In his inspiring and innovative book Takeshi Hieda raises the question as to why, despite similar demographic demands, elderly care policy approaches in advanced societies differ considerably. The author identifies political institutions as decisive for the differences. Political institutions define how socio-demographic demands are transmitted into elderly care policy approaches. With his research he aims, ‘to reveal the political logic of the development of long-term care policy for frail older people in advanced industrialized countries’ (p. 1).
Conceptually, the author develops his main argument embedded in a framework of ‘historical rational-choice institutionalism’. As his starting-point, Hieda draws on Lynch's ideas (Reference Lynch2006) on the significance of distinct modes of party competition for the establishment of universalistic or particularistic social policies. From this perspective, the establishment of universalistic social policies presupposes a capacity of the state to retain a relative autonomy regardless of societal interests. The author argues:
Universalistic social policy faces collective action problems, because it assigns its benefits and burdens to the entire citizenry equally, but societal interests seek to receive special treatment and convey its costs to the general public. Particularistic benefits are preferable for each societal actor. Hence, the universalistic social policy is less likely to develop unless the state is capable of coordination the benefits and burdens of social protection programs in an equitable way. (pp. 3–4).
The autonomy of the state from societal interests, in turn, depends on the dominant mode of inter- versus intra-party competition, which is underpinned by electoral rules and party systems, as well as by the type of (coalition) government. He contrasts two types of political logics and relates them to the development of universalistic or particularistic social policies.
While a dominance of intra-party competition leads to the development of particularistic policies, a dominance of inter-party competition is connected to universalistic policies. The author motivates this interrelationship by the effect of the mode of competition on the strategies of politicians. When electoral rules are based on personal instead of party votes, strategies of intra-party competition are promoted and politicians aim to establish particularistic welfare benefits for their (potential) voters, i.e. clientelistic policies. In contrast, when, due to electoral rules, the results of an election are based solely on party votes, political parties and their programs become the unit of political competition. Party politicians have no interest in seeking personal votes based on particularistic policies and thus support the development of a joint party program. This relative autonomy from particularistic societal interests promotes the establishment of universalistic policies. Furthermore, if a catch-all party in a situation of inter-party competition dominates a (coalition) government, the party aims to appeal to broader constituencies based on universalistic programs.
The basic assumptions on the interrelationship of the political system (mode of party competition underpinned by electoral rules and party systems, as well as the type of government) are investigated by a combined quantitative and qualitative research approach. The quantitative part reveals the interrelationships of the effects of demographic change and the political system on public elderly care spending. Based on pooled time-series and cross-section data of 15 OECD countries from 1980 to 2001 with multivariate regression models, the results show that demographic factors, i.e. the percentage of population aged 80 years and over, is the main driver of spending. In addition, results reveal the impact of the political system. While personal-vote-oriented electoral rules and a fragmented coalition government dampen the effects of demographic ageing on public spending, party-vote-oriented electoral rules increase public spending. One criticism here is that universalism is directly connected to the level of spending; however, universalism, in particular within elderly care policies, is a very complex principle and not generally related to generous public policies (Anttonen et al., Reference Anttonen, Häikiö and Kolbeinn2012; Theobald, Reference Theobald, Burau and Vabo2011).
The quantitative analysis is followed by a very rich and convincing analysis of policy development in three countries, namely Sweden, Japan, and the US. The countries are well selected and represent examples of three different political systems. Generally, the case studies confirm the assumption of the interrelationship between the political system and the development of universalistic respectively particularistic public elderly care policies. Using Sweden as an example, the author reveals the significant role of Social-Democratic party dominance underpinned by a party-vote-oriented electoral system as a precondition for the establishment of universalistic public elderly care policies. In contrast, the case of the US demonstrates that a political system based on very individualistic intra-party competition underpinned by a personal-vote-oriented electoral system hinders the introduction of universalistic elderly care programs. The development of universalistic elderly care policies in Japan provides us with a very interesting median example. In Japan, the electoral system has different effects on the long-ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and the opposition parties. While the system promotes intra-party competition for the LDP based on an emphasis on personal votes, it actually strengthens programmatic party competition for the opposition parties. Universalistic public elderly care policies were introduced in Japan over a short time-period when the dominant LDP was in a crisis and opposition parties seized political influence. The welfare bureaucracy and further social groups, e.g. the Women`s Association, also used this window of opportunity to restructure public support and promote the introduction of universalistic and generous elderly care services (for the role of social groups, see Eto, Reference Eto2001).
With the case studies, the author robustly confirms the assumptions of the significance of electoral rules, party-competition, and the composition of the government for the introduction of universalistic and generous public elderly care policies. However, I would argue that the political system is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the development of universalistic policies and there is room for additional explanations. The opportunity to balance burdens and benefits among the entire population according to the political system, i.e. electoral system, inter-party competition, or government composition, does not mean that it will be done equally or generously. Depending on the norms of significant, influential, or elite groups, one could also vote for less-generous, basic universal support or an unequal distribution of benefits and burdens among the entire population. Furthermore, the case study of the US also gives some indications of the impact of the norms of politicians. Despite an electoral system based on personal-vote, at certain junctures there might be quantitatively significant but not sufficient groups among the politicians to support universalistic as opposed to particularistic welfare policies.
