President Gerald Ford's pardon of former President Richard Nixon in 1975 triggered national controversy. Jeffrey Crouch marks that event as signaling a changing role for pardon power. After it, presidents were more likely to use pardons in self-dealing ways in order to protect themselves, their subordinates, and their supporters. In the past, the Constitution's Article II pardon power drew little attention. Pardons have been “granted almost exclusively in innocuous cases” and have had little importance for policy or politics (p. 5). But in the controversial pardons that began with Nixon, Crouch identifies a presidential power begging for scholarly examination.
This book examines the pardon power's origin, its uses over time, and the constitutional norms guiding its uses. Crouch's theoretical challenge is to explain an emergent paradox in presidential pardons. Their issuance has declined sharply. From Ulysses S. Grant through Jimmy Carter, the number of pardons issued per presidential term varied between 500 to over a thousand. That number dropped after Carter, falling from 250 in Ronald Reagan's first term to only a handful during George W. Bush's first term (p. 3), and the trend appears to be continuing in the Obama presidency. As the number of innocuous pardons plummeted, presidents ventured to grant high-profile, politically self-serving pardons, such as the Nixon pardon, George H. W. Bush's pardon of Iran-Contra participants, Bill Clinton's pardons of Marc Rich and others, and George W. Bush's pardon of Lewis “Scooter” Libby.
Crouch contrasts this recent politicization with the Framers' view that the pardon power must be incorporated in the Constitution so as to accompany justice with mercy. The Framers debated whether the power should be granted to the president without checks, and some feared possible self-dealing uses by presidents. What found its way into the Constitution was the rationale that Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 74: “One man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government than a body of men” (p. 18). Article II, Section 2, gives the president the “power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.” Along with mercy, the Framers saw that reasons of “the public interest” would also justify pardons (p. 53). Exemplifying that larger purpose, in 1795 George Washington granted amnesty to those convicted in the Whisky Rebellion, saying that “the principal end of human punishment [is] the reformation of others” (p. 55).
There have been congressional challenges to the president's unfettered pardon power, but federal courts have repeatedly affirmed executive discretion. However, Crouch notes, there are informal constraints upon presidents. Inappropriate pardons can weaken a president's public support. Furthermore, Congress can “express its displeasure … by holding hearings, cutting off funding,” and using other means of legislative intransigence (p. 52).
The author's otherwise solid historical survey of presidential pardons is disappointing in its narrow treatment of the conflict between Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republican Congress over post bellum amnesties. Congress attempted to stymie Johnson's general amnesties as each branch fought to assert its own vision for Southern reconstruction. However, Crouch limits his examples to several Supreme Court cases arising from the conflict, concluding that “the Court's approach nearly every time was to allow the president a wide scope of authority” (pp. 40–1). Curiously, while claiming that some modern uses of the pardon are inappropriately political, the book treats narrowly the most politically explosive historical case of the pardon power.
Crouch asserts normative guidelines for pardon decisions, adopting the criteria expressed in the founding and early republic: “Presidents should use clemency either as an ‘act of mercy’ for the individuals involved, or ‘in the public interest,’ but not for personal gain—that is, to protect themselves or their associates … or to advantage … supporters or donors” (p. 53). The author finds that until Nixon, presidents largely respected the pardon power's purposes of mercy and public interest. Then in December 1971, Nixon pardoned James Hoffa, former president of the Teamsters, the major labor union supporting Nixon's reelection.
In the decades after Nixon, presidents have issued highly visible, controversial, and self-serving pardons. Simultaneously, there was a sharp drop in pardons granted among the huge number of “innocuous cases” in the modern application bureaucracy. That decline, Crouch argues, is a function of political wariness of the 24-hour news cycle and polarized politics. An apparently innocuous pardon could eventually embarrass a president. But, what then can explain the propensity of recent presidents to make politicized pardons? The key to unlocking this puzzle, the author argues, is the role of independent counsels.
The 1978 Ethics in Government Act provided for judicially appointed special counsels. Earlier, occasional investigations of executive branch irregularities had been conducted by outside prosecutors appointed by the president (or attorney general). Of these cases, Crouch finds the conduct of presidents in question to have been exemplary. Until Nixon's firing of Watergate special counsel Archibald Cox, presidents had “resisted the temptation to interfere with the outside prosecutor,” and they did not (Grant excepted) protect their subordinates through the pardon power (p. 86). The 1978 law, Crouch argues, changed the incentives for presidential behavior.
Presidents benefited by identifying the independent counsel as politically hostile and illegitimately intrusive on executive responsibilities. Therein was a “political opening for the president to thumb his nose at a Congress (usually … dominated by the opposite party) pursuing an executive branch investigation” (p. 87). The author's argument is plausible but insufficiently developed. The assumption is that when presidents were themselves accountable for investigating executive branch misdeeds, they were more likely to act responsibly and unlikely to use the pardon power to make their troubles vanish. Then, Congress undermined presidential responsibility with the judicially appointed special prosecutor provision.
Consequently, presidents discovered the utility of dealing with a special prosecutor's reports and possible prosecutions as merely political acts. In that context, the pardon power became an available countermeasure to those political acts, rather than an instrument to be used only for mercy or the public interest. Also, the incentive for politicizing pardons increases when a president no longer faces reelection, as was the case with G. H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush. Finally, Crouch describes the presidential proclivity for self-interested pardons as violating constitutional values and deserving reproof. He writes: “The framers intended pardons to be motivated by mercy … or made in the public interest, not used in the service of the president's private interests” (p. 146).
This book provides a rich description of the pardon power's uses, casting light into an overlooked corner of presidential power. That is a substantial contribution. However, the analysis of the effects of the independent counsel law as well as the normative assessment of the pardon's uses contribute less than they otherwise might. Crouch weakens both aspects of his book by overlooking salient work on presidential unilateralism, the contributions of Terry Moe, William Howell, and others. The author draws a bright line between proper uses of the pardon and self-dealing uses. Yet Terry Moe's “politicized presidency” is inherently self-dealing, acting in a competitive system to maximize power and political accomplishment. Nor does Crouch consider that the power-seeking president may find little difficulty in justifying as public interest the decisions that may appear to opponents as self-dealing. Thus, this able contribution to our knowledge of the pardon power might have accomplished more regarding presidential pardoning behavior had he brought a wider intellectual scope to his project.
