The study of “Nasserism” has undergone a bit of a renaissance in the last several years. After the avalanche of monographs (dealing mostly with political economy) that were published in the 1970s and very early 1980s, the Nasser period assumed the status of the neglected middle child; sandwiched between the rich and growing body of historical work on the 19th and early 20th centuries and the often innovative social science work being done on the post-infitāḥ and contemporary periods, it inspired very little in the way of new or exciting work. Fortunately, there has been a renewed interest in the Nasser period, which, in the last five years, has translated into an increasing number of works that have attempted to look at the period of Nasserist rule—its legacies and precursors—in new ways. Some of these attempts, like Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt, a collection of articles edited by Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler, have been novel.
Rethinking Nasserism has tried to move beyond existing paradigms for the study of the Nasserist period, dominated by political economy and political science, by including articles on memory, legal history, cultural production, the role of intellectuals, and changing social practices. Their goal, according to the editors, is to provide new insights into Nasserism by analyzing it as a form of populism. Drawing heavily from Latin American models, they characterize populism as a predominately middle-class movement that mobilizes the lower classes against imperialism and the existing political establishment, in part through use of symbols, imagery, and language that resonate within popular culture. Populism, although typically including some promises to redistribute wealth and effect social justice for marginalized members of society, stops short of abolishing private property or threatening the position of the petty bourgeoisie.
The benefit of looking at Nasserism as a form of populism, according to the authors, is twofold. The first is that it combines elements of the existing scholarly interpretations of Nasserism (very usefully summarized in a brief but fairly comprehensive literature review) that have variously analyzed Nasserist rule as an ideological movement, a revolt against Western imperialism, or the result of Nasser's status as a charismatic leader. The second is that it opens space for comparisons across national and regional boundaries: “A comparative analysis, which sees Nasserism as a form of populism, places it as part of a world-wide—or at least a Third World—phenomenon” (p. 28).
Although the case that Podeh and Winckler make for Nasserism as a form of populism is convincing, it remains unclear, looking at the rest of the volume's contributions, what the benefits of such an approach actually are in practice. One could perhaps argue that the welcome presence of articles that focus on the social and cultural aspects of Nasserism (e.g., Yoav DiCapua's article on sports culture and Joel Gordon's piece on Nasserist nostalgia and the multiple pop cultural lives of Abdel Halim Hafiz) is possible because populism as an analytical framework allows space for the consideration of such heretofore neglected subjects. However, neither of these articles—both excellent and standout contributions—deal directly with the applicability or (lack thereof) of populist models to the Nasserist case.
Opening space for comparative work seems a more plausible benefit of analyzing Nasserism as a form of populism, but only one of the chapters, Paul Rivlin's interesting essay comparing economic development policies in Park's Korea and Nasser's Egypt, is actually comparative. Although it only scratches the surface, Rivlin's suggestion of the importance of exchanges between and among the nations of the global South during this period is something that deserves further research and offers real potential for rethinking both Nasserism and the process of decolonization as a transnational phenomenon.
In truth, few of the contributions live up to the promise of the title. Most engage in familiar debates or pose questions similar to those found in earlier works on the Nasser period. What was Nasser's true relationship with the Soviet Union (Ginat)? Was Nasser a friend to or a foe of the United States (Lesch)? Why was Egypt's family planning program largely a failure under Nasser but a relative success under Mubarak (Gilbar and Winckler)? It can certainly be valuable to revisit such questions, particularly when using new methodological tools. However, the answers provided in Rethinking Nasserism, for the most part, do not offer much that is new.
The exception to this is Nathan Brown's article on Nasserist legal culture. Writing against the argument that Egyptians traded political rights and the rule of law for social welfare gains, resulting in an authoritarian system, Brown argues that Nasserist legal reforms aimed to make the court system more accountable to Egyptian citizens, not less. Brown further points out the increase of accessibility to the legal system experienced during the 1950s and 1960s. In doing so, he challenges conventional pictures of Nasserist authoritarianism and the more general linkages between rule of law, liberalism, freedom, and institutional accountability so prevalent in contemporary policy debates about democratization and political reform in the Middle East. Instead of asking only what looking at legal culture can tell us about Nasserism, the aim of Brown's article is to further ask what looking at Nasserist legal culture can tell us about liberalism, about the rule of law, and about authoritarianism and legal systems. This is what is needed if scholars are to truly succeed in “rethinking Nasserism”: instead of recycling old questions, what we really need is to ask new ones.
