Can anyone in 2008 explain why President George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq in 2003? The stated reasons—weapons of mass destruction, nebulous ties to al-Qaʿida, humanitarian intervention—made little sense, even at the time, to hardheaded students of international relations. Surely, these scholars rejoined, the stated reasons must be smoke screens. The Iraq War must be about something else: ensured U.S. stewardship of Gulf oil, perhaps, or the neoconservatives' desire to deter future challenges to U.S. global hegemony.
Philip Smith's Why War? is an intriguing riposte to such materialist theories of why modern democracies go to war. Wars are not just the inevitable violent resolutions of conflicts between states over scarce resources, he writes, nor are they mere by-products of intra-elite rivalries within states. Realist and materialist theories fail to appreciate that leaders of democracies must engage in dialogue with civil society before loading the tanks on the C-130s. Only through open debate can the political leadership gauge the legitimacy accorded a prospective military venture by the public. A war might be launched without legitimacy, but its human and financial costs will be much more readily questioned, particularly if the war turns out not to be a cakewalk. Presidents and prime ministers need “cultural mandates” for their wars to be judged worth the sacrifice (p. 11).
Smith follows this basic thesis with an unduly dense detour through anthropology and semiotics, the upshot of which is that denizens of democracies interpret world events with recourse to four remarkably durable narrative genres. The most common is low mimesis, in which the actions of others are deemed, like “ours,” to be ordinary and unexciting. Tragedy and romance, by contrast, assign moral valences to the various actors, with romance being the better backdrop to war because the protagonist is seen as fighting for a noble cause. War is best narrated, however, in the apocalyptic mode of the life and death struggle between unimpeachable good and implacable evil. All participants in discourses about crises, including the state, make a “genre guess” (p. 27)—an estimation about which storyline will be most vindicated by history—in real time, often based on fragmentary information. Advocates and opponents of a warlike crisis response seek, respectively, to “inflate” and “deflate” the genre underpinning the discourse (see, for instance, p. 29).
Next, Smith marshals evidence from the leading national press organs of the United States, Britain, France, and Spain to show a one-to-one correspondence between each nation's dominant narrative genre and each state's military posture in the Suez Crisis, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War. In 1956, the British and French press cast Gamal Abdel Nasser as a Nilotic Hitler, an “icy fanatic” (p. 76) at once inscrutable and transparently malignant, while Time magazine, in low mimetic mode, saw “a man sincere in devotion to the improvement of his impoverished land and desperate people” (p. 65). Smith notes the parallels in representations of Saddam Hussein thirty-five years later, when Time breathlessly asserted that the Iraqi strongman “made the entire world quake, weak-kneed, at his power” (p. 105). By 2003, after thirteen years of sanctions and containment, there was a trans-Atlantic gulf of genre choice, with low-mimetic France so dubious of the “mortal threat” posed by Iraq that it blocked the United Nations Security Council's authorization for war and with British Prime Minister Tony Blair's continuous courting of political exile for his retelling of the Bush administration's apocalyptic narrative.
Smith does not propose his schema as a substitute for realist and materialist theories referencing interests and geopolitics. He considers culture to be a “contributory if not sufficient cause for war” (p. 11). One might still protest that his claim of any causality for narrative genres is convincing only insofar as the dominant genre is autonomous from the state. Indeed, Smith offers only one instance in which, arguably, civil society pushed aggressiveness upon government: Bush the Elder's initial low mimetic reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which intensified toward the apocalyptic after a weekend of heated editorials. In addition, would the junior Bush have paid a political price if he had “ignored Iraq”? Smith surmises not, quoting a 21 April 2003 Time article's assessment that “the price would have been a few disappointed administration hawks and one or two grumpy op-eds” (p. 156). However, he then persuasively demonstrates that culture—to wit, the apocalyptic themes infusing post-9/11 American discourse about the entire Islamic world—was the factor allowing Bush's apocalyptic genre guess about Saddam Hussein to be met with flag-waving fervor whereas President Bill Clinton's 1998 missile strikes on alleged al-Qaʿida facilities, for instance, were met with snickers about Monica Lewinsky.
Why War? deserves the careful attention of diplomatic and cultural historians, political scientists, sociologists, and cultural studies scholars, all of whom may find the volume a thought-provoking assignment for their graduate and advanced undergraduate students. By dint of its subject matter, this book should also have an audience outside the academy, but the jargon-laden first chapters will likely ensure that it does not.
More is the pity, if one posits that the ultimate test of Smith's theory lies in its predictive value. In the on-again, off-again confrontation between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran, there is a crisis in the making with ready-made elements of an apocalyptic narrative. There is the dormant American trauma of the hostage crisis, the Iranian leader who seems almost Hollywood-trained for the role of “icy fanatic,” the wounded superpower and the insouciant upstart whose ambitions are said to include acquisition of a doomsday machine. If the West were to make an apocalyptic genre guess about Iran, realist and left-leaning dissenters would of course have many narrative-deflating facts at their disposal. Smith's book, however, suggests that facts—in and of themselves—might prove incapable of resisting the momentum of political culture. It is an elegant, and most disquieting, analysis.
