Indonesia is a confounding case for scholars of constitutional design. With the country’s multiple social cleavages, profusion of parties, and combination of presidentialism and proportional representation (PR), scholars would have expected polarization and deadlock to be defining features of Indonesian politics. Yet Indonesia has become a stable democracy in which parties govern by forming coalitions across ideological, cultural, and religious divides. In this marvelous book, Donald Horowitz argues that its stable democracy is a product of a unique set of institutions grafted atop a particular cleavage structure. Although this book is a story of institutional design, Horowitz stresses that Indonesia’s constitutional reformers stumbled somewhat unwittingly upon the recipe for “multipolar fluidity” through an incremental and insider-dominated reform process.
Critical for Horowitz’s story is that Indonesia did not undergo a “big bang” constitutional reform. If it had, things would have turned out differently. Reforms proceeded incrementally because the initial conditions faced by reformers after the fall of Suharto in 1998 both constrained them and determined their priorities. One constraint was the founding 1945 Constitution. Although this constitution was inappropriate for an aspiring democracy in an ethnically divided archipelagic state, Indonesia’s constitutional reformers did not begin their work by rewriting it because powerful actors such as the military still revered it. The transition government, haunted by the “aversive memory” of the deadlock and divisiveness of previous attempts to reform the constitution in the 1950s, chose to follow the path of least resistance by holding democratic elections for a new government first.
One consequence of holding elections first was that Indonesia designed the legal framework for political parties and elections before tackling constitutional reform. Past experiences of territorial separatism and party fragmentation preoccupied reformers, and so they sought to design institutions that limited the number of parties and discouraged regionalism. Although political advisers recommended single-member districts, lawmakers’ preference for PR prevailed. Consequently, many small parties won seats in the legislature, but because there were multiple parties within cultural streams, polarizing dynamics did not ensue. In order to limit the proliferation of parties and mitigate the risk of regional party formation, however, lawmakers also set onerous party registration requirements and electoral thresholds for participation in subsequent elections. In years following, lawmakers tightened registration requirements, raised electoral thresholds, and tinkered with constituencies in ways that benefited large parties.
To deal with concerns about the centralization of power in Jakarta and fears of dominance by the largest ethnic group, the Javanese, reformers also enacted a radical decentralization bill in 1999 that devolved many powers to hundreds of districts and municipalities. By leapfrogging the provinces, the law both brought government closer to the people and deterred the formation of regional identities. Party registration requirements assured that national parties would govern districts and municipalities. The combination of electoral, party, and decentralizing reforms nimbly steered a course between the Scylla of concentration of power at the center and the Charybdis of party and territorial fragmentation.
Another consequence of holding elections first was that the responsibility for constitutional reform fell on the newly elected legislature. Delegating this task to the legislature instead of an appointed constitutional committee opened the door to a gradual, incremental reform process controlled by insiders. Lawmakers amended the constitution four times between 1999 and 2002. For Horowitz’s purposes, the most important amendments were the third and fourth, which provided for the direct election of the president. By introducing a personalistic element into presidential elections, these amendments had the unanticipated effect of weakening ties between parties and voters, which enhanced the multipolar fluidity of Indonesian politics. Also unanticipated was the further blurring of party lines. The requirement that presidential tickets win a majority, not a mere plurality, of votes meant that winning tickets had to span party and ideological lines. Further reforms mandated direct elections for local executives and had similar effects on local politics.
This jigsaw puzzle of constitutional and legislative reforms, adopted incrementally and without a full comprehension of their effects, explains Indonesia’s stable democracy. These institutions muted Indonesia’s social cleavages by fragmenting power at the center while creating strong centripetal forces that deterred regionalism. Horowitz sees some storm crowds on the horizon, however. The drive by larger parties to lock in their advantages by ratcheting up registration requirements and electoral thresholds for participating in subsequent elections has the potential to threaten multipolar fluidity, which depends on having many parties and multiple parties within cultural streams. If these efforts succeed, polarization would likely ensue.
In the penultimate chapter, Horowitz reflects on the “low quality” of Indonesia’s democracy. He makes some astute observations. For example, since no single party was powerful enough to dismiss a judge, multipolar fluidity created space for independent courts. But the insider-led process of reform also meant that judges from the Suharto era have retained their positions, and their independence has made reformation of a corrupt judiciary harder. Horowitz’s admiration for the capacity of Indonesian institutions to dampen polarization, however, perhaps leads him to give short shrift to some of their drawbacks. He insufficiently engages with Dan Slater’s argument that party promiscuity weakens accountability to voters, and he seems unconcerned that the absence of well-defined party platforms means that voters can express few policy preferences at the ballot box. Scholars who identify oligarchy as the driving force in Indonesian politics—Vedi Hadiz, Richard Robison, and Jeffrey Winters—would point to his failure to consider the extent to which oligarchs have shaped the evolution of multipolarity in Indonesia. Oligarchs founded all of the new parties that have successfully established themselves in the last decade, a fact that warrants deeper consideration.
What are the broader implications of Horowitz’s study? Perhaps the strongest is that a PR legislature in a presidential system does not necessarily result in deadlock and polarization, even when there are many parties in the legislature. However, since Indonesia’s initial conditions are unique, and the pathway followed so complex, the author is understandably hesitant to make bold claims about the replicability of Indonesia’s experience. He misses some opportunities to engage more robustly with other literatures. Given the role of sequencing, incremental change, and path dependence in the argument, the lack of engagement with the robust literature in historical institutionalism is regrettable and might have resulted in a sharper analytic structure to the engaging story that he tells. Horowitz also has much to say to rational choice scholars. His narrative contains many observations about actors incorrectly assessing their interests, of inconstant preferences, and of unintended consequences. He muses that “institutional design … is a soft science” (p. 124) but does not develop the implications of his analysis for rational choice scholars of constitutional reform.
These quibbles aside, Horowitz has written the definitive account of constitutional and political reform in Indonesia, which is an admirable achievement for a scholar who was not an Indonesia expert before writing this book. The analysis is incisive, insightful, and engaging. Given the technical details of the reforms and the complexity of the political context, weaving a lucid and sometimes gripping narrative is not an easy task. Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia should be required reading for students of Indonesian politics and scholars of constitutional and political reform.
