If there is ever a chance to make the comparative study of party organization relevant and palatable to a larger audience of aspiring scholars in search of challenging research topics, Margit Tavits’s book is the document to study. But Tavit’s mighty effort also highlights how difficult it is to examine parties as micropolities.
Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization is organized around four theses, each of which is explored and defended with copious data against rival contentions. First, a thorough construction of party organization matters for parties’ electoral success and subsequent survival. Even net of party finance, government status, and economic environment, stronger party organizations achieve better election results. Over time, the effect of membership and staff size on electoral performance increases, while that of local election participation and branch offices remains roughly the same. A detailed comparison of nine core parties in Chapter 3 provides the intertemporal evidence against the suspicion that organization is endogenous: Parties’ organizational investments precede, not follow, electoral success.
The book’s second thesis is that—net of electoral systems—a party with organizational prowess commands greater compliance by its legislators, as it credibly ties their individual careers to organizational capabilities. Empirically, the independent effect of party organization on legislative discipline is not erased by conventional control variables that are partially confirmed: When government parties have generous legislative majorities, it is more difficult for them to discipline their caucus members. But Tavits disconfirms the institutionalist expectation that parties with centralized candidate nomination are more disciplined.
At first sight, the third thesis, detailed in Chapter 5, appears to contradict the second thesis: If party subunits are more powerful, the leadership has less capacity to dominate the party, revealed by strong membership branches getting to fill leadership positions in legislative committees and/or their representatives to defy the national party line in roll call votes. Yet Tavits shows that the second and third hypotheses are consistent: While strong organization increases the overall cohesion of parties, at the margin subunits within such organizations have the greatest counterweight leverage.
The fourth set of arguments deals with the choice, not the consequences, of party organization. Since building organizations is a painful, costly undertaking, politicians make the investment only under duress, when it may be their only comparative advantage. Tavits develops a theory of “rough competition” in “hostile environments” that induces them to build party organizations once they have exhausted other options. This applies when a party is treated as a pariah, because of its extremism or its role in a preceding authoritarian regime, when it has been confined to the opposition for a long time though commanding the largest electoral bloc, or when it is a late novice in a crowded field of competitors. The demand side matters as well: Parties appealing to poorer, less educated people who do not process much political information may mobilize their electorates only with good organization. Finally, the quality of leaders—a background in administrative and managerial professions—makes a difference.
Methodologically, the book, in exemplary ways, shows how to deal with causal inference if the research subject requires observational data. Tavits makes good use of a mix of quantitative analysis (cross-section and, where possible, pooled time series of data points stretching over almost 20 years) and qualitative analysis with comparative case-study process tracing and contrasting of cases. Moreover, the study takes advantage of subnational variation, holding constant for many conditions. The quantitative core of the book is an original subnational, district-level data set of party organization in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland since the early 1990s. Tavits’s project measures district-level membership densities (as a ratio of voters), the density of local party branch offices, and the size of the professional staff in national party headquarters, but also uses as a summary measure the intensity of parties’ participation in local elections (candidate nomination), a tracer of parties’ local numerical strength and capabilities. Furthermore, the author assembled a roll call data set for all four countries, data on legislators’ defection from parties, and data on the personal propensities, skills, and occupational experiences of all party leaders to promote organization building (“professionals”) or to elaborate programs, goals, and ideologies (“amateurs”). All of these systematic data are complemented by extensive archival work supporting the qualitative process tracing and contrasting case comparisons in the book, deployed to detail the causal mechanisms that play out in party competition.
Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization goes against the grain of conventional wisdom in the study of parties. First, Tavits challenges the hypothesis that parties seamlessly moved from being labor-intensive to capital-intensive organizations. Second, she offends Robert Michels-inspired oligarchy theorists with her observation that large subunits show resistance and resilience in the face of national leadership demands. Third, she questions the institutional account of legislative party cohesion. She does find herself, however, in agreement with many classics of the party literature, that political entrepreneurs, sidelined to the periphery and away from the centers of power, can stage a challenge only through systematic organization.
Let me nevertheless raise some questions for further inquiry beyond what is a highly important study. First, the book claims to set itself up against those who see mass membership parties as doomed (pp. 36–38), but Tavits’s own data prove that even the best organized parties in Eastern Europe have no mass organizations: Postcommunist parties incorporate only between 0.1% and 0.3% of national electorates (pp. 78, 204). This is even a whole magnitude lower than current post-mass-organized West European parties that once upon a time encapsulated between 5% and 20% of national electorates. What Tavits’s study shows is that a minimum of party membership and branch organization does pay off, but there is no evidence that mass organizations are valuable. My counter-hypothesis: The effect of party organization is nonlinear, and the limited sample of comparison in this study cannot reveal the rapidly declining marginal returns on more organization, once certain threshold levels are approached.
Second, in order to draw the link between party organization and electoral success and cohesion, more needs to be done to model and incorporate the strategic interaction among political parties. Also, it is necessary to consider the substance of mass publics’ preference distributions, be it in terms of the parties’ programmatic appeals or parties’ other linkage effort (clientelism, leadership valence, etc.). A party’s electoral success is a function of demand side conditions and competitors’ strategic positions. This is not sufficiently reflected in the book’s current analytical setup.
Furthermore, because of their ideological appeal and constituency demand functions, only some parties may be better off with larger organizations. Tavits mentions parties appealing to the poor. Conversely, then, it could be no accident that parties appealing to market-liberal, secular, urban, younger, and highly educated professionals have always remained weak and declined over time. Given political-economic circumstances, no amount of organization may boost their fate. Parties, of course, may move out of that market segment: Tavits’s case study of Fidesz in Hungary (pp. 92–94) could have reflected the party’s ideological reversal in 1992–94 that moved it out of the liberal-cosmopolitan sector to embrace a nationalist-populist position. This may well have been a critical condition for its organizational reversal, as this reviewer would assert, based on what he learned from Fidesz politicians when conducting fieldwork in Budapest in 1992.
To reverse the perspective, consider that ultimately, the most electorally successful communist successor parties in Tavits’s comparison group (Hungary, Poland) were also those that shed the most members after 1989. In countries in transition to some kind of capitalist market economy, success may be here sharply conditioned by parties’ positions relative to these challenges. And this brings me to my third and final critical suggestion: To learn about the net impact of party organization on popular support, we must account for parties’ positions within their national and global political economy. This is a vast problematic, and a simple control for (short-term) changes in unemployment levels (p. 57) does not do justice to the complex interaction between economic transformation and electoral party fortunes in formerly communist countries.
Having argued for three extensions to gauge the power of party organization more adequately—comparison beyond these four postcommunist countries, consideration of strategic interaction among parties, and incorporation of political-economic liberalization and structural reform after communism—let me close by reiterating that this book is an impressive achievement that puts the study of party organization (back) on the map of anyone who wants to explain the dynamics of democratic representation and political governance. The author has convinced me that it would be premature to give up on the significance of party organization.
