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The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Julien Dutant*
Affiliation:
University of Geneva
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Meno’s Thesis—the idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about it—is incompatible with the joint claims that (a) believing the truth is the sole source of the value of knowledge and (b) true belief and knowledge are equally successful in believing the truth. Recent answers to that so-called “swamping” problem reject either (a) or (b). This paper rejects Meno’s Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expected value and value proper. The proposed solution relies on an externalist view of rationality, which is presented.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012