Introduction
The most intuitive argument against the moralities of eating meat is that raising and killing animals for food (RKF for short) harms animals, and is thus immoral. The essay will delve into two main objections proposed against this argument: first, RKF does not always have to harm animals, unlike the general consensus of cruel ways of factory farming, given the option of free-range farming, and might even be in animals’ best interests; second, animal welfare is unimportant, we hold no duties towards animals, and the satisfaction gained from consuming meat outweighs any harms induced on animals by RKF, even if they are to be considered. These objections do not stand.
First Objection: RKF Does not Have to Harm Animals
One could argue that free-range farming induces good for animals because it brings animals into existence. It is existence that grants the prerequisite for well-being and for pleasures. Non-existence would deprive animals of the opportunity to experience such pleasures. But it is implausible that having an existence can be better for a being than having no existence at all. To be better off in one scenario than in another one must involve a level of well-being in both scenarios. Those who do not exist in a given scenario do not have poor well-being, they simply have no well-being. Consider scenario A, where a man named Alex exists and has all basic necessities of life, a social network and a sense of purpose. In scenario B, Alex does not exist, there is no entity to experience well-being or the lack thereof. We cannot compare Alex in scenario A and non-existence in scenario B. We cannot compare well beings in scenarios where well-being does not exist.
Suppose one is unconvinced and worries that I have missed the point of the argument: it is the missed opportunity that is a form of harm. Free-range farming could guarantee animals short, happy lives, plentiful green spaces to roam in, quality food and good contact with other members of their species, an opportunity to experience well-being, then to be killed painlessly in their sleep when the time comes. RKF could at least grant this. Yet, such animals would still live much shorter lives than they would otherwise have without RKF, depriving them of the extent of opportunities to experience such pleasures. Most RKF killings are carried out within a year of the animal’s initial birth. Killing these animals at a young age, albeit painlessly, eliminates qualitative pleasures one could experience. Consider a scenario where elephants were euthanized once middle age is reached. Young elephants lose the guidance and wisdom of their older counterparts; middle-age elephants are denied their fulfilment of social roles and relationships; old elephants are deprived of the fruits of their life experiences. Animals would live significantly better lives without RKF.
What is it about RKF that allows animals to live till old age, and to die of natural causes in a happy free-range farm? Surely, there is no moral harm done in this scenario. The essay accepts that this kind of RKF would not harm animals but argues that this RKF would cease to exist. There would be no market for such meat. Consumers of meat are reluctant to purchase flesh of older animals due to roughness and tastelessness. Currently, 60% of all mammals on earth are livestock, with a mere 4% being wild animals. Even if there were a market for such meat, the sheer scale of animal production is so vast that if they were also allowed to live much longer lives before dying naturally, not only would the cost of sustaining them be exorbitant, but the number of animals would be unsustainable.
Second Objection: Animal Welfare is Unimportant
One could argue that we have no duties towards animals. Our perceived duties towards animals are just indirect duties towards humanity. Allow me to outline this argument briefly: animal nature has analogies to human nature, and by doing our duties to animals, this corresponds to our duty towards humanity. Consider a dog that has served its master long and faithfully yet is disposed of due to old age. The dog has little capacity to judge, but the man’s act of cruelty diminishes his humanity, for he who is cruel to animals could also be cruel towards men. It is tender feelings towards dumb animals that develop human feelings towards mankind.
‘One could argue that free-range farming induces good for animals because it brings animals into existence. It is existence that grants the prerequisite for well-being and for pleasures.’
The essay accepts that whilst this may be true in some cases, that some duties towards animals are indirect duties towards humanity, not all duties towards animals serve such a purpose. The argument displays a possible negative outcome, and fails to establish totality. In any case, this view does not mean that we have no duties to animals, even if they are indirect duties. We do have duties towards beings that suffer in general. Animals have a capacity for suffering, and suffering is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. Consider a laboratory mouse that is subjected to painful procedures, injections, exposure to harmful substances. It exhibits and vocalizes distress, and demonstrates adversity by attempting to hide. The mouse has a capacity to suffer, thus is a sentient being, available to pleasure, pain and subjectivity of experiences. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. This creates a moral obligation to prevent unnecessary harm and promote their welfare. Granting this moral consideration acknowledges their inherent value as sentient beings.
Suppose one is unconvinced and argues that even if humans do have duties towards animals, these duties are outweighed by the small satisfaction gained by consuming meat. Our duties towards animals are inadequate to stop RKF. Human well-being and satisfaction are more worthy, since humans live longer lives and experience a larger range of subjective experiences, pains and pleasures.
However, the essay argues that it is an easy mistake to confuse this greater capacity for well-being with our well-beings having greater value. Consider two beings, Alex is a hugely gifted person with enormous potential for enjoying the arts, and vast academic interests, while Bob is a comparatively unintelligent and uncreative person. Both beings are suffering and in need of medical treatment. The suggestion that we have less of a moral duty to Bob would be widely rejected. Although Alex may have a higher potential for experiencing well-being, it does not diminish the inherent value of Bob’s well-being. Both individuals are experiencing the same degree of suffering. Their suffering is not any different, any more valuable, or any less valuable. Humans often display more compassion to their own kind, yet when it comes to animals, the standard at which one is held accountable is distorted. As suggested by Bob, the logic applies to all species: a cow’s lower capacity for well-being does not demonstrate that its well-being has lower value.
‘One could argue that we have no duties towards animals. Our perceived duties towards animals are just indirect duties towards humanity.’
Conclusion
In my evaluation of the first objection, I have argued that RKF brings more harm than good to animals. RKF that allows animals to live till natural death is accepted, but unpragmatic in reality. In my evaluation of the second objection, I have shown how humans have duties towards animals that are sentient beings. These duties that guarantee the well-being of animals are as importantas duties that preserve the well-being of humans and all other sentient beings. Thus, eating meat which involves RKF is immoral because it harms animals and the importance of considering the well-being of animals.
