The field of legislative politics is one that now has a rather rich history of digging for new or unique data to assess the merits of conventional wisdom or explore research questions that have appeared tangential in understanding institutions. Often, these forays ultimately tell us a great deal and have broad implications. Such is the case with these two texts. One is concerned with explaining how separate parties manage to work together, while the other is concerned with explaining how individuals within a single party manage to work together. In both cases, of course, there is also the story of what drives the two (sets of parties, or parties and their individual elected members) apart. By looking into these processes and behaviors, each book seeks to challenge conventional wisdom about the nature of parliament—its role (or presumed lack thereof) in affecting outcomes of government.
In Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics, Christopher Kam dutifully lays out the importance of studying party discipline and dissent by individual members, which is not simply to show how members behave and whether parties affect that behavior; it is also important to understand that members of parliamentary legislatures affect how votes result and which policies are passed—a nontrivial matter that often goes overlooked in these systems. Dissent, Kam claims, is destabilizing, and consent must be elicited. His synthesized model of individual behavior accounts for various frameworks by drawing upon rational, institutional, and sociological explanations, through which he constructs an explanation of how the behavior of members of parliament is based upon loyalty elicited through advancement, discipline, and socialization (LEADS).
Kam tells a particularly convincing story that, perhaps surprisingly, also tends to fit temporally with the acronym. Each of the three factors affecting dissent is likely present in some form at each stage of a parliamentary career, but advancement as an inducement for behavior is one that generally plays the biggest role early in one's career, discipline takes over where advancement as an inducement loses its power, and socialization plays the most significant role at the latter end of longer careers.
The author selects four Westminster-style parliaments for comparison—Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand—and uses primarily quantitative analysis at the party and individual level to provide satisfying responses to a number of research questions regarding how and why dissent occurs among parties, whether it affects electoral stability, and how it is relevant for governing. Anonymous interview data are used for illumination on particular points, but are not generally treated as a primary source of data.
The theory is clearly articulated, the approach is novel, and the results are illuminating. My impression is that Kam's work will interest and even surprise many scholars of these countries. As one who specializes in Canada, I found much here that challenges conventional wisdom about the case and that is exemplary of how new research agendas concerning members in parliamentary systems should be conducted. Kam's work will certainly become essential reading for anyone focused upon parliamentary systems.
My qualms with this book are few and minor. I personally dislike the use of “discipline” as meaning both “intentionally structured behavior” (or “cohesion”; p. 5, n. 3) and “punishment.” In a number of cases, use of the term punishment would have avoided this confusion. Loyalty, to me, is a part of what we call “party discipline,” rather than a result of “discipline” among other factors.
Further, as often happens where multiple cases are used to tell different parts of a story, I wondered at times if a particular case was the best one to fill a particular gap in the story, or whether the four-country comparison itself required that a given case receive its due attention. While it would be unfair to ask that the entire story be told fully through each case, there are sections on specific cases where it is unclear if the case can be effectively generalized to the remaining three. There are also places where a deeper qualitative explanation might have aided the analysis, such as in Chapter 4 where dissenters are those on the extreme margins of left-leaning or right-leaning parties, rather than those who share positions with opposing parties at a more central position. A deeper explanation of the contexts, such as the types of topics and whether the governing party is being supported by opposition parties, would have been helpful in assessing the results in these cases.
In Parliaments and Coalitions, Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg seek to more closely link both legislative studies and coalition theory. They aim to better understand the nature of a given coalition and how it interacts with legislative institutions to affect the behavior of parties in the legislative process. Their reason for this exploration is that previous studies have tended to give either one picture or the other, and that coalition formation and dissolution have formed the bookends of an understanding of coalition governance, with too little attention given to the ways in which coalitions affect the process in between. Their stated goal is to be predictive of the type of policy processes that we can/should see from coalitional arrangements, and to aid in the understanding of coalition buildup and breakdown based upon these expected processes.
Coalitions require a form of compromise and delegation that brings multiple entrenched interests together to govern effectively, yet coalitions also necessarily present the “dilemma of coalition government” (p. 13): that policymaking must be conducted jointly, while at the same time electoral accountability will be assessed to each political party separately. This forms the basis of studying the chosen five countries where coalition government has been the norm throughout the 1980s and 1990s: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Ireland. The authors distinguish the former three as being strong legislatures due to a range of factors, including their committee systems and legislative agenda control, whereas the latter two are comparatively weak in these factors. Consequently, in the latter two the executive is felt to have a greater role in governing. Martin and Vanberg spend much of the book examining the degree to which coalition partners use either executive institutions (such as “shadow” junior ministers) or legislative institutions (such as committees to scrutinize and amend legislation) in order to achieve preferred outcomes.
Ministers in such systems are constrained in their proposals due to the expectations of coalition partners. Yet ministers also have an informational and positional advantage that permits them to use proposals to engage in policy signaling and to favor their own party's policy positions. How do partners react when policies are potentially divisive? For the most part, they exploit the avenues that are most effective for relieving tension in the coalition while still attempting to achieve their preferences. In strong legislatures, this means greater use of legislative institutions as opposed to executive institutions.
Martin and Vanberg rely heavily upon quantitative approaches to analyze a range of hypotheses that are focused primarily upon the degree to which legislatures will scrutinize and amend legislation depending upon both the nature of the legislature and nature of the coalition. As a caveat for what is a rather effective analysis of the data, it should be noted that one might sometimes be unconvinced by the forms of measurement by proxy upon which Martin and Vanberg depend. While the links are logical, there are often questions as to their overall validity. As an example, the amount of time a bill spends in committee is considered a measure of scrutiny within committee. Of course, the link is a logical one, but time is also affected by the number of committees, the number of items, the size of the items, and the agenda control of the committee itself. These factors are not random across cases and do not always work to make the analysis a conservative one. Further, time is measured in days—not sitting days—which means that calendar breaks are included in the measurement.
Similarly, amendment of bills is measured by using the number of subarticles that have been added, subtracted, or changed from the original bill. Again, the link is logical, but it lacks any qualitative assessment of the value or importance of these amendments. A reader must wonder about the politics of subarticles—perhaps a fascinating study on its own—but has to assume that all subarticles balance out evenly in the end.
All this is not to detract from what is for the most part a very effective analysis, and one where the authors take great steps to be transparent in their methods and choices, often providing appendices to chapters to justify models and provide alternative analyses. Method is not taken lightly. However, the constraints of findings measures that are reliable across cases and the obvious issues of data availability present significant challenges, and overall Martin and Vanberg respond effectively to these challenges. The assessment of any method is ultimately not whether it follows a set of rules but whether it is convincing. I find the results convincing, but I also see significant space in which I could be better convinced of the same arguments, and my sense is that others might as well.
Martin and Vanberg rather effectively achieve their goal of challenging the conventional wisdom that parliaments play little role in policymaking in parliamentary democracies. To the degree that the study increases predictive ability regarding policy, my sense is that this book does much to indicate how processes of policymaking change due to both institutional and coalition structures, and that these important steps might potentially aid in the prediction of policy outcomes themselves.
What the authors accomplish in both of these carefully constructed manuscripts is a believable argument about the broader relevance of parliaments and parliamentarians, which has long been a blind spot across many of these systems. These two books complement each other well in covering Westminster and non-Westminster systems and in showing how the parliaments themselves are much more relevant to representative democracy than much recent scholarship recognizes.
