At what point does a constitution begin existing? Constitutional theorists typically treat constitutional principles like Platonic ideas that exist autonomously of the people and that some exceptional leaders (founding fathers) translate into written laws that the people acknowledge as theirs. These theorists narrow the idea of a constitution to the work of experts in devising norms, which people then ratify by explicit or tacit consent. It is not necessary to resort to the model of a divine-like founder, like Lycurgus, to comply with this elitist idea. Indeed, the structure of constitutional politics we have inherited from the eighteenth century retains the Lycurgus model, albeit now vested in depersonalized norms and a juristic language. As Elizabeth Beaumont writes in The Civic Constitution, “To the extent that citizens or civic groups have a role in constitutional politics, that role often seems limited to voting for representatives or litigating in court” (p. 3). If this traditional view wants the constitution not to be an object of popular politics, it is because it identifies popular constitutionalism with “mob rule” and anti-institutional participation. Yet the history of constitution making presents us with quite a different narrative.
Relying upon theory and history, Beaumont reconstructs the intense controversies over the text and the precepts of the American Constitution during four eras of constitution making: the revolutionary path toward independence, with the intense debates on the role of the people and the meaning of self-government in the new republic; the drafting, ratification, and amendment to the U.S. Constitution, with the debates on the meanings of liberty and equality; the antislavery refounding, with the advancement of more inclusive notions of equality; and the suffragists’ movement, with its full acquisition of a democratic meaning of citizenship. Political liberty—the social conditions of liberty, equality, and political agency—are the constellations of what Beaumont defines as popular constitutionalism, whose protagonists are the civic founders, or ordinary citizens and would-be citizens.
These battles over the implications of norms and principles in the life of concrete men and women substantiated the formation of what we call today democratic citizenship. Beaumont acknowledges that historians, political theorists, and constitutionalists recognize the importance of political movements by activists, such as abolitionists and suffragists, in the construction of the American republic, yet they give too “little recognition” of their “profound importance for American constitutionalism” (p. 2). Emancipating civic founders from oblivion and regaining for them a place in cofounding, along with legal founders, is the valuable contribution of this excellent and rich work, which draws upon multiple disciplinary domains.
The meaning of Beaumont’s project is hugely relevant to students of democratic politics as it reconstructs the pragmatic connection of democracy and constitutionalism. It shows viva voce (through the narration of the actual events, protagonists, struggles, and discussions) how democracy is a form of constitutionalization of politics. Norms and principles are, as Beaumont quotes Aristotle, guides that political practice validates. Niccolò Machiavelli compared the buoni ordini (procedures and institutions) to the banks of a river, thus suggesting that devising them well entails allowing the political energy to flow orderly, not repressing or suffocating it. This makes the constitution a work by citizens participating within different functions: as leading magistrates, judges, politicians, journalists, and ordinary citizens. This pragmatic approach is a democratic answer to theories that deem the constitution a cage of norms to tame the irrational masses and their disruptive power. As Beaumont writes, “civic constitutionalism overlaps with the official legal Constitution” in a process of interpretation and adjustment that transforms the Constitution in a battlefield where citizens practice their liberty.
The U.S. Constitution was, since the beginning, the mirror through which various people represented themselves: as slaves who claimed to be part of “the people” and their emancipation a consistent expression of the Declaration of Independence; as poor landowners and manual workers who contested the system of credit in the name of a more substantive interpretation of equality; and as women who in the name of the republic’s ideal of participation fought against a narrow view of citizenship and an unjust deprivation of equal rights. In all of these cases, popular contestations opened the public sphere to ordinary citizens and the plurality of their views, thus shifting constitutional discourse from state institutions to public assemblies and the press, family circles, associations, and neighborhoods. Suffragists were, in this regard, the most advanced democratic leaders because they were conscious both of the legitimate content of their battle and of the democratic meaning of their political tactics. Beaumont quotes from Maud Malone: “It was in the broadest spirit of democracy that we went out into the streets inviting passersby to listen to our arguments and offer their objections and ask questions” (p. 199). What we call today democratic deliberation was the experience made by those movements in their conscious invention of forms of participations or reutilization of old ones: petitions, picketing, street speaking, open campaigning, and door-to-door activism to persuade and explain.
Popular constitutionalism is rational behavior that citizens devise in the attempt to make their claim supported by the public and win their cause. Democracy is never a solitary action as the individuals’ decision to act presumes and wants the support of the public. For this reason, it may clash against the established system of power, which may also appeal to the constitution in its effort to guard the citadel of the written norms. American movements of emancipation, Beaumont tells us, faced harsh repression by state officials. Thus, forms of civil disobedience proliferated among “civic founders,” first against the Britons and then against slave masters and male citizens.
As anticipated, Beaumont does not counter a top-down elitist constitutionalism with a bottom-up popular one. Rather, she wants to prove that the arena of constitutional politics overlaps with civic life, which “influences” the institutional and constitutional development. This seems to be too timid a claim and contradicted by the content and the spirit of her book, which is much more outspoken and radical in narrating the history of the democratic project as a work of civic constitutionalism, conditioning and even guiding the work of the jurists and political leaders. The latter were, after all, immersed in the civic culture that animated the process of interpretation, dissent, and emendation of the original constitutional text of 1791, when the Bill of Rights was officially ratified.
This history of “civic founders” reveals the double meaning of democracy: a form of government and a way to act politically. This speaks for the permanent tension animating democracy between the decision-making system (institutional realm) and informal world of opinion formation and expression. Beaumont offers us a remarkable body of documents that amend both the “originalist” views and the dualistic paradigm of ordinary politics and constitutional law (with the people as a periodic disrupting force). Recalling the myth of the Athenian founding in Plutarch, she argues that the U.S. Constitution resembles Theseus’s ship that the Athenian people succeeded in preserving by gradually replacing all of its planks so that some could claim that the “ship remained the same” and some could contend that “it was not the same” (p. 219). This pragmatic view of civic constitutionalism is the best answer to the alleged paradox of constitutionalism and democracy, of the tension between a system of fundamental law that limits political action and a political order in which citizens are supposed to give themselves laws.
The question arises at this point concerning what makes a group of citizens civic founders. Are all forms of participation aimed at changing the constitution “civic”? Is Jim Crow’s vision part of American popular constitutionalism? Beaumont answers in the negative because, she argues, the “separate but equal” logic would violate the principles of equality and freedom contemplated in the Declaration (pp. 223–24). Yet this is an intriguing issue. Once we start walking the walk of history and popular constitutionalism, we may encounter problems in excluding or admitting some movements instead of others, unless we endorse what I call a diarchic view of democracy. Constitutional democracy is a diarchic system in which “will” (by which I mean the right to vote and the procedures and institutions that regulate the making of authoritative decisions) and “political judgment” (by which I mean the extrainstitutional domain of political action) influence each other and cooperate without merging. Keeping together these two perspectives is the art of democratic politics. Criteria for judging derive from the principle of equal political liberty, which qualifies a constitutional democracy and demands to be expanded, not curtailed. This immanent normative argument is implied in Beaumont’s narrative, though not made clear and explicit.
For instance, in narrating the history of antislavery movements, Beaumont notes how “unfortunately” they “provoked strong reactions” and pro-slavery petitions, how they instigated “competing responses” (p. 77). Albeit unpleasant, this is not, however, “unfortunate” because the moment the public forum is opened to all participants, a plurality of ideas and movements are primed to emerge. If those on the right side were able to be strong and assertive in their views, it was also because they were pressed by their adversaries. Civic founders are not solitary fighters, and liberty does not necessarily entail good or desirable outcomes.
If we accept this conflictual view of democracy (as also popular constitutionalism entails), we cannot embrace a militant democracy and exclude adversaries ex ante. Certainly, the latter fight for an interpretation of the constitution that would narrow its principles, yet they contribute unpredictably to the making of a project that is open to an enrichment of the democratic principle. We learn from Beaumont that there is only one basic normative limit for a group of citizens to be civic founders: the preservation of the basic principles that define the democratic community. This is the core theory of her book. We may deduce it from the story she narrates, which makes democracy a permanent work of defense and adjustment, always facing the alternative of either admitting all critics (and risk the consequence of freedom) or predefining the spectrum of critical ideas or movements. If the Tea Party were to achieve amendment and repeal of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, “these changes could be seen as textual markers reflecting the initiation of a national transformation that would structure the powers of state and national government and their relation to the electorate” (p. 227). This makes the Tea Party not a civic founder, although it is free to exist and act. The political arena should be open enough to allow both “civic” and “uncivic” movements. When political judgment is included in the definition of democratic politics along with norms and rules, when we embrace consistently the idea of diarchy, the risks of unwanted changes become part of the self-emendation process, part of the history of popular constitutionalism.
Beaumont refuses to make constitutional principles a “matter of ‘metaphysical’ notions of human dignity” (p. 233) and proposes that we consider their relations to the “practical exercise of democratic capacities and participation” (p. 233)as criteria for judgment. This profession of immanentism is more consistent with democracy than is the top-down model. But to embrace the former thoroughly would require endorsing a view of democracy that is radically political and procedural, not identified with any desirable outcome, and nonperfectionist. Democracy as a process of making and changing decisions and opinions based on an equal share in power: this is an interpretation that accepts the risk coming from liberty, although it does not renounce judging which movements are and are not consistent with civic constitutionalism. The “rules of the game” perspective includes all as partisans of different (and somehow divergent) interpretations. It is up to democratic citizens to make sure that the more expansive views win and the constitution is interpreted in view of expanding, rather than narrowing, its principles. Including ordinary politics and conflicting opinions in the making of constitutional democracy entails making the citizens of each generation responsible guardians of their constitution, capable of understanding which domains ask for maintenance and adjustment, and risking doing so without limiting political liberty and the equal opportunity to participate.
