Paul A. C. Koistinen’s book, State of War, is the last in a five-volume study of the political economy of American warfare. The goal of his multivolume project was to “provide scholars and other researchers with … a comprehensive, analytical, and interdisciplinary study of the economics of America’s wars from the colonial period to today” (p. 1). Koistinen argues that his work demonstrates “how the political economy of warfare impacts domestic life and foreign policy and what economic mobilization for defense and war reveals about the nature and operations of power within society” (p. 1).

In the current volume, Koistinen, a professor emeritus of history at California State University, Northridge, argues that the current system of procuring and sustaining the national security establishment of the United States—including DOD, DOE, NASA, and the intelligence agencies—is destructive to the nation and our democracy, is causing America’s decline, and is actually creating insecurity because of the lack of readiness of existing military systems and diminished funds for training and adequate numbers of forces. Koistinen argues that the “military industrial complex” (MIC), and now private military companies (PMC), that so worried President Eisenhower have come to dominate the American conduct of war and peace, and influence almost every aspect of American life. He writes that “a massive Cold War military and a powerful private defense industry have accumulated vast influence and power that directly affects practically every area of foreign and domestic life” (p. 7). In his view, the United States has become “a warfare or national security state.” Koistinen believes that substantial reforms from without are necessary to stop the decline. He writes, “For decades, the armed services have drained America’s human and physical resources without any positive return and have had a destructive effect on the nation’s economic, political, and social system. Until DOD spending is brought under control, the United States has no prospect of regeneration and faces continuing economic decline” (p. 217).

In recent years, a number of books have come out sounding the alarm of the growing power of private military companies to influence U.S. foreign, military, and domestic policies. See, for example, Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (2003); Dina Rasor and Robert Bauman, Betraying Our Troops: The Destructive Results of Privatizing War (2007); Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (2010); and Ann Hagedorn, The Invisible Soldiers: How America Outsourced our Security (2014), to identify just a few works in this growing body of literature. It is estimated that the decade-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will ultimately cost the American people more than 3 trillion dollars. Large portions of this money went to private military firms. With the causes, conduct, and outcome of the wars still in doubt, and the subject of considerable debate, the cost and uses of congressionally legislated funds is a necessary discussion for the nation to have.

Koistinen’s book is organized into nine chapters: “The Presidency,” with subsections devoted to each president from Truman to Bush Jr.; “Congress”; “A Big Military”; “The Defense Industry”; “Big Science”; “Other Estates”; “Weapons”; “National Security and the Economy”; and “Political Economy of the Cold War.” Koistinen’s analytical paradigm consists of four major elements: (1) the American economy (industrial and financial), (2) the federal government (particularly the expanded powers of the executive branch), (3) civil–military relations (explaining the growing power of the military during the Cold War), and (4) sophisticated weapons systems (made possible by “Big Science” and America’s universities). The most important chapter is “National Security and the Economy,” in which Koistinen writes, “With multiple trillions of dollars and tens of thousands of contractors and subcontractors involved throughout the nation, the effect on the economy is destructive.” Koistinen’s book is based primarily on secondary sources. He quotes numerous other like-minded scholars to advance his argument.

Koistinen concludes: “Under those circumstances, the industry became characterized by inefficiency, waste, and corruption; defense contractors too often turned out defective or failed weapons and equipment. Over time, massive expenditures for defense have had a very deleterious effect on the economy. … Of crucial significance … DOD budgets have distorted public priorities and spending, denying adequate attention and resources to infrastructure, education, medical care, and other public services and interests” (p. 235). Even the military has become “victimized” by the industries that support it, he says.

I do agree with Koistinen’s main argument that the MIC/PMC has distorted the foreign, military, and domestic policies of the United States. However, I think he needs two more chapters. The first should be titled, “The American People,” who continuously put into office political leaders who sustain the MIC, and who, after the Vietnam War, failed to show up to fight. Part of the reason for the enormous expansion in PMC after 9/11 is that the Army and Marine Corps were too small to do all that was required of them in two long wars. As a result, administrations turned to PMC, as opposed to conscription. The American people are a significant part of the problem. Trying to close a military base, fort, or production facility garners the anger of entire communities. The second additional chapter should be titled “The Threats.” The United States provide the majority of security on earth. What would the world look like without that security? Would South Korea exist? Would they be selling us Hyundais and Kias? Would Taiwan exist? How would the Cold War have ended? Would Germany still be divided? Who would control the largest known oil reserves on earth? Would Israel exist? The armed forces of the United States guarantee certain conditions on planet Earth, conditions with which much of the Western world is happy. It is worth considering what the world would look like without them.

Koistinen’s book is packed with information and data. A few charts and graphs of defense spending, size of the services, and size of MIC would have strengthened his argument, particularly in the chapters “A Big Military” and “The Defense Industry.” I will recommend this book to some of my graduate students. There are a few points, however, with which I strongly disagree; for example: “Although the armed forces had acquired some new weapons and equipment, the military as a whole appeared to be in no better shape in 1989 than it had been in 1981” (p. 29). Having served in the Army throughout this period, though, I know this is just not true.