Writings on the political economy of the Middle East and North Africa are so scarce that a monograph related to the subject is always welcome. This edited book, based on a conference held in Italy in March 2007 (as part of the eighth Mediterranean Research Meeting under the aegis of the European University Institute's Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies), examines monetary policy, central banking, and exchange rate regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. Although most chapters are thematic and the editors purport to adopt a broad comparative dimension, a few countries, such as Algeria, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, and Turkey, are discussed in great detail.
The conference was held shortly before the financial meltdown, which very few economists or bankers saw coming, and at a time when macroeconomic orthodoxy was riding high. The opening line of the volume sets the tone: “Monetary policy, including monetary policy frameworks, central bank independence and exchange rate regimes is an area in which both academics and policymakers have made enormous strides in the last two decades.” Because research had until then focused on industrial countries and a small number of developing countries, primarily in Latin America, the contributors sought to bring research on the Middle East and North Africa in line with the prevailing consensus, at a time when countries in the region were adopting economic and financial market reforms and most of their central banks were moving toward greater independence.
This volume is thus very much an artifact of an era of macroeconomic certainties, when monetarism reigned supreme. Most of the essays endorse a “theory of optimal monetary policy” through the “delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank and to a ‘conservative’ central banker . . . who has higher inflation-aversion than all other economic agents and groups in society and is protected from the political influences of various social groups by its [sic] legal and instrumental independence” (p. 9). In addition to winning the fight against inflation, such independence would ensure accountability and good governance. During that era, central bankers assumed unprecedented visibility and prestige, at least until Alan Greenspan (chairman of the Federal Reserve Board between 1987 and 2006), the best known among them, acknowledged following the financial meltdown that he “found a flaw” in his thinking.
The most interesting parts of the book are those that are based on intimate knowledge of the politics of individual countries, such as the chapters on the central banks of Lebanon and Algeria by Ghassan Dibeh (“The Political Economy of Central Banking in the MENA Region with Special Reference to Lebanon”) and Abdallah Zouache and Mohamed-Cherif Ilmane (“Central Bank Independence in a MENA Transition Economy”), respectively. The book also offers interesting insights on matters such as the difference between “debtor central banks” that characterize emerging markets and “creditor central banks” common in large industrialized countries (in Gunther Schnabl and Franziska Schobert, “Monetary Policy Operations of Debtor Central Banks in MENA Countries”) or the necessary distinction between de jure and de facto independence of a central bank (in Abdallah Zouache and Mohamed-Cherif Ilmane, “Central Bank Independence in a MENA Transition Economy: The Experience of Algeria”). All too often, however, contributions strive to shoehorn the Middle East and North Africa into the prevailing paradigm, with little attention paid to the complex realities of these countries. Some convey the feeling of a tedious graduate seminar, with repetitive literature reviews, attempts at showing off econometric prowess, and conclusions limited to calls for “further research.”
One can certainly question whether the fight against inflation is truly the most pressing issue in countries beset by more significant problems such as poverty, unequal distribution of income, and endemic corruption. Most countries in the region did move, sometimes reluctantly, in the direction recommended by the Washington Consensus (which was famously described by John Williamson, who coined the term as “the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists” in his book The Political Economy of Policy Reform [Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994, 18]). But one can wonder whether the commitment to economic reform was not simply a way for rulers whose primary concern was to retain power (for them or their offspring) to simultaneously “modernize autocracy” and curry favor with the international financial community (the International Monetary Fund, foreign investors, etc.), without addressing more fundamental issues of governance and human development.
One also wonders, in light of recent developments in the region, whether all the talk about central banking independence is not primarily cosmetic—providing a smokescreen for rulers who turned their central banks into piggybanks for themselves, their families, or their cronies. The book includes a chapter titled “Inflation Targeting and Financial Fragility in Tunisia,” written by Adel Boughrara, Mongi Boughzala, and Hassouna Moussa, which is so steeped in abstractions, macroeconomic models, and simulations that one would barely recognize the kleptocractic regime that collapsed after twenty-three years in power. Significantly, when president Zine al-ʿAbidine Ben ʿAli and his wife fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia in January 2011, they brought with them 1.5 tons of gold worth an estimated $60 million from the Tunisian central bank. In sum, although the book does not quite live up to its ambition of bringing about “a step improvement in our understanding of the institutions and operations of monetary policy and the strategic choices it faces in the Middle East and North Africa” (p. 5), it is still a welcome addition to the embryonic literature on Middle Eastern economics.
