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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
In terms of scholarly research, Egypt of the 1950s is a crowded slot. We know much about the Free Officers' seizure of power. We understand fairly well how they managed to stay in command and the details of their foreign policy. We have a good sense of their economic policies, the structure of society under their purview, and a host of other more specific information. However, despite such apparently detailed knowledge, early scholarship propagated the myth that the revolution had no specific ideology and was propelled forward by a vague nationalist orientation. Many archive-oriented studies took the regime's foreign policy (Pan-Arabism, non-alignment) to represent the core of its ideology, even though that policy was entirely silent on domestic matters. Many studies engaged with the period through the writings of Nasser, Sadat, and Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. (The influence of Haykal's work was particularly detrimental to modern scholarship.) Despite the enormous worth of such studies, when it comes to the regime's early ideology we have been left with only a vague picture.
Roel Meijer's new book provides the definitive—and by far the most substantial—statement on early revolutionary ideology. In this work, a much improved version of a previous edition (Amsterdam, 1995), Meijer begins the story in the post-1945 era, which he identifies as the cradle of radical reformist thought. From the ruins of this quarrelsome period he salvages a surprisingly coherent body of ideas, articulated through the writings of forgotten second- and third-tier intellectuals. Three questions frame his study: Why did Egypt of the 1950s take the authoritarian road to modernity? Why did so many intellectuals join the new regime, even though they were ostensibly the builders of the civil society that was supposed to object to it? And finally, how did these intellectuals contribute to Nasserism?
By grappling with these questions, Meijer develops a notion of ideology that was focused on this young generation's common cause: an urgent need to modernize. The origins of this ideology are to be found in the diversity of political and economic thought as advocated by secular-liberal, socialist, and communist movements. By following these secular trends from the 1940s into the 1950s, Meijer illustrates how authoritarian modernism appeared as a full-fledged ideology.
According to Meijer, during the monarchic period Egypt produced two contradictory political traditions: civil society and state authoritarianism. Operating from within this framework, reformist movements were characterized by intellectual and structural ambivalence. Since these two movements were the outcome of the second wave of modernization and its discontents (post-1930s), radical solutions were selected almost by default (Young Egypt) while the dangers of authoritarianism were almost entirely overlooked. Consequently, authoritarian modernity in the 1950s was a natural choice.
Through their Society for National Renaissance, the liberals sought to “deepen” the structure of a self-regulating civil society. Perhaps naively, they expected that the state would accelerate this process by executing reforms. The prolific political economist Rashid Barrawi represented the socialist option. He called for technocracy through state power as the most efficient way to overcome the “chaos of civil society” that hampered modernization. His influence on Nasserist ideology would be critical. The communists had joined the revolution only in 1955–56, after a long and unsure journey. Despite various initial responses to Nasserism, all three movements eventually joined the regime. As Meijer clarifies, “This change of attitude was…part of the authoritarian modernism most intellectuals upheld in their writing even before the July Revolution” (p. 202).
By the mid 1950s, increasing numbers of intellectuals were given the prestigious status of “experts,” “engineers,” and, by extension, “ideologues.” They inhabited new and idealistic institutions. Their source of authority, like that of the regime itself, was based on the application of science for the benefit of progress. They developed a centralist ideology of planning that launched extreme projects of social engineering. Much of the programs of collectivization and industrialization were conditioned by the structural historical analysis of the communists. Their application of Marxist theory helped pin down the exact “historical laws” that hampered or pushed modernization. The regime acted on these insights. Thus, an analytical perception of the past and a critical view of the present were fused into a new futuristic vision of modernity. This holistic system is precisely what made authoritarian modernism an ideology. Once operative, it was applied to all fields of political action, foreign policy and culture included.
Meijer's discussion, however, goes far beyond the subject of authoritarian modernity. He raises revisionist arguments, such as the denial of the centrality of Pan-Arabism since the 1930s. Though such a claim could probably be supported, Meijer does not substantiate his argument through direct engagement with Pan-Arab thought. Consequently, it appears merely as an informed hunch. In addition, he neglects the populist character of Nasserist politics, the most important means by which authoritarian modernity was legitimized. Beginning in the workplace, and including the monopolization of leisure, a great deal could be said about the dissemination of this ideology. All things considered, however, to say that Meijer is familiar with his sources is to underestimate his achievement of being at home with Egyptian historiography in general, and rare source material in particular. He has used both to the fullest possible extent and provided an essential statement on Egypt's early revolutionary experience. Now we await the rest of the story: the period from the authoritarian modernism of the 1950s to the troublesome years of the infitah.