Donatella Alessandrini's Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trade Regime: The Failure and Promise of the WTO's Development Mission examines how the ‘science of development’ has operated as an ‘extra-economic means’ to produce and sustain ‘capitalist-imperialist’ relations in the context of the multilateral trade regime. The work's declared aim is ‘to expose the development assumptions of the international trading regime and its trade disciplines as political rather than rational, neutral and objective’ (p. 10). To achieve this aim, the author retells the evolution of the GATT/WTO as a history about the shaping and reshaping of the notion of development.
According to Alessandrini, the notion of development has served to perpetuate and reinforce the position of ‘developed’ countries and their enterprises within the capitalist system vis-à-vis ‘developing’ countries, while concealing the imperial legacy that lies beneath the GATT/WTO. Alessandrini describes the ‘normalization’ of development by the conjugation of three fundamental normative assumptions established at the end of the colonial era. These are, in the author's synthesis: (i) ‘the establishment of an unquestionable dichotomy between advanced and backward societies’; (ii) ‘the reliance on a supposedly neutral economic rationality through which to bridge this gap’; and (iii) ‘the invocation of the help and expertise of the so-called advanced members of the international community and the specialized international economic and financial institutions in order to facilitate the development process’ (p. 4). Alessandrini argues that these three assumptions have recurred, even if the actual development approach of the GATT/WTO has mutated in time.
In Alessandrini's view, the international trade regime's institutions have contributed to the ‘normalization’ of development. In the early GATT days, development was identified with rapid economic growth within the capitalist economy, so developing countries’ ‘failure’ to develop was considered to result from their inability to increase their trade as fast as developed countries (Chapters 1 and 2). According to the author, such links between trade and development, combined with the underlying normative assumptions, have framed all successive GATT initiatives as well as the establishment of the WTO. For instance, while the creation of the WTO took place against the backdrop of a neoliberal turn in development thinking in the 1980s and 1990s, the explanation for underdevelopment remained the same as it had been in previous decades: developing countries’ inward policies and failing institutional arrangements (Chapter 3). In turn, the rearticulated neoliberal reading of the ‘failure’ of developing countries set the stage for developed countries’ recipe of further liberalization and economic reforms in the developing world, as an alleged means to achieve development (Chapter 4). The Doha Round, for its part, stalled amidst developed countries’ attempts to advance their liberalizing interests without addressing the persistent imbalances carried over from previous rounds (Chapter 6).
Two principal claims permeate Alessandrini's account of the ‘promise’ and ‘failure’ of the multilateral trade regime's development mission. Her broader and principal claim is that the scientific apparatus about development which underlies the GATT/WTO has persistently linked a specific form of knowledge (i.e., economic/trade/development theory) with forms of power over and intervention in the developing countries (i.e., imperial powers through the recipe of trade liberalization and enhanced protection to investments and intellectual property). In short, Alessandrini argues that the multilateral trade regime's embracing of the notion that development takes place through progressive liberalization is an attempt to structure and control a certain division of labour that favours developed countries and their multinational enterprises.
Alessandrini's narrower claim is that the GATT/WTO and the negotiations under their auspices profoundly contradict their self-proclaimed free-trade rationale. To her, these institutions have championed selective liberalization and harmonization in the sectors of interest to developed countries, while resisting attempts to liberalize sectors of fundamental interest to developing countries. In this sense, the author views the GATT/WTO as contributing to and embodying the very ‘failure’ attributed to developing countries: to develop their trade in order to ‘catch up’. As Alessandrini points out, imbalances in the WTO's architecture include, for instance, persistent tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade in agriculture and long-lived restrictions on trade in textiles (sectors in which further liberalization would favour developing countries’ interests), whereas trade in industrial goods has essentially been liberalized (which favours developed countries). Further, the WTO's ‘single undertaking’ approach brought into being a set of agreements that advance protection to investments, trade in services, and standards on the protection of intellectual property, which Alessandrini considers to result in a reduction of the regulatory autonomy of developing countries. Meanwhile, developed countries have failed then again – and presently, in the context of the Doha Round – to meet the unfulfilled promise to redress the traditional inequities within the trade system. Moreover, as the author points out, when developing countries are able to halt further liberalization and harmonization in sectors where they are less competitive, developed countries resort to bilateral and regional negotiations as a means to advance their trade interests. This logic, in the view of Alessandrini, calls into question the possibility of multilateralism itself, as embodied in the GATT/WTO.
That so-called ‘neutral’ theories (e.g., economic theories) may conceal important political assumptions and issues is certainly not a novel proposition. Neither is the particular version of that argument to which the book under review adheres, which draws directly on prior works by Antony Anghie and Ellen Meiksins Woods, as the author readily acknowledges. Nor is novel the author's narrower claim that the multilateral trade regime is fraught with long-lived imbalances along the developed–developing countries’ divide. Moreover, Alessandrini's argument does not appear to sufficiently account for the fact that development is a ubiquitous term with multiple meanings, and that there are many subclasses and groups of countries, including sub-groups among developing countries, and so on. Further, the book seems to downplay certain ‘pro-development’ initiatives (e.g., special and differential treatment in the GATT context) while overstressing the reach of ‘pro-liberalization’ initiatives (e.g., certain GATS and TRIMS disciplines).
Yet, Alessandrini's account of the ‘development norm’ and GATT/WTO history in particular is an original and interesting academic contribution. International trade scholars have tended to focus on imbalances within the system and negotiations. Potentially inherent biases of the system have by and large been left in the shadows. By shedding a certain light on the latter topic, from a critical perspective, Alessandrini contributes to paving the way for academic exploration and discussion about the development-related aim and purpose of international trade rules and, more specifically, the WTO.
In the light of the development framework that underlies the WTO and that the WTO does foster, in her view, Alessandrini dares to call into question the desirability of the WTO political process. This at a time when the economic downturn has led some to call into question also the viability of the WTO. In such context, crucial related questions (which the book under review does not raise) would concern the alternatives: would there be other desirable/viable political processes and institutions, if any, to discuss and implement development from an international perspective? Should those be preferable to the WTO? And from whose perspective?
