This fine book contains six essays, four of which originated as papers at a Liberty Fund Symposium on “Hayek and the Liberal Tradition” held in December 2006. It is a little misleading to claim editorially that “this is the first book to bring the voices of Hayek, Mill, Knight, Smith, [Samuel] Bowles, [Herbert] Gintis, and [Jaroslav] Vanek (and other thinkers) together” (p. 4), since Bowles, Gintis, and Vanek figure only fleetingly. The title should, in fact, have been precisely as at the conference, since Hayek’s relation with J. S. Mill is systematically considered in only one chapter (Andrew Farrant), while two chapters are devoted to Hayek and Adam Smith (Leonidas Montes; Sandra Peart and David Levy), and one to Hayek and Frank Knight (Ross Emmett). The “Adam Smith Problem” figures large in Robert Garnett’s “Hayek and Philanthropy.” Ted Burczak’s “A Socialist Spontaneous Order” stands somewhat apart from the others as a contribution to political theory, but is no less valuable because of that.
Several of the authors are apologetic for basing themselves on selections only from Hayek’s writings, but there is no alternative, given the human lifespan. The papers are of a consistently high quality and the book is to be heartily recommended as a fair account of Hayek’s relationships with, and status within, the classical liberal tradition. I am constrained in this review to brief comments on some of the points that have particularly attracted my attention.
Montes raises the question: “Is Friedrich Hayek Rowing Adam Smith’s Boat?” and offers a strong positive answer, pointing to the intellectual debt Hayek owed not only to Smith but to other Scottish Enlightenment figures, pre-eminently Ferguson and Hume. Now, on one issue, Montes recognizes a difference between the two; namely, on the question of natural differences in talent. He points out that Hayek did not assume equal natural endowments and capacities, insisting only (in Hayek’s own words) “that no man is qualified to pass final judgment on the capacities which another possesses or is to be allowed to exercise” (p. 17). Hayek, Montes writes, “does not believe in natural equality but simply proposes to formalize ‘equality of the rules applying in the same manner to all.’” (I cannot resist noting that an almost identical position to that of Hayek’s, expressed in much the same terms, was adopted by Karl Marx, an identity I have addressed elsewhere.) All this matters greatly for the sense to be attached to the desideratum “equality of opportunity,” and should be taken into account when evaluating the assertion that Hayek’s “own conception of human nature resembles the one developed by Hume and Smith” (p. 12). And, when Montes represents Hayek as “a staunch and committed follower of Smith’s ‘liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice’” (p. 28), I suspect that he may not have fully allowed for the extensive range of interventionism acceptable to Smith (of which Hayek was apparently unaware), since he supports the further assertion that “Hayek, as Smith, is not a laissez-faire economist,” by referring only to “education as a public duty, and … regulation in terms of fostering competition to increase ‘vertical mobility’” (pp. 24–25), as if that were the totality of the allowances.
Whereas Montes finds it “surprising” that Hayek does not develop Smith’s concept of sympathy (pp. 28–29), Peart and Levy devote their paper to “F. A. Hayek’s Sympathetic Agents.” The authors write that Hayek’s account of “‘sympathetic’ agency … is not necessarily the same as Adam Smith’s,” which entails “an act of imagination, a projection of one’s preferences to another in the same situation” (pp. 41–42). So, are we to conclude that it may be the same? The authors, in fact, go on to cite Hayek’s British Academy lecture of 1963 where he “explains how something like Smith’s imaginative projection allows us to classify … to say that some of my actions and some of your actions are the same thing” (p. 43); and they similarly refer to a 1943 contribution involving “a type of projection, what ‘we know solely from knowledge of our mind’” (p. 44). I would have liked to have seen further developed the comparisons between the Smithian and the Hayekian versions of sympathy, but, in any event, important implications are traced in the case of the latter. One entails what the authors refer to as “projection at a great distance” (p. 45)—that is, from one’s own mind (and the minds of others belonging to the same small group with a common purpose) to the broader social group, an unjustified transition carrying with it a temptation to totalitarianism and encouraging efforts to secure a “just” income distribution (pp. 45–46), both outcomes, of course, anathema for Hayek. This is an insight that is new to me at least, and I am obliged to the authors for enlarging my horizon.
A second application (again novel to me) is to corporate pyramiding, allowing minorities to exploit a majority of shareholders, an application that can be extended to more general issues of well-organized groups exploiting those less well organized, where bonds of sympathy and reciprocity fail (p. 47). The important point to note here is Hayek’s concession of the need for government regulation to disallow voting rights to corporations owning shares in other corporations (pp. 47–48; also p. 40), an instance to be added to several others one might cite where Hayek himself expresses doubts regarding the character of evolutionary institutional development that he himself insists upon when formulating matters of high principle.
One issue raised in the Peart–Levy chapter seems to me troublesome. It is the proposition that Smith’s concern with the tendency of factions to exploit the larger society—also Hayek’s concern—might be resolved by his perception “that if the local groups are small enough, individuals in the larger society will belong to overlapping organizations … and move from one small organization to another” (pp. 39–40; also p. 49). This feature is apparently offered as a contribution towards the solution of the Adam Smith Problem of “incoherence” between the Wealth of Nations and the Theory of Moral Sentiments (p. 50). But this reading of the celebrated text regarding competition between religious factions (cited p. 49) as “implying” a notion of overlapping organizations is not self-evident. As I understand the text, at any time each individual belongs to only one sect, remaining loyal to his “teacher” and the doctrine the teacher conveys, close as it may have become to that of a neighboring sect. To the extent that, even on this reading, tolerance is enhanced, the substance of the Peart–Levy argument may perhaps be retained. The conclusions of this paper are similar to those of Garnett’s paper, which are touched on below.
A main theme of Ross Emmett’s illuminating contribution “Discussion and the Evolution of Institutions in a Liberal Democracy: Frank Knight Joins the Debate” is Knight’s insistence on adding discussion between free individuals to the pure theory of the evolution of institutions upon which Hayek focused. This, Emmett amply shows (p. 61). Whether Hayek would have objected is not so clear, but this cannot be ruled out, since so often we find Hayek moderating his position when he descends from the upper stratosphere of high generalization to address real-world problems where the weighing of competing interests is of the essence and (dare I suggest) a utilitarian dimension becomes pertinent. Knight, in reviewing The Constitution of Liberty, makes this very point, as Emmett demonstrates when he cites both Knight’s charge that Hayek is “scornful of politically organized freedom” such that his book amounted to “a calumny on democracy,” and his modified verdict that, as it “is hard to be consistently absurd,” even Hayek sometimes made concessions to policies proposed by “humane liberals, common-sense ‘pragmatism’ and even popular clamor” (p. 70). (I myself was unaware of the strength of Knight’s hostility towards Hayek.) Emmett proposes that Knight’s conception of discussion in a free society “will cement the connection between Knight and Mill” regarding justice, but he does not elaborate. I would add a Smith connection with regard to Knight’s insistence upon “common-sense ‘pragmatism’” and even “popular clamour” as pertinent to considerations of legitimate government intervention.
In his editorial introduction, Andrew Farrant writes: “As is well known, Hayek, particularly so in his later writings, deemed Mill as being by and large outside the classical liberal tradition” with respect to distributive or social justice, interventionism, and socialist organization (p. 1). His own contribution (“A Renovated Social Fabric: Mill, Hayek, and the Problem of Institutional Change?”) provides a rich account of Mill on economic policy, particularly his preoccupation with the poverty problem and concern with the “incentive structure” entailed by alternative solutions (pp. 82, 86-7, 89-94). In the course of his account, Farrant convincingly shows how misleading were Hayek’s complaints regarding Mill as supportive of socialism—though I myself often find it difficult to pin Hayek down to what precisely he intended by the charge—since Mill wrote so strongly against centralization and planning from the center. Support of institutional arrangements favorable towards proper incentive also arises conspicuously with regard to Irish land tenure, and this too is nicely shown by Farrant (pp. 96–97). Similarly, Mill’s case for social justice focused upon enhanced equality of opportunity to be achieved by educational reforms and reforms to the private property system rather than its abolition, and certainly nothing akin to the command economy Hayek so dreaded (pp. 107, 111-115, 116). Farrant’s demonstration of the weight Mill placed on enhanced “sympathy” when elaborating the potentialities of co-operative organization (pp. 87–89) is of high interest, particularly so in the light of the other commentaries on the topic noted above.
I would suggest, as an aside, that while Hayek sometimes seems to be aware of his unfairness towards Mill, he, yet all too often, allows himself to be carried away by the bogey he made of British Utilitarianism in general. The ambivalence of his own position on policy in practice—far more interventionist than Knight implies, extending to state assurance of a “decent minimum” and abandonment of the stance of the early 1930s to acknowledge finally government responsibility for “full employment”—should have helped him achieve greater objectivity when he approached Mill.
In his illuminating and original paper, “Hayek and Philanthropy: A Classical Liberal Road Not (Yet) Taken,” Garnett describes Hayek’s “inability” (read: “failure”?) to integrate philanthropy into his theory of commercial society (pp. 154–155). Garnett tends to mitigate this sort of charge in the case of Adam Smith, by reading into (so it seems to me) The Wealth of Nations a perspective incorporating “multiple modes of reciprocity, market and non-market, through which individuals give and receive the means to create a flourishing life” (p. 154)—in effect, causing the old Adam Smith Problem to evaporate into thin air. Garnett, in fact, perceives (as is not uncommon these days) The Wealth of Nations to be “but a special case of the general theory of social co-operation outlined in his Theory of Moral Sentiments” (p. 155); and his paper closes with an appeal for economists “to redefine their scientific domain in a Smithian fashion, not just a commodity space but a pluralistic provisioning space comprising multiple forms and scales of actions that enable individuals to secure ‘the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes’” (p. 159). I am not sure of “Smithian fashion”—and note that Garnett himself concedes that Smith’s writings contain “only inchoate hints about the economic role of philanthropy per se” (p. 154).
Burczak’s “A Socialist Spontaneous Order” proposes a form of socialism that would satisfy Hayek’s insistence upon the rule of law but in the service of achieving socialist goals—intending thereby “prohibition of wage-labor and a legislated guarantee of a basic income” but not “central command of production and the social ownership of capital goods” (p. 145). Private property would remain intact, with labor hiring capital rather than the reverse, and management delegated to workers (p. 136). Burczak is by no means naive and is fully aware of the potential complexities implicit in the proposal. This reviewer regrets that John Stuart Mill is no longer with us to offer his comments, for Mill engaged in precisely the same sort of exploratory exercises regarding desirable organization as does our author, as Farrant’s chapter in particular makes abundantly clear.
