EMOTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND MOBILIZATION

Studying the link between individual emotional experiences and collective action is an important niche in collective violence studies. Petersen’s seminal work (2001) on the role of community networks in mobilizing and organizing individual emotions, for instance, identified how resentment towards foreign occupation can lead to rebellion. Emotions such as indignation have been directly linked to the propensity to violent mobilization (Costalli and Ruggeri Reference Costalli and Ruggeri2015). Armed organizations, such as insurgent groups, need to channel bottom-up emotions into collective and organized action. Insurgent organizations, in other words, need to institutionalize events that can trigger individual emotional responses to build their own legitimacy as an effective representative of grievances. One key tool they can use is the creation, and nurturing, of organizational myths (Meyer and Rowan Reference Meyer and Rowan1977; Pettigrew Reference Pettigrew1979). “Foundation myths,” for instance, are required as an organization tries to assert its role as the legitimate representative of its reference constituency’s grievances and to channel its emotions towards organized violence (Selbin Reference Selbin2010). Myths, intended as stories about how an organization came to being, how it dealt with existential challenges, and how it had to transform through time, become the backbone of organizational cultures (and norms), and can thus drive their actions—especially in ambiguous situations (Schein Reference Schein2004).

In an early stage of mobilization, a key problem for insurgent organizations is to identify the events that trigger individual emotional responses and transform them into part of their organizational narratives. Specific events can provide occasions to (a) mobilize support for a group’s campaign (that is, extending recruitment) and (b) convince a more restricted number of individuals to participate in violent mobilization. In March 1960, the South African police opened fire on black South Africans participating in a street demonstration against Apartheid laws in the town of Sharpeville, killing 69 and wounding 180. The event signaled the escalation of the government’s repression campaigns, which culminated with the banning of the leading (yet, not only) opposition group, the African National Congress (ANC). The response of the ANC was a decision to modify its strategy with the creation of an armed branch, the MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe, “spear of the nation”). The attempt to institutionalize the memory of Sharpeville was explicit in the founding of MK and in the beginning of the violent campaign. The Manifesto of the MK makes direct reference to the “massacre” in Sharpeville, and the ANC leader, in a speech pronounced at its trial in 1964, links the same event with the decision to organize armed resistance. The event thus serves the purpose of radicalizing members of the organization and justifying the choice of overcoming the threshold of violence. Myths thus play two key functions. First, they arouse emotions, starting with “indignation,” that can be connected with armed mobilization (Costalli and Ruggeri Reference Costalli and Ruggeri2015). Second, myths constitute the basis upon which other organizational values emerge and upon which rules can be elaborated and institutionalized (see below).

Leaders play a central role in creating an organization’s myths/shared symbols (Schein Reference Schein2004), such as by “bricolage” (Baker and Nelson Reference Baker and Nelson2005; Selbin Reference Selbin2010). Leaders in the early phases try to patch different events and experiences into relatively coherent narratives that define the organization’s raison d’être and its link with the broader cause it supports. Analyzing political entrepreneurs in an early phase of armed mobilization could provide important information over which group is more successful in armed mobilization. Political entrepreneurs that are better able to produce coherent and compelling narratives that can (a) effectively allow the switch from non-violent to violent mobilization, and (b) develop an armed organization which can win over more recruits and supporters—needed for sustained action—and thus beat others that compete for the same pool of resources.

FROM IDEOLOGY TO ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The study of how ideologies can affect the conduct of civil wars has emerged as a promising avenue of research, both at the cross-national and within-country levels (Balcells and Kalyvas Reference Balcells and Kalyvas2010; Ugarriza and Craig Reference Ugarriza and Craig2013; Costalli and Ruggeri Reference Costalli and Ruggeri2015). The link between ideology and organizations is multifold. Ideologies—defined here as political beliefs that provide both an understanding of how the world works and a view of the relationships between the in-group and out-group and among members of the in-group (Ugarriza and Craig Reference Ugarriza and Craig2013)—shape the beliefs actors hold about how they should organize and the group’s strategy (including cooperation with other groups). It does so, first, by addressing the relationships between the organization and its environment: ideologies, for instance, shape alignments with other insurgent groups or, as shown by Staniland (Reference Staniland2015), between militias and governments. Also, ideologies indicate how groups should organize internally on matters such as the role of leadership, the link between the political and military branches, and the appropriateness in the use of certain tools (both in discourse and action). But once embedded in organizations, ideologies are also reshaped by a process of specification and adaptation.

Specification entails moving down the ladder of abstraction and giving more concrete meanings to ideologies, often by establishing organizational structures and rules. Examples abound: while the link with “Marxism” has been a frequent feature for radical opposition groups in Latin America, further differences exist in how Marxist ideology was interpreted and then implemented. Every organization needs guides on daily functioning operations, on which ideologies provide only partial, and often ambiguous, codes of conduct. An example is the armed group’s preferences towards the use of violence and targeting. Marxist ideologies, for instance, legitimate the use of force but do not necessarily provide rules on how insurgents should be used. Different Marxist groups in Central America might have identified the same enemies (authoritarian regimes and the landowner class that supported them) and shared other features: in other words, they had the same ideology. Yet, they did not adopt the same organizational set-up and did not share the same preferences for military strategy because of different processes of specification (pursued by the groups’ leadership).

In the Guatemalan civil war that began in the ‘60s, different groups that were all inspired by the same Marxist ideologies and that recognized each other (and also established alliances with different levels of integration at given moments) adopted different strategies vis-à-vis the civilian population. The group operating since the late ‘70s in the western region surrounding San Marcos, the ORPA (Revolutionary Organization of Armed People), chose to mostly attack the security forces linked to the authoritarian regime. The group operating in the mountainous area of Quiché, the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), in addition to state forces, targeted the civilian population that was perceived as supporting (or providing information) to the regime. One of the reasons for such different behavior is that the leadership of the two groups had different interpretations of the cause of failure in the previous insurgency campaigns. ORPA chose continuity with strategies adopted by insurgent groups in the ‘60s and the adoption of a “vanguard” approach based on limited organizational membership and highly selective violence. EGP, on the contrary, was critical of such an approach and tried to expand their support base to the poorest strata of population (the indigenous people living in Quiché) by “mass mobilization.” ^{Footnote 2} This entailed clashes with those segments of the local population who proved not to be “collaborative” with their project (see also Stoll Reference Stoll1993).

Adaptation involves striking a balance between the core tenets of ideologies and the realities the organization faces in its daily routines. As noted in now classical organizational research, the difficulties in making over-arching rules everyday practice is one of the hardest challenges for organizations (Meyer and Rowan Reference Meyer and Rowan1977). To overcome the difficulties in reconciling ideology and practice, organizations often adopt solutions such as loose-coupling—defined as “building gaps between their formal structures and actual work activities” (Meyer and Rowan Reference Meyer and Rowan1977, 341) and “ceremonial conformity.” In Guatemala, all groups made constant reference in their programmatic documents to the need to move from a “vanguard” approach to one based on the control of the territory and provision of governance, as their major reference as model of guerrilla warfare (the Cuban struggle led by Guevara and Castro) had postulated. Yet, their actions belied the need to adapt to local realities: some of these groups (like the abovementioned ORPA) kept targeted attacks of Guatemalan security forces as their main form of action for their entire lifespan, while never really building institutions for rebel governance.

HOW CULTURE SPREADS WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION

Another important issue is how “shared” values spread through the organization, as this represents a key element for the group’s effectiveness and sustainability over time. Pre-existing social ties and beliefs about “reciprocity” have been found central in the decision of individuals to rebel (Petersen Reference Petersen2001). When the group’s size increases—that is with successful mobilization—new problems emerge. Extending recruitment to people who do not share these ties, though necessary to expand skillset and effectiveness of insurgents, can be conducive to distrust and less cohesive groups, with all the ensuing risks of defection and ineffectiveness. Reliance on ethnic and religious identity could solve some of the problems of trust in recruitment, “because membership in these informal and formal networks facilitates trust and makes the threat of sanction credible” (Weinstein Reference Weinstein2007, 101). However, resorting to broad notions of kinship or ideology does not necessarily reduce risks of defection (Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2008). Looking at values and how these are embedded into codified behavior could provide relevant insights into the cohesion of a group and its chances to splinter and/or collapse. ^{Footnote 3} Cohesion here is a function of the homogeneity of the values transmitted, their pervasiveness, and the effectiveness of the mechanisms of monitoring and sanctioning.

In addition to the study of norms and rules through which values are embedded, it is also relevant to understand how organizational cognitive processes (including rules and the acquisition, distribution, and interpretation of information) work (Huber Reference Huber1991). This dimension—in which rebel groups are still understudied—led to important research on regular military organizations. Yet, it allows empirical descriptions of a relatively unknown phenomenon: how insurgent groups produce and transmit rules and knowledge (starting with the process of “indoctrination”). The mechanisms linking re-production of values and norms and organizational change have in fact been often overlooked in literature. Strong cognitive frames can lead to the inability of armed groups to modify their strategies when external circumstances change, thus explaining apparently irrational insistence on repertoires of action that do not seem to bear positive outcomes. For instance, the inability of Guatemalan groups such as ORPA to escalate their fighting in the early ‘80s (facing an intensification of repression by the government) was also due to their inability to conceive “military” operations on a larger scale than the sporadic attacks used until then. ^{Footnote 4} This would have required a profound change in doctrine, indoctrination, and recruitment strategy that—even if it were materially possible—would have altered the self-conception of the group. Such a view would radically change the role of leadership: while in the foundational phase leaders have a relatively ample margin of maneuver to establish which values and norms should permeate an organization; once these are entrenched, their freedom of action is severely constrained.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES AND ARMED MOBILIZATION: PROBLEMS AND PROMISES

Using the insights derived from the analysis of organizational culture with research on armed mobilization and its agents might help strengthen different fields of inquiry. Further research along these lines could focus on early phases of armed mobilization and the decision to resort to violence, allowing a different perspective on how emotions shape these (Petersen Reference Petersen2001; Costalli and Ruggeri Reference Costalli and Ruggeri2015). Similarly, it could provide new stimuli to existing studies addressing the organizational aspects (Weinstein Reference Weinstein2007; Johnston Reference Johnston2008), as well as literature focusing on cohesion and fragmentation of rebel groups (Staniland Reference Staniland2014; Seymour, Bakke, and Cunningham Reference Seymour, Bakke and Cunningham2016).

Two caveats are in order. On the one hand, it is clearly important not to downplay the methodological problems in the study of organizational cultures (Schein Reference Schein2004), which in part explain the neglect of this approach. For instance, the artifacts such as documentary material can be accessible, but their “decipherability” would require interviews and, possibly, organizational ethnography—a difficult task in the study of insurgent groups. On the other, supporting research on insurgent groups that is sensitive to cultural factors does not imply abandoning other approaches by committing to a radical cognitivist turn. At the current stage, it seems safer to say that analysis of cultural factors should be incorporated into existing research paradigms and their relative research questions.

Yet, analysis of values, norms, and cognitive processes of insurgent groups allows us to address important questions and to pose new ones. I mention two that, at least in part, regroup those mentioned previously. First, a culturally-savvy analysis can explore the creative space of leadership in setting up and then managing insurgent organizations. In line with institutionalist accounts, this brief article suggests that it is important to distinguish the foundational moment from those that follow, with a diminishing space for agency over time as values and norms become part of the standard (cognitive) frames of the organization. This has consequences for the study of emotions and ideology: in the first phase of violent mobilization leaders can specify and adapt existing ideologies and build foundation myths based on emotions (such as indignation). Emotions-based myths would allow leaders mobilize large pools of people (as compared to those witnessing the events that triggered the emotions). The theme, however, is clearly up for further inquiry, and an analysis of the role of leadership in crucial moments might suggest that the proposed relation is far from being linear.

Second, and related, taking culture into account can lead to important insights into organizational change. Culture is essential for organizations to work effectively, but it is also a constraint on their behavior (Weber and Dacin 2011). When rooted, culture might prevent alternative paths of action from consideration, be they alliances, mergers, organizational reshuffles, or modes of conducting military operations. Finally, further attention could be paid to the formal and informal organizational bodies that collect, process, and distribute information within the armed groups. Analysis of the insurgents’ institutions, such as the rules and codes adopted by insurgents and systems of training and indoctrination, can provide important insights into how organizations effectively embed ideologies in their structure. Also, it could show how armed organizations can use events that trigger emotions to build, and perpetuate, themselves (Schubiger and Zelina, this issue).