Katherine Epstein's new book is an impressive study of one of the most important weapons systems of the early twentieth century, the torpedo. Because torpedo technology was so complex and expensive to develop, she argues, governments had to devise new ways to procure it. Most importantly, rather than build the weapon themselves or buy a finished product from private contractors, they “had to invest in private-sector technology during the experimental phase” of development (2). The resulting collaboration between governments and private firms raised thorny legal questions about who owned both the technology itself and the systems put into place to generate data about its development. Epstein traces how these legal battles over intellectual property rights played out in Britain and especially in the United States, providing, she asserts, “a new perspective on the creeping militarization of peace in two liberal democracies and on the meaning of property as it relates to warfare rather than welfare” (2). At the same time, according to Epstein, torpedoes were revolutionary weapons that forced navies to rethink battle tactics, budget priorities, and blockade strategies. Just as much as capital ships such as the Dreadnought, torpedoes lay at the center of naval history prior to World War I.
Torpedo is in some ways a challenging book to read. As Epstein notes in her introduction, her study “provides extensive technical information about torpedo technology and government contracting” (16). She spares no detail in examining both topics. For example, early on in the book, Epstein outlines American and British efforts to improve gyroscopes and various engine components on various types of torpedo. This discussion includes engine component diagrams, test results of new technologies, cost projections for torpedoes with varying capabilities, and precise government procurement orders over the course of the late 1890s. This attention to detail reflects Epstein's deep research into primary sources on both sides of the Atlantic. It also derives from her belief that most histories of technology and contracts are “overgeneralized and overdetermined accounts that fail to capture the complexity and contingency of events as they appeared to decision makers at the time” (16).
Epstein's approach to the technological and legal aspects of her subject has a downside, however. As she herself observes, “neither torpedo technology nor government contracting lends itself to limpid prose” (16). The sections on these topics are indeed somewhat difficult to follow, as one is confronted, for example, with more than one lengthy technical analysis of the types and testing of “superheaters” in turbine engines (29). This is not to say that Epstein is a poor writer – on the contrary, her prose is actually quite lively and clear given her subject matter. The problem is that the author's devotion to technical details limits the potential audience for the book: it seems unlikely that undergraduates could or would even try to master the narrative, and one suspects that even graduate students might be intimidated by the material.
Epstein's analysis of the impact of torpedoes upon naval strategy is more accessible. She effectively sums up the line of scholarly debate on Britain's prewar naval tactics and strategy between Arthur Marder and more recent historians such as Nicholas Lambert and Jon Sumida. In contrast to Marder and his disciples, the latter historians do not see British naval leaders in the prewar years as focussed on battleships, Germany, and blockading the German coast in the event of war. Instead, policymakers tried to develop a diverse force flexible enough to deal with various potential enemies and envisioned crippling Germany's economy in wartime not with a blockade, but by denying Germany access to British capital and merchant ships. Torpedo development, Epstein argues, helped to drive these policy trends because torpedoes made battleships more vulnerable and torpedo craft (destroyers and submarines) were cheaper to build at a time of tight British budgets. By spelling out exactly how the British dealt with the evolution of torpedo technology and how they integrated the weapon into their naval tactics and strategy, Epstein has made a major contribution to the “revisionist” history of prewar British naval policy.
More broadly, Epstein succeeds in her goal of illuminating the complexity and significance of the development of “weapons acquisition in the industrial age” (17). Lying at the “intersection of military history, the history of science and technology, business history, legal history, and policy history,” the story of weapons procurement provides a new way to enhance our understanding of all of these topics (2). Any scholar with an interest in these various fields will find much to think about in this excellent book.
