The immense influence and transnational authority exerted by contemporary Shiʿi Grand Ayatollahs is widely acknowledged in the existing secondary literature. Yet, so far there have been few attempts at providing a reliable empirical underpinning for this broad scholarly consensus. Fortunately, Elvire Corboz in Guardians of Shiʿism goes a long way in substantially enriching the field. Her original study investigates the life and legacy of the Najaf-based jurists Sayyid Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm (d. 1970) and Sayyid Abū ʿl-Qāsim al-Khūʾī (d. 1992), two of the twentieth century's most important “Sources of Emulation” (marājiʿ al-taqlīd). The scholars make for fruitful comparison not only with respect to their complex interactions with the Iraqi state. What they have in common, too, is that after the clerics’ death close relatives continued to advance their respective marjaʿiyya in innovative institutionalized forms on both a local and transnational level. These efforts underline that being born into a prominent clerical family of sayyid status (nasab) is nothing more than a “legitimising potential,” the author holds (13–14). Scholarly fame and honor acquired through deeds (ḥasab) can only be upheld if it is actively cultivated. Crucial in this regard “are the narratives made of hasab, or in other words, family history narratives” (14).
Such dynamics manifest themselves in the leadership of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, today known as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq). Three of al-Ḥakīm's sons subsequently headed this organization which was founded in 1982 in Iran as an umbrella to unify the anti-Baʿthist Islamic opposition. Under their watch, SCIRI “gradually evolved into an al-Hakim family entity” (43). The brothers deliberately embellished and reclaimed their father's rather cautious political involvement (128–29), turning him into a pan-Iraqi revolutionary figure who transcended immediate Shiʿi concerns (151). By drawing on powerful symbols associated with Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm, SCIRI was able to establish itself as an important intermediary between Iraqi refugees and prisoners of war and the Iranian authorities (82–88).
Similar developments are at play as far as al-Khūʾī is concerned. His erstwhile exalted position lives on in the form of the Imam Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation, established in London in 1989, and also successively supervised by three of his sons. Corboz argues that this organization “offered a hybridised version of clerical leadership by combining a modern NGO-type structure and the marjaʿiyya's traditional networking practices” (57). During the 1990s, the foundation engaged in intensive international lobbying, mostly on Iraq-related themes such as Saddam Hussein's “genocide” of the country's Shiʿis. Through the publication of journals, the distribution of newsletters to governments, and meetings with state officials, the Al-Khoei Foundation went beyond its founder's careful and limited political maneuvering by arguing that humanitarian ends justified political means (180–188).
These examples reflect three distinct aspects of clerical authority on which Corboz focuses in her study, namely networks, philanthropy, and participation in politics. She devotes two chapters to each of these three elements, which, in turn, pay separate attention to the marjaʿiyya of al-Ḥakīm and al-Khūʾī, respectively. The author argues that these features collectively “determine the circular processes” through which the authority of the marājiʿ is “acquired, exercised and further reinforced” (6).
One of the great strengths of Corboz's book lies in her rich archive, consisting of over 90 interviews conducted in eight countries, official and private documents, as well as published works in Arabic. This material yields unique data suitable for mapping the webs of close collaborators and representatives (wukalāʾ) on which the Grand Ayatollahs rely in order to project their position beyond their immediate environment. Importantly, these networks remain remarkably stable over time and can thus be tapped by family members after the death of the marjaʿ, as happened in the case of the Al-Khoei Foundation, for example (50–64). Particularly convincing is also the book's questioning of the activist/quietist dichotomy according to which Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ are often classified, depending on whether they follow or oppose the Iranian model of “Guardianship of the Jurisprudent” (vilāyat-i faqīh). Instead, Corboz proposes to identify specific “moments of participation” and to privilege political practice over expressed commitments to ideology (120). This approach allows her to capture the nuances of political maneuvering by al-Khūʾī, who often relied on advice and mediation and even “conscious political aloofness” to reach certain goals without falling prey to governmental manipulation (165). Describing the Al-Khoei Foundation simply as quietist would likewise forestall a better understanding of its adopted, inherently flexible strategy when navigating various political environments such as Jordan, Thailand, or the United Kingdom with the goal of establishing Islamic centers and schools (100–116). Singling out “moments of participation” also enables Corboz to carefully delineate how SCIRI gradually and especially after the end of Saddam Hussein's regime moved away from an exclusive reliance on Iranian rhetoric (136–38). The organization tried to reinvent itself as a more visibly Iraqi popular force that was not afraid of collaborating with the United States (154–64).
The book's explicit top-down approach towards religious authority, however, comes with certain costs. In particular, it prevents Corboz from fully achieving her aim of showing how “the transnational is localised and, simultaneously, the local is transnationalised” in her networks under study (4). Since Corboz looks at transnational efforts exclusively from the perspective of the (institutionalized) marjaʿiyya, the crucial local authority of the wukalāʾ is not further explored, for instance. While she hints at how the standing of Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallāh (d. 2010) in Lebanon was enhanced thanks to his role as a wakīl of al-Khūʾī, the book does not consider Faḍlallāh's agency in strategically employing this connection or in shaping the image of the Iraqi marjaʿ in his native country. Similarly, the reader only gets a superficial sense of how Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm's son Mahdī al-Ḥakīm (d. 1988) experienced the “superstitious” practices of Pakistan's Shiʿis during his exile there in the early 1970s. Corboz does not discuss, however, how this visit impacted internal Pakistani dynamics and how certain ʿulamaʾ tried to claim Mahdī al-Ḥakīm for their particular cause in order to enhance their own local standing (79).
These additional reflections only underline the timeliness and importance of Guardians of Shiʿism, which doubtlessly will open an entirely new chapter in how we study the “Sources of Emulation” and their transnational reach. This stimulating work is both clear and accessible and should be of great interest to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and specialists alike.
