Notably, this constant holds in spite of two significant facts. First, neither men nor women have a natural predilection for killing; societies in general must work hard to convince any of their members to kill, whether male or female. Second, women who do manage to participate in war seem to function on a par with men. If neither women nor men want to kill, and there are many of both sexes who are equipped to do so, why is combat almost wholly the domain of men? Goldstein offers this puzzle as an organizing theme.

The book presents twenty possible explanations, which are organized into four major categories: the biology of gender, gender differences in group dynamics, the cultural construction of masculinity, and the cultural construction of dominance/subordination relations between men and women. Goldstein derives these hypotheses primarily from feminist theory. Although he provides a concise description of major feminist approaches, it is somewhat disappointing that he infrequently returns to those ideas later in the book. He is careful, however, to state that his work is not theoretical, but is intended as “a dossier of evidence,” a survey of relevant empirical evidence (p. 58).

Having concluded from the evidence that females' participation in war as individual combatants, in groups, and as leaders can be as effective as men's, he considers biological differences between the sexes at the individual and group levels. His comprehensive review suggests that where there are differences on characteristics relevant to differential war capability (e.g., size and strength, ability to work in hierarchies), they are in the direction of favoring men but are quite weak. An important finding is that for many measures, the bell curves of men and women have large zones of overlap, and so a small but nontrivial number of women should be found as combatants.

Two chapters deal with the cultural construction of gender, the first focusing on masculinity (“tough men”) and femininity (“tender women”), the second on men's domination (sexual and economic) of women. Goldstein finds the strongest explanations here, particularly in the socialization of males for war (toughness, suppression of emotion) and of females for supporting men's war roles. He concludes overall that the best explanation for gendered war roles is the combination of 1) small but significant biological differences in average size, strength, and rough-and-tumble play, and 2) the socialization of men for war, paired with the tendency to demonize the enemy through feminization as a marker of dominance.

This book makes a significant contribution to the political and larger social science literature on war and international relations, in many ways providing a bridge between mainstream and feminist IR theory and research. The review of the research literature, painstakingly covering several disciplines, is remarkably thorough, as evidenced by his analysis, as well as by the exhaustive list of references and author and subject indexes. Goldstein's analysis is incisive, clearly argued, and concise. His consideration of feminist approaches is thoughtful, and he concludes that the evidence he cites supports feminist theorists' efforts to “problematize masculinity” (p. 407). Although the author is clear that this is not primarily a theoretical work, there are many places where the reader's appetite is whetted for more discussion and analysis.

The only weakness of the author's almost ruthless attention to the presentation of evidence is that on occasion questionable claims appear as fact. There are not many such instances, but some are significant. One example is Goldstein's statement that “men must take actions, undergo ordeals, or pass tests in order to become men” (p. 264), while “womanhood comes more naturally and does not require passing tests” (p. 265). This is clearly arguable. Several feminist political theorists have addressed the danger underlying this notion of the apparent “naturalness” of femininity and its use for oppressing women, holding them to the private sphere (e.g., see Susan Moller Okin, Gender, Justice and the Family 1991, and Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases 1989).

One might make the case that some of the more obvious “ordeals” women undergo or are threatened with are physical abuse and rape, which help to construct women as vulnerable, weak, and in need of protection. Less violent ordeals, such as discrimination in the workplace, contribute in fact to women's economic vulnerability. One only needs to walk down the “girls” aisle in any toy store for evidence of the shaping of the qualities attributed to and demanded for womanhood—mandates for domesticity, submissiveness, sexual availability, and so on. Goldstein's contention that boys and men are forced into “artificial manhood” (p. 265) to “be all they can be” is a strong one and central to the book. Girls and women are no less forced into an artificial gender identity, and one might argue that in the process they are trained to “be less than they can be.” That said, one of the strengths of War and Gender is that it invites many lively debates, which have the potential for bringing forward scholarly investigations of war and political conflict.

Goldstein presents a cogent argument that the majority of mainstream social science research and theory (the province largely of male scholars) has focused on war without attending to gender. Scholarship that has attended to gender in the context of war has been engaged in primarily by (women) feminists, who have addressed women's roles and, to a lesser extent, the social construction of gender. The book's analysis fills a gap, focusing on the role of gender in war, and primarily the role of men and masculinity.

In sum, Goldstein convincingly concludes that, given the evidence for an interaction between war and gender, scholars of political conflict should pay attention to gender, and gender scholars should pay attention to war. A somewhat remarkable claim, one well worth further attention, is that war can be seen as a cause of gender. If one accepts that many (if not most) societies, to a greater or lesser extent, spend resources (both soft and hard) on war preparation, in light of Goldstein's evidence it is not at all ludicrous to consider that gendered social roles might be “used” to construct potential combatants.