In 2007 Vasileios Syros, a young scholar with exceptionally broad interests in the field of political theory and its history, published Die Rezeption der aristotelischen politischen Philosophie bei Marsilius von Padua, an intervention, firmly on the negative side, in the debate (engaged in fitfully by specialists over the last few decades) over whether Marsilius can rightly be classed as an “Aristotelian.” The present volume might be described as a companion to that one or, better, since it openly incorporates ideas and material from about seventy-five percent of it, as an Englishing and expansion of it. Where Rezeption was more single-minded in its focus on Marsilius's divergences from the Politics of Aristotle, Syros's new book tries to weave a much more variegated tapestry of sources and influences for the Paduan thinker. These include borrowings from other classical traditions—Platonic, Stoic, Ciceronian—and, strikingly, from protohumanist and non-Western ones as well. But I should be careful about the use of terms like “sources” and “influences” here, which suggest that Syros is a rather traditional historian of political ideas, albeit one with a knack for finding long-hidden intellectual linkages. The truth is that Syros tries, as much if not more, to be a comparative political theorist.
Comparative political theory is still a relatively new sort of academic inquiry, certainly in medieval studies. But in the two decades or so since Fred Dallmayr, in the pages of this journal (vol. 59, p. 421), could rightly describe the entire field as “nonexistent or at most fledgling and embryonic,” the notion of “dialogue” and of a dialogue specifically aimed at a Gadamerian Horizontverschmelzung has become a central motivation for the field. Throughout Syros's book there is an unspoken tension between history and theory that surfaces around his use of precisely this term, “dialogue,” to describe and defend his model (116). Syros the historian wants to reveal the hidden marks of Marsilius's actual dialogue with thinkers from ancient Western and wider Abrahamic traditions, but Syros the theorist wants to place Marsilius in an imaginary yet meaningful dialogue with them and their descendants. Syros the historian seems to want to collapse rather than fuse horizons, between Marsilius and his “sources,” but also between a highly selective subset of Marsilius's ideas and the entire tradition of political thought from antiquity to early modernity. The criticisms that I present below are criticisms of this Syros only, of Syros the historian of ideas, and before I present them I feel compelled to note in fairness that few scholars would be capable of the sort of detailed comparative work that is so dazzlingly on display in this book, and few scholars have read as widely and deeply in the primary and secondary sources of premodern Western and non-Western political thought.
Since Marsilius himself cites relatively few sources in the Defensor pacis, chief among them Aristotle, the Gospels, Peter Lombard, and a few Church Fathers, Syros casts a wide net for uncited ones, dragging in as his catch an often impressive array of echoes and similarities and possibilities. Let us take a closer look at one section of the book, “Rhetoric and the Genesis of Civil Life” (36–46), to get a feel for Syros's method. Syros explains here that Marsilius held the first civil communities to have been formed when the patresfamilias, persuaded by prudentes and without any coercion, came together in a majority. This reading mixes two passages, taking its substance from a snippet of 2.22.15, where the agreement of the valentior pars is brought about by the exhortations of the prudentes; and some of its terminology from 1.3.4, a complex passage where rule in the first community, the village (vicus), is said to be similar, in some but not all respects, to the rule of patresfamilias. Syros then suggests that three basic origins models are found in medieval and early modern thinking: the Aristotelian, involving a foundational lawgiver, the Ciceronian, involving mutual consent, and another Ciceronian one in which the earliest orators and heads of households worked in synergy. He traces the notion of the heroic founder through Aristotle, Al-Fārābī, and Aquinas, and then through Machiavelli, George of Trebizond, Gasparo Contarini, and Donato Giannotti; and he follows the Ciceronian threads through Duns Scotus, John of Paris, Engelbert of Admont, Giles of Rome, Thierry of Chartres, and Brunetto Latini. He concludes, after this ten-page succession of political thinkers, as we suspected all along, by noting what parts of “Cicero's account” Marsilius omitted and what parts he drew upon. But what are we meant to take from this? Syros has no evidence that Marsilius drew directly upon Cicero or any of these other sources—if there are echoes, they are faint ones—and he has none that any of the later authors were even aware of Marsilius's origins story, which is really only a few sentences (separated by 37 chapters) in a very large book. Of course, Syros's reading is possible and, I must admit, it is very interesting, but it is not much more than that. In many ways this section is representative of the whole of Syros's book, which elaborates disparate and meandering genealogies of political thought and plugs Marsilius into them, but there is one way in which it is not: in this section, Syros reads outside of the first dictio of the Defensor. In the book's first incarnation, Syros was more open about the limits of his investigation, describing it as an “Untersuchung zur ersten Diktion des Defensor pacis,” but here too, despite the broader title, he has little if any use for the Defensor's lengthier and more problematic second dictio or for the remarkable Defensor minor.
In stark contrast to the approach of Jeannine Quillet, George Garnett, and others, who have seen Marsilius as a providential and imperial thinker, deeply embedded in his historical context, Syros views him as a secularizing and republican philosopher, one who anticipates Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Syros describes his approach as “cross-cultural” and as putting Marsilius “in ‘conservation’ with” not only earlier and contemporary Western and Eastern traditions but with “representatives from … early modern political traditions” (115). Unfortunately, when he leaves the terra firma of Marsilius's Aristotelianism or lack thereof, Syros can only build his arguments on an airy scaffold of anachronistic parallels and tenuous links. Perhaps he betrays some discomfort with this when he speaks of himself as excavating “subterranean influence[s]” (4) and finding “intriguing affinities” (19). Or perhaps he is proud of having found something hidden away, and hidden away so well that this reviewer still cannot find it. One is left with the impression that Syros is interested less in what Marsilius's sources actually were, and more in aggrandizing and modernizing or classicizing (or, perhaps, just de-medievalizing) him; less in Marsilius himself and in his world than in the canonical thinkers who preceded and followed him. There is room for Campanella, Contarini, Christine de Pizan, Gemistus Pletho, Grotius, Guicciardini, Machiavelli, and many others in this slim book (the argument, without the often distended notes, runs to fewer than 100 pages), but the reader will look in vain for Peter Lombard, regularly cited by Marsilius, or, to take just one example, for the numerous civilians and canonists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries who dealt with the same subject matter as Marsilius and with whom there would surely be affinities and incongruities, and right on the surface.
I will leave judging the merits of this book's contribution to the field of comparative political theory to others, but as history of political thought it fails to live up to the talents and ambitions of its author.
