness’ in the Tory brand were actually joined up with the actual policy detail being worked up by his former boss at the Conservative Research Department, Andrew Lansley, seen by colleagues as a ‘steamroller’ rather than the traditional politician for whom politics was the art of the possible.
What we now know of Cameron's record across a whole range of policies beyond health shows such a way of thinking to be optimistic: the spin and the policy content were separate, with the latter detail possibly unknown by ‘Non-Executive Chairman Cameron’ and his Liberal Democratic Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, both of whom signed the Foreword to the White Paper containing the material for the Health and Social Care Bill Mark 1 yet which both Cameron and Clegg then demanded be withdrawn to allow the infamous ‘pause’ for ‘consultation’. This ‘pause’, forced on a temporarily humiliated Health Secretary Lansley, was presented ludicrously to the country as a new, inclusive way of doing business (and even spun surreptitiously as a contrast to the dictatorial approach under Margaret Thatcher). Yet anyone with any nous knew that the ‘top-down reorganisation that was not a top-down reorganisation’ was being reviewed because the Bill was going to be defeated in parliament, as the Rip Van Liberal wing of the Coalition woke up to the outrage not only among their grassroots but also on their backbenches.
This does not mean that Cameron and colleagues did not know that the Health Bill Mark 1, pre-pause, contained a more radical ‘marketisation’ of the NHS than ever before – with not only private provision but also private management of public funding looming; with ‘external regulation of the market’ replacing performance management of a public system; and most of the money given to solo contractors who were mostly not even employed by the NHS (known as GPs.) For Cameron's implicit ‘quid pro quo’ with the anti-NHS tendency on his backbenches and the market ideologues of (e.g.) the Reform think tank was as follows (in my words): I am forcing you to ‘love the NHS’, but in return I will give you an NHS commercialised and localised as never before.
But it does mean that – just as Justice Secretary Ken Clarke (who was Health Secretary from 1988 to 1990, when he introduced the first, ‘Thatcher’ market into the NHS) had breezily boasted of not bothering to read the Maastricht document on EU integration – Cameron had not bothered with the detail and implications of Lansley's reforms. Presumably, to give him the benefit of the doubt, he thought that the detail was in the realm of low politics (i.e. below the waterline as far as the public were concerned.) Little did he know that the translation of the detail into its policy implications – communicated atrociously, to boot – would lead to a series of explosions above ground level, which led to the vilification of the proposed reforms. It also led to the highly unlikely and ironical beatification of some of the most dubious, neologistic institutions bequeathed by New Labour between 2000 and 2006, the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), modest ‘commissioning’ bodies with much to be modest about. Andrew Lansley became a YouTube anti-hero, seen as attacking the NHS's treasured structures. He sought unsuccessfully to turn the argument around by painting his opponents as clinging on to bureaucratic failure rather than giving power to the ‘frontline’ [an echo, equally ironically, of Milburn's language in 2001 that had led to the creation of the PCTs in the first place (Department of Health, 2001)].
However, some of Lansley's diagnosis was right. New Labour had fiddled and fumbled its way through one structural reorganisation after another, in the process helping to discredit the purchaser (commissioner)/provider split and ‘purchasing’ per se. Timmins perceptively quotes Ken Clarke as stating that, if this approach failed to deliver after 20 years, then we had been “barking up the wrong tree”. However, ideological closure in favour of the purchaser/provider market is well-nigh complete within the London consensus. Therefore, any failure of the purchaser/provider split is translated into apologia such as ‘the need to develop commissioning further’ (this refrain has been sung for at least 20 years, in the portals of the middle-of-the-road think tanks) or ‘the need to extend the market’. The intelligent and pragmatic Chairman of the Commons Health Select Committee, Stephen Dorrell (former Health Secretary), is a good example of someone who sees the illusory nature of the purchaser/provider split in practice, yet sees this direction of travel as both inevitable and desirable. There is cognitive dissonance here.
However, such ideological closure is completed in an evidence-free zone, or where evidence is an afterthought. Where evidence is sought, it is in the context of policy-based evidence rather than evidence-based policy – evidence to justify what is happening anyway. The policy is buttressed by public choice and New Right economics, although such spry ideological spectres go unnoticed in the new conventional wisdom of those NHS trusties and commentators who think it is a pragmatic policy.
In the United Kingdom/England, the NHS internal market of 1989 to 1997 (as were later incarnations of the market) was developed not in response to evidence, but as a desideratum. Only once it was enacted was modelling of what the perfect market for the NHS might look like done by academics (the ‘quasi-market’ modelling of the 1990s), and only later still was this followed by empirical data as to the alleged benefits of market choice (Cooper et al., Reference Cooper, Gibbons, Jones and McGuire2011). Critics (Pollock et al., Reference Pollock, Macfarlane and Greener2012) maintain that such empiricism consists in ‘data dredging’ and questionable methodological assumptions (e.g. as to when and where the market did and did not operate in the NHS) as opposed to theory-driven research, which links hypothesis to actual practice.
Lansley in effect argued that the PCTs were poor, with poor cost-effectiveness. Market reforms, sold as efficiency on the hoof, had been overcome with management costs. Research quoted by the House of Commons Select Committee on Health (2010) said as much. Hence, a new approach was needed. At this point, Lansley's analysis could have had the support from both Left and Right. This reviewer, speaking from the Left, thinks that Lansley should have said (although it was never going to happen), ‘when in a market hole, stop digging’. Instead, Lansley plumped for a deeper hole. Thus, the White Paper, Equity and Excellence and the Health Bill sponsored more market and more localism.
This approach was paradoxically emboldened by the incoherence of the Coalition agreement brokered by the Tories’ Oliver Letwin (the party's policy guru) and the Liberal Democrats’ Danny Alexander, fresh from running PR for the Cairngorms National Park in Scotland. In the post-election negotiation between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, a compromise was stitched up whereby elected PCTs (a Liberal policy) would be kept ‘on message’ by being accountable to centrally appointed Chief Executives – a ludicrous mess, which could be devised only by politicians who knew nothing of the NHS or wider health policy.
Therefore, in seeking to go beyond this, Lansley was emboldened to go beyond even his own previous approach – keeping PCTs but letting them fade into the background; letting the process be voluntary. When Cameron first started to get concerned about Lansley's trajectory, he asked Oliver Letwin – again – to give the plans the once-over, with Letwin approving them in November 2010.
When we turn to the validity of Lansley's analysis and policy, he is much more culpable. The main plank of the Health Bill Mark 1 (before the ‘pause’) was to give the commissioning budget to groups of GPs. As Timmins correctly notices, the nearest previous incarnation of this policy lay in the Total Purchasing Pilot schemes promoted at the end of the 1990s Conservative government, when Stephen Dorrell (after 2010, the Chairman of the House of Commons Health Select Committee) was Health Secretary. The Department of Health-funded official evaluation of these schemes (Mays et al., Reference Mays1998) concluded (unsurprisingly but importantly) that GP commissioning could not be done on the cheap or in the short term, and crucially that it worked best for ‘extended primary care’ (i.e. areas which the GPs were locally interested in) rather than the main gamut of secondary services (with honourable exceptions).
Yet Lansley's policy turned this evidence on its head – and removed primary care from the putative new GP Commissioning Groups (on the grounds that in a ‘market’ there would be a conflict-of-interest if GPs commissioned from inter alia themselves), while giving them the responsibility for commissioning the bulk of hospital services – a responsibility that the bulk of the profession did not want, except for the commissioning wonks and ‘reform junkies’ of the NHS Alliance and the National Association of Primary Care.
The government should also have noticed that the more the meso-level institutions of the NHS (e.g. regional or strategic authorities) are abolished in favour of the market or localism, the more the centre has to step in as uber-localism fails at the first hurdle. Paton's law of NHS structural change is ‘the more decentralisation is sought or advertised, the more centralisation occurs’. That was the fate of Alan Milburn's disastrous reform, Shifting the Balance Of Power (Department Of Health, 2001), which can in fact be seen as a plain-clothes rehearsal for the Lansley Bill. And as I write in September 2012, the Health Act, sold as the biggest ever decentralisation, is turning into the biggest ever centralisation, as the NHS Commissioning Board – out of necessity, not conspiracy – is forced to grab the controls to save the NHS from the Sorcerer's apprentice and his helpers, flooding the NHS with amateurism and anarchy. With Lansley removed from Health in the Cabinet reshuffle of September 4, the main challenge for the new Secretary will be to gain central control of the ‘new anarchy’, not least in order to attempt to make some of the vast savings inherent in the NHS business model to 2016.
However, the main reason for the ‘pause’ – from March to June 2011 – in passage of the Health Bill was not concern that it involved too much localism. The NHS and the Department of Health have very little institutional memory these days (redisorganisation has reigned supreme there too, as Timmins explains) and a vision of decentralisation usually plays well, as the history of ‘devolving power’ repeats itself (first time as tragedy, second time as farce, to adapt Karl Marx). Instead, the political concern lay in the Bill's abdication of the Health Secretary's “responsibility… to provide health services…”; the seemingly vastly expanded role of private providers and private care in NHS providers; and also the absence of governance in and of the new GP Commissioning Groups.
Leading up to the ‘pause’, some of the questions raised regarding the market included (Paton, Reference Paton2012a) if private providers ‘cherry picked’ hospital services, what would be the implications for the clinical, financial and educational viability of the extant public services left within the NHS?; if whole NHS hospitals were not allowed to tender for contracts, how could the above issue be tackled?; if NHS hospitals and other providers were not allowed to be ‘preferred providers’ (the sensible, pragmatic approach of Labour's last Health Secretary before 2010, Andy Burnham), then how could there be integrated care between hospitals and other community services if each component of the care pathway was perpetually out to tender?; and, if price competition were reintroduced by the back or indeed front door, then how could a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of quality be avoided?
The NHS Future Forum was set up to take the political heat for the Coalition, but it produced what I have described elsewhere as a “confused consensus” (Paton, Reference Paton2012b). Cameron nearly bit the hand of its Chairman off to accept its recommendations the day after they were delivered (perhaps like the original White Paper, without digesting the report?) but very little was resolved. The buzzword was now integration rather than competition – but subsequent events suggest that the government saw this as a political fig-leaf rather than a policy change.
Monitor, trailed in the Bill Mark 1 as an all-powerful pro-competitive regulator, was now, in the Bill Mark 2 after the pause, to have the additional responsibility to promote integrated care and was charged with ‘preventing anti-competitive practices’ rather than ‘promoting competition’. To those who say that competition and integration or ‘collaboration’ (an infamously vague NHS buzzword over the decades) are compatible, I say, ‘up to a point’ or indeed ‘usually not.’
For there is a genuine divide between those who believe in the purchaser/provider split 1990s and 2000s style – which leads to disintegration in provision (to be fair, not seen as a problem by market enthusiasts of this genre) – and those who believe in integrated services, covering hospital–hospital and hospital–community cooperation on the basis of clinical and managerial networks if not full institutional integration. The NHS Future Forum was led to believe that there was a ‘third way’, judging by the fact it took advice from the King's Fund. The Fund's Chief Executive Chris Ham had been on a circuitous journey from 1989 to 2012, oscillating between support for and scepticism about the market agenda for the NHS – and had by now settled upon the idea of competition between integrated care organisations (actually the ‘competing Health Maintenance Organisations’ model promoted by Alain Enthoven, the guru of ‘managed competition’, for 35 years). What the Forum did not see was that such competition, while partially viable in the richer areas of California where excess capacity was a reality, was a non-starter in an NHS facing the ‘Nicholson challenge’ of £20 billion savings over four years – an NHS for which the same King's Fund prescribed hospital contraction (Ham et al., Reference Ham, Dixon and Brooke2012), rather than the excess capacity needed for competition. With stripped-out capacity, such ‘competition’ could only be for the purchasing (or its management) of a fixed and scarce quantum of integrated care on behalf of patients, and patient choice, in this context, would consist in poring over the small print of quasi-insurance policies (all of which would be touting their ability to strike a deal with the same providers) rather than choice of real doctors in real time.
The Health and Social Care Bill (Mark 2) was given a rough ride in the House of Lords, as detailed by Timmins, just as the Health Select Committee had given Mark 1 a good going-over in the Commons. In the Lords, former ministers and experts queued up to challenge various aspects of its incoherence, ranging from the role of the Secretary of State through its susceptibility to EU Competition Law. Various amendments improved it slightly, but the NHS was left facing a massive top-down reorganisation, which was, frankly, unnecessary. A further irony was that pro-competitive advocates such as Julian le Grand and Simon Stevens from the quasi-neo-liberal Blairite wing of the Labour party now saw the resultant Act as a dog's breakfast rather than a continuation of Blairite aspirations, which they had seen in the original Lansley Bill. Thus, the NHS was left with a universally unpopular, massive distraction at a time when it could least afford it.
I say universally, but this is not quite fair. For the ‘usual suspects’ – those GPs who thought they could use the Act as an opportunity to seize the reins of the NHS on behalf of patients – came forward to try to make it work. I hope they are not too offended if I say that history is likely to see them as Lenin's ‘useful idiots’. For the new centralism and control of commissioning from on high is leaving them with little power and much responsibility.
Timmins concludes with some recommendations for better policy. These are a little wish-list-ish, for his preceding analysis gives a full-blooded picture of why ticking off the items on such a list is so difficult. I suspect it is a cultural rather than technical change that policy requires. The politics of making and keeping the Coalition has of course created further problems in terms of awkward compromise. But it has also had some minor benefits (by comparison with an all-Conservative regime). Had the original Health Bill been introduced in a Thatcher-like context, it would have been on the statute book without the compromises promoted by Shirley Williams and other publicly interested parties. These may be footnotes when set against the wider mess created by the Act. But they also rein in some of its more dangerous features, and keep the NHS public enough to fight another day.
