APS

Acts of the parliaments of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes, Edinburgh 1814–75

NAS

National Archive for Scotland, Edinburgh

NLS

National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh

SHS

Scottish History Society

Between 16 April and 22 July 1706 commissioners representing the parliaments of Scotland and England met in London and negotiated a treaty for an incorporating union between the kingdoms. The treaty had to be ratified by the respective parliaments and its first test came in the Scottish parliament, which opened on 3 October 1706. The commission of the general assembly, acting in accordance with instructions from the general assembly to protect the interests of the Church and present establishment, met on 9 October and remained in session thereafter.Footnote ¹ Both bodies were the focus of national attention and the significance of the moment was not lost on the participants in the debate in either parliament or commission.Footnote ² A well-attended commission was considered essential. A circular letter to all presbyteries on 7 August urging attendance upon all members underlined the importance of its work. The business of previous commissions meeting during parliamentary sessions had been ‘much slighted and retarded’ because of bad attendance.Footnote ³ The issues of fasting and security dominated the commission's opening sessions, but it was that of a national public fast that offered the first major test for both sides and, for the opponents of the treaty, their first major opportunity to prevent or disrupt its passage.

That the Church became the focal point for the struggle between the government and the opposition was not surprising. During the treaty negotiations, some Scottish commissioners argued for the inclusion of an article that would give security to the Church, on the grounds that church government was a fundamental and that its omission would increase hostility to the treaty from within the Church. However, James Douglas, 2nd duke of Queensberry, had overruled them on the grounds that the Church was secure enough.Footnote ⁴ William Carstares, Principal of Edinburgh University and one of the Kirk's more influential ministers, had written to commissioners ‘that one way or other something should be expresslie mentioned as to what may be for its securitie’.Footnote ⁵ He argued that the omission of an article on security would be exploited by the opponents of union, would create a storm of protest within the Church and make the task of persuading the nation of the benefits of union much more difficult. He warned of ‘zealous speeches’ on behalf of the Church when parliament opened, not only from the Church but also from its enemies and opponents of union. Security for the Church within the treaty, while unlikely to silence the most vociferous critics of the union within the Church, would go some way towards addressing the fears of many.Footnote ⁶

Presbyterians were not entirely hostile to the idea of union. They had promoted confessional confederation in the 1640s and a federal arrangement between the kingdoms was preferable to either the status quo or an incorporating union. However, the prospect of an incorporating union stirred up all of their fears and anxieties because of its perceived threat to the Kirk.Footnote ⁷ George Ridpath expressed the commonly-held view that in every reign since the union of the crowns their religion had been invaded or endangered by English influence and that religious differences had been at the root of all the oppressions that the country had suffered during that time.Footnote ⁸ Presbyterians did not trust a British parliament to safeguard and maintain the constitution of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland: hence their concern over the resignation of sovereignty. They believed that in a union in which Scotland would be governed from London by a British parliament dominated by English Anglicans, including twenty-six bishops in the House of Lords, the Church of England would hold an advantage over them. They feared that a British parliament could at its pleasure subvert any fundamental in their constitution and that it was short-sighted, considering recent history, to believe that securities offered at the time would be valid in the future.Footnote ⁹ Furthermore, having two legally recognised church governments in one nation was unprecedented; they believed that it was not likely to last, to the detriment of presbytery.Footnote ¹⁰ At the very least union made toleration of Episcopalians inevitable and their success so far in preventing it would be undermined.Footnote ¹¹ The worst-case scenario, and one which according to Sir John Clerk of Penicuik (Sr) was widely held, was the complete overthrow of presbytery.Footnote ¹² The fact that some Anglicans and Episcopalians insisted that union should lead to the restoration of episcopacy, merely confirmed Presbyterian fears.Footnote ¹³

As anticipated, the treaty met with a hostile reception. Opposition hopes to a large extent rested upon clerical hostility and they were quick to exploit it. They were convinced that the clergy would be more useful to the cause than any other social group and that if they used their influence against the treaty, it would never carry.Footnote ¹⁴ Robert Wylie, minister at Hamilton, was confident that efforts to organise ministers would have the desired effect and ‘that nothing will divert any Presbyterian from opposing this union in their stations’.Footnote ¹⁵ There was recognition on both sides that the pulpit could be a powerful medium for articulating dissent. As early as July ministers were reported to be ‘roaring and denouncing judgements on those that [are] for it’.Footnote ¹⁶ The polemicist James Hodges wanted the commission to recommend that ministers purchase a copy of his latest anti-union work because of its usefulness in informing them of the true state and interest of the nation, and because they ‘have so great an influence on the people’. He urged the dukes of Hamilton and Atholl to print the advice on fasting separately and to send copies to every parish in Scotland for ministers to read to their congregations both on the fast day and on the day of preparation. Hodges assumed that there would be a national fast and was planning to exploit it.Footnote ¹⁷

Hodges was not alone in making these assumptions. Presbyterians generally took it for granted that a national fast with a civil sanction would precede any parliamentary debate on so momentous an issue as union. This assumption was based upon strong theological and historical precedents. National public fasting had a long history within the reformed tradition in Scotland. It dated from 1565 when the general assembly, having collected the causes of a fast, declared the necessity of holding one. John Knox and John Craig, both ministers at Edinburgh, were instructed to set down a form of exercise to be used during the fast that was to be held from the last Sunday of February to the first Sunday of March 1566.Footnote ¹⁸The ordour and doctrine of the generall fast outlined not only the reasons for the fast but also the principles of fasting that were to become the basis of public fasting within the Kirk thereafter; it was only superseded by the directory for worship produced by the Westminster Assembly in 1645.Footnote ¹⁹ The reformation in Scotland was rooted and grounded in the word of God. While some reformed Churches, such as the Church of England, operated upon the principle that if it was not forbidden it was allowed, in Scotland a regulative principle applied in which any practice that did not have divine warrant was forbidden. This accounted for the radical and thorough nature of Scotland's reformation.Footnote ²⁰ Knox and Craig drew a clear distinction between what they regarded as the pharisaical and superstitious fasting practised in the Church of Rome, which they claimed was ‘no fasting that ever God approved’, and fasting in the reformed Church, which had a firm biblical basis and was therefore pleasing to God. They agreed that there was clear scriptural warrant not just for private fasting (never in doubt) but also for the practice of public fasting; most notably in this case, the example and practice of Israel in the Old Testament. The reformers believed that in the post-Exodus period of the old dispensation, the nation of Israel constituted the visible Church and that the Church was pretty much restricted to that nation.Footnote ²¹ The Ordour highlighted several reasons why the Church might call a public fast and in each case biblical examples were provided as illustrations. Reasons included fear of and danger from their enemies, their having provoked God to anger, facing the prospect of God's judgements, the realisation of sin of which they might not otherwise have been aware, zeal for God and his glory, his people and their preservation and the desire that God would fulfil his promises to his Church.Footnote ²²

Having outlined some general principles, they identified the more immediate reasons for holding a fast. First, they argued that their previous zeal for God that had brought his blessing and carried them to success at the Reformation had declined, allowing the idolatry and superstition that had been purged, to return. Whereas God had prospered them against great odds, now, because of their falling away, they could see no sign of his former favour. Secondly, whereas they once had hoped that God would move the queen's heart to embrace the Gospel and forsake idolatry, such hopes were now gone.Footnote ²³ Mary continued to maintain the mass and acknowledge the pope's jurisdiction both of which had been legally abolished in 1560. Her actions flouted acts of parliament and undermined the Reformation. The 1565 assembly insisted that the word of God and true religion be established, approved and ratified throughout the kingdom and observed by all, including Mary.Footnote ²⁴ Mary maintained that she was not persuaded as to the rightness of the reformed religion or that there was any impiety in the mass.Footnote ²⁵ Knox and Craig interpreted this as a declaration against the reformed religion.Footnote ²⁶ Finally, they argued that even if their domestic situation were not as bad as they thought (there was no question in their mind that it was), the threat to Protestantism across Europe from the papacy, France and Spain was sufficient cause to call a fast.Footnote ²⁷

From the outset a national fast was a rallying call to the defence of realm, of religion and of liberty. It could unify the nation, not only in a common act of worship, confession and supplication, but in creating and maintaining a common political and religious identity and goals. Calling a fast during times of national crisis and deliverance became common practice and subsequent fasts followed a similar pattern. Causes included the universal corruption of the estates, and the prevalence of sin, irreligion and ungodliness, which were likely to provoke a patient and long-suffering God. Fears over the Counter-Reformation and the sufferings of Protestants at the hands of a cruel and bloody Roman beast, were a constant theme. In 1588 the Church called a fast over the conspiracies of Scotland's Catholic elites, aimed at subverting the Kirk and putting into practice the ‘bloodie determinatioun of the Councell of Trent’.Footnote ²⁸ The August assembly of that year proclaimed a universal fast in thanksgiving for the ‘notable deliverie God had givin from the invasioun attempted by the cruell Spaniard’.Footnote ²⁹ The 1588 assembly underlined the importance of fasting as an integral part of the ordinary functioning of the Church. It ordered that wherever subsequent general assemblies met, the inhabitants of the town and those attending the assembly should spend the first day as a public fast. This act was subsequently renewed in 1644.Footnote ³⁰

The imposition of an episcopal hierarchy upon the Kirk by James vi and i was accompanied by a diminishing emphasis upon national public fasting. Stuart monarchs, with their preference for episcopal church government, royal supremacy and prerogative rule, rarely held either assemblies or parliaments and consequently few national public fasts. Under James vi and i and Charles i, a licence for a fast within any locality had to be sought from the bishop.Footnote ³¹ Under Cromwell, Scotland was incorporated into the Commonwealth and after 1654 the Protectorate. The Scottish parliament was abolished and general assemblies suspended. Presbyterians were generally hostile to the regime and looked upon Cromwell as a usurper. Public fasts were as rare as ever they were under the Stuarts and were called by the Protector himself and after him by his son Richard.Footnote ³² Under the Restoration regime public fasts were likewise rare and called by the privy council. The rarity of fasts under each of those regimes can be explained by the fact that they all had to deal with a significant body of Presbyterian dissent. Free general assemblies and frequent national public fasts had the potential to undermine their authority. General assemblies were therefore not held and fasts were restricted in terms of observance and content in an attempt to control dissent. When one was called, the terms were usually of a general nature and rarely addressed issues of immediate concern to Presbyterians. Hence, in June 1621, Presbyterians complained that the call for a fast made no mention of the defection from the purity of the reformed religion, breaches of the covenant and the persecution of ministers for nonconformity.Footnote ³³

The emergence of the covenanting movement was accompanied by a renewed emphasis upon public fasting. In 1638, at a time of deteriorating relations between the covenanters and Charles i, public fasts were held on 3 June, 22 and 29 July, 16 September and on 4 November just prior to the opening of the general assembly at Glasgow.Footnote ³⁴ On the importance of fasting, the leading covenanter Alexander Henderson explained that it had been the laudable custom of Church and nation to humble themselves before God and to afflict their souls. Days of public fasting and humiliation were regarded as a powerful means of holding off deserved judgements and bringing down undeserved blessings. Henderson insisted that the Lord might justly have punished them for neglecting such a necessary duty as fasting under episcopal government, but because he had spared them and was quickening them again it was necessary for them frequently to undertake the exercise with all their heart.Footnote ³⁵ The covenanters were in no doubt that they were witnessing the work of God. They believed that they had been offered a providential opportunity to reform the Church in doctrine and government on a British basis. Remarkable times called for remarkable measures, hence the frequency of fasting. Moreover, the frequency of fasting, like the signing of the covenants, helped to forge a common political and religious identity and purpose. It is a reflection of the significance placed upon public fasting by the covenanters that parliamentary sanction was sought and granted more times during this period than in any other. Furthermore, in an attempt to enforce universal observance, an act of parliament in 1644 extended all acts against the profanation of the Lord's Day to include fast and thanksgiving days.Footnote ³⁶

The practice of frequent national fasting was re-established with Presbyterianism at the Revolution of 1688–9. In terms of seeking the civil sanction for their annual fasts, the post-revolution Church dealt primarily with the privy council and the granting of the sanction whether by act of council or parliament was one element in the cooperative relationship that existed between the post-revolution Church and the government. Not surprisingly for such tumultuous times, foremost among causes was the uncertainty of the political situation, the desire for a successful conclusion to the revolution and ‘the Lord's threatening the sword of a cruel and barbarous enemy, in the present great distress of Ireland, by the prevailing of an Anti-Christian party’.Footnote ³⁷ From the outset observance of a fast was regarded as a test of loyalty to the new regime. This was a reaction to the Jacobitism of the majority of the episcopalian clergy many of whom were already being charged by the council for their failure to observe its proclamation ordering public prayers for William and Mary.Footnote ³⁸ The proclamation for a fast issued in August 1689 warned that those who neglected ‘such a religious and necessary duty’, would ‘be proceeded against, and punished as Contemners of His Majesties Authority, Neglecters of Religious services, and as persons disaffected to the Protestant Religion, as well as to their majesties Royal Persons and Government’.Footnote ³⁹ On 26 September 1689 the council deprived Robert Rait, minister at Dundee, for his failure to read the proclamation of 13 April and for his failure to pray for William and Mary. Rait was also found guilty of neglecting to observe a day of prayer and fasting held in the town.Footnote ⁴⁰ Presbyterians were accused of exploiting the fasts to ‘ruine the Episcopal Clergy’. The fasts were unpopular among episcopal ministers because the sentiments contained in the acts were favourable towards and supportive of Presbyterianism and the revolution interest while reflecting unfavourably upon prelacy.Footnote ⁴¹ The 1690 assembly was accused of having drawn up an act for a fast deliberately designed to ensure that the episcopal clergy would refuse to observe it and thus find themselves before the privy council. The removal of the offending clauses was attributed to the intervention of William's commissioner, John Lord Carmichael. Nevertheless, the amended act was still said to be ‘choaking’ to Episcopalians.Footnote ⁴²

The success of William's campaigns in Ireland and on the continent, the defence of the reformed religion and the Protestant interest across Europe, were major causes of subsequent fasts called by parliament in 1690, 1693 and 1695.Footnote ⁴³ In 1698 parliament appointed a fast because of the evident tokens of God's displeasure: the state of the economy, poor harvests and the famine that the country was experiencing. The fast called in April 1706 focused minds upon the treaty negotiations and called for prayer that God would direct them for his own glory and the good of Church and kingdom. National crises, or rather divine judgements, were caused by national sins and each act carried a comprehensive account of what the Church regarded as the most God-provoking of sins; as the commission put it in 1696, ‘iniquity aboundeth in city and country’. Among other things, the Church complained of the lack of national reformation in Church and State, political and religious divisions, neglect of the Gospel and religious ordinances, the increase of ‘atheistical and execrable principles subversive of all religion’, and of course the increase of ‘gross Immoralities of uncleannes of all sorts, Drunkenness, Swearing, Sabbath-breaking and Unrighteous dealing among men’.Footnote ⁴⁴ Of the annual fasts held in each of the five years preceding union, only those in 1702 and 1703 had parliamentary sanction. The other three, in 1704–6, were not held on a single day and were sanctioned by the privy council.Footnote ⁴⁵ The usual practice was to observe the fast on separate days north and south of the Tay. In 1690 it was observed south of the Tay on 24 June and north on 1 July. In 1706 it was observed on 23 May and 6 June respectively.Footnote ⁴⁶ In 1704 and 1705 it was left to the individual presbyteries to decide when they held the fast within their bounds. The decision eventually taken in October 1706 was not without precedent.Footnote ⁴⁷

In 1700, following the failure of the expedition to Darien, both parliament and the commission resisted calls for a specific day of fasting because it was not politically expedient to hold one. A considerable national investment of capital had been lost in the venture, which exacerbated the economic plight of the country and confirmed Scotland's dependence upon access to English domestic and colonial markets.Footnote ⁴⁸ The widespread belief that Scottish colonial enterprise had been sacrificed in the interests of English trade and William's foreign policy caused further deterioration in already poor Anglo-Scottish relations. The Court party sought to defend William and the political status quo against the Country party opposition championing the cause of the Company, whose court of directors and council general it dominated to such an extent that ‘the Company had become synonymous with the opposition’. The opposition transformed the Company's cause into a national one by organising petitions and addresses, in particular national addresses to William. Meanwhile, the Jacobites sought to exploit the crisis to promote the return of their King James.Footnote ⁴⁹ The Church had viewed Darien as a missionary opportunity and ministers were sent out to establish the presbytery of Caledonia, take care of the spiritual needs of the colonists and participate in missionary enterprise.Footnote ⁵⁰ The failure was described as a ‘manifestation of the displeasure of the righteous Lord, justly gone forth against them and us, for our and their iniquities’.Footnote ⁵¹ To the disappointment of many, the Church appeared to stand aloof from the fierce political debate that followed the failure. It was accused of abandoning the ‘interest of our country’ and of being ‘the favourers of a foreign interest for selfish ends’.Footnote ⁵² There were nearly thirty addresses to parliament relating to Darien but none from the Church. The commission refused to sign the national address to William organised by the Country party, a refusal welcomed by the administration, as was the news that ‘the Presbyterian ministers continue very firm in their duty to the king on this occasion’.Footnote ⁵³ At the suggestion of James, 4th duke of Hamilton, the presbytery of Hamilton petitioned the commission for a national day of fasting and prayer. The moderator of the commission refused to call a meeting but raised the letter at a meeting of the presbytery of Edinburgh. The presbytery's petition was rejected amid warnings that they had gone too far in writing in such terms.Footnote ⁵⁴ The commission's refusal ran contrary to the Presbyterian practice of appointing such days in times of national crisis. Instead they sent out a circular letter to presbyteries recommending them to observe a day of prayer and fasting as they saw fit. The Kirk's response led to accusations that it had ‘sadly abandoned the interest of our country’.Footnote ⁵⁵ Furthermore, the assembly's subsequent annual act for a fast mentioned Darien only briefly and as one of a number of causes of the fast.Footnote ⁵⁶

At the heart of the political agitation many in the Church perceived a Jacobite design that threatened the revolution. Robert Wodrow explained that ‘It is very much to be suspected that evil designing men croud in among others and are soe carrying on their hellish designs of overturning our government, laues, liberties & religion.’Footnote ⁵⁷ The Church's muted response and its refusal to call a fast or join the protests can be attributed chiefly to its determination to avoid any action that might inadvertently contribute to such designs.Footnote ⁵⁸ Thomas Boston had intended to protest against the decision not to hold a particular day of fasting but ultimately did not. He saw the over-ruling providential hand of God in the outcome, ‘for it is thought that such a fast at this time would greatly weaken the King's interest in Scotland’. For Boston the outcome was sad evidence that church affairs, from a human perspective, were being heavily influenced by politics.Footnote ⁵⁹ On the other hand the Church's position can be seen as a determination not to get involved in party politics. One of Boston's contemporaries, John Bell of Gladsmuir near Edinburgh, recalled that despite some ministers getting carried away by the Country party, great care was taken to maintain the authority of the Church by electing to the assemblies in 1702 and 1703 such ministers ‘as would Readily beware of Running into factions, and of Perusing the Interest of Either party to the neglect of the Publick and General Interest of the Church, in a Juncture so Criticall’. Not getting involved did not mean that the Church was unwilling to exploit the situation. Darien demonstrated the Church's pragmatism and its willingness to depart from usual practice when it was in its interests to do so. Queensberry was under strict instructions from William not to pass an act asserting the right of the company's colony in Darien. The beleaguered administration worked hard to muster enough support to resist opposition efforts to secure such an act. Both parties attempted to exploit the Church. During the May session the opposition raised Presbyterian grievances about William's treatment of the general assembly and his attempts to secure toleration for Episcopalians. However, the Church was able to secure beneficial parliamentary legislation through a combination of factors including William's willingness to buy Presbyterian support to shore up his beleaguered administration, a lengthy address delivered by the commission and strong representations from the pulpit.Footnote ⁶⁰

In the light of this history of fasting in the reformed Church, resistance to holding a fast before parliament debated the treaty was met with incredulity in some quarters. Anne, dowager duchess of Hamilton, was at a loss to explain why the Court should appear so publicly against a fast and hoped that their attitude would prove counterproductive.Footnote ⁶¹ Even more surprising had been the resistance to a fast within the commission. Initially it was moved in the commission on 7 August, that a day of fasting and prayer be set apart before the parliament sat. A committee reported that a fast would not be practicable or appropriate at that time and despite opposition the commission approved the report.Footnote ⁶² A draft act was drawn up during the August commission recommending that a fast be held before the next parliamentary session. The terms were similar to the act subsequently passed on 14 October. Each parish, including the minister, the session and those parishioners who cared to join them, were to set apart a day of their own choosing to fast and pray that the Lord would preserve the rights and liberties of the Church and that the Church would not be endangered by designs to restore a popish successor on the one hand or by ‘weakening legal securities in an union with England on the other’. Prayers for the deliberations of parliament focused on the desire that they would tend to the glory of God, the good of the Church and nation and that truth, righteousness and peace would be preserved along with a continued good understanding between the kingdoms.Footnote ⁶³

According to John Logan, minister at Alloa, the commission refused calls for a national fast in order to prevent any rupture developing between Church and State over the union issue.Footnote ⁶⁴ It is likely that the Court's supporters on the commission were instructed to block all moves for a fast and in the light of subsequent events this was a miscalculation. Had the fast been allowed, it would have been over before parliament sat and before the treaty was published. It would have been held before the opposition could have effectively exploited it, not that they exploited it anyway, but they did get a second, better chance. There would have been only one fast instead of two and the Court party would have caused themselves less trouble. The Church secured more in October than it was asking for in August. Denying the fast simply made those who wanted one cry all the more loudly for it. Having a fast became an issue in itself. While the decision did not cause lasting damage, it had the potential. It caused problems the Court could have done without.

The issue of a fast was again raised in the commission on 9 October. The first session was not well attended.Footnote ⁶⁵ During the morning session it was urged that the commission address Queensberry and parliament for securing the doctrine, discipline, worship and government of the Church as established by law, in the event of a union. When the committee appointed to prepare an overture reported back to the commission in the evening, a division arose over what course of action was the most appropriate at that time.Footnote ⁶⁶ The draft of the address to parliament was brought in and read. John Bannatyne and Thomas Linning, ministers from Lanark and Lesmahagow in the presbytery of Lanark, opposed it. Both men were at the forefront of opposition to an incorporating union. Daniel Defoe described them as ‘two firebrands who deserve to be marked as incendiaries’.Footnote ⁶⁷ Only Bannatyne had been present at the morning session and had waited for Linning to arrive before making their objections. The two men, supported by others in the commission, alleged

They were suspicious of the motives of some on the commission and objected to both its haste in pressing for security and to the composition of the committee. Their suspicions were not without foundation. Of the sixteen members of the committee, four of the five ruling elders were from the Court party and eight of the eleven ministers were from Edinburgh. The opposition was suspicious of Edinburgh ministers generally because it felt that they could not be relied upon to oppose the union and might even try to persuade their brethren not to oppose it.Footnote ⁶⁹

Intent on reversing the decision of the August commission, Bannatyne and Linning insisted that ‘parliament should be also addressed for a solemn fast and humiliation’. Priority should be given to a national fast as ‘prefatory to all’, and no affair of such importance as union ought to be entered upon without a fast. They argued that parliamentary consideration of the treaty should be delayed until after a fast had been observed.Footnote ⁷⁰ The ruling elders resisted overtures for a fast on the grounds that with parliament likely to proceed quickly with the treaty, there should be no delay in securing the Church. However, Bannatyne and Linning continued to press for a national fast and added significant weight to their case when they produced instructions from the synod of Glasgow urging the commission to apply to parliament for a fast.Footnote ⁷¹ The synods of Dumfries and Galloway gave similar instructions to their commissioners. The synods of Glasgow and Dumfries also insisted that the commission address parliament to ratify the Church's present establishment. They wanted parliamentary guarantees that the Church would not ‘sustain any hurt or prejudice’ to its interests as a consequence of any union.Footnote ⁷²

The synod of Glasgow and Ayr had met on 1 October and appointed Wednesday 16 October as the day its presbyteries should set apart for prayer and fasting. Presbyteries were urged to pray that under the direction of God, parliament would conduct all its affairs for his glory, the comfort and satisfaction of his people and that the

The act, while reflecting concern about the status of the Church in a union and the desire that the Church's interests be secured, did not go as far as articulating anti-union sentiments, or any condemnation of an incorporating union. The desire that there should be ‘a good understanding and agreement continued and increased between the two nations with respect to a happy union’ implied an acceptance of some kind of union without specifying what kind of happy union was meant. The synod probably preferred a federative union but it was not as forthright or specific as were two of its presbyteries, Hamilton and Lanark, in their addresses. The moderate tone was consistent with that later adopted by the commission and suggests that the more strident anti-unionism of Lanark and Hamilton was offset by more moderate voices from other presbyteries. Copies of the act were sent to neighbouring synods in an effort to coordinate their response and encourage widespread observance of a fast.Footnote ⁷⁴ On 10 October the synod of Dumfries met and passed an act that was an exact copy of Glasgow's and the synod of Galloway followed on 15 October.

William Carstares was troubled by the synod's act. Writing to John Stirling, Principal of Glasgow University, he acknowledged the difficulties Stirling had faced in the affair, difficulties that seemed to ‘portend an uneasie commission’.Footnote ⁷⁵ Carstares believed that the synod's stance was likely to be divisive and put them at loggerheads with some on the commission, in particular the ruling elders associated with the Court party and Squadrone Volante. His comments also suggest that the synod was divided over whether or not it was right to organise a ‘private’ fast independently of the commission, and before the commission had discussed the issue. Carstares himself disapproved of private fasts. The synod may also have been divided over the terms of the act as some sought specifically to express their hostility to incorporating union. The fact that the synod's act was moderate in tone and did not contain a forthright condemnation of union did not augur well for the opposition.

On the commission, it was objected, mainly by ruling elders, that Bannatyne and Linning had taken too long in expressing the mind of their synod. They argued that the commission was well advanced on the question of security and, because parliament intended to proceed quickly with the treaty, it was considered inappropriate to delay any application for securing the interest of the Church. Adam Cockburn of Ormiston, the Lord Justice Clerk, and Francis Montgomery of Giffen, member of parliament for Ayrshire, both unionists, argued that a national fast could not be indicted in less than six weeks and it was not to be supposed that parliament would delay for that length of time. Bannatyne and Linning had insisted on a parliamentary delay while a fast was observed. However, other ministers who wanted a fast and were not necessarily concerned about delaying parliament's work insisted that parliament could indict a fast and still continue with its work. They saw the fast primarily as a spiritual exercise in which was sought the guidance and favour of God at such a critical time and not as a mere tactical ploy to hold up the treaty. Furthermore, those favouring a fast did not believe that parliament would rush through the treaty because it was ‘a business of so great moment’ requiring great and grave deliberation. They saw no problems in giving preference to a fast before an address.

The ruling elders in particular insinuated that those seeking a fast at this time were deliberately trying to stir up strife and contention and to ‘amuse the nation’ by implying that union was dreadful and dangerous to Church and State.Footnote ⁷⁶ The ministers protested and stated that they were suspicious of a parliament that refused to begin consultations on such an important affair without asking for guidance from God. It was decided after further dispute that the committee dealing with the address regarding the security of the Church should reconsider the address and ‘ripen the same’ for the commission and also consider the expediency of a national fast. The decision marked a success for Bannatyne, Linning and their supporters; the committee became the committee for public affairs.Footnote ⁷⁷

The committee was made up largely of those already appointed to prepare the overture to parliament for the security of the Church, to which were added Bannatyne, Linning and another opponent of union, Walter Stewart of Pardovan, parliamentary commissioner for Linlithgow. The committee's meeting the following day was open to any member of the commission to attend. Opening up its deliberations to the members of the commission served to ensure that the committee's work would be influenced by the views of the commission as a whole, at least those who had arrived in Edinburgh. It would also serve to quieten any fears or suspicions of bias hinted at by Bannatyne and Linning. The committee reported to the commission on 14 October, but prior to this the question of a fast was raised in parliament. On 12 October Walter Stewart, described by Mar as a ‘foolish fellow’, proposed that parliament appoint a day for a national fast. Stewart's recollection was that the motion was urged by its promoters on the grounds that not only was it the practice and example of all Christian kingdoms, including Scotland, but it was also pointed out that the pagan Greeks and Romans always ‘invoked their Gods who were no Gods, for light and direction to all their arduous undertakings’. The house was presented with dire warnings of divine vengeance upon the undertaking if such a motion should be rejected. In which case the opposition ought to have welcomed the rejection of their motion. The motion itself had substantial backing and provoked a furious debate. Stewart lamented the fact that while the overture was made and seconded by members well affected to both Church and State, it ‘was unwisely and presumptuously too early appeared for by some of whom it may be said, that excellent speech becometh not; a tool which prov'd fatal to the motion’.Footnote ⁷⁸ The successful opposition to the motion was led by the ruling elders who had resisted a national fast in the commission.Footnote ⁷⁹ The debate ended when William Johnstone, first marquis of Annandale, who stressed that he believed a fast to be necessary, suggested that the house delay further consideration until the commission had come to a resolution on the affair. It was thought that Pardovan's motion and Annandale's speech were intended to quicken the zeal of the commission and strengthen their hand, thus prompting them into calling on parliament for a national fast.Footnote ⁸⁰

The opposition were promoting a fast in both commission and parliament on the grounds that they believed it would delay consideration of the treaty.Footnote ⁸¹ As far as Hamilton was concerned, ‘the delay was the main point of importance to us’.Footnote ⁸² Furthermore, they wanted to create and exploit differences between Kirk and government and a national fast had that potential. The government was aware of the opposition's intentions.Footnote ⁸³ Sir John Clerk of Penicuik complained that the opposition ‘jumped eagerly’ at the chance of a fast in the hope of winning ministers and people to their side. He maintained that ‘Prayer and fasting has been a common trick of unscrupulous politicians’ and that if prayers are to be offered to God it ought to be that he would favour ‘this long sought union’.Footnote ⁸⁴ The earl of Abercorn was reported as having claimed ‘with abundance of malice’, that ‘in the late times of Presbytery in Ireland, all the disasters which happen'd to the Cavaliers there, were usher'd in by days of Religious Fasting and Prayer’.Footnote ⁸⁵ Unionists accused the opposition of jesting with religion, and argued that it was right to fast in cases of war, plague or famine, but that now was not such a time. They warned that the ‘effect of this fast will be to aggravate anger and conflict, to excite the populace to violence and disorder by making them afraid of some impending catastrophe’.Footnote ⁸⁶ Precisely what the opposition was looking for: an opportunity to engineer a conflict between Church and government. Even failure to secure a fast would not necessarily be a bad thing because any refusal had its own potential for conflict.

The commission was the key and both sides focused their efforts on trying to influence its decision. On the day of the parliamentary debate, Hamilton wrote to Robert Wylie criticising him and other ministers for their absence from the commission and urging their attendance as soon as possible. With the fast due to be debated in the commission within days, it was imperative that the opposition had as large a representation within it as possible.Footnote ⁸⁷ In an effort to dissuade the commission from asking for a national fast, the Court had spoken to its ‘friends’ in the commission and lobbied ministers.Footnote ⁸⁸ On 14 October, the day Mar told Godolphin that steps were being taken to prevent the commission meddling with a national fast, the number of ruling elders rose considerably and outnumbered ministers by twenty-two to twenty. The elders had turned up under instructions from Queensberry to obstruct efforts to secure a national fast. According to Walter Stewart, these members forced a number of lengthy ‘dilatory’ debates in which the draft act was ‘often times read and considered’, by the end of which the Court's tactics had paid off.Footnote ⁸⁹ Despite the fact that a fast was ‘strongly urged’, the ‘Court members by thronging in among the ministers of whom only a few were come in from remote places of the country, did obstruct all’.Footnote ⁹⁰ Instead, the commission agreed unanimously to send a circular letter to presbyteries urging their ministers, elders and anyone who wished to join them, to observe a day of prayer, fasting and humiliation at the time of their own choosing. The presbyteries duly appointed and observed a day of prayer and fasting.Footnote ⁹¹ The commission observed a day of fasting and prayer in Edinburgh on Friday 18 October. Walter Stewart maintained that parliament would have been ashamed to have authorised a city-wide fast after having rejected a motion for a national fast and therefore contrived a ‘very silly trick’ whereby the civil sanction for the city fast was to be granted by the magistrates and council.Footnote ⁹²

The decision was a compromise, ‘a kind of medium betwixt a fast and no fast’, intended to satisfy both sides. Even those most dissatisfied voted for it on the basis that it was a step in the right direction and better than nothing.Footnote ⁹³ The presbytery of Hamilton recorded that at the time they were ‘not a little astonished and grieved’ at the limited nature of the commission's response.Footnote ⁹⁴ The opposition had gained little from the debate and were disappointed at the outcome. However, the Court party was satisfied. Chancellor James Ogilvy, 1st earl of Seafield, remarked that the commission had acted very prudently and he was confident that after the diet of prayer on 18 October the issue of a national fast would be dropped.Footnote ⁹⁵ However, despite the passing of the act on 14 October, the issue was by no means settled. Some members of the commission still insisted on appointing a national fast and applying to parliament for sanction. Their pressure was sufficient to have it referred back to the committee for public affairs which would consider the issue after the diet of prayer held on Friday.Footnote ⁹⁶ In the meantime they urged all to consider the expediency of a fast. It is likely that some of the committee were hoping, as was the government, that the fast and diet of prayer observed on the Friday would be enough to satisfy most and that the issue would be dropped. The diet for prayer was held in the New Kirk before a crowded congregation. William Wishart of South Leith, moderator of the commission, began proceedings with a short explanation of the design of the day. He was followed by a succession of ministers that reflected both sides of the union debate and included Carstares, George Meldrum, Professor of Divinity at Edinburgh, John Stirling, Thomas Linning, George Hamiltone and David Blair (both ministers of Edinburgh) and Robert Wylie. They prayed by turns and Psalms were sung before the meeting was concluded with a blessing. According to John Bell, the talk of the town was that this diet of prayer was all that they were likely to get in relation to a fast: ‘The Parliament medled no more in the matter and the commission were likely to be equally silent.’Footnote ⁹⁷

The committee appointed to consider the fast finally reported to the commission on Monday 21 October. Once again the number of ruling elders rose sharply compared with the previous sessions, but nevertheless large numbers of ministers had arrived in Edinburgh and they outnumbered the ruling elders by almost two to one.Footnote ⁹⁸ The committee had prepared a draft of a circular letter to be sent to the presbyteries recommending to all that they appoint and observe a day of prayer, fasting and humiliation in all churches within their bounds as soon as possible. Each presbytery was left to decide the time of appointment. The commission was asked to decide whether to send the letter or proceed with the alternative, which was to apply to parliament to appoint a day of national fasting.Footnote ⁹⁹ Initially there was a heated debate about whether or not to hold another, more extensive, fast. On this occasion the increased number of ministers, led by Thomas Linning, John Bannatyne, Patrick Cumming of Ormiston and James Ramsay from Eyemouth, ‘overpowered the Court elders’ who opposed the idea. The debate became so heated that some felt that it threatened to split the Church. However, the issue was settled favourably as far as the ministers were concerned when the commission decided without a vote that a fast should be held. The decisive factor was a discourse made by James Ramsay.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ The Court ruling elders, having acquiesced in the decision for a fast, urged the commission to carry out the task on their own ecclesiastical authority and not to apply to parliament for the civil sanction because the issue would ‘raise or create a new storme’ in the house.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Having lost the debate on whether to hold another fast, their sole concern now was to keep it out of parliament. They did not want to give the opposition another opportunity to delay the passage of the treaty. To the relief of the elders, and no doubt Queensberry, the commission agreed unanimously not to apply for the civil sanction but to draw up and send out the circular letter. A day of prayer and fasting was considered necessary and expedient, but the commission decided that it was not necessary or expedient to apply to parliament for its sanction. It is inconceivable that anti-unionist ministers like Wylie, Bannatyne and Linning, acting in concert with Hamilton, would not have preferred a parliamentary sanction. It is equally inconceivable that they did not argue for it in the commission. However, they must have judged it unlikely that they would win a vote and acquiesced in the alternative. Walter Stewart's disappointment at the decision to allow individual presbyteries to appoint their own fast days, was such that he hinted at collusion between the Court and commission over the outcome.Footnote ¹⁰²

The act itself did not deal exclusively with the treaty of union but included among its causes issues common to acts for fasting, such as the increase of impiety, popery and prophaneness, and a call to confession, repentance and reformation. With an eye to the international background to the debate, the commission also urged prayer for the success of the queen's forces in their struggle against France, ‘the common enemy’ and ‘the great troubler of the peace of Europe’. In relation to the treaty, the commission, acknowledging that the outcome of parliament's deliberations on the treaty had immense civil and religious consequences for Church and nation, both to the present and succeeding generations, urged and recommended to all presbyteries that they appoint and observe a day of prayer and fasting in all churches within their bounds as soon as possible. They were to pray that

The act, like that passed by the synod of Glasgow, was moderate in tone and neutral in its stance. It neither opposed nor approved of union and prayers were not urged for or against union. Ultimately, that was an issue for an individual's conscience. The act was entirely in keeping with the commission's position throughout the debate, which was to act in the interest of the Church and to secure those interests ‘in event of an union’. While it was composed of men who held different opinions on union and who attempted to influence the debate, the commission as a church court took up a position on the issue that was politically neutral. From the Court's perspective a neutral commission was preferable to a hostile one, and its supporters within the commission encouraged that stance.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ However, those hostile to incorporating union also argued in favour of neutrality on the grounds that the Church had friends on both sides of the debate.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ The commission's neutrality was the product of the balance of power within it and a desire to avoid damaging divisions within the commission and the Church. It could not take one side in the debate without offending the other.

The fast was duly observed by all presbyteries and while some like Cupar and St Andrews did make an effort to co-ordinate their dates, most did so on days most suitable to their presbytery.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ John Gilchrist, minister at Keith and moderator of the presbytery of Strathbogie, had taken it upon himself, because the weather was too stormy to hold a meeting, to send a circular letter to the ministers of the presbytery to observe the fast on 19 November. Gilchrist chose that date because he had been informed that the other presbyteries within the synod were observing the fast on that day.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ The action of the presbyteries of Cupar and St Andrews and those within the synod of Aberdeen, demonstrated that it was perfectly feasible for the Church as a whole to coordinate a specific day of fasting across the nation. However, the commission, although perfectly entitled to do so, chose not to. Furthermore, there seems to have been no suggestion that it organise such a day and as it was happy with the outcome of the debate, it saw no need to take the issue any further. The decision about which day to hold their fast was left to the discretion of each presbytery and there appears to have been no attempt made by the commission, or the opposition, to influence that decision. The failed efforts of the synod of Glasgow and Ayr to encourage other synods to follow its example and hold a fast, is the closest that any church court other than the commission came to organising anything like a national fast.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ They failed because churches took their lead from the commission and not from a lesser court. For many in the Church the issue of a fast was a spiritual issue and not primarily a question of using a fast as an anti-union tactic. On such an important issue as union it was considered a spiritual necessity that the country humble itself before God and prayer be offered to the effect that His will be done. The fact that two fasts were held in each presbytery more than outweighed the absence of a civil sanction.

The outcome seems to have satisfied most opinion within the commission. The government and its supporters were relieved that they had avoided having to grant a civil sanction to a national fast and of having a fast on a single specified day, with all the potential difficulties that may have accompanied it. Because the commission chose not to ask for a civil sanction, the government was spared having to refuse it. Thus, they avoided the possible conflict with the Church that denying a fast might have created, and the benefit it would have given the opposition. They avoided any delay in pushing through the treaty that a debate on a sanction for a fast might have caused. They thus denied the opposition an opportunity to create a national focus to galvanise its support against the union. They had, as in the case of Darien, avoided a national fast because it was not politically expedient to hold one. While the ruling elders and their clerical allies like Carstares had been unable to prevent a second fast taking place, on the crucial issue of applying for a civil sanction their interventions had been successful.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

The Church was satisfied that it had a fast on a national basis that exceeded that of the earlier act. Despite not having the civil sanction, attributed by some largely to the influence of the elders, the overall outcome of the debate was viewed as a victory for the ministers on the commission over the ruling elders.Footnote ¹¹⁰ The ministers agreed not to apply for the civil sanction because they were happy with the arrangements they had secured. The opposition was disappointed, having gained little from the debate. Hamilton accused the commission of trifling with the fast. He was critical of them for being satisfied with the outcome and for believing that they had obtained something as good as a national fast. By settling for what was less, he argued that they had fallen into a trap set for them by the Court.Footnote ¹¹¹ Hamilton was disappointed because the failure to apply for the civil sanction denied the opposition the opportunity of a parliamentary debate and a further chance to delay the treaty. They wanted a national day of fasting and even if such a day were unlikely to hold up proceedings on the treaty it could have served as a focal point for opposition. A national fast would have been an occasion on which they could have exploited the real fears and uncertainties about union that existed within the Church.Footnote ¹¹² Disappointed though they were at the commission's decision, neither the opposition nor any group within the Church made any attempt to organise and coordinate a specific day of fasting, either nationally or within specific localities. The affair of the fast served to underline the disorganised nature of the opposition and its failure to exploit those opportunities with which it was presented. It demonstrated the ability of the Court to mobilise its supporters within the Church in order to manage a favourable decision. It also demonstrated that the Church, far from being the bulwark of the opposition, sought compromise rather than confrontation and that the commission was intent on acting in the interests of the Church rather than in the interests of particular parties. However, as the affair of the commission's second address demonstrated, it was not afraid of a confrontation with the Court when it believed that the interests of the Church were under threat. Throughout the period during which the treaty was debated by parliament, the commission acted according to its instructions from the assembly to secure the interests of the Church in the ‘event of a union’. Despite having supporters and opponents of the treaty within it, and indeed because of this, the commission refused to be the instrument or mouthpiece of either side. The opposition in particular had high hopes of the Church as a significant partner in resisting the treaty but the affair of the fast provided early evidence that those hopes and expectations would be largely disappointed.Footnote ¹¹³