In July 1967, the Birmingham Daily Post published a short note entitled ‘Rain and Fog – But No Lenin’.Footnote 1 The note announced an exhibition of Soviet artists at the Royal Academy of Arts, claiming that ‘Russia has left ideology aside in choosing 179 modern Soviet paintings’ to be shown in London. It emphasised that ‘the aim is to make money’ and that ‘paintings of rain and fog had been chosen in an effort to cater for British taste’.Footnote 2 The note was partly reprinted in the Liverpool Daily Post, which added that while Soviet artists chose to exhibit rainy landscapes in London, ‘a show for Italy had concentrated on sunny themes’.Footnote 3 These reports are suggestive of the Soviet side’s willingness to engage in practical cultural cooperation with the British public and a partial step back from the ideological confrontation that was typical of Cold War rhetoric.
This exhibition formed part of a significant initiative focused on exporting Soviet art that combined two major post-Stalinist foreign policy objectives: to promote Soviet culture abroad and to expand international commercial relations.Footnote 4 The export of Soviet art was formally launched in 1964 by a decree of the Council of Ministers that stated that export volumes were insufficient and called for the significant expansion of exports ‘of various kinds of souvenirs, handicrafts, products made from semi-precious stones, as well as works of painting and sculpture’.Footnote 5 This statute launched a qualitatively new practice for Soviet artists and art officials, who had not been seriously involved in international trade before.Footnote 6 Entering export trade challenged the whole system of the Soviet art economy, which had originally been constructed as a part of the planned economy. In the Soviet Union, art was primarily bought by enterprises, which allocated special funds that could be spent on art commissions. This arrangement guaranteed Soviet artists regular contracts.Footnote 7 In addition, art officials who estimated the value of art works were mainly artists themselves and therefore were influenced by their stylistic and personal preferences.Footnote 8 The principles of the international art market, including free pricing, a diversity of styles and techniques, and competition for individual buyers’ interests, lay beyond the control of Soviet art officials, which pushed them to revise their commercial practices.
This article examines the history of Soviet art exports from an institutional perspective. It explores how Soviet art organisations dealt with the systematic difficulties that they faced when entering the international art market and evaluates the extent to which the official art system was prepared to revise its principles for economic gain. In dialogue with Stephen Gardner’s work, the article investigates the decision-making process in foreign trade, presenting art export as the product of interactions between different organisations and actors.Footnote 9 This article focuses on mid-level bureaucrats as important – though not always visible – actors who made decisions and shaped the character of Soviet art exports. In adopting this perspective, the article builds on the work of Zbigniew Wojnowski and Michel Abesser, who have emphasised the role of bureaucrats from within the Ministry of Culture in establishing productive collaborations with Western recording companies and exporting recordings by Soviet musicians.Footnote 10 This approach illuminates the mechanisms of art export and reveals how a desire to expand the international art market coexisted with bureaucratic motivations and hierarchies, as well as with ideological anxieties about the reputation of Soviet art abroad. At the heart of the article lies a fundamental question: why did Soviet art export fail to achieve impressive commercial results and raise the profile of Soviet art in the West? On a broader level, this article contributes to a more nuanced understanding of Soviet–Western trade relations and the cultural Cold War by highlighting their complex dynamics, in which economic interests and cooperation coexisted with political tensions and rivalries.Footnote 11
The 1964 decree that launched art export was part of a broader Soviet policy that began in the late 1950s and intensified in the 1960s and 1970s.Footnote 12 As the Soviet Union was increasing its import of Western machinery and technologies, it continued to suffer from a consistent deficit in stable foreign currency.Footnote 13 According to Philip Hanson, Soviet overall export trade in the 1960s and 1970s was low. Moreover, 80 per cent of export trade was with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and developing countries, which was often run on bilateral agreements and, in some cases, could even generate loss.Footnote 14 Gardner noted that economic and political motives were interwoven in Soviet foreign trade, with commercial interest growing over time.Footnote 15 This dual approach – of cultivating a positive image of the Soviet Union alongside generating venue – can be seen in other initiatives of the late 1950 and 1960s, such as the establishment of the Berezka hard-currency stores, the Sovetskii eksport journal and the development of tourism through Inturist.Footnote 16 Discussions of art export in official documents expresses the same duality: it was common to simultaneously refer to economic and ideological impulses.Footnote 17 It is important to note, however, that the 1964 decree, which was an internal administrative document, did not frame the goals of art export in ideological terms. Instead, it emphasised commercial goals and the importance of studying the preferences of foreign customers, which thereby shows that state motivations lay primarily within the economic field.Footnote 18
The history of commercial art practices remains an understudied area of Soviet foreign trade and cultural diplomacy. The existing literature either examines the smuggling of art or portrays Soviet officials as being willing to engage in any financially profitable deal.Footnote 19 This absence of scholarship can be explained by the fact that the income from cultural exports did not contribute significantly to the Soviet budget and thus did not attract the interest of historians of Soviet foreign trade.Footnote 20 Another reason why the export art trade has been overlooked is the lack of clear information in the available sources. Even when officials were heavily engaged in generating financial profit, they chose not to discuss it and instead emphasised the ideological aspects of art export and publicly declared their critical attitude towards the cultural policies of capitalist countries.Footnote 21 Therefore, this article is one of the first attempts to explain the mechanisms of art export, as well as the goals and principles through which it was implemented by different actors.
This article draws upon archival materials from the collections of the Ministry of Culture, the Union of Artists and the Art Fund, which are all held in the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI) in Moscow. Unfortunately, many documents that are important for this research are not accessible to researchers. RGALI does not provide access to documents less than seventy-five years old that contain financial or personal information, which means that details of sales and profits remain unavailable. In addition, many documents from the Export Art Salon – the shop that sold artworks to foreign buyers – were damaged in the fire that occurred in RGALI in 2018. Another significant limitation of this research is that the records of Novoexport – the organisation under the Ministry of Foreign Trade that was responsible for negotiating with foreign buyers – remain classified. As a result, a substantial part of the story concerning the strategies, agency and motivations of the Ministry of Foreign Trade is not covered in this article. The most important findings come instead from correspondence between the Union of Artists, the Ministry of Culture, the Export Art Salon and Novoexport. Although these letters contain a limited amount of precise financial information, they make it possible to partly reconstruct the mechanisms of negotiation, as well as the motivations of Soviet actors and their foreign clients. The main source of financial data consists of reports written by the Art Fund of the Soviet Union, an organisation that managed all aspects of the Soviet art economy, including export sales. Published every five years, these reports provide aggregate figures on sales and the countries to which Soviet art was exported. However, they do not specify revenue by country or by medium, which means that paintings and craft objects are grouped together. Because of the available sources, this article shifts focus away from measuring the financial success or failure of Soviet art exports and towards analysing the mechanisms of how art export functioned within the Soviet Union. The source base has also determined the article’s primary focus on Western countries, since insufficient evidence was available to reconstruct Soviet art export policies in Eastern Europe. Moreover, drawing on documents from Russian archives, the article focuses primarily on Russian artists and does not address the participation of artists from other Soviet republics in the export trade.
This article begins by introducing the Soviet organisations that were involved in art export and their hierarchical subordination. By comparing them with the infrastructure of music export, it aims to demonstrate that the weakness of art export and its results were largely due to the peculiarities of its institutional system. The article then examines the limitations of the planned economy and artists’ reluctance to abandon its guarantees when entering the free market. It subsequently takes a closer look at the mid-level bureaucracy of the Ministry of Culture, highlighting the role of professional preferences and personal connections in art exports. Finally, it demonstrates how conflicts between different actors and organisations created grey areas in which semi-official deals could take place.
Actors in Soviet Art Export
In the Soviet Union, where the state held a monopoly over all foreign trade, transactions with foreign buyers were conducted through foreign trade organisations (FTO) within the Ministry of Foreign Trade.Footnote 22 The FTO that handled art exports was known as Novoexport. Established in 1929 with the official name of the State Office for New Types of Exports under the People’s Commissariat for Foreign and Domestic Trade of the USSR, it was tasked with identifying new categories of export goods, organising their procurement and conducting their sale abroad to procure funds for domestic industrialisation.Footnote 23 The sale of museum objects – primarily ethnographic items and crafts, rather than fine art – formed a core part of Novoexport’s activity from its inception.Footnote 24 In the 1960s, Novoexport had the monopoly on exporting semi-precious stones and continued to organise the sale of crafts and souvenirs, including Palekh miniatures, which had been a successful export since the 1920s.Footnote 25 A 1964 Council of Ministers decree on the promotion of art exports listed fine art, crafts and souvenirs as equivalent categories for export.Footnote 26 From the available sources, it is difficult to determine whether art was one of Novoexport’s priority areas or whether it was merely embedded into the more developed practices and regarded as another type of souvenir. In a 1966 interview with the newspaper Moskovskii Khudozhnik (Moscow Artist), the director of Novoexport did not discuss art exports directly and instead focused on the variety of traditional crafts he had been working with, such as Baltic amber and Caucasian daggers.Footnote 27 Although he emphasised that Novoexport employed several cultural experts, he did not mention any specialists in fine art and instead referred to individuals with expertise in jewellery and carpets.Footnote 28
In this respect, Soviet art exports differed markedly from music exports, which were administered by the Ministry of Culture and its subordinate institutions. Zbigniew Wojnowski and Michel Abesser argued that representatives of the Ministry of the Foreign Trade lacked competence in matters related to musical performance and link the success of the export of musical recordings to the expertise of bureaucrats working within the Ministry of Culture, who were able to build systematic partnerships with major Western recording companies despite political constraints.Footnote 29 This striking contrast reflects the fact that music was regarded as an important source of export revenue and Soviet cultural prestige in a way that fine art was not. The higher status of music was established in the Stalinist period, which generated mutual interest between Soviet and foreign organisations even before the Thaw.Footnote 30 Wojnowski and Abesser demonstrate that the success of the export of Soviet musical recordings relied in part on the active participation of Western institutions, which played a crucial role in disseminating Soviet music abroad. The foreign reputation of Soviet fine art, in contrast, was not nearly as strong.Footnote 31 At major international exhibitions such as the Venice Biennale in 1956, 1958, 1960 and 1962, the Expo 58 in Brussels or the Soviet exhibition at the Royal Academy of Arts in London in 1959, the Soviet Union primarily presented conservative socialist realist paintings that were unfavourably received by critics.Footnote 32
Artists whose work was included in the state export system did not participate in the export process personally. Unlike musicians who travelled and performed abroad, they remained institutionally represented, rather than individually visible. Their names were known, but their biographies were rarely foregrounded in the context of art export; they did not normally travel with exhibitions or communicate directly with foreign dealers. Artists also did not create works specifically for export. Employed by the Art Fund, they sold their works to their employer, after which the works were distributed to different enterprises, schools or clubs, designated for sale in art stores or included in the export fund.Footnote 33 Export activity was not a central component of the professional lives of the vast majority of official artists. This is clear from the transcripts of the general meetings of the Union of Artists, during which issues related to art exports were hardly ever discussed.
Rather than the artists themselves, it was the Art Fund that participated in the process of exporting art and acted as the owner of the artwork in question.Footnote 34 Established in 1940 as an institutional analogue to the literary and musical funds, the Art Fund was created in order to employ artists and cover their material needs. It was subordinated to the Union of Artists and functioned as a commercially oriented body. It did not rely on direct state subsidies. Instead, it made its profit from its own production enterprises that manufactured consumer goods such as porcelain and textiles and retained a percentage from their sale. The Art Fund’s prosperity relied heavily on its monopoly over artistic production and its exemption from taxation. Market expansion was therefore in the Art Fund’s interest, and it often focused on expanding its customer base; by 1964, it operated seventy-eight shops across most Soviet republics, selling artwork to private buyers on the domestic art market.Footnote 35 Following the 1964 Council of Ministers decree on art export, it immediately established an export section within its Central Art Salon. Three years later in 1967, this section was transformed into the Export Art Salon (Khudozhestvennyi salon po eksportu), which gained its own headquarters in Moscow on Smolensk Square, around the corner from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Footnote 36
Before they were cleared for export sale at the art salons, artworks were reviewed by the Commission for Reviewing and Evaluating Artistic Works for Export (Komissiia po prosmotru i otsenke khudozhestvennykh proizvedenii dlya postavki na eksport), which operated under the Ministry of Culture.Footnote 37 It was charged with approving or rejecting proposals that were submitted by the Art Fund and adjusting the export prices proposed for individual artworks. Comprised of high-ranking artists and art historians, the Commission was the most ideologically engaged participant in the export process. Its priorities lay less in commercial expansion than in promoting specific professional standards and corporate interests within the artistic establishment.
The Export Commission’s composition partly overlapped with that of other ministerial art commissions, and its selection decisions reflected the broader cultural policy of the Ministry of Culture, which developed extensive cultural exchange programmes with many European countries from the late 1950s onwards. Non-commercial overseas exhibitions that were organised by the Ministry typically presented a continuous narrative of Soviet art from the medieval Russian icons to the Soviet present and emphasised realism as its defining principle.Footnote 38 This concept of Soviet art as grounded simultaneously within a medieval tradition and nineteenth-century art influenced the selection of artwork for commercial exhibitions, although in a less systematic and less conceptually articulated form. Commercial exhibitions were ultimately shaped by not Soviet officials but rather foreign gallerists and dealers, although their selection was limited to the works that had been exhibited at the Art Salon and previously approved by the Export Commission of the Ministry of Culture.
Overall, the Soviet art export system emerged as an institutional arrangement combining actors with different priorities and competencies: the Export Commission of the Ministry of Culture, Novoexport of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Export Art Salon of the Art Fund. These three bodies operated in cooperation, but they were not organised into a vertical hierarchy. Instead, they formed a shared institutional infrastructure comprised of actors with distinct competencies. This structure explains both the relative stability and the structural limitations of Soviet art export: it enabled controlled participation in the international art market while simultaneously reinforcing the official art scene and securing the privileged status of realist art within the Soviet Union. It also shaped the profile of foreign partners, favouring gallerists and dealers who were willing to operate within Soviet regulatory and aesthetic constraints, and whose clientele tended to belong to more conservative segments of the market rather than to the avant-garde–oriented sphere that drove contemporary art trends.
Art Export: Commerce Under the Planned Economy
Art export began to develop in earnest in 1965, the year in which the Kosygin economic reforms were adopted.Footnote 39 These reforms prompted discussions about profit and efficiency, and this affected the ways in which art export was represented in Soviet art media. In December 1965, Moskovskii Khudozhnik introduced its readers to Novoexport, which was described as ‘a solid newcomer to the global market’ that took studying the demands of international customers as one of its guiding principles.Footnote 40 In this article, the concepts of art and commerce were brought closer together than ever before in the Soviet press. However, as Mark Harrison has noted, the Kosygin economic reforms were ‘conservative, not radical’, and reformers were not prepared to question fundamental principles of the Soviet economy, such as state ownership, central planning and the dominant role of ministerial and party guidance.Footnote 41 This tension between the pursuit of financial profit and political conservatism shaped Soviet foreign trade during the 1960s and 1970s, and art export was wholly typical of this.Footnote 42 This section argues that although official reports on art export showed a consistent increase in sales abroad, commercial interests and initiatives often failed to overcome the limitations that were imposed by the Soviet centralised economy.
Official reports produced by the Art Fund show that art export expanded rapidly. From 1968 to 1972, fifty-three commercial exhibitions were held in twenty-two foreign countries, including the United States, Canada, Spain, West Germany, England, Italy, France, Australia, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland; between 1973 and 1976, the number of foreign exhibitions tripled, reaching 150. During these four years, approximately 15,000 Soviet paintings and works of graphic art were exhibited in various countries across Western Europe, North and South America and Asia.Footnote 43 In addition to expanding its geographical connections, the Art Fund used other opportunities to enlarge its trade network. For example, it exhibited artworks at international trade exhibitions in Moscow, such as an exhibition of shoes Obuv’ 69, at the Budapest department of Berezka store and on the walls of the Inturist.Footnote 44 In 1974, the Moscow Union of Artists signed an agreement with the head of the Soviet Maritime Passenger Fleet (Morpasflot), E. Mikulinsky, to organise onboard exhibitions and auctions of Soviet artworks and to provide paintings valued at the enormous sum of 100,000 rubles.Footnote 45 Despite the increasing number of export initiatives, the selection of artworks remained standardised due to the centralised two-level approval procedure, first by the Art Fund and then by the Ministry of Culture. This expansive approach to business was not unique to the art sector but was more broadly characteristic of Soviet hard-currency trade. As recent research by Anna Ivanova and Shawn Salmon has shown, a similar strategy of expanding trade through the opening of new stores was employed by officials at Inturist and Berezka, which in both cases did not yield significant financial results.Footnote 46
Official reports produced by the Art Fund indicate that sales advertising was under-developed.Footnote 47 The idea of publishing a catalogue of the artists whose work was available at the Export Art Salon had circulated in Art Fund documents since the 1960s. In 1967, Novoexport together with the Union of Artists planned to identify fifty to sixty of ‘the most promising artists’ to be promoted on the foreign market and to publish a catalogue with their works by a foreign printing press by May 1969.Footnote 48 Art officials expected that this catalogue would allow them to hold an auction abroad or an international auction of Soviet paintings in Moscow, presumably in 1969 or 1970.Footnote 49 The only art catalogue produced by Novoexport that I have been able to locate through libraries and second-hand bookshops lacks both a publication date and information on its print run. Its hard cover of vinyl leather, colour reproductions and brief biographies in English are consistent with the plans described by Novoexport. Considering that the exhibitions listed date to 1970, the catalogue was most likely published shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, this example should be regarded as an exception, rather than evidence of an effective advertising strategy. As late as 1983, Art Fund officials continued to report on the absence of such publications, stressing ‘the necessity of publishing advertising and information materials in English, with leaflets in other languages’.Footnote 50 Reports from subsequent years make no further mention of these materials, which makes it difficult to confirm whether they were actually published. The first catalogue of graphic artworks exhibited at the Export Art Salon did not appear until 1981.Footnote 51 The equivalent volume for paintings was only sent to the publisher in 1987, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet art market.Footnote 52 Poor advertising likely explains why clients of the Export Salon were mainly companies, not individuals. The amount of art sold for hard currency to individuals was low. For example, in 1971, only five works were sold to individuals through the salons, and this increased to just ten in 1972 and twenty-three in 1973.Footnote 53
Regarding plans to collaborate with international auction houses, Novoexport indeed had such ambitions and made several attempts to place Soviet official art within the most prestigious art market institutions. In 1967, British newspapers reported that representatives of Sotheby’s had visited Moscow and met with Novoexport officials to discuss the sale of Soviet artworks.Footnote 54 These negotiations, however, did not result in any sales at Sotheby’s, and instead, sales were carried out by Christie’s in 1970. By that time, Christie’s had already collaborated with Novoexport for three years, selling early nineteenth-century Russian porcelain.Footnote 55 Sales of contemporary Soviet paintings, however, were not particularly successful. An article in the Scotsman entitled ‘Lukewarm Appeal of Soviet Artists Work’ reported that of 100 paintings offered for sale, the total number of sales amounted to £5,186.Footnote 56 This result was apparently lower than both Novoexport and the auction house had anticipated. In a 1974 letter to the Union of Artists, representatives of Novoexport summed up their negotiations with Sotheby’s and Christie’s auction houses by stating that Soviet art was poorly known and not popular abroad, so auctions could not take place.Footnote 57
The details of Novoexport’s negotiations with foreign firms remain opaque; however, given that Soviet embassies and trade missions were often involved in organising commercial exhibitions abroad, it can be assumed that Novoexport was guided by not only commercial interests but also political affinities, choosing European actors with leftist sympathies.Footnote 58 This was the case with one of the first commercial exhibitions of Soviet art, which took place at the Paul Eluard Museum in Saint-Denis near Paris. It was run by l’Agence Littéraire Et Artistique Parisienne Pour Les Echanges Culturels, an organisation established in 1953 by French communist writers Georges Soria, Louis Aragon and Jean Lurçat to introduce French audiences to literature, art and performances from different parts of the world.Footnote 59
Another example of the overlapping of economic and political motives was the Japanese gallery Gekkoso, whose owner, Nakamura Yōko, signed an agreement with Novoexport in 1969. Viktor Belozerov, who has researched the Gekkoso gallery, argues that the ease and success that Yōko enjoyed in her negotiations with the Soviet officials were due to her reputation in Japan, where she was connected to the state authorities and promoted Soviet art within them.Footnote 60 This largely uncommercial approach was driven by the initially low demand for Soviet art abroad, a fact that Novoexport officials frequently reported to the Ministry of Culture and the Art Fund.Footnote 61 At the same time, it demonstrated that Soviet trade organisations were not prepared to fully adapt their working strategies to the principles of the capitalist art market and chose to collaborate on political grounds.
Additionally, entering the free market could cause financial losses for Soviet organisations. In the Soviet Union from 1975 onwards, the prices of artworks were regulated by a special resolution produced by the Council of Ministers.Footnote 62 When evaluating artwork for export, officials from the Ministry of Culture applied domestic price standards that had been established within the non-market Soviet art economy. According to Novoexport officials, these prices were significantly higher than similar works on foreign markets.Footnote 63 Moreover, an additional 25 per cent surcharge was applied, which was shared between the Art Fund and the Export Art Salon.Footnote 64 The 1971 letter to the Moscow City Court from the Ministry of Culture explained the existing rules for pricing artworks for export. According to it, Ministry officials determined two prices for each artwork: one paid to the artist and another that was offered to Novoexport’s clients, which was usually two to three times higher.Footnote 65 This system of surcharges and fixed minimum wages was largely incompatible with the realities of the international capitalist art market, where the income of all participants in the sale depended directly on the size of the profit and could be zero if the sale failed. Thus, entering the international market would have required Soviet art organisations to adopt a more flexible approach to pricing and potentially offer prices below the minimum wage by reducing artists’ royalties or lowering their own commission.
By the middle of the 1980s, a significant portion of Soviet art export income came from collaborations with larger Soviet organisations abroad, such as Ost-West Bank, a branch of the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) in West Germany. It operated according to Soviet non-market conventions in art trade and, in doing so, provided Novoexport with a stable and secure source of income. The Art Fund also provided artworks to shipbuilding companies in Finland and Austria to decorate ships that were commissioned by the Soviet Union. Formally, this was classified as export trade.Footnote 66 In reality, however, these deals were unlikely to be profitable, as Soviet economic relations with Finland were based on bilateral exchange and therefore did not generate hard currency. This situation supports Philip Hanson’s point that the growth of Soviet exports did not necessarily translate to an increase in currency income.Footnote 67 Overall, while the Art Fund’s activities boosted export figures, they remained deeply intertwined with the domestic Soviet economic system and its commercial limitations.
Art Export and the Soviet Bureaucracy
The conservatism of the Soviet cultural bureaucracy was another obstacle to the development of commercial initiatives. Many studies on late Soviet cultural policy highlight hidden tensions between reform-minded, consumer-oriented bureaucrats, on the one hand, and their conservative counterparts, on the other, who prioritised ideological concerns.Footnote 68 In most cases ideological restrictions were imposed by officials who acted as editors, censors or members of expert committees responsible for deciding which pieces to accept and which to reject.Footnote 69 From the 1960s onwards, such expert bodies were given greater agency, as official party and government decrees became less detailed and delegated responsibility to the experts.Footnote 70 In the history of art export, the role of experts and the censorial board was fulfilled by the Export Commission of the Ministry of Culture. It had a special section for Soviet painting, graphic artwork, sculpture and applied arts, which served as the final checkpoint during the long process of selecting and evaluating artworks for export.Footnote 71
Neither the 1964 decree ‘On Additional Measures to Increase Export of Goods’ nor the documents establishing the Export Commission provided guidelines on the types of works that ought to be selected. The rare clarifications published in the 1977 collection of instructions and documents for art export workers stated that ‘artworks should be of high quality, yet not of great significance for national heritage’ and that their export ‘should not harm the country’s artistic heritage’.Footnote 72 With such imprecise guidelines, decisions about artworks and their prices came to depend substantially on the interpretations of the Export Commission members.
The section of Soviet painting, graphic artworks, sculpture and applied arts consisted of nineteen people, all of whom were appointed by the minister of culture. Only one of them was a representative of foreign trade, while the others were high-ranking artists and art historians, heads of the Unions of Artists and members of the Academy of Arts.Footnote 73 They were experienced bureaucrats operating within the planned economy, but they lacked expertise in contemporary European and American art and had no specialist knowledge of the international art market. Although initially appointed for a four-year term, the composition of the section remained largely unchanged throughout the 1960s and 1970s, reflecting broader trends in the recruitment of state bureaucrats that prioritised stability and minimised rotation.Footnote 74
Its long-standing chairman was an art historian, Georgii Timoshin, who also served as the head of the entire Department of Fine Arts and Monument Protection in the Ministry of Culture (Upravleniye izobrazitel’nykh iskusstv i okhrany pamyatnikov Ministerstva Kul’tury SSSR) and was a member of the board of the Moscow branch of the Union of Artists. While leading the ministerial department, he published two books on the virtues of Soviet socialist realist battle painting.Footnote 75 In the Commission, Timoshin was accompanied by dedicated socialist realist artists, one of whom was painter Vasilii Efanov (1900–78), winner of five Stalin prizes; another was Fedor Reshetnikov (1906–88), a painter of didactic genre paintings known to be a militant anti-modernist. Reshetnikov manifested his aesthetic views in a 1961 triptych, The Mysteries of Abstractionism, in which he ridiculed modernism for its commercial nature and lack of academic training and skill.Footnote 76 The presence of leaders from the Stalinist art scene in the Export Commission highlights its restrictive function and underscores the tensions that were embedded within Soviet attempts to establish trade connections with foreign countries.Footnote 77 The Export Commission of the Ministry of Culture did not alter its policies even as the participants of the Stalinist art scene were gradually replaced by a younger generation. These younger artists, such as Aleksei and Sergei Tkachevs, Ivan Sorokin or Petr Ossovskii, were still conservatively minded. While the art world of the late 1960s and 1970s was becoming increasingly diverse, these artists believed in the superiority of realist art over modernism and promoted this view in their administrative work.
The lack of consideration for potential buyers can be explained by the fact that the salaries of those in the Export Commission did not depend on economic success, as they did not receive any share of the income from sales. The only symbolic benefit that they could derive was from promoting works by artists who shared their professional values, or with whom they had warm personal connections. Thus, Soviet art export was marked by an inherent contradiction: the commercial initiative of expanding Soviet trade and entering the international market was controlled by an administrative body with no market interests.
It is still difficult to define the criteria used by officials from the Export Commission to evaluate whether a given artwork was eligible for export. In their working correspondence, members of the Export Commission frequently mentioned ‘professionalism’ as a key criterion, but they did not specify the qualities that made artworks ‘professional’. Based on the artistic style of the artists whose works were usually accepted for sale – Fedor Glebov, Andrei Tutunov, Alexei Pisarev, Eduard Bragovskii, Vladimir Stozharov and Vyacheslav Zabelin – the Commission seemingly favoured realistic paintings executed in a colourful manner with free brushstrokes, reminiscent of Russian paintings from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, such as those by the Peredvizhniki (Isaak Levitan, Ilya Ostroukhov) or members of the Union of Russian Artists (Igor Grabar, Sergei Ivanov, Leonid Turzhanskii).Footnote 78 These choices instead indicated personal and corporation preferences of the members of the Export Commission, rather than concern for the interests and preferences of the foreign audience. As Verity Clarkson has shown, the 1960s in Britain and in other European countries enjoyed an increase in the public and galleries’ interest in Russian avant-garde art and constructivism, while the persistence of Soviet officials in showing realist art at the exhibitions abroad was seen as an ideological concern.Footnote 79 On the other hand, the consistent inclusion of still lifes with folk objects, or painting depicting traditional national feasts or rural life in the Caucasus or Central Asia, as well as the popularity of Ivan Sandyrev’s artworks with visual references to icons and Palekh miniatures, suggests that the Commission favoured artwork with ethnic and national themes, placing these amongst the export crafts that had already gained popularity abroad as exotic souvenirs from the Soviet Union.Footnote 80
Most of the documents related to the work of the Export Commission are succinct minutes consisting of the titles of the works, their authors, the ministerial resolution to either ‘accept’ or ‘decline’ and the prices offered by the Art Fund, which were then confirmed or adjusted by the Commission. The boundary between what was deemed acceptable and unacceptable was often vague, with choices often appearing somewhat arbitrary. For example, during the Commission meeting on 10 January 1969, Nonna Khotemova’s works Church in Izmailovo and Portrait with a Dagestanian Jug were accepted and valued at 175 and 200 roubles respectively, whereas her Borovsk. Red Church was rejected.Footnote 81 It was common for works rejected in one meeting to then be accepted months later. For instance, two still lifes and three landscapes by Ilya Tabekin were accepted on 10 January 1969, whereas two further still lifes were rejected.Footnote 82 Ten months later, in October 1969, one of the rejected pieces, Still Life with a Blue Bird, was accepted.Footnote 83 This fluctuation in decision-making might have been driven by a desire to maintain relative parity among artists, avoiding the acceptance of too many works by a single artist at once. Alternatively, this inconsistency could be attributed to the composition of the Commission, which was never plenary, meaning decisions could vary slightly depending on the preferences of the members present at the time.
Amongst the documents held at RGALI, there is a rare full transcript of an Export Commission meeting, which demonstrates its dependence on the broader political context. The meeting in question took place on 19 June 1974 and considered the miniature sculptures of Vasilii Konovalenko, a Leningrad-based artist.Footnote 84 By this time, Konovalenko was a member of the Union of Artists and had made a name for himself working in theatre and creating small sculptures from semi-precious stones, depicting genre scenes from the lives of pre-revolutionary peasants and townspeople, as well as fairy-tale characters. Some of his works illustrated fables by a highly regarded Soviet writer, Sergei Mikhalkov, which led to Mikhalkov becoming Konovalenko’s patron. In 1973, Konovalenko had a solo exhibition at the Russian Museum in Leningrad. This unprecedented event for a relatively young artist was made possible through the personal assistance of Mikhalkov himself, who secured permission for the exhibition from the USSR Council of Ministers, wrote the opening speech for the catalogue and published a laudatory article in the popular journal Ogonek.Footnote 85 Later that year, Konovalenko’s sculptures were exhibited at the Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy (VDNKh), a prominent exhibition space in Moscow, and awarded a small gold medal. In other words, this artist had secured a strong position in the Soviet art world. However, during the same year, Konovalenko found himself under criminal prosecution that was initiated by Grigorii Romanov, the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The details of the trial remain unclear. Art historian Galina Gubanova argues that the artist was a victim of the ongoing conflict between Romanov and Vasilii Pushkarev, the director of the State Russian Museum. Konovalenko’s exhibition, which had been organised without the approval of the Leningrad authorities, inflamed this conflict.Footnote 86 The official charge against Konovalenko was the illegal possession of a large quantity of semi-precious stones, and he was forced to donate part of his works to the state.Footnote 87
The discussion of Konovalenko’s works by the Export Commission took place after his prosecution. At this time, fourteen of his artworks were exhibited at the Coloured Stones (Tsvetnye kamni) salon – a store operated by the Ministry of Geology. There they attracted interest from representatives of foreign firms who wished to organise commercial exhibitions of Konovalenko’s sculptures in Western European countries and the United States.Footnote 88 Another potential buyer was the renowned collector Armand Hammer, who had been purchasing art from Soviet collections since the 1920s and became interested in the work of this young Soviet sculptor.Footnote 89 As a result, in 1974, the salon representative, geologist Aris Turinge, presented Konovalenko’s works to the Export Commission to obtain permission for their export.Footnote 90 This deal appeared highly favourable: Konovalenko’s folk style aligned with the aesthetic conventions of Soviet art exports, his successful official career left no doubts about his professionalism and Hammer’s interest promised a profitable transaction.
Although the deal appeared to offer a mutually beneficial outcome, the Export Commission of the Ministry of Culture blocked it. Their reasoning was framed in aesthetic terms with no mention of Konovalenko’s criminal prosecution, but it is difficult to believe that artistic disagreement alone could justify such a categorical rejection and the Commission’s strikingly emotional tone. The first speaker, art historian Mikhail Ilyin, dismissed Konovalenko’s work as something that ‘cannot be called art’ and instead defined it as a ‘vulgarisation of precious material’.Footnote 91 Ignoring the fact that Konovalenko’s sculptures were made from inexpensive semi-precious stones, Ilyin argued that Konovalenko’s sculptures would be dismantled in the West, with the stones repurposed as raw materials.Footnote 92 Yet, the main threat that he perceived was not deception by unscrupulous buyers but rather potential damage to the international reputation of Soviet culture if these works were to be exhibited abroad.Footnote 93 Ilyin’s speech encapsulated many tropes of official Soviet rhetoric: deep-seated anxiety and mistrust of Western trade partnerships, condemnation of the commercialisation of art and a lack of clearly articulated criteria for artistic evaluation. His impassioned critique set the tone for the discussion, with other Commission members only escalating and reiterating the condemnation.
The nature of the unanimous criticism of Konovalenko’s works was not easily understood by those outside the official art world. Geologist Aris Turinge from the Coloured Stones salon, who was present at the meeting, was surprised when he heard such harsh judgements. He responded to the critique by noting that the stones in Konovalenko’s sculptures were inexpensive and therefore unlikely to attract buyers seeking raw materials. As for their artistic value, he reminded the Commission of the sculptures’ ‘popularity among Soviet audiences’. Finally, he questioned the vague notion of ‘professionalism’: ‘the artist is a member of the Union of Artists, so how can his work be considered unprofessional?’Footnote 94 Despite these counter-arguments and the clear commercial potential of Konovalenko’s sculptures on the international art market, the Export Commission ultimately banned their export, concluding that the works had ‘no artistic value and their ideological content is absolutely unacceptable as it distorts the lives of Russian and Soviet people’.Footnote 95
This case highlights how final decisions were shaped by the judgement and convictions of ministerial officials, who, in turn, were influenced by ideological considerations and most likely acted on directives from higher-ranking officials. The aesthetic justifications given during the meeting did not align with the nature of Konovalenko’s works, nor with the general Soviet export policy, which valued art reminiscent of folk traditions. In 1973, Novoexport published a series of pocket calendars featuring Konovalenko’s sculptures. The calendars did not have to pass the Export Commission and were sold together with crafts, souvenirs and semi-precious stones. In 1980, Konovalenko emigrated to the United States. According to Galina Gubanova, after his departure, his works were displayed at official Soviet exhibitions abroad and featured in publications on Soviet stone-carving.Footnote 96
Aside from ideological considerations intertwined with hidden political intrigues, members of the Export Commission were intolerant of artists who worked outside official art institutions. Participation in the export trade was a privilege that offered both reputational and financial advantages. Just as Soviet writers received royalties in foreign currency for the publication of their work abroad, artists could earn additional income when their work was sold internationally.Footnote 97 Records kept about the artist Vladimir Weisberg, whose work was regularly exported, reveal that in 1982 this sum amounted to an additional 10 per cent of the sales price and could be received in either Soviet roubles or hard currency.Footnote 98 Given the potential for additional profit, artists serving on the Export Commission – most of whom were board members of the Union of Artists – sought to preserve these privileges exclusively for officially recognised artists and regarded others as competitors.
A group of potential rivals in the international market were underground artists.Footnote 99 Some had already gained recognition abroad through exhibitions that had been organised without official approval, which led foreign dealers to believe that their works would attract interest overseas. In the early 1970s, numerous foreign firms submitted requests to the Ministry of Culture to collaborate with artists who were not members of the Union of Artists. This surge of interest can be linked to an order by the Union of Artists, which was adopted in 1971 and allowed foreign dealers to select artworks from not only the Export Art Salon’s collection, but also exhibitions and artists’ studios.Footnote 100 This directive increased the visibility of a greater number of artists and expanded opportunities to connect with foreign buyers. In 1971, the German company Terra, based in West Berlin, requested works by Il’ya Glazunov, Il’ya Kabakov, Ernst Neizvestnyi, Anatolii Brusilovskii, Mikhail Grobman, Vladimir Yakovlev and Vladimir Yankilevskii.Footnote 101 In response, the head of the Union of Artists, Nikolai Ponomarev, informed Terra that some of these artists were not members of the Union of Artists and therefore their work could not be sold to foreign companies.Footnote 102 Works by Glazunov, Kabakov and Neizvestny, who were members of the Moscow Union of Artists, could be sold via the Export Art Salon.Footnote 103 Despite efforts to expand art exports by granting foreign buyers greater freedom in selecting works, the process nevertheless remained tightly controlled by the Union of Artists’ regulations.
An Italian art dealer, Gianfranco Mazzoleni, who owned Casa d’Arte gallery in Milan, faced a similar refusal when he sought to exhibit works by non-official artists Iurii Sobolev and Valeri Kosorukov.Footnote 104 His request was rejected by the director of the Export Art Salon, Volodin, who justified his decision by stating that Sobolev and Kosorukov had exhibited their works abroad by ‘bypassing our state and public organisations’.Footnote 105 Furthermore, he underscored their culpability, writing that ‘the foreign press tends to juxtapose the art of such artists with [official] Soviet art and to highlight the split within the Soviet creative intelligentsia’.Footnote 106 Thus, the very reputation that made these artists commercially appealing was an obstacle in the eyes of Soviet administrators. Instead, Mazzoleni was advised to select works from the Export Art Salon. He assembled a collection of vibrant, colourful landscapes by Moscow and Vladimir artists, which he exhibited in Milan (1971), Bologna (1970), Bari (1970) and Diano Marina (1971). Although he sold 178 paintings for $31,450, he considered the venture a failure both culturally and commercially, as this sum fell slightly short of the gallery’s expenses.Footnote 107
Mazzoleni blamed Soviet officials for his commercial failure, arguing that their approach to business was incompatible with the realities of the Italian art market. In his letter to Volodin, he emphasised the importance of ‘seeking out artists whose works better align with the tastes and demands of Western countries’, warning that without such measures, commercial success would remain elusive.Footnote 108 Mazzoleni contended that Western audiences’ preferences differed from that of Soviet organisations. Despite this candid discussion, no improvements were made to the relations between art dealers and Soviet sellers, which suggests that Soviet organisations were unwilling to reconsider their trade strategies or adapt to market demands when it came to embracing non-official artists.
Soviet bureaucracy had a strong impact on art exports and significantly limited their commercial potential. Selections of export artwork were consistently made from a relatively narrow register of officially sanctioned realist artists. Although many of the experts’ motivations remain opaque, they were likely shaped by the broader political climate and constrained by the directives of party leaders. These characteristics, typical of the Soviet command–administrative system, were fundamentally incompatible with the art markets that they sought to engage with. The reluctance to depart from these principles significantly constrained the commercial success of Soviet art exports.
Departmentalism: Conflicts of Interest
Discrepancies between Soviet officials and institutions provided unexpected opportunities for art trade that functioned in a semi-legal grey zone. Moshe Levin used the notion of ‘departmentalism’ to describe how the official Soviet system functioned. This notion challenged the idea of a centralised Soviet political and economic system and highlighted the growing importance of departmental and sectoral interests.Footnote 109 Gardner describes Soviet foreign trade as a permanent rivalry between different institutions that led to the development of ‘an intricate web of symbiotic relationship’ between the agencies participating in foreign trade.Footnote 110 The framework proposed by Gardener suggests the existence of multiple possible scenarios for actions and decisions within the official Soviet system.
The Soviet export art trade also offers evidence on departmentalism: art salons could be flexible and make deals with their clients in order to bypass the restrictions of the Ministry of Culture. In the early 1970s, the Salons of Graphic and Painting enterprises (kombinats) were permitted to sell their art to foreigners.Footnote 111 Work from these salons was not selected by the officials working within the Ministry of Culture, but they still had to be endorsed at the Ministry before leaving the country. In order to evade ministerial controls, these art salons started selling art for Inturist cheques, which were substitutes for foreign currency in the Soviet Union. This was advantageous because items purchased using these cheques were not subject to additional customs control.Footnote 112 This practice was noticed by the head of the Department of Fine Arts of the Ministry of Culture, A. G. Khalturin, who sent a letter about this to the first secretary of the Union of Artists, Tair Salakhov, in 1974. Khalturin demanded that Salakhov exert control over the situation and ‘strengthen control measures’ over the art trade.Footnote 113 Khalturin noted that ‘the sale of large quantities of work is widespread’ and dated the beginning of this mass practice to March 1973. Unfortunately, there is no response from Salakhov among the available documents, and therefore it is unclear how long the trade of art for Inturist cheques continued. Nevertheless, this case provides important insight into the inherent conflict between the different bodies that were involved in the art export policy. The Art Salon was concerned with profit, whereas the Ministry of Culture and the Union of Artists were primarily concerned with promoting ideological orthodoxy.Footnote 114 The gaps between formal policy and behaviour demonstrate that commercial considerations could override ideological prescriptions when hard-currency earnings were at stake.
Further evidence of overcoming official restrictions can be found in the memoirs of Soviet artists. Georgii Kizevalter writes about a couple of art dealers from Pittsburgh named Shou-Korneichuk who signed a two-year agreement with ‘a government foreign trade association’, which granted them carte blanche to select artworks within the Soviet Union. According to Kizevalter, the collectors invested over $100,000 in twenty-five oil paintings and 300 graphic works by Soviet artists, both underground artists and members of the Moscow Union of Artists.Footnote 115 Unfortunately, the details of this deal, as well as the fate of the Shou-Korneichuk collection, remain unclear. However, the very fact of the deal serves as significant evidence of the ambiguities in Soviet art export policy.
The technical aspects of one of the most well-known cases of Soviet art export remain opaque. This is the case of collaboration between Soviet art officials and Eric Estorick, the owner of the Grosvenor Gallery in London and a significant collector of international art, including a substantial collection of Italian modern art.Footnote 116 Estorick paid an official visit to the Soviet Union in 1960, four years before the Art Fund began its official hard-currency art sales. In Leningrad, he purchased lithographs by twenty-seven Soviet artists and exhibited them in his London gallery in 1961.Footnote 117 Between 1960 and 1964, he visited the Soviet Union fourteen times, acquiring works by both official and underground artists, including Ernst Neizvestnyi and Oskar Rabin, which he managed to purchase and legally transport from the Soviet Union.Footnote 118 Art historian Alek Epstein suggests that Estorick’s gallery business may have served as a cover for other objectives during his visits to the Soviet Union, and that his easy access to the Soviet art world was likely facilitated by the protection of Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist connected to the KGB.Footnote 119
Some rare sources indicate that an economy of favours sustained by personal connections and bribery constituted another force shaping the grey zone of export negotiations.Footnote 120 In 1969, Pravda (Truth) published a critical article documenting various cases of financial misconduct within the Art Fund. One of these concerned I. N. Zubok, who had served as director of the Central Art Salon in the 1960s. The article claimed that he had held several positions within the Art Fund and acquired a reputation as a ‘seasoned swindler’ (materyi zhulik) prior to securing his post, allegedly extorting bribes from artists. By 1969 he had been arrested and accused of criminal collusion with an employee of the Export Art Salon, E. S. Shpaysman. According to the article, they systematically engaged in the theft of public property – paintings, icons and souvenirs – and extortion. It further reported that Zubok’s apartment was lavishly furnished with red wood, equipped with electric locks and contained a unique collection of masterpieces by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century artists.Footnote 121 This case gives possible hints as to how some non-official deals were made by recalling Gardner’s observations on the complex motivations behind bureaucratic decisions, where personal interests and friendship ties played a notable role.Footnote 122
Conclusions
This article has approached the history of Soviet art export from an institutional perspective, examining how the planned economy, the conventions of the Soviet art system and the motivations of different actors shaped both its mechanisms and outcomes. Reconstructing the process of decision-making in art export, it revealed that the commercial interests of Soviet trade organisations were often in conflict with the artistic bureaucrats, who mainly cared about bolstering the realist reputation of Soviet art abroad. The tension between Soviet officials’ desire to collaborate with the West and their anxiety about losing face contributes to the broader field of study of Soviet cultural policy during the Cold War. It is remarkable that restrictive tasks in art export were carried out by artists, rather than party functionaries. Although these artists were appointed by the minister of culture and worked in conjunction with the Ministry’s broader art policies, they claimed to be professional, rather than ideological, experts. However, this did not facilitate the commercial success of art exports because Soviet artistic experts drew on their personal preferences rather than their knowledge of the international market.
In the late 1960s, as the iron curtain was becoming increasingly porous and personal contacts across institutional and ideological divides multiplied, foreign collectors developed growing interest in underground artists.Footnote 123 This generated interest in artworks that were excluded from official export channels and exposed tensions between market demands and the official policies of the Soviet export institutions. These tensions manifested themselves in departmental rivalries and personal patronages, resulting in semi-official transactions whose full contours remain difficult to reconstruct.
Investigating Soviet art export policies contributes to our understanding of the status of art in Soviet cultural policy during the Cold War. In contrast to music, art export was not organised by its own dedicated institution, and it was regulated by Novoexport from the outset, which specialised in crafts and souvenirs. Although at certain moments Novoexport and the Art Fund developed ambitious plans to collaborate with leading international auction houses, these initiatives generally failed to materialise. Soviet visual art rarely entered major international galleries, auction houses or exhibition venues, and when it did, the outcomes were disappointing. It may be tempting to attribute the limited success of Soviet art export primarily to the aesthetic differences between socialist realism and Western modern art, which was shaped by the avant-garde movements of the 1960s.Footnote 124 While this explanation has some validity, it does not fully account for the Soviet side’s insistence on exporting realist art despite the stylistic diversity that existed even within the Union of Artists. Export exhibitions were often more conservative than domestic ones, particularly from the late 1970s onwards, when underground artists gained a greater number of officially approved exhibition opportunities.Footnote 125
Successful art export required sustained attention to the tastes of potential buyers. Soviet officials attempted to respond to foreign expectations, but only in limited and often peculiar ways. Sending views of Saint Paul’s Cathedral in the rain to a commercial exhibition in London or sunlit landscapes to Italy resembled gestures of cultural diplomacy rather than genuine engagement with market demand. At the same time, by supplying works reminiscent of icons or incorporating folk and national motifs into the artworks, officials addressed a different sphere of demand – for crafts and souvenirs – which existed largely outside high art institutions. This strategy offered a relatively safe compromise: it satisfied foreign interest in culturally distinctive objects, aligned with expanding commercial exchange and allowed Soviet artists to continue working within familiar professional frameworks. Growing Soviet domestic interest in national heritage and development of national art schools within Soviet republics further encouraged the production of such works, often in conditions of limited domestic demand. Consequently, export practices contributed to the development of the Soviet art economy itself: in the 1970s, official statistics indicate steadily increasing revenues, while evidence of illicit transactions points to the parallel readiness to engage in unofficial trade.Footnote 126
The project of official art export declined in the late 1970s with the end of détente and the renewed escalation of tensions between the Soviet Union and Western countries. Official business relations weakened following the international condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the same time, the large-scale emigration of non-official artists – beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s – helped to create an alternative market for Soviet art abroad and introduced international audiences to modernist and experimental practices that had been largely absent from official export programmes.Footnote 127
Soviet art export functioned as part of the command economy and was shaped by its constraints. This system effectively ended in late 1980s, when major reforms dismantled the monopoly of the Art Fund and the system of state art commissions while granting foreign gallerists and buyers easier access to the Soviet market.Footnote 128 The first international art auction was organised by Sotheby’s in Moscow in 1988 in cooperation with the Soviet Ministry of Culture.Footnote 129 The selection of works for sale was made by the auction houses’ experts and included a substantial number of underground artists, whose works were priced exceptionally highly. This event marked the effective entry of Western institutions into the Soviet art world and signalled not only the collapse of the previous administrative model of art export but also the beginning of the new market era.
