Introduction
Many of us working in bioethics are familiar with the notion of “Sophie’s choice” or the story behind the choice. Sophie was offered the opportunity to save one—but only one—of her two children from death, and she had to choose which.Footnote 1 As a parent, I find her dilemma beyond gut wrenching: as Katz-Rothman says, “Had someone simply shot one of the children, it would surely have been a kindness.”Footnote 2 My point in starting with Sophie’s choice is not simply to illustrate the dilemma of being charged with choosing which of two people to save. My point is that, as hard as it must be to make such a choice, it pales in comparison to being forced as a parent to choose between one’s children. This is not just because parents love their children but because of what it means to be a parent. Imagine another awful choice: the choice between one’s child’s other parent (whom one also loves) and one’s child. Wretched as such a choice would be, one can imagine choosing one’s child on the grounds that this is what the other parent would wish one to do and what one would expect one’s partner to do if he or she were the one having to choose. It is not simply love that is at issue here, but the relationship between parent and child. Likewise, Solomon got it right when he identified the real mother as the mother who chose to give up the child rather than see him killed.Footnote 3 In the story, of course, Solomon got it right in the sense that we as readers know that this was the woman who had actually given birth to the child. But I think that Solomon got it right either way; no mother lightly consents to her child being sacrificed for a principle, and to sacrifice him to the principle that she is his mother rather undermines her claim to be the mother at all in any meaningful sense: this is the deeper sense in which Solomon got it right.
In Clones, Genes and Immortality,Footnote 4 John Harris introduces us to various fictional women—all called Martha—who have to make hard decisions about their children, and also to other unnamed mothers, and fathers, who have to make hard decisions about when to terminate a pregnancy, when to opt for preimplantation selection, and which embryo to select once they have taken that option. Although I agree with Harris’s arguments that children are rarely wronged by being brought into existence, I disagree with his view that, with one exception, parents are to be blamed for the harm they cause when they continue with—or attempt to start following preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and embryo selection for—a pregnancy knowing that the resulting child will have some disability. I also want to modify his exception.
What I Take Harris’s Arguments to Be
Harris draws a distinction between a person being harmed by being born with some impairment and being wronged by being born with this impairment. Undoubtedly, Harris considers impairment of any degree to be a kind of harm:
A condition that is harmful . . . is one in which the individual is disabled or suffering in some way or in which his interests or rights are frustrated. The disability or suffering may be slight, just as harms may be trivial. And of course what constitutes a disability may have to be defined relative to a particular population. . . . In the particular circumstances of the case, such a condition may be advantageous to the individual. . . . But it is still something disabling and hurtful, it still counts as being in a harmed condition.Footnote 5
However, assuming that the individual has a life worth living (i.e., would not prefer nonexistence or death to the life that they have), the individual has not been wronged by being brought into existence, even though he or she has been harmed. The individual is not wronged because the alternatives were existence with the impairment or nonexistence, and existence is always in the interests of the child (provided that the child has a life worth living): “the injury, ex hypothesi, would be worth having in exchange for existence.”Footnote 6
According to Harris, however, this does not mean that parents do nothing wrong when they choose to bring into the world children who have some sort of impairment: a distinction has to be drawn between the parents doing wrong and the child being wronged:
It is important to be clear that where we do choose to bring avoidable suffering or injury into the world this is wrong. But unless the injury and suffering to the individual thus created is so great as to make life intolerable then this individual is not thereby wronged. The wrong is that of an individual deliberately choosing to increase suffering in the world when she could have avoided so doing.Footnote 7
The wrong in question is repeatedly spelled out as being the wrong of bringing “avoidable” or “needless”Footnote 8 suffering into the world, the wrong of “choosing deliberately to increase unnecessarily the amount of harm or suffering in the world or of choosing a world with more suffering rather than choosing a world with less.”Footnote 9 And it is for this that parents, with one exception, can be blamed. The exception is when the suffering is not avoidable in the sense that any (genetically related, we should suppose) child born to this mother, or these parents more accurately, would have the same disability. Or in other words, that this child with an impairment is not replaceable with a different child without that same (or another worse) impairment.
On this point, although I agree with Harris that individuals with impairments (whose lives are not worse than death) are not wronged by being brought into existence, I argue that parents who bring such children into existence are not necessarily to be blamed for this, as Harris argues that they should be.Footnote 10 My exception is different from Harris’s; indeed I will argue that Harris puts too much weight on one kind of avoidability—namely, the avoidability of the impairment—rather than an alternative understanding, the avoidability of having a genetically related child at all. Before this, though, we need to look at some of Harris’s comments on parenting and parental partiality.
It is clear that Harris strongly supports reproductive freedom (as an expression of liberty and autonomy),Footnote 11 and even though, as we have seen, he considers that some of the procreative choices that people make are bad choices, he considers that reproductive liberty should nevertheless be largely unregulated, and certainly people seeking assisted conception services should not be spuriously selected for their suitability as future parents.Footnote 12 Beyond this, he also affirms the value of having children. In The Value of Life he writes:
Anyone denied the opportunity to have children which they want is denied something almost universally acknowledged to be one of the most worthwhile experiences and important benefits of life: in the woman’s case the opportunity to become pregnant, give birth to and bring up children; in the man’s, that of fathering and rearing his own children. To deny anyone this opportunity when they want it is to do them a substantial wrong.Footnote 13
Harris also argues that being a parent provides individuals with a reason to be partial (favoring their own children) when they would otherwise be required to be impartial. His justification for accepting preference for our own children is typically utilitarian:
We have seen that this preference generalized would not lead to any group being systematically and unfairly disadvantaged . . . also . . . we can see that the disposition to love one’s family (and one’s friends) is a disposition that generally speaking makes life better all round, better for everyone. We want all people to love their families and friends, we want to live in a world where people are like that.Footnote 14
Thus, a doctor who “ought to save as many lives as she can, even at the expense of her children . . . should not be blamed if she saves her own children. This would be a case of . . . ‘blameless wrongdoing.’”Footnote 15
Harris also accepts that parents are justified in refusing to endanger their children to save the lives of others. Here it may be that some great harm is a risk rather than certainty.
If your child is suffering from a fatal kidney disorder and mine has the only available kidney, would I be wrong to risk my child to save yours? I do not think that I would in fact do so, but that is because I am a parent and I have fierce protective feelings towards my child. But would I be morally wrong to risk my child to save yours?Footnote 16
I take it that this is a rhetorical question, that Harris is actually saying that of course it would not be morally wrong for parents to take this risk with their own child, but I also take him to be saying that it would also not be wrong to refuse to take this risk, or that if it were wrong, it would be another example of blameless wrongdoing.
I argue that sometimes when parents decide not to discard embryos thought to have some impairment (or when they decide to continue with a pregnancy knowing that the fetus has some impairment), this might equally be a case of blameless wrongdoing, rather than, as Harris suggests, blame-attracting wrongdoing.
What Counts as Unavoidable?
Imagine a couple whose first child is diagnosed with some genetic disorder. The couple would like to have another child and are recommended in vitro fertilization (IVF) and PGD as a means of having a child unaffected by the same disorder. But the couple only met when they were in their mid-thirties, and the woman is by now beyond the peak of her fertility. On the first attempt, no oocytes are collected, and on the second, despite increasing the ovarian stimulation, only three oocytes are found. Only two embryos result, and both of these are found to be affected. Imagine also that this disorder is such that an individual would consider it worth having in exchange for existence. The advice of their consultant is that they may never manage to create any more embryos. They decide to go ahead and try for a pregnancy using these embryos.
This case is surely one of Harris’s exceptions. This is what he says of a woman who continues with a pregnancy when she discovers that the fetus is affected, as too will be any other children she may have: if she
decides to go ahead [with the pregnancy,] . . . she is acting in the best interests of that child. . . . [S]he would not be doing wrong in bringing avoidable suffering into the world. Any suffering that her child experiences due to its disability is unavoidable just in the sense that she can have no child that will not be subject to such a disability and whatever suffering goes along with it. . . . [S]he wrongs no one and benefits someone.Footnote 17
What I am not clear about is whether Harris would think that our couple would be doing anything wrong if they decided not to go ahead. On the one hand, he does not think that the embryo/fetus/neonate is a person, and as a preperson it cannot be harmed by not continuing to exist. Thus, he writes that if the same woman decides not to continue with the pregnancy, she “wrongs no one and benefits no one. She wrongs no one because in ending the life of the fetus she deprives the fetus of nothing that it can value and she benefits no one since there is no one she brings into existence.”Footnote 18 But on the other hand, he says: “If children are wanted it is better to have healthy children than to have disabled children where there are alternatives, and it is better to have children with disabilities than to have no children at all.”Footnote 19 Given, then, that our embryos are wanted, in the sense that our couple wants another child, and given that their only reason for hesitation in continuing was that they did not want to bring avoidable suffering into the world, surely it would, according to Harris, be better if they continued than if they did not, notwithstanding that they would not be doing anything wrong by not continuing. And by extension, couples who know that they carry genes for similar genetic disorders (i.e., those that the resultant individual would still consider worth having in exchange for existence) are under no obligation not to reproduce when all the possibilities for having an unaffected child (or further children) have been exhausted. This seems wrong to me.
My objection is that Harris appears to set the threshold for exhausting all possibilities too low, or perhaps alternatively he appears to place too great a weight on the freedom to have a genetically related child. Both the woman in Harris’s example and our couple could choose instead to have a nongenetically related child, either by adoption or by using donated gametes.
I’m not sure that Harris would disagree with me on this point. Although some of his comments, particularly those related to the importance of reproductive liberty, access to reproductive services, and the right to assistance with conception, suggest that genetic relatedness is an important aspect of the worthwhile experience and benefit of having children, I doubt that Harris would disagree with me that having genetically unrelated children is an equally worthwhile experience and important benefit. Thus, although it might be better to have a disabled child than no child at all, we should not presume that one has “no child at all” if one has genetically unrelated children; thus genetically unrelated children without impairment should be preferred to genetically related children with impairment, if we accept Harris’s argument that an impairment is always a harm.
Choosing as Parents and Blameless Wrongdoing
Harris, as we have seen, accepts that parents should not be blamed for putting the interests of their children ahead of the demands of what would otherwise be expected by morality. What I now argue is that if parents decide that they will continue with a pregnancy—or, more specifically, if they decide to try for a pregnancy following PGD—when the fetus/embryo is known to have some impairment, this might also be a case of blameless wrongdoing. I continue to assume throughout that in every case the impairment is such that an individual would still consider it worth having in exchange for existence. To argue convincingly, I take it that I must show two things: first, that it is possible to be the parent of an embryo, and, second, that there are sufficient similarities between decisions about children and impairment and the examples Harris uses to explain blameless wrongdoing for these decisions also to count as blameless.
Can One Be the Parent of an Embryo?
On one level this seems a stupid question: it does not seem any more unnatural to speak of an embryo’s parents than it does to speak of a pregnant woman as a mother—as indeed Harris does, though not consistently. But this inconsistency also seems correct. Not all pregnant women would perceive themselves to be mothers: a pregnant surrogate might consider that the woman for whom the child is intended, not herself, is the mother. Likewise, some women terminate a pregnancy because they don’t want to be a mother (which suggests that at the time of the termination they do not consider themselves already to be one), and others do so because they feel that, as the child’s mother, they are acting in the best interests of their child. Similarly, there is no reason for sperm donors to consider themselves to be the fathers of embryos created as a result of their donations, and it is possible that the recipients do consider themselves to be the fathers of the embryos, despite not being genetically related. I do not have time to explore the issue of what makes a parent here, but I have done so elsewhere.Footnote 20 At this point, all that really needs to be noted is that there is no reason to suppose that one could not be a parent of an embryo or fetus.
It is important to distinguish this from claims about status: some parents might believe that embryos and/or fetuses are morally significant, and others might not. The claim that an embryo can have a parent is not a sneaky means of trying to award it some moral standing with which Harris may disagree. Harris, we should not forget, thinks that embryos, fetuses, and neonates are (by and large, i.e., severe mental impairments aside) prepersons. But it seems to me that if we can take it for granted that a baby at birth can be considered to have parents whose views about how it should be treated and so on are to be awarded considerable respect because they are the parents, and if we grant that a newborn baby has the same status as an embryo or fetus, then there is reason to suppose that both embryo and fetus can have parents too. In other words, whether or not one has parents does not seem to be related to whether or not one is a person.
Parents, PGD, and Blameless Wrongdoing
Harris seems to accept that there are circumstances under which parents can be partial to their own children even to the extent that they should not be expected to risk the interests of their children when there are good moral reasons to do so. But he also wants to blame parents who choose to continue with a pregnancy, and, by extension, choose to try for a pregnancy, when they know that the embryo/fetus has some impairment. The right thing to do is to replace this embryo or fetus with another who does not have an impairment. One justification might be that the duties that parents as parents have to their embryo children is different from the duties that parents as parents have to older children, and given that the interests of older children are greater in number and more complex, this does not seem unreasonable. Of course the interest that Harris does not think that the embryo, fetus, or neonate has that seems most crucial here is the interest in continuing to live. Thus he could argue that there can be no parental duty to protect the interests of the embryo in continuing to exist because the embryo is not the kind of being that can have such an interest.
One of the difficulties that I have with this possible argument (I use the term “possible” because I have not actually heard or read such a formulation made by Harris) is that parents do have a duty to protect their children’s future interests. A neonate has no immediate interest in the ability to run, but given that the person she will become could be reasonably thought to have an interest in this ability, a parent may be thought to have a duty to ensure that the neonate gets the necessary treatment to her legs that would make this future running possible. Harris has no problem with considering the interests of individuals who will come into being: he accepts that if harm is done to a gamete, the person who develops from this gamete can be thought to have been harmed as a result, and that if we know that a person will result, we should avoid doing whatever it is we were thinking of doing to the gamete. Harris is, however, also able to argue that no harm is done if we do whatever it is we were planning to do but ensure that the gamete does not become an individual in the future. But likewise, if the baby in question is a neonate, surely the parents could, according to Harris, simply decide not to go for the treatment, but to kill the neonate and have a different one instead, one that didn’t need the treatment. The purpose of this example is not to score a cheap point based on response to cuddly babies but rather to ask, “is this the kind of behavior we would expect of parents”? And the answer is “surely not.”
The weakness in Harris’s arguments, or so it seems to me, is that “our” children (as opposed to “other” children or “other” people) are not so replaceable to us: a sense of their being “ours” sets in before they are born, even if we are prepared to accept that they are replaceable in a philosophical sense. Thus, I think that it might be possible (and not unreasonable) for a parent to have the same fiercely protective feelings toward a fetus, embryo, or newborn as Harris described previously in relation to his child. Also, although possible or hypothetical children might be interchangeable or replaceable for parents, actual children are not. Thus, there might be a real difference for parents between delaying becoming pregnant to avoid an impairment and having a termination and becoming pregnant again to avoid an impairment, and the difference is that one is a decision about a child that one would like to have but have not yet got, and the other is about a child one has already—irrespective of whether one believes that that child has some right to life or inherent moral value.
Several points of clarification need to be made here. The first is that I am not arguing that everyone making a decision about fetuses or embryos does so as a parent. I have only tried to show in this article that there is reason for some people to consider themselves to be parents of embryos or fetuses or newborns, not that they are required to do so.
The second is that a distinction must be made between the point at which some parental duties begin and the point at which one becomes a parent. For instance, given that it is wrong to harm your children, people who want to become parents should not knowingly damage their gametes if they intend to use them to have children. But this does not make them the parents of their gametes, even though it might be thought of as a form of parental duty, just as taking folic acid before becoming pregnant might be. I have just said that we cannot be parents of gametes. I think that this is true, but it begs the question of when children start to be. Clearly, Harris is correct in arguing for the gamete principleFootnote 21 in the sense that gametes are part of where we begin; another part of our life story is when we become an embryo (whether by conception or by successful— in the sense that failure to implant could be overcome—artificial parthenogenesisFootnote 22 or cloning), and another is when we become a person. Again, we can separate when we start from any moral significance gained from potential,Footnote 23 but what I am trying to do here is to define the earliest point at which we can consider ourselves to be parents, and I would suggest the embryo. I have been careful here to say “earliest point,” but of course it need not be the latest point: stepparents, for instance, only come to see themselves as parents much later in a child’s development.
The third point is that I am not arguing that there is one right parental decision about continuing or not with a pregnancy, or trying for a pregnancy with a particular embryo. Just as one parent might choose to take a risk with his or her child to save another with a fatal kidney disease, another parent might not, and neither decision should attract blame (the first because it is right to save life if one reasonably can and the second because parents are entitled to be partial). Equally, some parents will be unable to accommodate within their understanding of what it means to be a parent and their understanding of when one becomes a parent the impartiality between actual and possible children that is required if one is to avoid harm using replaceability. Others might consider themselves to be parents only once their child is a person, or perhaps at some point in late pregnancy.
In summary, I am only arguing that when individuals make a decision to continue with a pregnancy in which the fetus is known to have some impairment or when they try for a pregnancy using an embryo known to have some impairment and do so because as parents they are unable to be impartial about their children, this may—if we agree with Harris that impairment is always a harm—count as wrongdoing, but it should be considered blameless wrongdoing. Parents should not be required by morality to adhere to principles over the interests of their children; one might even argue that no kind of morality would require them to do so.
Embryo Selection and Sophie’s Choice
It is sometimes argued that PGD and embryo selection are very similar to fetal testing and termination of pregnancy: that if the latter is acceptable (or even morally required), then so is the former, and that any conditions that justify termination in the latter justify selection against in the former. But there are differences, too. I will not address all of these—for example, the difference in the experience of women between superovulation and termination or differences for those who would argue that the fetus is more morally valuable than an embryo, and so on. The difference that interests me here is the difference that is generated by choosing between embryos as opposed to choosing whether or not to terminate the life of this individual fetus. But perhaps this distinction has less force if Harris’s arguments are employed, as the decision could be characterized as favoring some embryos over others versus favoring future fetuses over this fetus. However, if my argument is correct, it is not unreasonable for parents to be partial to their existing children, preferring to protect their existing children’s interests over those of merely possible children (but I also accept that not everyone making a choice between embryos may do so as a parent—some will be doctors, for instance, or other individuals who do not consider their embryos to be children).
Again, I want to argue that, for parents, embryo selection is a bit like Sophie’s choice. It is not as bad as Sophie’s choice: the embryos will not experience the choice or their death—like Sophie’s child presumably did. And because Sophie’s children were older, they had a different kind of parent-child relationship than can be achieved with an embryo. Discussions between those arguing that embryos have no moral status (or less moral status than infants) and those who think embryos and infants all have an equal and inherent value often get to the point at which the supporter of inherent value is asked, “Are you seriously saying that given the choice between saving a test tube with ten embryos in it and saving an infant, you would save the embryos?” Agreeing to save the infant does not, however, mean that the embryos have no value. In the same way, my decision to save my child rather than some other child does not mean that this other child has no value. Likewise, the fact that it would be easier for a parent to choose an infant over an embryo does not mean that it is easy for parents to chose between embryos, any more than it means that when forced to choose between infants, the infant sacrificed had no value to the parent.
So why would parents put themselves in the position of making this Sophie’s choice? The difference between Sophie’s situation and PGD is that Sophie did not consent to be put in the position of choosing, so, surely, parents who think that it is wrong to choose between their children would not agree to PGD. One reason why parents may opt for PGD is that they do not want to bring into the world a child whose impairment would not on balance be chosen as the price for existence. If, then, this were the only decision that they had to make—that is, to discard embryos with this condition—it would not be a difficult one. We are, however, moving toward more complex choices. In agreeing to look for one condition, parents may be presented with knowledge about other conditions that are much less serious and they may be expected to rank their children in order of preference for existence or discard some of them completely. Just as Sophie begged the guard to help her to save her children and received an answer that created her terrible dilemma, so some parents may be presented with a different choice from the one they originally sought.
But what of the bystander? Katz-Rothman’s comment suggests that it would have been less cruel if the guard had simply shot one of the children and saved the other, that is, if he had made the choice for Sophie. What if there are more than two embryos and the parents prefer to leave to chance which are stored for future use and which are used now? Would the clinicians be obliged to select the embryos that they know not to be affected in preference to ones known to be affected? Possibly they would, because they would be in a position to be impartial. Whether they should refuse to choose at random if specifically instructed by the parents to do so is a different matter, and one that relates to respect for procreative liberty, rather than whether parents can be expected to be impartial as far as their children are concerned—as indeed is the question of whether they should refuse completely to transfer an embryo known to be affected with some disorder.
