Nearly nine years after a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze in provincial Tunisia, a sense that the aspirations of the Arab Spring were always doomed to fail has set in among pundits and policymakers. The United States, and to a large extent the European Union, have all but given up on any pretense of democracy promotion in the region and have instead turned again to well-trodden policy repertoires emphasizing a realpolitik approach.
While the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia, it was the street protests in Egypt, the most populous and historically most influential Arab state, that captured the imagination of the world. If in 2011 Egyptians showed the power of ordinary people to topple repressive and corrupt regimes, then they have also demonstrated how difficult it would be to achieve democracy and justice. In 2013, a military coup installed a new authoritarian regime, exceeding the previous one in its appetite for brutality.
In explaining the failures of the Arab Spring, many scholarly accounts have turned to historical legacies. As Lisa Anderson noted soon after the uprisings, political cultures, levels of economic development, experiences with statehood and constitutionalism, the role of institutions such as the military, and issues related to internal diversity and identity all varied significantly across the region and were likely to cause different trajectories of change.Footnote 1 Since then, a literature on the Arab Spring that highlights structural legacies has grown.Footnote 2
However, more recently, scholars such as Kristen Kao, Ellen Lust, and Michael Wahid Hanna have emphasized contingency and human decision-making as important drivers of these trajectories.Footnote 3 The two books reviewed here follow in that vein. Rather than accept any notions of structural inevitability, David Kirkpatrick and H.E. Hellyer seek to deconstruct the post-Arab Spring Egyptian experience as a series of events and decisions shaped by key individuals and groups in the five to six years that followed the 2011 protests in Tahrir Square. Their books describe an uncertain transition in which a multitude of actors (both inside and outside the country) made decisions with unforeseeable consequences. They do not discount the role of history, but they also do not see Egypt's past as dictating what happened after 2011.
Neither of the two works is a scholarly book nor seeks to provide comprehensive answers to large questions about the ultimate fate of countries rocked by the Arab Spring protests. Nevertheless, they address important subjects such as the roles of structural conditions, agency, and contingency in democratic transitions, the reasons for authoritarian resilience, and the compatibility of political Islam and democracy.
Both authors lived in Egypt after the Arab Spring. Kirkpatrick was the New York Times Cairo bureau chief from 2011 to 2015, while Hellyer was raised by an Egyptian mother and has maintained close ties to Egypt. Both books greatly benefit from their authors’ first-hand knowledge of the events and people that shaped Egypt's tumultuous post-2011 history. As a correspondent for the Times, Kirkpatrick also enjoyed privileged access to the officials and activists who often drove these events.
Kirkpatrick's central argument is that hopes for Egyptian democracy were foiled not by the weight of history or an undemocratic political culture which prefers authoritarianism, but by three powerful actors with different agendas: the Egyptian deep state, reactionary Gulf Arab states, and a United States torn over how to respond. Kirkpatrick eloquently captures each of their apparent contempt for the idea of treating popular sovereignty as the guiding light to their policies toward Egypt.
Kirkpatrick's Into the Hands of Soldiers chronicles the efforts of the Egyptian military, police, intelligence services, and judiciary to thwart the development of democracy at all costs. One of the book's key contributions is an account of how the deep state worked to sabotage Mohammed Morsi, who in 2012 won Egypt's first free presidential election.
Kirkpatrick further demonstrates how this constellation of so-called deep state institutions fomented sectarianism and other forms of discord. It was a way to prove what Egypt's military rulers have always maintained: that they are the only governing force standing between order and chaos. In the end, this strategy paid off: enough Egyptians bought into the authoritarian narrative, and the disorder state of Egypt's post-2011 politics further helped solidify the idea that the military and deep state were the country's only salvation.
The most troubling part of Kirkpatrick's story is that of the Egyptian “liberals” – the elites and ordinary people who supported the 2011 revolution but whose hatred for the Muslim Brotherhood blinded them to the true intentions of the deep state. In 2013, the liberal camp, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, supported an extraconstitutional military coup against Morsi.
Of course, none of these domestic political machinations occurred in a vacuum. The United States pursued a contradictory policy toward Egypt during this time. As Kirkpatrick argues, powerful elements within the Obama administration had little faith in Egyptian democracy and preferred the status quo of military rule, believing that only authoritarianism could guarantee stability. They shared the Egyptian state's contempt for the aspirations of ordinary people, and especially its paranoiac fear of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such internal divisions within the Obama administration led different officials to deliver conflicting messages to their Egyptian counterparts, which may have led the 2013 coup-makers to believe they had Washington's blessing.
Kirkpatrick argues that it's impossible to know whether Washington's policies could have made a difference, as Washington never mustered the will to try. Each time it threatened to cut off security assistance, Egypt's autocrats simply called Washington's bluff.
Kirkpatrick paints a damning portrait of the role of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in countering what gains toward a more open political system were made because of the Tahrir Square protests. The Gulf Arab monarchs saw the fall of Mubarak (and Obama's decision to abandon him) as a calamity and the ascent of Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat. Between 2012 and 2013, the Emiratis and Saudis went all out to bring Morsi down, bankrolling the Egyptian opposition movement Tamarrod and using their clout in Washington to help shift policy in favor of authoritarian retrenchment.
Kirkpatrick could have deepened his analysis of the fears and grievances that drove the anti-Morsi opposition. Democratic activists were not necessarily duped by the military: sticking with Morsi until the next election carried its own set of risks, from the standpoint of democratic activists, and the author could have engaged more deeply with the history of the Egyptian Brotherhood to account better for popular attitudes against it.
The last part of Kirkpatrick's book covers the Trump Administration's policies toward Egypt. The president's opinion of the current regime in Egypt boils down to venerating Sisi as a “fantastic” leader who is fighting terrorism and keeping the peace with Israel. Although the Trump Administration has somewhat challenged the Sisi regime's track record on human rights, for example denying Egypt nearly $100 million in economic aid as a punitive measure, it does not appear willing to go much further than that, giving Sisi relative impunity to manage domestic politics as he pleases.
Like Kirkpatrick, H.A. Hellyer plays a part in his narrative. He calls himself an “entrenched witness,” and throughout the book retains a voice that is simultaneously deeply personal and yet detached. Unlike Kirkpatrick, Hellyer pays little attention to the role of external actors.
In his focus on the domestic, Hellyer does a commendable job of rejecting the binaries that have come to define common views, both among Egyptians and foreigners, of political players such as the military and Muslim Brotherhood. Even more importantly, A Revolution Undone highlights that it was individuals making concrete decisions that drove the critical moments in Egypt's post-2011 political trajectory. At times, he presents these moments in terms of “what if” counterfactuals. For example, he observes how differently things may have turned out had the Muslim Brotherhood opted to collaborate with pro-revolutionary forces rather than the military. In the months after Mubarak's fall, a Brotherhood-Revolutionary alliance, Hellyer writes, “would have been deeply threatening” to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The Brotherhood's decision not to pursue any retributive justice would prove fatal, allowing the military to remain the real power in Egypt and eventually launch a coup.
While Hellyer presents the Muslim Brothers in a more critical light than Kirkpatrick, he also does not hesitate to criticize the young urbanite revolutionaries of Tahrir Square for their political immaturity and for failing to field a viable candidate in Egypt's first free and open presidential election. Here, Hellyer pinpoints another moment during which, had certain groups acted differently, the transition may also have proceeded in a different direction. Namely, had the revolutionaries united around a single candidate in the first round, the Mubarak-holdover candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, would likely never have gotten to the second.
Hellyer relentlessly documents the failings of Mohamed Morsi, from his attempt to arrogate judicial powers to his failure to include more voices in his government. Such shortcomings, argues Hellyer, led to broad public dissatisfaction, which then created an opening for the military to retake power.
Like Kirkpatrick, Hellyer introduces us to some of the individual actors, including revolutionaries such as the poet Shaimaa al-Sabbagh, who was fatally shot in the back by security forces while attending a peaceful demonstration commemorating the fourth anniversary of the revolution. He memorializes other victims by name at the end of the book.
In the end, however, one gets the sense that Hellyer places greater blame on the opponents of the deep state than he does on the deep state itself. Both the revolutionaries and the Brotherhood failed to successfully challenge the military. He thus sees the 2013 coup as primarily the result of public dissatisfaction with both camps rather than the plotting of the deep state.
One notable weakness of Hellyer's book is its organization. At times, he makes confusing leaps in chronology or sudden detours into tangential historical matters, which are interesting but can detract from the narrative structure. At other points, Hellyer states as fact points of view that others have disputed, including Kirkpatrick. For instance, he makes the very controversial and unsubstantiated claim (p. 62) that Western governments helped engineer Morsi's victory. Elsewhere, he claims, also without substantiation, that riot police outside the presidential palace in December 2012 were working with Morsi.
These are important books that contribute a great deal to our understanding of the failure of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. They skillfully avoid determinism while offering rich accounts of the people and events that have shaped post-2011 events.
