In a collection of articles covering the Qajar period, the thirteen contributors to this work seek to study relations between Russia and Iran in contexts outside the Great Game using hitherto unstudied sources. Muriel Atkin introduces the period in “The Early Stages of Russo-Iranian Relations” by pointing out that Russian involvement in Iran began at an unlikely time given its engagements in Europe. She traces Qajar involvement with Russia from 1793 and shows how both the Russians and ‘Abbas Mirza were seeking to maintain their prestige to compensate for weaknesses in their position, in the case of Russia, in Europe. Russia's approach to peace terms in 1813 was a combination of contempt and misinformation, characteristic of its relations with Iran. In “The Khan, the Shah and the Tsar: The Khanate of Talesh between Iran and Russia,” Soli Shahvar and Emil Abramoff demonstrate that Talesh survived by exchanging loyalty for expediency according to which power prevailed. Gradually Talesh became divided and both Russia and Iran used family feuds to undermine the local khans, until and following the Treaty of Turkmanchai, when Russia triumphed and was in full control by 1821. New light is thrown on Aleksandr Griboedev, the Russian diplomat murdered in Tehran in 1829, by Firuza Melville in “Alexander Sergeevich Griboedev: Russian Imperial James Bond Malgré lui.” The article is of considerable interest in revealing how he was perceived in Russia itself, not as a diplomat but as a playwright, composer, and revolutionary involved with secret societies, a businessman with interests in the Caucasus, and a rebellious poet. Less fortunate are Melville's assertions on Griboedev's connection with John MacDonald, which include unreliable information on the British subsidy derived from his correspondence, and her gross exaggeration of the influence of John McNeill over the Shah. In an outstanding article on “Russian Government Action against Russian Deserters in Iran in the Nineteenth Century: Russian Orientalism at State Level,” Elena Andreeva argues that initially deserters were welcomed in Iran, which benefited from their military expertise, but their numbers declined by the mid-century. By 1838, they were an embarrassment to the Russians and pressure mounted for their return. By 1900, the Russian attitude was influenced by Orientalism, combined with a sense of inferiority toward western Europe. The pursuit of deserters became a way of asserting Russian power and prestige, an attitude of inflated superiority seen by Andreeva as a particular characteristic of Russian orientalism.

The subject of Armenian activism is addressed in “Nest of Revolution: The Caucasus, Iran and Armenians,” by Houri Berberian based on “the archival Documents of the Armenian Revolutionary Foundation,” to which the references are few. Fortunately, there is much published primary material industriously researched by the author. The author adds a “time-space compression” theory, which provides little in interpretation that scholars have not been long accustomed to. However, the article gives a highly informative account of Armenian activists and the ways they used the opportunities of modernity to pursue their cause, not least in the Baku oil fields. Irina Pavlova in “The Loan and Discount Bank as an Agent of Russian Interests in Iran,” traces how the bank, whose board consisted of Russian officials, extended its influence through the royal family and leading merchants. It mediated concessions, which it also had direct from the Shah. The board avoided projects that would provoke the British, however, such as a kerosene pipeline from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf. In “Infidel Aggression: the Russian Assault on the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza, Mashhad, 1912,” Matthee moves from state interests in the event to the part played by individual non-state actors. By examining the sequence of events, he demonstrates that the Russians were obliged to take action reluctantly as Mashhad was sliding into disorder. The rebels, led by an anti-constitutionalist named Herati, whom the Russians had initially supported, forced them to fire on the agitators in the shrine to avoid chaos.

Three articles in particular that make admirable use of unstudied primary materials look specifically at people with a bureaucratic background, and how their own preoccupations influenced events. Nugzar K.Ter-Organov in “A Russian Officer's Letters on Russian and British Activities in Iran during World War I” shows how they provide previously unknown information about Russian influence in Iran and cooperation with the British. Volkov on “Vladimir Minorsky (1877–1966) and the Iran-Iraq War 1980–88,” perceives the somewhat overstated influence of a Russian Iranist on the Iran-Iraq boundary delineation, and hence on the 1980s war. He gives an interesting account, however, on Minorsky's involvement in 1911–13 in the delineation of the Iran-Iraq (Ottoman) boundary. Lana Ravand-Fadai in “Cossack Brigade Fighter and Architect of Tehran—Nicolai L΄vovich Markov” discusses an exiled Orthodox Tsarist's passion for all things Iranian that led to his designing government buildings, mosques, and schools in Tehran, in styles reflecting the multi-cultural Russian Empire.

The relations between Russia and the Tudeh Party during the occupation of 1941–45 are discussed by Abdul Razak in “Convenient Comrades: Reassessing the Relationship between the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party during the British-Soviet Occupation of 1941–5.” She considers that the British perception of the Tudeh changed after Stalingrad in 1943. Previously they were encouraged to be anti-fascist; thereafter they were seen as increasingly pro-Soviet, with Britain worried about Soviet interference in the Iranian elections and Tudeh support for a Soviet oil concession in the north. Kozhanov looks at Anglo-Russian relations in “The USSR and the Allied Occupation of Iran 1941,” arguing that Britain wanted joint action in Iran only and avoided an agreement on the whole Middle East. The main reason for cooperation between the powers was not fear of German penetration so much as the need for a secure line of military supplies. This required Iran to declare neutrality, which Reza Shah resisted, with his resultant removal. Altogether, this publication is admirable for including articles by scholars from a variety of backgrounds based on new primary sources, leading to a much more complex picture of Russian engagement with Iran.