Paul Quigley connects the individual experience of Civil War era white southern Americans with the academic concept of nationalism. He uses his extensive research to demonstrate that his protagonists practiced “active nationalism” (11), as southerners reached out, or crossed boundaries, in three directions: first, outward to their understanding of nationalism throughout the mid-Atlantic world; second, backward to their experience as American nationalists; third, inward, to connect nationalism to everyday lives, especially religion. Crucially for southerners, these grasped ideas “gained stronger purchase over time” (10), due to the increasing need to defend themselves rhetorically and then militarily against perceived northern aggression.
Central to Quigley's thesis is the connection between small-‘r’ republicanism and nationalism; he stresses the importance of understanding the meaning of democratic citizenship. Individual citizens held themselves responsible for the future of their nation (22), hence explaining why “everyday acts as individuals carried national meaning” (162). With this power came a reciprocal sense of responsibility, especially under the Confederacy, when “every individual … had a direct responsibility for the moral character of the whole nation, therefore for its very survival” (207). Hence Quigley uses the Victorian obsession with “character” to illuminate our understanding of nationalism; more importantly, it also helps us to comprehend why Confederates carried on fighting, rationalized setbacks and accepted conscription (188–91). “The hardships of war were not meaningless obstacles”; they were “constructive of good character” and hence “they were the true test of nationality, and the means by which it was to be forged” (212). The reader is familiar with how nineteenth-century Americans saw their republican self-government as an example to the world, but not with how it connected with individual experience.
Nationalism also related to slavery. Before the war, anti-slavery propaganda had an effect on fire-eaters as it “drove the radicals to embrace southern nationalism as a means to simultaneously protect their region's peculiar institution and themselves as individuals” (59). Especially at the end of the 1850s, all white southerners came to share a “psychological investment in slavery and the race relations it supported” (103). In particular, John Brown's Raid, or rather the northern reaction to it, “seemed so ominous because it threatened white southerners at a personal level” (104). Again, Quigley enhances understanding of the consequences of events by connecting them to his analysis.
Finally, Quigley grasps the religiosity of his subjects; he argues that “nationalism's deep emotional appeal lay in its ability to connect individuals with sacred communities and transcendent purposes within the past, present, and future” (83). Quigley shows that the boundaries between religion and nationalism became blurred as casualties mounted during the Civil War and when, “across the modern world, nationalism appealed to individuals with offer of what only religion could previously provide: life after death” (208). Through commemoration, nationalism could extend the religious potency of the memory of national martyrs. Quigley relates this practice to the Confederate war effort, as the living needed to ensure that the fallen had not died in vain (204).
Quigley does neglect the importance of place in his study of nationalism. “Your Land” is an important part of transatlantic romantic nationalism and he accepts that the “visceral attachment to a particular soil, land, or place generated powerful connections between individuals and their nations” (33–34). But he overlooks the southern and Confederate stress on the centrality of the Mississippi Valley to their nation, or how white southerners responded to northern nationalists, such as Daniel Webster and Abraham Lincoln, who used the absence of a clear physical barrier between North and South, in contrast to European geography, as evidence that no separate southern nation could exist.
Political parties also played a role in southern nationalism. Quigley nods briefly to the fact that “for almost two decades the Second Party System had helped unite Americans across sectional borders, promoting national links of sympathy and affection” (101–2). Political parties did more, as historians Jean Baker and Michael Holt have shown, with their “Hoopla Elections,” parades and log cabins. Parties instilled patriotic nationalism as well as partisan difference, so a southerner could be both a Whig or Democrat and an American. Related to this broader theme is the central importance of Republican Party Slave Power, as opposed to abolitionist, attacks on the South. Southern claims of victimhood were responses to the Republican portrayal of slaveholders as an arrogant, expansionist, oligarchy. If left to themselves and certainly as Confederates, southerners stressed the opportunities of nationalism over its problems.
