Why should we manage migration? For centuries the movement of individuals and groups from one country to another or even from one continent to another seemed like an ‘act of God’. Poor harvests, political unrest, religious strife and perhaps sheer boredom made people leave home and stimulated them to find greener pastures elsewhere. Migration usually relieved the economic and religious tensions in the sending countries. In their new host countries migrants usually stimulated economic growth and intellectual life, since they moved to places, where the rewards for labour and the level of religious and political freedom were higher than at home. Thus, for centuries, migration has reduced the economic differences in the world, saved lives from sheer starvation and prevented or at least shortened political and religious civil wars.
In the past there have been multiple efforts to manage migration, but often to no avail. One of the most dramatic attempts at regulating the migration flows across the Atlantic was the institution of immigration quotas by the US government in 1920s. The number of immigrants from any country in any year should not exceed 2% of the size of the immigrant community from that country. In reality, however, this attempt at managing migration was hardly effective as the number of immigrants remained well below these quotas. After the First World War, the attraction of migrating from Europe to the US had declined as the economic opportunities at both sides of the Atlantic had evened out.
After the Second World War, North America remained a continent of immigration and, without realizing it, Europe became one. At first, Europe viewed migration in a favourable light. Part of the economic upswing after the Second World War in Western Europe was made possible by large numbers of migrant workers from the South. In addition, West Germany could profit from a constant influx of refugees from the German Democratic Republic until the Wall was built in 1961, while the shortages in the labour market of the former colonial powers in Europe were alleviated by migrants from the former colonies.
No wonder Europe viewed migration at the time as ‘a good thing’ as it did not only benefit the migrants, but also the sending as well as the receiving countries. There seemed no need to restrict it. Yet, reducing and even blocking the influx of migrants is what ‘managing migration’ in Europe is about these days. Each European country has legislated a set of intricate rules and regulations strictly limiting the inflow of migrants, and a common European border control agency (Frontex) has been set up in order to keep illegal migrants out. Admittedly, similar measures have been taken in North America, Australia and in many of the other traditional immigration countries, but only Europe seems set on making illegal immigration a punishable criminal offence. Elsewhere, the authorities turn a blind eye in view of the fact that illegal immigrants have become a substantial part of the labour supply and are vital to the economy. Why are European migration policies so different?
Europe is afraid of migration because of its expensive welfare state. Unsuccessful migrants are liable to become a drain on the public purse. As the benefits from the welfare state differ from country to country, there even exists a danger that migrants go shopping for higher social security payments rather than for higher wages. This happened when the UK joined the EU, allowing squatters living on welfare at home to move to the Netherlands in order to profit from the higher Dutch welfare payments. And, in spite of the recent economic downturn, Polish migrant workers in the UK did not return home as the unemployment benefits in the UK provide more buying power than does a job in Poland.
What applies to internal migrants in Europe also holds true for those wanting to migrate from outside. During the 1960s and 1970s sizeable numbers of Turkish and Moroccan unskilled migrant workers – some were even illiterate – settled permanently in Western Europe with their families in spite of the fact that their employment prospects had virtually disappeared. Again, not the labour market, but the benefits of the welfare state explain why this happened.
No wonder that the population in the wealthy part of Europe started to view migration as a threat rather than as a benefit to their economies and societies. However, Europe's population is ageing and many national labour markets are in need of immigrants. If migration is to continue, the mistakes from the past suggest that in future it should be handled differently. This volume shows how the ‘discourse’ regarding migration management has developed. Several of the 13 essays in this volume analyse the various ‘think tanks’ that conduct research into this field, such as the International Organization for Migration (IMO) and the Vienna-based International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Another essay concentrates on Mauretania as this country serves as a stop-over for migrants from tropical Africa planning illegal entry into the European Union. Migration does not only target the EU, as another essay discusses the position of migrants from Afghanistan who fled their country and moved to Iran and Pakistan. These migrants could also be labelled as refugees according to the Geneva treaty. During the early 1990s, Afghan migrants were welcomed in Iran and enjoyed several benefits, such as the opportunity to enter the labour market. After the lost war against Iraq and the subsequent economic downturn, however, Iran became less hospitable. Similarly, after 1990, Afghan migrants in Pakistan were ushered into an UNHCR repatriation programme, while they had been allowed to stay during the previous period.
Unfortunately, this collection has no concluding chapter. Instead, the final contribution deals with the policy of the US vis-à-vis the massive influx of migrants from Mexico. The authors point to the various changes in the US policy towards migrants from South of the border and to the role played by the transfer payments made by Mexican migrants working in the US to their home regions.
In spite of the wide array of topics, one topic is sadly missing: the effects of migration on the welfare state. Could it be that countries with the highest benefits stand to lose most from unmanaged immigration? That would explain why their populations are more opposed to immigration than people living in countries with a weak welfare state. And when this is the case, does that imply that migration and a highly developed welfare state are mutually exclusive? Should we reduce the level of solidarity in Europe – of which we are so proud – in order to benefit from immigration? We need to find an answer to these questions as Europe's ageing population is faced with a stark choice: more immigrants or economic decline.