This volume is the second, after Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, edited by Jane Hathaway in 2002, in a series published by the Center of Turkish Studies at the University of Wisconsin. Opening with a typology-oriented introduction by the editor, Kemal H. Karpat, it includes fifteen contributions (arranged in a rather uninspiring chronological order), three maps, a lengthy bibliography, and an index.
Borderlands are everywhere. This has been the case for a while. Scholars, regardless of their field, have relished the conceptual toolbox that this multidimensional site provides for understanding a wide array of sociopolitical configurations—empires and nation-states alike. Indeed, this topic brings to the fore several perspectives and problems, such as the diplomacy of interstate interactions and the micropolitics of identity maintaining. Above all, it allows scholars to make a variety of approaches intersect so as to test the limits of our very disciplines and “studies.”
Ottoman Borderlands as a whole fulfills this polymathic ambition: it provides the reader with many fruitful inroads into an approach to the Ottoman state that questions “both the centralist approach, which ignores the borderlands, and the center-periphery scheme, which ignores the great variation of centers and borderlands which had their own ‘centers’” (p. 4). Meanwhile, this volume may constitute a handy yardstick to assess the degree of consensus prevailing in the field of Ottoman studies as to the “pragmatism and flexibility” (p. 177) that the Ottoman administration deployed in its various domains. Indeed, a number of authors phrase their analyses in terms that denote this historiographical drift: they put forth a “sharing of authority” (Gábor Ágoston on the Black Sea regions, p. 23), an “ambiguity” concerning legal statuses and idioms (Viorel Panaite on the tributary principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania, pp. 97, 103), “inconsistencies and inadequacies in the nomenclature” pointing to shifting institutional arrangements (Tom Sinclair on the various structures of Ottoman administration in the tribal principalities of the Lake Van region, p. 139), a “pragmatic and practical approach” (Mehmet Öz on Eastern and Southern Anatolia, p. 155), a “dilemma between the exigency of realpolitik and the ambitious Tanzimat reform policy” (Maurus Reinkowski on the Montenegrin border in Northern Albania, p. 240), or a “relational field of administrative ideals and local realities” (Isa Blumi on late 19th-century Albania and Yemen, p. 255). This being said, sifting through the various contributions in this book also leads us to acknowledge that “if we speak about Ottoman borderlands we must be aware that many different kinds did exist” (Reinkowski, p. 239).
One is thus led to tentatively distinguish between various perspectives. The first is that borderlands are contact zones allowing for a multisited comparative approach. Such a perspective, although not fully unfolded, underpins Armand Gosu's study of the anti-Napoleonic endeavors and jostling among the Russian and Ottoman top brass in the early 19th century. The same holds true for Erik Jan Zürcher's microprosopography of the Young Turks, as well as Mitat Çelikpala's scan of the North Caucasian intelligentsia networks in Prague, Istanbul, Paris, and Warsaw during the 1920–30s.
The second perspective is that borderlands are sets of “small-scale challenges” (Blumi, p. 256) that impose a necessary scale variation oscillating between local and global levels of interpretation. A case in point is Nagy Pienaru's study of Persian and Arabic chronicles concerning the late 14th-century crisis in Ottoman leadership in Anatolia, with a focus on the Black Sea regions. Another is Şevket Pamuk's dissection of the multilayered monetary system set up by the Ottomans in newly conquered European territories (16th–17th centuries).
The third perspective is that borderlands are “frontiers,” conjuring up echoes of Frederick Jackson Turner's “Significance of the Frontier in American History,” and (although explicit allusions to the “ghazi thesis” rarely occur in the book) of Paul Wittek's Rise of the Ottoman Empire. While studying Tursun Bey's chronicle, Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth, Kenan İnan focuses on its “pattern of panegyric,” which, its inconsistencies notwithstanding, aims to “present Bayezid II in conventional terms as a holy warrior” (pp. 108, 113). Rudi Matthee insightfully adds the dimension of “sacred geography” (p. 158) to the matter through an investigation into narratives of the “Iraq-i ʿArab” by Safavid historians; in so doing, he also touches upon terminological issues (what were the words used to define the Ottoman borderlands?), the absence of which elsewhere in the book one may bewail (p. 167). In addition, Yaşar Ocak provides a formidable synthesis on the plurality of Ottoman Islams although it is not strongly related to the topic of borderlands.
All in all, Ottoman Borderlands lives up to its heuristic ambition: never have “centralist” or center–periphery perspectives appeared hoarier. This does not mean, however, that doubts could not be raised as to the book's implicit premises. Indeed, the very notion of borderlands draws on a strictly topographical imagination, the main criterion of which is their spatial outlying location. By contrast, the notion of “core” (Kernraum) once put forth by Klaus Kreiser suggests that a more geopolitical understanding of the Ottoman universe would be much needed. Thus, while reading Ottoman Borderlands, one often wonders: if the areas under consideration had been elsewhere, in the inner parts of the “well-protected domains,” to what extent would the authors' conclusions have been different? In other words, what is specific to borderlands here that would not characterize many other Ottoman provinces? Indeed, what if borderlands were everywhere?
