The success of Islamist parties in the first post Arab Spring elections was no surprise to scholars of the Middle East and North Africa. A long-time regional trend has seen Islamists as the foremost opposition parties that have competed in many of the region's authoritarian elections. An important question for scholars, therefore, is what explains the dominance of Islamist parties. In Counting Islam, Tarek Masoud takes up this question, exploring the Islamist electoral advantage in Egypt under authoritarianism and in the first postrevolutionary elections in 2011–12. Masoud seamlessly weaves an impressive range of interview, archival, and election data throughout the book. In combining this empirical evidence with theoretical insights, the book represents a rich contribution to the literature investigating the electoral success of Islamist parties, and also the analysis of authoritarian elections.
Masoud first refutes existing ideational and material explanations for the case of Egypt. Ideational explanations, including those that link Islamists’ electoral successes to the desire for Islamic government, cannot account for the electoral success of Islamist parties across space and time. Material explanations, which emphasize Islamists’ organizational discipline and provision of social services, fail to consider why Islamists, and not also secular and leftist parties, “have a monopoly on organization discipline or machine politics?” (p. 5). One of the book's principle contributions is to ask not only why Islamists have been successful, but also why leftist parties have not.
Masoud's own explanation is novel. He argues that Islamists benefitted from the dynamics of authoritarian elections and economic underdevelopment. Opposition parties were unable to compete with the ruling party, and its superior patronage resources, for the support of poor voters. The politics of patronage disadvantaged leftist parties in particular: “A leftist party that wanted to reap the suffrages of Egypt during that grim period [Mubarak era] had to either compete with the ruling party's patronage machine (largely impossible) or to redirect its attentions to more affluent voters (who were less likely to be receptive to the party's radically redistributive aims)” (p. 6). Unlike the left, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to play a “different game” and focus its efforts on building a constituency of middle-class voters (p. 93).
The problem for the left in Egypt was compounded by economic underdevelopment. The relatively large agrarian workforce and an associational life dominated by religious institutions and charities limited the opportunities for leftist parties to connect to voters and build nationwide party networks. Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, however, benefitted from the nature of associational life and the plethora of religious organizations, which enabled them to better connect and communicate their platforms to potential voters.
A particular strength of Masoud's approach is his effort to derive testable implications from his theory both under authoritarianism and at moments of transition (i.e., during founding elections). One important implication of his theory is that Islamists will have a short-term advantage in founding elections that occur in any transition out of authoritarianism. In Egypt, for example, the fact that Islamist activists were embedded in preexisting religious organizations and networks with citizens allowed Islamist parties to more easily connect and communicate with voters than secular parties. Leftist parties, on the other hand, remained at a significant informational disadvantage, even after the fall of Mubarak, because they entered the new period of electoral competition without nationwide networks to connect with voters.
While Masoud offers a persuasive theoretical and empirical story for the success of Islamists in Egypt, his claims regarding the poor performance of leftist parties are less empirically persuasive. Masoud contends that “the leftists’ disadvantage lies not in the practices of parties but in the social landscapes within which those parties are embedded” (p. 181). An important implication of Masoud's argument, then, is that under different structural conditions, the story of leftist parties would be quite different. Unfortunately, readers do not get a full sense of the extent leftist party leaders and activists were in fact embedded in labor organizations, or other potential networks, and how leftist parties fared electorally in the few industrial and urban areas with independent labor organizations (even if limited in reach).
To his credit, Masoud does present some evidence that voters belonging to labor unions were better aware of the National Progressive Unionist Rally's economic platform (Chapter 6), a finding consistent with his theory. The author, however, offers little complementary analyses of leftist parties’ nominating strategies (i.e., in which districts did leftist parties nominate candidates?), the characteristics of those districts in which leftist parties won, their organizational characteristics, as well as recruitment and mobilization histories. This is important for the generality of Masoud's theory that the electoral fates of political parties, whether Islamist or secular, are tied to their ability to connect with voters through preexisting networks, and that the ability and opportunity to do so is, in turn, influenced by the social and institutional environment.
A related issue worthy of further analysis is whether potential constituencies of Islamists and leftist parties are mutually exclusive, and whether or not this varies across different election types (e.g., authoritarian, founding, democratic). Masoud seems to imply that, in the case of Egypt under Mubarak, there may have been some exclusivity across these constituencies. Whether the left’s, and in particular the National Progressive Unionist Rally’s, policies would indeed be unpalatable to all middle-class voters is an empirical question that needs to be evaluated in future research. Nevertheless, one is left wondering if the leftist parties could have mobilized other groups (e.g., youth) who were potentially amenable to messages of economic redistribution, but were not drawn to the regime's politics of patronage.
These shortcomings, however, should not detract from the author's principle contributions. It is unfair to ask one book to fully account for both the failure of the left and the dominance of Islamists. Moreover, Counting Islam certainly lays theoretical grounding for future work to evaluate the contention that it was not leftist parties’ practices as political actors (e.g., leadership, organization, and strategy) but rather a broader set of structural factors that disproportionately benefitted Islamist opposition parties.
Overall, this is a novel and thought-provoking contribution to comparative political science. It offers an alternative perspective on Islamists’ success in authoritarian and founding elections, and the process of electoral transition more generally. Masoud opens a number of new avenues for future research, and motivates further analysis of the complex political economy of elections in the Middle East and North Africa region.
