Mahr and Csibra (M&C) propose that autonoesis (being aware that one remembers a past event) as a core feature of episodic memory developed in order to equip people with epistemic authority in communication (i.e., being able to use the fact that one remembers as a claim to veridicality). Although I emphatically agree that social context is important for understanding episodic memory (and M&C provide a convincing analysis of episodic memory function in communicative contexts), I do not think that this communicative context has produced the crucial features of episodic memory (autonoesis and epistemic generativity, in M&C's analysis).
My main argument is that autonoesis can only grant epistemic authority (in one's own eyes and those of other people) if it reliably signals veridicality. There would be no point of having autonoetic awareness, and of using it within a communicative context, if “I remember” didn't mean a thing (e.g., I might “remember” then that I met the Queen yesterday, or went cross-country skiing in Finland, when I was actually working in my office). That is, communication crucially relies on autonoesis as a cue for veridicality – but is it plausible to suggest that communication led to the development of this signal in the first place (as M&C seem to do)? In my view, autonoesis and episodic memory as a whole have fundamental benefits outside any communicative context, mainly in terms of surviving and navigating in the environment. For example, accurately remembering places where food has been found or predators have been sighted previously will help an organism to survive, and remembering where exactly one has parked the car will save time on the way home. Of course, these things may be communicated to other people as well, but that doesn't affect the benefits. Also, whereas some of these benefits might be attained on the basis of mere factual knowledge (i.e., without autonoesis), this would be mainly restricted to situations where the environment is predictable and therefore an episodic record is not needed. As soon as contingencies vary or are unknown, an episodic record of the environment including autonoesis (“I'm sure I came past this building”) is helpful.
The idea that (correspondence to) reality is primary and communication secondary (as far as these terms make sense in a context where communication constitutes a large part of reality) is also reflected in a classical social psychological theory: Festinger's (Reference Festinger1954) social comparison theory. Applied to memory, this theory would emphasize a relation between autonoesis/veridicality and the social/communicative context that complements the justification relation highlighted by M&C. Specifically, rather than using autonoesis to claim epistemic authority in a communicative context, this context (i.e., other people) would be consulted as a source of evidence about reality whenever epistemic vigilance does not provide strong enough evidence to trust one's own episodic recollection (i.e., under conditions of uncertainty; for a review, see Blank et al. Reference Blank, Walther, Isemann, Nash and Ost2017).
That is, communication can inform beliefs about past events as much as autonoetic remembering can, each under respective circumstances. I have developed this view more systematically elsewhere (Blank Reference Blank2017). Essentially, and relating to the veridicality theme above, people need veridical beliefs about the past, and these depend on both the output of their individual memory systems and (perceived) reality constraints that can be inferred from general knowledge or communicated through other people. Note in this respect that the emphasis here is different from M&C. While I agree that there is a reciprocal relation between recollective experiences and beliefs about past events, I take the latter to be an integral part of remembering (i.e., arriving at – and often further communicating – a believed memory of a past event in a process of conversion; Blank Reference Blank2009; Tulving Reference Tulving1983a), not a mere inference from it. In fact, even the autonoetic experience itself is subject to external influence, as cases of induced false memories clearly illustrate (e.g., repeated visualization leading to ultimately “remembering” a suggested event; Hyman et al. Reference Hyman, Husband and Billings1995). Simple world knowledge can also provide constraints (e.g., making a mental simulation of floating in outer space unlikely to be interpreted as a memory for most people), but, on the other hand, the existence of non-believed memories (Mazzoni et al. Reference Mazzoni, Scoboria and Harvey2010) also demonstrates that autonoesis can occur independently from and sometimes in the face of external influence.
In any case, the foregoing illustrates that the reality monitoring involved in autonoesis is often an inferential process in which attributes of the recollective experience and external knowledge are combined (Johnson Reference Johnson1988; Johnson et al. Reference Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay1993; Lindsay Reference Lindsay and Roediger2008), which leads me to my final point. Although communication may not have shaped episodic memory as much in terms of reality monitoring and autonoesis (i.e., in terms of basic attributions to past reality), it may have played a more decisive role in source monitoring, that is, in attributions to particular social sources of information (mostly people but also media, etc.). Inasmuch as we consider input from other people to inform our beliefs about the past, being able to reliably identify the sources of this information is crucial for epistemic vigilance, such that greater (delegated) epistemic authority can be claimed for memories of past events that are informed by the testimony of credible others. Given that such testimony will mostly be obtained through communication, it seems very plausible that this function will have contributed to the development of such source monitoring processes.
Mahr and Csibra (M&C) propose that autonoesis (being aware that one remembers a past event) as a core feature of episodic memory developed in order to equip people with epistemic authority in communication (i.e., being able to use the fact that one remembers as a claim to veridicality). Although I emphatically agree that social context is important for understanding episodic memory (and M&C provide a convincing analysis of episodic memory function in communicative contexts), I do not think that this communicative context has produced the crucial features of episodic memory (autonoesis and epistemic generativity, in M&C's analysis).
My main argument is that autonoesis can only grant epistemic authority (in one's own eyes and those of other people) if it reliably signals veridicality. There would be no point of having autonoetic awareness, and of using it within a communicative context, if “I remember” didn't mean a thing (e.g., I might “remember” then that I met the Queen yesterday, or went cross-country skiing in Finland, when I was actually working in my office). That is, communication crucially relies on autonoesis as a cue for veridicality – but is it plausible to suggest that communication led to the development of this signal in the first place (as M&C seem to do)? In my view, autonoesis and episodic memory as a whole have fundamental benefits outside any communicative context, mainly in terms of surviving and navigating in the environment. For example, accurately remembering places where food has been found or predators have been sighted previously will help an organism to survive, and remembering where exactly one has parked the car will save time on the way home. Of course, these things may be communicated to other people as well, but that doesn't affect the benefits. Also, whereas some of these benefits might be attained on the basis of mere factual knowledge (i.e., without autonoesis), this would be mainly restricted to situations where the environment is predictable and therefore an episodic record is not needed. As soon as contingencies vary or are unknown, an episodic record of the environment including autonoesis (“I'm sure I came past this building”) is helpful.
The idea that (correspondence to) reality is primary and communication secondary (as far as these terms make sense in a context where communication constitutes a large part of reality) is also reflected in a classical social psychological theory: Festinger's (Reference Festinger1954) social comparison theory. Applied to memory, this theory would emphasize a relation between autonoesis/veridicality and the social/communicative context that complements the justification relation highlighted by M&C. Specifically, rather than using autonoesis to claim epistemic authority in a communicative context, this context (i.e., other people) would be consulted as a source of evidence about reality whenever epistemic vigilance does not provide strong enough evidence to trust one's own episodic recollection (i.e., under conditions of uncertainty; for a review, see Blank et al. Reference Blank, Walther, Isemann, Nash and Ost2017).
That is, communication can inform beliefs about past events as much as autonoetic remembering can, each under respective circumstances. I have developed this view more systematically elsewhere (Blank Reference Blank2017). Essentially, and relating to the veridicality theme above, people need veridical beliefs about the past, and these depend on both the output of their individual memory systems and (perceived) reality constraints that can be inferred from general knowledge or communicated through other people. Note in this respect that the emphasis here is different from M&C. While I agree that there is a reciprocal relation between recollective experiences and beliefs about past events, I take the latter to be an integral part of remembering (i.e., arriving at – and often further communicating – a believed memory of a past event in a process of conversion; Blank Reference Blank2009; Tulving Reference Tulving1983a), not a mere inference from it. In fact, even the autonoetic experience itself is subject to external influence, as cases of induced false memories clearly illustrate (e.g., repeated visualization leading to ultimately “remembering” a suggested event; Hyman et al. Reference Hyman, Husband and Billings1995). Simple world knowledge can also provide constraints (e.g., making a mental simulation of floating in outer space unlikely to be interpreted as a memory for most people), but, on the other hand, the existence of non-believed memories (Mazzoni et al. Reference Mazzoni, Scoboria and Harvey2010) also demonstrates that autonoesis can occur independently from and sometimes in the face of external influence.
In any case, the foregoing illustrates that the reality monitoring involved in autonoesis is often an inferential process in which attributes of the recollective experience and external knowledge are combined (Johnson Reference Johnson1988; Johnson et al. Reference Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay1993; Lindsay Reference Lindsay and Roediger2008), which leads me to my final point. Although communication may not have shaped episodic memory as much in terms of reality monitoring and autonoesis (i.e., in terms of basic attributions to past reality), it may have played a more decisive role in source monitoring, that is, in attributions to particular social sources of information (mostly people but also media, etc.). Inasmuch as we consider input from other people to inform our beliefs about the past, being able to reliably identify the sources of this information is crucial for epistemic vigilance, such that greater (delegated) epistemic authority can be claimed for memories of past events that are informed by the testimony of credible others. Given that such testimony will mostly be obtained through communication, it seems very plausible that this function will have contributed to the development of such source monitoring processes.