For some readers, any book with the title ‘The Evangelical Universalist’ will sound as oxymoronic as a handbook on Military Intelligence. But to write this volume off without a second thought would be a serious mistake. In the last decade or so there has been a growing and ever more sophisticated literature devoted to matters eschatological, and to hell in particular. There is a thriving analytical-philosophical literature on the subject, with several monographs in existence that are state of the art (e.g. the work of Jonathan Kvanvig, Jerry Walls, Thomas Talbott and Marilyn Adams). There is also a growing literature in biblical studies that has dealt with aspects of the doctrine of hell (Bauckham, Dunn, Bell, Lincoln and others) and everlasting punishment, and a large body of work from amongst systematicians too (consider the work of Moltmann, Jenson, Pannenberg or Hick, to name four). Despite the many avenues down which one may go to pursue problems clustering around the doctrine of hell, there is little work that has attempted to bring together these different strands of work in one place (although, see Parry and Partridge (eds), Universal Salvation? The Current Debate (Paternoster, 2003)). One of the merits of this volume is that it does attempt just such a synthesis. The author begins by setting out the philosophical case for universalism, using the work of the American philosopher Thomas Talbott in particular (to whom the book is dedicated). He then turns to consider biblical material, surveying the universalistic-sounding passages in Colossians, then material in the Old Testament, before coming to the hard pericopae of the Apocalypse. The teaching of Jesus on Gehenna is also dealt with, before assessment of further objections and advantages for the position he advocates are considered.
The book is a model of clarity and charity. His discussion of those with whom he disagrees is scrupulously fair. Every attempt is made to inform the reader. There is no unnecessary technical terminology that sometimes accompanies synthetic works of this nature, and each time a difficult passage is under discussion, MacDonald displays real humility in his attempt to get at the right understanding of the matter in hand. He is not afraid to say when he is not sure where the answer to a particular difficulty lies. One seldom finds such honesty in academic work and it is refreshing to read someone who admits to being existentially, not merely academically, engaged with the subject matter of the book.
This brings me to matter of the universalism on offer. MacDonald relates in the introduction how his own spiritual journey has brought him to question traditional doctrines of hell. But whereas some thinkers writing in this area seem to have arrived at their conclusions independent of biblical considerations (i.e. on philosophical grounds), this is not MacDonald's story. He makes a careful and nuanced defence of the view that the biblical material is not clearly particularistic. He compares the discussion between particularists (those who think scripture teaches only some, but not all humanity, will finally be reconciled to God) and universalists, to that between Arminian and Calvinist theologians. There appear to be data that support one view over the other such that each position in these discussions has its problem texts to deal with. This, he contends, is as true for the particularism–universalism debate as it is for the Calvinism–Arminianism debate. In such situations much depends on which data set is privileged over the other. And, with careful exegesis, he shows how even passages such as those at the end of Revelation that appear to be straightforwardly particularist may, on closer inspection, be consistent with universalism of some kind.
MacDonald wants to avoid committing himself to one particular account of universalism, or rather, he wants to make room for different versions of universalism consistent with a range of live theological positions. So, in his opening chapter he outlines how one might be a Calvinist, free-will theist, openness theologian or Molinist and hold to universalism, although his endorsement of these options is qualified. He seems concerned about the relation between some species of free will theism and hell, especially openness theology. There is good reason to be concerned. Take the example of what is often called ‘contingent’ universalism, which would be consistent with contemporary free-will theism. On this view, human beings have libertarian free will (their actions are not predetermined, or caused by anything prior to the actual choice made, not even their own prior choices), and one hopes all human beings will eventually choose to serve God – in this life or the next. The problem here is that it is difficult to see how such a position can ensure universal salvation without some sort of divine coercion or ‘re-programming’ of those individuals who refuse the offer of salvation in this life, or, indeed, the next. If an agent is truly morally free to reject God in a libertarian sense, it is not clear to me how universalism can be assured. The best one can hope for (without divine intervention) is that all will eventually come to salvation. But this is hardly universalism – for it provides no guarantee that all will eventually be reconciled with God. It is more like a sort of eschatological optimism, which is much weaker than universalism, and which, I think, many would find far less objectionable.
That said, the philosophical case for universalism is a strong one, and the recent discussion of this in the professional journals only underlines that fact – although, for my money, it is necessary universalism, the view that God will ensure all humanity is eventually reconciled, that is the version of the doctrine that is most intriguing, because it is metaphysically unambiguous: all will inevitably be saved. Now, it is all very well providing a valid argument to the conclusion that some version of universalism is coherent. It is quite another thing to argue that this is consistent with the testimony of scripture. MacDonald has made a good job of dealing with Colossians, Ephesians (in the second appendix) and even – to my astonishment – provided some reason to think there may be a way of understanding Christ's words in a fashion that is not inimical to universalism (depending on what one makes of the temporal referent of the Gehenna passages and aionios and its cognates). I was also very interested by the work done on the New Jerusalem and those outside the City – whose gates are always open to allow those outwith the walls to ‘wash their robes’ and enter. But, like Agrippa's response to the Apostle, my considered view was ‘you almost persuade me to become a universalist’. To be fair to MacDonald, there were several points in his biblical chapters where he could have made it easier on himself by siding with biblical theologians like the bishop of Durham (e.g. on the referent of Gehenna), but he did not do so. It is surely a sign of the integrity with which he has pursued his project that he has refused to avail himself of such possible help in the belief that it is better to concede to one's opponent ground that is contentious, where that is possible.
But all this brings us to the real question: is this an evangelical argument? Can one be an evangelical universalist? To be sure, evangelicalism is a difficult notion to pin down, and admits of a variety of different meanings and qualifications (e.g. catholic evangelical, conservative evangelical, progressive evangelical and so forth). Still, one would think that a professed evangelical would take scripture seriously as the final arbiter in matters touching faith and doctrine, given that evangelicals have traditionally believed that scripture is divine revelation, or, at least, the particular medium through which God reveals himself to his people. It is, in this sense, normative. MacDonald certainly claims to take this seriously. And if his dealings with the texts of scripture in this book are anything to go by (and what else do we have?) he is certainly faithful to that stated principle. His work does not play fast-and-loose with scripture. Nor does it offer a skewed or eccentric reading of particular texts, given the parameters within which he is working. He draws on much current biblical scholarship, all of which seems reputable. Evangelicals will not like the thought that one of their number claims he can remain ‘within the camp’ and yet espouse universalism. No doubt this is why the author has opted for a nom de plume, rather than expose himself to the criticism his work will call forth. This book is an interesting study in how one might find a universalistic doctrine consistent with scripture, reason and (a minority report in) the tradition. That alone makes it worth reading. But it also raises much wider issues, to do with the nature of evangelicalism itself. The author does not address himself to this last matter in his book (he has enough to be getting on with as it is!). But this study surely challenges where the boundaries of evangelicalism lie. Might it be that in due course ‘evangelical’ and ‘universalist’ may be uttered in the same breath just as now we are able to conjoin ‘evangelical’ with ‘annihilationist’, where a generation ago this would have been impossible? Those within the evangelical constituency who find such thinking worrisome and discomforting need to do some hard thinking in order to show why one cannot be both an evangelical and a universalist.
