THE CONSISTENCY IN THE ITALIAN OUTLOOK: TURKEY AS A POTENTIAL COLONY

The ambiguous relationship between Italy and Turkey depended in part on Turkey's security concerns. These concerns were based on the fact that Turkish people witnessed the Italian aggression in Tripoli and the Dodecanese in 1912 and, following World War I, had to endure the Italian occupation of Anatolia. Although Italy withdrew its occupation forces from Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence,⁹

Mussolini's rise to power with a heavy rhetoric of change in foreign policy, dubbed tono fascista (fascist tone), immediately revived Turkish fear of Italy.¹⁰ While history loomed largely in shaping Turkish leaders' view of Italy, Turkey's approach was also influenced by two inter-related factors: the need for foreign economic support and Turkey's international isolation. These two factors prompted Ankara to seek rapprochement with the great powers of Europe to survive as a new nation-state.

Between 1922 and 1927, Mussolini's tono fascista translated into Italy's refusal to see Turkey as a sovereign state. It viewed the new country as only a geographical entity—Anatolia—with promising opportunities for Italian expansion. In case of the collapse of the new regime in Turkey, the Italians were planning to invade the country by taking advantage of the proximity of the Dodecanese Islands and using them as staging post. It was expected that the ongoing Mosul issue between Ankara and London would lead to the disintegration of Turkey and would offer the opportunity for Rome to get its share of Anatolia. Mussolini was convinced that the new Turkey was not strong enough to resist a powerful country such as Britain. As “a frustrated potential ally of Britain,” Mussolini's Italy expected to be treated by Britain like “a sister rather than a waitress.”¹¹

Mussolini believed that, because of the Mosul crisis, Turkey would offer this chance to Rome.

The Balkans was the region where Italian and Turkish interests conflicted. This region played a crucial role not only for understanding the development of the fascist foreign policy in Italy in general but also specifically with regard to Turkey. The Balkans had always been the center of attention for Rome. Italy's main rivalry with the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire had been over the Balkans, including the Adriatic. For the Italian leadership of the time, the acquisition of Adriatic port cities such as Fiume and Trieste was vital for the realization of Risorgimento, the national unification of Italy.

After he came to power in Italy, Mussolini pursued an Italian version of Lebensraum in the Balkans.¹²

The Balkan Peninsula, an area between the Adriatic and the Aegean, lay on the north of the Mediterranean, the Mare Nostrum of Mussolini. Actually, the early 1920s offered conditions conducive to Italian expansion into these territories, as Mussolini's rise to power followed the collapse of both the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire. Mussolini aimed to extend Italian control over the new nation-states that came into existence in the territories of these multi-ethnic empires. The Balkans, at the crossroads of the two collapsed empires, became a natural target and preoccupation of the fascist regime.

For Mussolini, in the first half of the 1920s Turkey was not a country worthy of attention in the Balkans. In fact, the fascist leader intended to keep Turkey out of Balkan affairs through diplomacy. This goal prompted Mussolini to personally appear at the Lausanne Conference (November 1922–July 1923). Mussolini's policy at Lausanne was a typical example of the persistence of Italy's former colonial policies. Italy had a special interest in the Dodecanese, which formed the maritime border of the two Mediterranean and Balkan countries Turkey and Greece. He sought to contain Turkey because he feared that victorious Turkish nationalists might assert claims over these islands. Mussolini must have also scorned the idea of Greece controlling various strategic islands in the eastern Mediterranean. Since Greece had already acquired the northern Aegean Islands, it had to be deterred from demanding the Dodecanese Islands.

In the final analysis, Mussolini's presence at Lausanne was meant to convey a clear warning to Turkey. At the time that Turkey was recognized as a sovereign state, Mussolini secured formal recognition of Italian possession of the Dodecanese Islands. Even though at Lausanne the fascist leader recognized the Turkish presence in the Balkans (limited to eastern Thrace), his insistence on the annexation of the Dodecanese by Italy made Balkan Turkey more vulnerable to any attack on the demilitarized straits. In addition, Mussolini was present at Lausanne to assert that Italy was an equal “partner” with other European powers and that he would not allow Italy's wartime allies to cheat Italy again over the spoils of war.¹³

For Mussolini, international conferences such as Lausanne were not the only forums in which Italy could assert itself. He also demonstrated that Rome could resort to violent methods in the Balkans without regard to international organizations. While the Lausanne Conference was drawing to an end in July 1923, Italian expansionism manifested itself over the port city of Fiume on the Adriatic coasts of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Mussolini proposed the incorporation of Fiume into Italy. His plan was to annex the city in case Belgrade refused the proposal. However, the chain of events prompted him to shift his immediate attention to Corfu, a Greek island in the Adriatic. Italy attacked the island yet had to withdraw its troops under British pressure. Intimidated by Italy's aggressive behavior during the Corfu incident, Belgrade eventually conceded and recognized Italy's full sovereignty over Fiume.¹⁴

These developments led Ankara to conclude that Turkey would be the next target of Italian expansionism in the Balkans. However, Mussolini's attention at that time was directed to the Adriatic coast in the Balkans, where he found himself blocked by French dominance.¹⁵

France remained “public enemy number two” to Italy since there was no “public enemy number one” after the collapse of Austria-Hungary.¹⁶ The fascist leader was obsessed with putting an end to French influence in the region. The best way to undermine France was to weaken its ally, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Only after that could he turn to Turkey, whose viability as a new state, he believed, was questionable.

After the mid-1920s, Mussolini was better situated to implement his strategy once he consolidated his power domestically and took complete control of the Palazzo Chigi. Thus, the fascist leader openly announced his dictatorship.¹⁷

The authoritarian state was also reinforced in the foreign office by the dismissal of many officials and their replacement with committed fascists. In fact, Mussolini was convinced that the foreign office ought to be the most fascist of all government departments. He gave preference for diplomatic posts to those with party membership dating before October 1922.¹⁸ With these new civil servants, Mussolini was able to put his assertive foreign policy into practice with tono fascista.

The new phase in Italian foreign relations had a clear impact on Italian–Turkish relations. Italian diplomatic papers indicate growing Italian interest in Turkish defensive measures along the western coast in 1924 and 1925.¹⁹

Specifically, two events—the Mosul issue and the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925—marked the transition in Turkish–Italian relations. On the one hand, the Locarno Treaties concerned Italian policy in Europe and the Balkans and therefore inevitably concerned Turkey, as well. On the other hand, Rome expected that the Mosul issue between Ankara and London would lead to the disintegration of Turkey and provide Italy with a share of Anatolia.

The Locarno Treaties offered two significant advantages to Italy. First, these treaties, signed by Italy, Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium, gave Italy a greater say in Europe. The treaties gave Italy the right to protect the frontier with Germany, France, and Belgium defined by the Treaty of Versailles. If an “unprovoked attack” were instigated by France against Germany or by Germany against France, the victim would be helped by Italy and Britain.²⁰

In addition, the Locarno Treaties made Italy a guarantor of the German–French frontier in cooperation with Britain. The Locarno Treaties in a sense legitimized Italy's right to intervene in Western Europe. Second, the treaties prepared the ground for Mussolini to focus on Eastern Europe, mainly on the Balkans.²¹ He could now easily challenge the status quo in Eastern Europe since the Locarno Treaties did not guarantee the frontiers beyond the east of Germany.

After Locarno, Mussolini's first diplomatic initiative was in the Balkans. Albania, the smallest Balkan state, was his main political and economic preoccupation. Italian troops were withdrawn from Albania, which had been under Italian occupation since World War I, in line with Comte Sforza's diplomatic tactics based on “strategic retreats and bargains.”²²

However, Mussolini wanted to prove that he was willing and able to overturn the policies of the previous Italian prime minister, Giolitti, and Foreign Minister Sforza in the Balkans. Between 1925 and 1927, Mussolini resumed an interventionist policy in Albania. Under Mussolini's pressure, Tirana adopted a policy of cooperation with Rome, resulting in Italian economic and political domination of Albania. In November 1927, Rome signed a military pact with Tirana. Under this pact, the Italian government pledged to Albanian King Zogu to preserve the political and territorial status quo in Albania. The pact also provided for reciprocal obligations between the two states, allowing each other armed assistance in the event of an attack by a third party.²³

Hence, Mussolini was able to achieve the old Italian goal for Albania. His Balkan policies were typical of change in fascist diplomacy more as a matter of style than substance. In other words, he did not substantially differ from previous Italian leaders concerning Rome's aims in Albania. However, he accomplished these goals with tono fascista instead of compromising policies like Sforza's. Mussolini's policy vis-à-vis Belgrade was shaped along similar lines. In 1926, Mussolini ordered twenty divisions to be ready at the Albanian border for a sudden attack on the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.²⁴

Turkey viewed Italian activities in the Balkans with apprehension. Turkish leaders believed that Italian aggression toward other Balkan countries would inevitably affect Turkey. Consequently, they pursued two related goals in the region: one was to devise a Balkan Locarno; the second was to reach an agreement among the Balkan countries in line with the motto formulated by Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, “The Balkans for the Balkan people.”²⁵

In 1926, Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary in Bucharest Hüseyin Ragıp talked to Romanian Foreign Minister I. G. Duca about the possibility of a Balkan cooperation project. He communicated to Duca four arguments advanced by the Turkish government: negotiations should take place at a slow speed; Belgrade should take the initiative in organizing the pact; no state should be excluded; and the pact should not be directed against another Balkan state.²⁶ Concerning the first argument, Turkey apparently did not rush to form a Balkan pact because of the unresolved problems among the Balkan states.

Ankara's suggestion that Belgrade take the initiative in organizing the pact was closely related to the pending problems between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and its neighbors—namely, Italy and its “ally,” Bulgaria. According to the Turkish government, Belgrade's initiative in this project would help the kingdom solve its problems with these neighbors. Finally, no Balkan country was to be isolated, but all of them were to be invited to participate in a future Balkan pact. In this way Ankara planned to prevent any attempt by a group of Balkan countries to form a bloc against the others. Forming partial blocs would make the Balkans more vulnerable to manipulation by great powers such as Italy and France. In sum, any kind of hegemony by a great power or by a bloc over the Balkans had to be avoided.

The second event that affected Italian–Turkish relations was the Mosul issue between Turkey and Britain. Unlike its policy on the Balkan region, where Rome's policy was marked by initiative and activism, in the Middle East Mussolini followed a strategy dependent on Britain. In the early years of his power, as the fascist leader was directly involved in the Balkans, he intended to shape his policy in Anatolia as an ally of Britain. The fascist leader knew that Italy could not easily compete at that stage with British power and influence in the Middle East. For a while, Italy had to remain a “frustrated ally” of Britain.²⁷

Under these circumstances, the Mosul crisis offered an opportunity for Italy to carve out a future sphere of influence in Anatolia. In this way, Mussolini would be able to realize Italy's colonial dream in Anatolia, as he expected the disintegration of the Republic of Turkey during the crisis. Therefore, fascist policy was geared toward reviving the old expansionist designs of Italy over Turkey by profiting from the conflict between Britain and Turkey. London used all its means not to relinquish this oil-rich region to Ankara. At Lausanne, it was decided that the Mosul issue would be settled within nine months by direct negotiations between Turkey and Britain, or, failing that, the problem would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.²⁸

Bilateral negotiations led to a deadlock, and the Council of the League of Nations decided in December 1925 on the attachment of Mosul to Iraq, which was placed under British Mandate for twenty-five years. On 6 June 1926, Turkey accepted the League of Nations' decision by signing a treaty with Britain concerning the establishment of the Turkish–Iraqi frontier. According to this treaty, Turkey, in return for relinquishing Mosul, was to receive 10 percent of Iraqi oil revenues for twenty-five years.²⁹

In January 1925, meanwhile, Italian diplomats in Turkey recommended to the governor of the Dodecanese Islands that the Datça and Marmaris regions be inspected for possible landing operations. The Italian consul in Antalya even complained that his location was not suitable for obtaining information on Turkish military measures on the coastal line across from the Dodecanese.³⁰

Ankara was alert to the possibility that Italy might send troops to Anatolia because of the Mosul crisis.³¹

Turkish press reports of the time emphasized the possibility of Italy's using Rhodes as a military base in case of war.³² In fact, Italian diplomatic reports included extracts from daily Turkish newspapers such as Ikdam, whose headlines alarmingly pointed to the Italian military preparations.³³ Moreover, the Turkish press in Antalya published articles opposing the presence of the Italians in the province. The press proposed that Italian schools and hospitals be closed. The perpetuation of these institutions, argued the press, proved that Italy had not given up the idea of taking over Antalya. The governor of the province had a similar opinion. He openly stated to the Italian authorities his belief that Italy still had territorial ambitions concerning Antalya and that the existence of Italian hospitals and schools confirmed these intentions.³⁴

The Italian mind set, which was fixated on colonialist expansion plans, was unsurprisingly reflected in the strategies developed by some Italian diplomats in Turkey. A telegram sent from the Italian Embassy in Turkey to the Italian Foreign Ministry focused on the advantages to Italy of pursuing colonial goals in southeastern Turkey. The telegram identified 1927 as the critical year to pursue colonial expansion into Turkey as the new Turkish regime began to consolidate domestically and before it acquired effective means to defend itself. It suggested that Italy occupy the Adana region instead of Izmir and Antalya, as an Italian presence in this region offered better economic and political benefits.The Adana region was rich in resources that would make a great contribution to the Italian economy.³⁵

Politically, the possession of the region would be a substantial reward for Italian expansionism. It would offer an opportunity for Italy to cooperate closely with Britain in the Middle East. Since Italy would provide a counter-balance in the Adana region, Britain could be at ease in Mosul. Moreover, if the opportunity arose for Italy to support a Kurdish revolt in the region in cooperation with Britain, the door to Persia and the Caucasus would be wide open. The telegram also claimed that such a scenario might even help Italy to come to better terms with the Soviet Union. In other words, if Italy could offer the Soviets economic advantages in the Mediterranean, then Moscow might withdraw its support of Turkey.³⁶

The handling of the Mosul issue by the Great Powers convinced the Turkish political leaders that these powers could at any time form a coalition against Turkey. It added fuel to the Turkish fear of Europe's Great Powers as the main threat to Turkey's independence and territorial integrity.³⁷

Between 1923 and 1927, the Turkish Foreign Ministry let Rome know on various occasions that it was not certain about the policies of the Great Powers vis-à-vis Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras openly said to the Italian ambassador in Ankara, Felice Orsini that, in case of Italian–British collaboration, Turkey would consider approaching other Great Powers. More specifically, Aras warned Orsini that Turkey might even conclude an agreement on the Mediterranean with France, although Turkey was not at all on good terms with France at the time. Ankara had in fact signed a convention of friendship and good neighborhood with France in May 1926. The main purpose of this convention was to secure the border between Turkey and Syria, then a French Mandate, in case of armed confrontation with the European powers, particularly over Mosul. However, Rome saw the signing of the 1926 convention as Turks' courting the French.³⁸

Thus, the nature of Italian–Turkish relations in general had not changed when Mussolini came to power. The same Italian colonial intentions toward Turkey that had existed at the beginning of the 20th century remained in effect. The Italian military presence in the Dodecanese Islands was perceived as a continuous threat to Turkey's security, which had already been compromised by the demilitarization of the Straits at British insistence during the Lausanne Conference.³⁹

Almost weekly, the Turkish press carried reports on the imminence of an Italian landing at Izmir.⁴⁰

Italian involvement in Albania heightened Turkish uneasiness toward Italy. In fact, the Turkish fear of Italy was not unjustified. Referring to a conversation with the Italian consul-general at Mersin, a British diplomat wrote later: “[he] was at no pains to hide his belief that at no distant date the flag of Savoy would be waving in the fertile Cilician plain.”⁴¹

CHANGING RELATIONS: ITALY WOOS TURKEY AS A REGIONAL ACTOR

By late 1927, the Italian diplomatic papers indicate that there was constant probing on both sides for a high-level Turkish diplomatic visit to Rome. Consequently, a high-level Turkish visit to Rome took place in 1928. Various factors contributed to the changing relations between Turkey and Italy. Between 1925 and 1926, the Turkish land frontiers were secured under friendship treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and Iran. Moreover, to solve the Syrian–Turkish and Iraqi–Turkish border problems, in May 1926 Turkey signed a convention with France and in June 1926 a treaty with Britain. Turkey had already realized at that time that it could not afford to confront the Great Powers on all fronts. In 1927, Turkey was finally able to turn its attention from its land borders to the Mediterranean Sea.

Second, the Mosul issue did not lead to the collapse of the republic of Turkey, contrary to Rome's expectations. Ankara chose to make concessions to the British on the Mosul issue for the sake of the survival of the republic. The Turkish leaders knew that they were ill equipped militarily to confront Britain on matters such as Mosul. In a sense, they had to compromise so as not to aggravate their international isolation. Turkey's political leaders did not want to give the Great Powers a pretext on the Mosul issue that could lead to the collapse of the new republic.⁴²

With the resolution of the Mosul problem, Turkey would be less likely to disintegrate or fall into the Great Powers' hands.

Above all, Rome's image of Turkey began to change. Turkey was no longer identified only with Anatolia but was increasingly seen as part of the Balkans. The new Italian image of Turkey was mainly shaped around the new situation in the Balkan Peninsula. Belgrade's policies vis-à-vis Rome were decisive in terms of the changing Italian strategy toward Turkey within the Balkan context. In the fall of 1927, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes concluded an alliance with France to deter Italian aggression. The growing French influence in Eastern Europe dated back to the formation of the Little Entente in 1922. In addition to the Paris–Belgrade alliance of 1927, the parliament in Belgrade refused to ratify the Conventions of Nettuno, signed with Italy on 20 July 1925.⁴³

The Paris–Belgrade alliance prompted Rome to seek closer links with Ankara as an extension of Mussolini's plan to create a group of client states that looked exclusively to Rome.⁴⁴

The French influence in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and in Romania, and the entente system Paris established in Eastern Europe, constituted models for the new Italian policy toward Turkey in the Balkans. At that stage, Turkey began to appear to Italy more as a regional actor than as only a potential colony. Mussolini's diplomacy then featured new aspects in relations with Ankara. Rome wanted to take advantage of Turkey's international isolation to turn Ankara into a pro–Italian actor. Not a member of the League of Nations until 1932, Turkey was a suitable candidate to become part of an Italian-led system in the eastern Mediterranean.

However, Turkey's initial response to the changing Italian attitude was mixed. Ankara was concerned about being dragged into any kind of conflict in the Balkans. Prime Minister Ismet Inönü expressed to Orsini, the Italian ambassador, Turkey's two main concerns. The first was the possibility that Belgrade might turn its back on Ankara after the signing of the Paris–Belgrade alliance in 1927.⁴⁵

The second concern was the future of deteriorating Rome–Belgrade relations and their likely repercussions on Turkey. He advised Orsini that problems between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were to be resolved peacefully.⁴⁶

Turkish leaders were aware that Rome would not suddenly become amicable with Ankara. Nevertheless, they thought that, for its survival, Turkey had to profit from the rivalries between the Great Powers. In addition to the Ottoman debts, the French military presence in Syria and its naval power in the Mediterranean gave France a stronger hand in its dealings with Turkey.⁴⁷

Well equipped diplomatically and militarily, Paris could manipulate Belgrade against Ankara and might even gain influence over Sofia and Athens.⁴⁸ For Ankara, the Paris–Belgrade collaboration could precipitate Turkey's complete exclusion from the Balkans.

France was a common problem for Turkey and Italy. Around that time, Rome was offering an alternative alliance system to Ankara against the Paris–Belgrade axis in the Balkans. Mussolini thought that the best way to undermine the Paris–Belgrade cooperation was to make overtures to other Balkan countries. Turkey and Greece formed important pillars of the new Italian policy. Both countries had an interdependent significance in Italian strategic calculations in the eastern Mediterranean. The French entente system in the Adriatic would be countered by forming an Aegean bloc among Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

Indeed, Turkey seemed the best candidate to cooperate against the Paris–Belgrade axis for a number of reasons. First, unlike Greece, which was at odds with Rome over Corfu, Italy had not been involved in any direct conflict with Turkey since 1921. Second, Turkey, not a Slavic country, was less inclined than other Balkan countries to cooperate with Belgrade. Unlike Romania, another non–Slavic nation, Turkey was not a member of the Little Entente sponsored by France. Last but not least, Turkey would be a useful ally because of its strategic position. Geographically, it oversaw the passage from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the gateway to the Middle East and Asia.

From Turkey's perspective, a sense of insecurity was more accentuated than in most Balkan countries because of its international isolation, marked by its “outcast” status vis-à-vis the League of Nations. The political and economic problems with Europe's Great Powers—namely, Britain and France—ruled out the normalization of Turkey's foreign relations with these countries. The intimate relations between Britain and Greece, on the one hand, and France and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, on the other, made Turkey even more isolated in the region. Improved relations with Italy were likely to offer the first concrete step out of Turkey's international isolation.

Rome was convinced that it would be advantageous for Italy to be in close cooperation with Turkey in a manner similar to the cooperation between Paris and Belgrade. The Italian Foreign Ministry invited Turkey's political leaders to Milan.⁴⁹

In April 1928, Undersecretary of the Italian Foreign Ministry Dino Grandi (who became the Italian foreign minister in 1929) met with Turkish Foreign Minister Aras in Milan. The meeting was intended to allay Turkish fears of Italy. Mussolini also attended the meeting to provide evidence of Italy's good intentions. At the meeting, Italian officials tried to explain to the Turks that Italy was not a potential enemy of Turkey.⁵⁰

The main purpose of the meeting, however, was to find out whether Turkey would cooperate with Italy in the Mediterranean. In Milan, Italy's political leaders also met with Greek Foreign Minister Michaliko Poulos. It was not a coincidence that the Italian leaders wanted to have Turkish and Greek officials in Milan at the same time. Their aim was to see whether Greece could be integrated into a future cooperation arrangement with Italy and Turkey against Paris and Belgrade. To achieve this goal, Italy's political leaders not only sought simultaneous improvement of their relations with Turkey and Greece, but they also tried to contribute to the reconciliation of Turkish–Greek differences. The Milan meeting was the first step toward resolving the post–Lausanne Turkish–Greek problems, which also stood in the way of the realization of the Italian strategy.

In fact, the Italian press interpreted the meeting of leading Italian figures with the Turkish and Greek officials as a political victory for Italy. To them, the Mediterranean nations finally realized that Italy was the only Great Power that cared about their independence. The press mirrored the mind set of the Italian leadership, reporting that some powers intended to create discord among the Mediterranean powers to establish their supremacy in the region.⁵¹

These powers, according to Rome, were France and its “ally,” the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, even though their names were not spelled out. The Italians wanted to give the impression that only Italy could preserve “stability” in the Mediterranean and portrayed Italy as a Mediterranean country working toward cooperation in the Mediterranean. The press reported that Rome would ensure balance and harmony in the region.⁵²

Unlike the Italian press, the Turkish press reflected the mixed public opinion in Turkey toward the Milan meeting. On the negative side, it warned Turkey's political leaders to keep all political options open and not to rely only on Italy. The editorials constantly pointed to Italy's unfriendly attitude in the past. They also suggested a policy of wait-and-see until the Italian ambitions over Anatolia crystallized. Reports drew attention to the emigration policy of over-populated Italy as a factor for its special interest in Anatolia. The Antalya region close to Rhodes seemed especially attractive for Italian emigration.⁵³

On the positive side, the Turkish press noted that Italy seemed to be giving up its pursuit of military expansion into Anatolia. The fact that Italy sought Turkish–Greek rapprochement was a sign of Rome's intention to change the “traditional alliance system” of the Great Powers. On balance, the Turkish press welcomed the Italian initiative in Milan for improving Turkish–Greek relations. Moreover, it was reported on 6 April 1928 that the meeting between Mussolini and Tevfik Rüştü Aras in Milan made a major contribution to resolving the problems between Turkey and Greece.⁵⁴

Following the Milan meeting, Turkey signed the Treaty of Neutrality and Reconciliation with Italy on 30 May 1928. Both parties agreed not to engage in any political and economic designs against each other. According to the treaty, Italy and Turkey undertook to remain neutral in case of aggression by a third party against any party to the treaty. For instance, if Belgrade attacked Italy with the help of the French, Turkey would remain neutral. Above all, according to this treaty Italy was to abstain from exerting pressure on Turkey. In fact, on 5 June 1928, a few days after the signing of the treaty, Mussolini expressed the Italian view of Turkey in the Italian Senate: “[f]rom now on, Rome must recognize Turkey as it is, given its strength and population.”⁵⁵

Mussolini's speech marked the elevation of Turkey's standing from a potential colony to a sovereign state with which Italy had to forge close economic, political, and military links.

The brief era of improved relations between Turkey and Italy was inaugurated under the new foreign minister, Dino Grandi, of Italy. In 1929, after Mussolini appointed Grandi as foreign minister, Italy moved for a few years toward a less vocal fascist diplomacy. In general, as many scholars argue, fascist diplomacy marked a change in style rather than in substance. The fascists' aim, like that of the Italian liberals, was not to be the least of the Great Powers but to win “glory and power.”⁵⁶

Where fascists differed from the liberals was in their adoption of a military style in conducting policy and in their glorification of war.

Grandi, who had the correct fascist credentials as a man of violence, was probably the most sophisticated among the squad leaders.⁵⁷

Even though he was convinced that Italy had to retain supremacy in the Adriatic to “safeguard the Latin race against Slav expansionism,” Grandi suggested that glory be postponed until Italy had rearmed and fascism's enemies had been immobilized.⁵⁸ Even though he was distrustful of disarmament and against the League of Nations, he wanted to show the “determining weight” of Italy and therefore participated in the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the ongoing efforts of the league.⁵⁹

The Grandi era coincided with the 1929 world economic crisis. The move away from aggressive rhetoric in Italian diplomacy under Grandi was not simply a coincidence; it was the reflection of crisis diplomacy that dictated another three years of caution in Mussolini's diplomacy.⁶⁰

Italy had to wait until the crisis was over because it lacked the kind of economic and military muscle that would allow it to be an independent player in international power politics.⁶¹ The era of Grandi could thus be defined as “with everybody and against all.”⁶²

In December 1928, Grandi made an official visit to Turkey to discuss Turkish–Greek relations.⁶³

A few months after the Turkish–Italian treaty, in September 1928, Rome had signed a similar treaty with Greece. Rome expected that the Turkish–Italian and the Greek–Italian treaties would serve as building blocks for a tripartite alliance, and Rome was ready to work to reconcile Turkish–Greek differences. The exchange of minorities was the major hindrance to the restoration of normal relations between Ankara and Athens. Their disagreements on the status of the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul created further strains.

Turkey's very weak navy also had to face a Greek navy flexing its muscles in the Aegean in the 1920s.⁶⁴

In fact, Greek naval maneuvers prompted Ankara to propose to Athens a treaty that would reciprocally limit the naval forces of both countries. Although Italy's political leaders were keen to ameliorate Turkish–Greek relations, they did not welcome this Turkish proposal. In the Milan meeting in 1928, Mussolini asked Turkish Foreign Minister Aras why Ankara was trying to leave Rome out of the process. He also requested an explanation of the Turkish intention to sign a neutrality treaty with Greece.⁶⁵

At the same time, Mussolini realized that Rome needed appropriate instruments to draw the two difficult neighbors, Turkey and Greece, into its orbit. Arms were seen as a particularly suitable means to facilitate Italian political and economic penetration into Turkey. In fact, the restoration of Italian–Turkish relations had a significant impact on the Turkish armament programs. By the end of 1929, Italy appeared to be the favored supplier for new Turkish naval arms. For the Italian government, the political significance of the naval arm supplies to Turkey probably far exceeded its commercial significance for the Italian shipbuilders. Rome was willing to provide a financial guarantee for Turkish orders that no other foreign government was willing or able to match. This guarantee was significant, as the financing of the Turkish naval arms programs was the key question. Turkey had not recovered economically from the devastation of the wars. It was also struggling to settle Ottoman debts. Ankara could afford to order new warships only under long-term financial arrangements with favorable terms. Rome agreed to provide Italian shipbuilders with a financial guarantee for up to 70 percent of the value of a possible Turkish order.⁶⁶

The change in Rome–Ankara relations following the Italian–Turkish treaty was so dramatic that London described the treaty as bringing the “lion” and the “lamb” together.⁶⁷

At the same time, the British ambassador in Turkey commented that the recent agreement had opened the door for considerable Italian economic expansion in Turkey.⁶⁸ Again according to the British, this relationship also suited Turkish interests because of unresolved problems with France and Greece.⁶⁹ Moreover, by helping Turkey to modernize its navy, Italy found an appropriate way to compete with France, its main rival in the Mediterranean.

On the Italian–French rivalry in the Balkans and the Mediterranean in 1928–32, Turkey stood closer to Italy than France. Turkey's political leaders thought that the root of uneasiness in Europe was French hegemony. For instance, even though Tevfik Rüştü Aras denied the emergence of a bloc against France and the states in its orbit in a conversation with British diplomats, he claimed it was French policy that made this a possibility.⁷⁰

An interesting indication of where Turkey stood in relation to the Italian–French rivalry was a series of conversations between the under-secretary of the Turkish navy, Captain Mehmet Ali Dalay, and the Italian naval and air attaché, Lieutenant-Commander Maroni, in December 1928. In response to Maroni's inquiry about the Turkish naval tender, Mehmet Ali confided to Maroni that the contract might be split between the French and Italian shipbuilders, although the state of relations with France did not warrant such a deal.⁷¹ During a later conversation, Mehmet Ali assured Maroni that the contract would be awarded to the Italian shipyards and admitted that the present political climate worked in Italy's favor.⁷²

On 24 May 1929, the conclusion of the Turkish naval tender in favor of the Italian shipbuilders was made public.⁷³

The next day, the Italian Foreign Ministry officially notified the Ministry of Marine in Rome that the contract to supply warships to the Turkish navy was finalized.⁷⁴ The Turkish orders from the Italian shipyards represented the high tide of Italian–Turkish relations in the inter-war years. The Italians were quick to conclude that the awarding of the naval contract signaled a change in Italy's image in Turkish minds. The improved climate in Italian–Turkish relations had immediate consequences with military significance. For instance, the Turkish army changed the location of its annual large-scale military exercise from Izmir in the west to Diyarbakir, near the Iraqi and Syrian borders in the east.⁷⁵ Also in 1929, the Turkish navy began to send its first junior officers to Italy for training.⁷⁶

Italy's supply of naval arms to Turkey worried the Greeks. In that regard, Italy faced a dilemma. Originally, Rome had sought simultaneous improvement in its relations with Turkey and Greece. The supply of naval arms to Turkey was meant to serve this purpose.⁷⁷

For a while it involved the risk of deepening the Turkish–Greek rift. However, Italy was able to keep Greece happy by supplying naval arms to the Greek navy, as well. In response to Turkish naval modernization, Greece decided to augment its navy with light units. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was personally more inclined toward Italy as the supplier for new destroyers.⁷⁸ In October 1929, Greece ordered two destroyers from Italian shipyards. With the Greek order, the Italian strategy toward Turkey and Greece was back on track. The impact of improved relations with Ankara and Athens was evident in the Italian navy's strategic war plans for 1929–31. In case of a war against Yugoslavia and France, the Italian navy assumed Turkish and Greek neutrality in the eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁹

In 1930, Turkey and Greece finally worked out their differences and concluded a friendship treaty. They also signed a protocol to end the naval arms race in the Aegean. This treaty was partly the outcome of Italian attempts to reconcile Ankara and Athens. In the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Aras expressed his government's gratitude to Mussolini and Grandi for their efforts toward Turkish–Greek reconciliation.⁸⁰

It should be added that the Turkish–Greek treaty was also a result of the efforts to promote regional collaboration in the Balkans. Indeed, it can be seen as a precursor to a wider regional cooperation scheme in the peninsula. As the Balkan nations began to feel the effects of the 1929 world economic crisis, their political leaders went on to revive the Turkish idea of founding a Balkan entente. In October 1930, the first Balkan conference met in Athens. A few weeks later, Ankara and Athens solidified their relations with the Turkish–Greek Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, and Conciliation.

The signing of the Turkish–Greek treaty prompted diverging political expectations in Ankara and Rome. The latter hoped that Turkey, having reconciled with Greece, would contribute to a similar political reconciliation between Athens and Sofia.⁸¹

Turkey had already concluded with Bulgaria a treaty similar to the Turkish–Italian treaty in March 1929.⁸² Turkey's signing of treaties with Bulgaria and then with Greece raised Italian expectations of an even larger alliance that would include Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria.⁸³ Such an alliance would also prevent a pro–Slavic rapprochement between Bulgaria and Serbia.⁸⁴

For Rome, an Italian-led alliance with Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria would help Italy extend its influence over the Black Sea, as well. In that case, fascist Italy would also be able to control the eastern Black Sea coast. On the one hand, regional collaboration with Ankara, which already had close relations with Moscow, might serve as catalyst for improved relations between Rome and Moscow.⁸⁵

On the other hand, the Italian leaders believed that Rome had to balance Soviet influence in Turkey. The Italians were hoping to sign a treaty that would give them a formal say in Turkey's foreign relations, as did the Turkish–Soviet Treaty of 1925. Under that treaty, Moscow and Ankara pledged not to engage in any sort of alliance with other countries without informing each other first.⁸⁶ Italy expected the same kind of relationship with Turkey.

TURKEY AND ITALY DRIFT APART

When French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand announced a new agenda for European countries—the founding of a European union—Rome revitalized its plan regarding Ankara and Moscow. Briand's idea of a European union was exclusivist in that the Soviet Union and Turkey were not among the countries invited to discuss his plan. Rome stood firmly against Briand's proposed European union idea. However, the proposal also seemed to have been perceived as an opportunity for Italy to capitalize on the increased sense of isolation in Turkey. The Italian diplomatic papers point to Mussolini's intention to press on with his Italian–Soviet–Turkish alliance plan in the form of an alternative to the exclusivist union idea of France.⁸⁷

He believed that Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union were victims of the European system established by Britain and France. By proposing a Pan-European union, France intended only to ratify the existing European system and its inequalities.⁸⁸ In other words, Italy accused France of emphasizing again the difference between the defeated and the victorious countries of World War I, although Italy had been a victor, too. For the fascist leader, Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, as the three countries that had pioneered reformist movements, could and had to collaborate against French intrigues in Europe.⁸⁹

Ankara was not against the idea of a European union, but it was against the French version proposed by Briand because it excluded Turkey.⁹⁰

Ankara admitted that the reformist policies in Turkey, Italy, and the Soviet Union provided to a certain extent common ground for these three countries to improve their relations.⁹¹ One of the main reasons for Turkey to be on good terms with Italy and the Soviet Union was its distrust of French policy in the region. In fact, the French ambassador in Turkey was suspicious of a triple arrangement involving Turkey, Italy, and the Soviet Union. When he asked Turkish Foreign Minister Aras whether there was “the possibility of a Russo–Turkish–Italian naval agreement,” Aras said, “Russia and Italy had more than hinted at such a combination but he had turned it down and intended to retain that attitude.”⁹²

Turkey's main priority and interest was to develop its relations with its Balkan neighbors. Indeed, the process had started with the first Balkan conference. The world economic crisis generated a strong impetus for Balkan states to develop new foreign-policy strategies. For instance, Turkey was busy working on an arrangement for Greek–Bulgarian reconciliation that would prepare the way for a wider regional “alliance” that included Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria but excluded Italy. Ankara was also promoting a framework to incorporate Yugoslavia⁹³

into this “alliance,” which, if realized, would, against the Italian will, contribute to Yugoslav–Bulgarian reconciliation.⁹⁴ On 20 October 1931, Turkey hosted the second Balkan conference in Istanbul. During this conference, as at the first one, the Balkan delegates tried to find common solutions to the effects of the world economic crisis in their countries. Turkey had economic problems that were similar, if not identical, to those of the other Balkan countries.

The Italians were concerned that Turkey might pursue an independent path and form an alliance with the other Balkan states. Turkey's political leaders seemed to favor Pan-Balkan cooperation over the tripartite-alliance proposal of Italy. In his interview with the Italian daily Popolo d'Italia, Aras stated that as three treaties of friendship already bound Turkey, Greece, and Italy, there was no need for an additional tripartite pact.⁹⁵

Aras's statement proved that the Italian concerns were not unjustified. Italian Foreign Minister Grandi recommended that Italy take precautions against the independent diplomacy of Aras in the Balkans.⁹⁶

In addition to diverging Italian and Turkish ideas on the political situation, there were serious financial limitations that undermined Italy's pursuit of political, military, and economic influence in Turkey. In fact, the 1929 world economic crisis seriously curbed Italy's ability to pursue an effective policy to this end. Italy's thin finances slowed down the construction of naval units for Turkey. For instance, the Zafer and Tinaztepe destroyers, which were supposed to be delivered in 1931, were delivered only after Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü's visit to Rome in May 1932.⁹⁷

The world economic crisis presented Turkey with a dilemma vis-à-vis Italy. In the early 1930s, in addition to paying the Ottoman debts, the Republic of Turkey had launched an ambitious program of industrialization. As a result, Turkey asked for economic aid from Italy to build not only its navy but also its national industry. Indeed, in 1929 Turkish diplomats were optimistic that Italian–Turkish relations would soon be solidified by a credit agreement.⁹⁸

In 1930, it was reported that the Banca Commerciale had agreed to extend a loan of 500,000 pounds sterling to the Turkish Treasury to assist the Turkish government.⁹⁹

In May 1932, Inönü made an official visit to Rome to discuss with Mussolini pending economic and political issues. The political leaders of the two countries decided to improve their commercial relations, which had been deteriorating since the world economic crisis.¹⁰⁰

They also discussed the possibility of a 300 million Italian lira loan to Turkey.¹⁰¹ The process that was supposed to lead to the Turkish borrowing of 300 million Italian liras, however, ran into difficulties. The protracted negotiations on the conditions for the release of the credit frustrated both the Italians and the Turks.

The Italian diplomats in Turkey criticized the Turks for acting with a “Balkan mentality” in their dealings with the Western Europeans on economic issues.¹⁰²

They claimed that the Turks were always suspecting that the foreign states would be asking concessions from Ankara in return for economic aid. They accused Ankara of not having confidence in European countries. For its part, Ankara was determined not to repeat the Ottoman experience of foreign debts, which Turkey was still paying to those same countries. Therefore, Turkey's political leaders had been extremely cautious about their economic involvement with Europe. Naturally, Ankara wanted to opt for a country that would make the best offer. In addition, it desired that such an offer not be attached to any political conditions.¹⁰³

To improve its bargaining position, Turkey had asked for a loan not only from Rome, but also from Moscow. In April 1932, Turkey's political leaders, including Inönü, visited the Soviet Union and agreed to receive a credit of $8 million from Moscow. They did not hesitate to accept the Soviet offer because Moscow gave the aid without interest. Italy was asking 6.5 percent interest for the 300 million Italian liras that it was planning to lend to Turkey.¹⁰⁴

The Italians interpreted Turkey's policy as turning its back on old friends.¹⁰⁵ They argued that Turkey had to count on its old friends when seeking economic aid from abroad.¹⁰⁶ Regarding the Italian loan, Rome turned out to be unwilling or unable, or both, to release the cash portion of the credit, most of which was to be spent on naval arms and aircraft built in Italy for Turkey.¹⁰⁷

Turkish–Italian commercial relations did not improve to a great extent, either. In general, the Turkish state, which developed étatist policies after the world economic crisis, became even more cautious in its economic relations. Protectionist measures that Turkey had implemented in foreign trade affected its trade with Italy. Ankara increased custom duties to curb imports from foreign countries, including Italy. In spite of political differences and disagreements about financial issues, however, Rome and Ankara agreed in 1932 to renew the Turkish–Italian Treaty of 1928 for five more years. They also signed a convention to delimit territorial waters between Anatolia and an Italian-owned island, Castellorizzo, off the Turkish mainland.¹⁰⁸

In the summer of 1932, Italy changed the style of its foreign policy. That change affected its relations with Turkey. Mussolini dismissed Grandi to revitalize the tono fascista in foreign policy. The appointments of Fulvio Suvich, a native of Trieste, as under-secretary within the Foreign Ministry, and of Baron Pompeo Aloisi, an expert in Balkan affairs, as the chef de bureau, confirmed the growing Italian interest in the Balkans.¹⁰⁹

After that, Italian territorial claims over Yugoslavia were more vocal. At the same time, Rome stressed its intention to enlist allies against Belgrade. At the first phase of the disarmament conference in Geneva, moreover, Mussolini declared his intentions on matters concerning international affairs. He was already known to be against the Versailles Treaty system and seeking to revise it. He saw the League of Nations as an obstacle to Italy's revisionist aims. For Mussolini, a stable understanding among the big states, rather than the League, would better guarantee the peaceful development of the smaller states.¹¹⁰ To put it differently, Rome did not favor the preservation of the status quo, especially through an international organization.

Again in 1932 Italy opposed Turkey's entry into the League of Nations. Italy's firm stand against Turkey's membership in the League adversely affected Turkish–Italian relations. The issue also clearly showed the Italian bias toward minor powers. Rome tried to foster the impression that peace could survive only with the Great Powers' initiatives. The Italian approach to the League and to Turkey's membership was closely linked to the Four-Power Pact proposal that Mussolini made. In March 1933, Mussolini presented his ideas for a Four-Power Pact to British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. For him, the four Western powers—France, Germany, Britain, and Italy—should cooperate to preserve peace. The proposal implied cooperation among only the Great Powers. Moreover, the four powers would have the power to revise the treaties that might lead to conflict among states.¹¹¹

In a sense, Mussolini declared his view that the existing treaties could lead to conflicts among the European powers and needed to be revised.

The declaration of the Four-Power Pact proposal set Turkey and Italy apart. The issue also reflected the divergence of interests between the Great Powers and the minor powers. The world economic crisis had already sharpened the contrast between the industrialized and non-industrialized worlds. Mussolini's Four-Power Pact definitely widened the gap between the great and minor powers. Turkish reaction to the Four-Power Pact was, needless to say, less than positive. Ankara did not consider the pact a step toward peace. On the contrary, it saw it as contributing to the policies of the Great Powers to intervene in other parts of the world. Mussolini's Four-Power Pact proposal prompted Turkey's political leaders to recall the political bargaining at Lausanne, where they had struggled to make Italy, France, and Britain accept Turkey's vested rights. At the same time, they could not help but emphasize Italy's position and power in the international hierarchy. In Aras's words, “Italy was ‘masquerading’ as a great power…. She was putting her potentialities for influencing the course of events in Europe to a strain disproportionate to their capacity. It was an absurdity for her to pretend she could exercise the same influence as such powers as Great Britain, France or Germany.”¹¹²

In fact, Mussolini's Four-Power Pact could never materialize because of British and French reluctance to involve Hitler's Germany in such an arrangement.

The growing Italian threat led Ankara to revitalize regional cooperation efforts that culminated in the conclusion of the Balkan entente in February 1934 among Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The entente was officially aimed at guaranteeing Balkan borders against revision from within. It also had the broader objective of preventing collaboration between Bulgaria and Italy in the Balkans. Atatürk wrote to Inönü that Italy was against this entente and that Bulgaria, as an Italian proxy, could attempt to undermine it with Rome's encouragement.¹¹³

Italian policy led Aras to conclude that “Italy under Signor Mussolini was apparently following the same policy as the pre-fascist Italian liberals, keeping waters troubled on the chance of being able to fish in them, and hoping that circumstances, and principally the misfortunes of others, would play into their hands.”¹¹⁴

The inconsistent and unpredictable policy of Mussolini, expressed elegantly by Aras, was perfectly reflected in Italy's relations with Turkey in this period. After the signing of the Balkan entente, Turkish–Italian relations spiraled into a deteriorating pattern. Lojacono, the Italian ambassador in Turkey, was pretty sure that the entente would encourage Turkey to adopt a stronger anti–Italian stand.¹¹⁵ However, Italian foreign policy incorporated a more aggressive tune. Mussolini's notorious speech on the future lines of Italian expansion in Africa and Asia in 1934 heralded the transition in Italian–Turkish relations from “cooling-off” to “frost.” The “frost,” which was marked by renewed fear of Italy, led to a major shift in Turkish foreign policy. This shift would eventually result in Ankara's alliance with Britain and France on the eve of World War II.¹¹⁶

The Turks, however, remained alone—at least, for a while—in their uneasiness regarding Italian policy in the Mediterranean. In February 1935, the British ambassador in Turkey was still convinced that Ankara exaggerated the Italian threat.¹¹⁷

It was not surprising that Ankara had willingly endorsed the Mediterranean pact proposal of French Foreign Minister Barthou to preserve the peace and status quo.¹¹⁸ However, the proposal could not find a lease on life because Pierre Laval replaced Barthou in October 1934. The new French foreign minister favored bilateral agreements over regional schemes. In 1935, he pursued agreement with Italy under which France and Britain relinquished their economic rights in Abyssinia to Italy. At the time, London still viewed Italy as a power that could be useful in checking Germany in Europe.¹¹⁹ In October 1935, Italy was satisfied by French and British conciliatory policies and went on to invade Abyssinia. The Italian invasion inevitably narrowed the gulf between Turkish and British assessments of the Italian aims in the Mediterranean. When the League of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia agreed to implement them. In return, Britain furnished guarantees to these three countries against the Italian threat during the implementation of the sanctions.