If you are interested in the question of why the Middle East failed to modernize economically while the West surged ahead, you must read Timur Kuran's The Long Divergence. Even if your interests are centered in comparative development in other regions of the world, you would gain insights into broader issues of institutional change, economic roles of law and religion, and how structural rigidities can cause unintended consequences. In recent years, the divergence between the West and the Middle East has obviously been at the core of numerous historical, political, and economic debates. Kuran contributes to these debates a systematic analysis of the deep causal mechanisms of why the Middle East experienced a reversal of fortune.
Kuran's basic argument is that although around the year 1,000 the Middle East and Western Europe looked very similar in technology, institutions, and living standards, a significant gap emerged in the eighteenth century because the Middle East was late to adopt key institutions of the modern economy. While the West adopted laws, regulations, and organizational forms that enabled impersonal exchange and the pooling of large amounts of capital under long-lasting private enterprises, the institutional complex of the Islamic Middle East, which had previously benefitted the economy, unintendedly produced rigidities that began to act as obstacles to organizational development.
The Long Divergence consists of fourteen chapters that are grouped under four parts. After introducing the puzzle that needs to be explained and the economic role of Islam in this analysis, Kuran examines in Part II the mechanisms responsible for organizational stagnation of the Middle East and how early institutional choices constrained later opportunities. These constraints include the drawbacks of the Islamic inheritance system, absence of the legal concept of the corporation, rigidities of the waqf system, and opposition to interest in credit transactions. Having established how traditional Islamic institutions inhibited economic modernization, Kuran turns in Part III to the logical extension of the argument to groups who could conduct business under different institutions, namely the question of whether foreign merchants or local Jews and Christians benefited economically from treaties or legal privileges that gave them the right to do business under their own institutions. Under Islam's distinct form of legal pluralism, non-Muslims were entitled to choice of law, which enabled them to conduct business outside the jurisdiction of the Islamic court system. As the West developed modern business institutions, Kuran argues, non-Muslim minorities had a major advantage in adopting these institutions and in forming alliances with westerners. The unintended consequence of Islamic legal pluralism was thus the ascent of region's religious minorities during western economic modernization. In ensuing chapters, Kuran similarly examines the origins of bilateral trade treaties, known as capitulations, which granted extraterritorial privileges to foreign merchants operating on Muslim lands. He shows how these treaties, known for the advantages they gave to foreign merchants, also had important positive effects on the Middle East, typically overlooked in traditional literature, by transplanting institutional innovations to the region and by promoting impersonal exchange. In the final chapter before conclusion, Kuran explores why Middle Eastern merchants did not develop associations in the West to support their commercial activities abroad. Although readers familiar with Kuran's recent work will recognize some of these arguments, they will also find the material to be completely restructured and coherently rewritten along with several chapters of new material. Typical of Kuran's other work, his new book is well-written with arguments that are carefully researched, tightly woven, and thoughtfully articulated.
The Long Divergence differs from most of the previous studies of the economic underdevelopment of the Middle East in explanatory depth, analytical basis, or ideological neutrality. Its primary objective is to analyze causes of divergence between the West and the Middle East, not simply to identify or compare differences in their long term trajectories of development. It probes further into the explanatory scheme by going beyond the apparent symptoms of the gap that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and studies at a deeper level the historical roots of institutional inefficiencies that caused observed differences. The analytical basis for the book's arguments is firmly rooted in recent developments in economics, history, political science, and other disciplines. Avoiding ad hoc suppositions based on unexamined correlations, Kuran analyzes historical evidence with sound social-scientific tools and concepts and constructs solid arguments that put the evidence into a coherent whole. By approaching religion from a neutral perspective, the book advances the debate about the economic role of Islam. Taking religion seriously but going beyond the sterile debate about the appropriateness of Islamic beliefs and attitudes for modernization, Kuran initiates a healthy discussion about the unintended consequences, evolutionary bottlenecks, and dynamic inefficiencies of Islamic institutions.
It would be too much to expect a project of this scope and magnitude to please everyone. Historians of particular regions or time periods may raise questions about specific sources or interpretations of evidence, but less so once they buy into the book's broader objective of understanding the long divergence as a whole. There are also limitations that would be expected to attract future studies. Prominent among those will be the analyses of auxiliary or even deeper causes, such as political economy constraints, which contributed to the long divergence. By explicitly downplaying the role of the state, Kuran limits the depth of explanatory framework to one level, because it leaves open the question of why institutional inefficiencies persisted for so long. Inefficiencies often survived because of political economy constraints (see, for example, Metin Coşgel, Thomas Miceli, and Jared Rubin, “The Political Economy of Mass Printing: Legitimacy, Revolt, and Technological Change in the Ottoman Empire.” University of Connecticut Working Paper).
Some of the basic arguments made in The Long Divergence require further support from systematic quantitative analyses. Although Kuran provides quantitative evidence (e.g., from seventeenth-century Istanbul courts) to support some of the claims, the book does not include quantitative analyses that are designed to test directly the empirical validity of some of the important arguments, such as the importance of inheritance laws for wealth accumulation, the operation of credit markets without banks, and the role of religious pluralism on the economic success of religious minorities. In fact, testing one of these arguments in a specific context, recent research has shown inheritance laws to have no affect on wealth accumulation (see Metin Coşgel and Bogac Ergene, “Intergenerational Wealth Accumulation and Dispersion in the Ottoman Empire: Observations from Eighteenth-Century Kastamonu.” European Review of Economic History 15, no. 2 [2011]: 255–76). Other studies would be required to confirm the generality of this result and to test the empirical validity of other arguments made in the book.
The Long Divergence is an excellent book that should be of great appeal to scholars interested in the Middle East and its history, economic historians interested in the general question of why some regions failed to modernize, and social scientists interested in the historical and institutional roots of comparative underdevelopment.
